(SANITIZED)GUIDED MISSILE PROJECTS AT PUTDLOVO USSR(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A001000270008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 29, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
COUNTRY USSR (Moscow Oblast)JGerrnany
Guided Missile, Projects at. Putmlovo
iT SR
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.B. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
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STATE S ARMY #X NAVY
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and one-half or two years of working along these lines, remote
control projeota (Fernlenkung) were segregated from the German
.This general summary deals with guided missile reconstruction
within the framework of the development program parried on by
the Rhein-Metal]. Borsig plant at Berlin-Marienfelde and in the
USSR. It deals with several types of rockets, ground-to-air,
air-to-air, and air-to-ground. This program was oonduoted
on a large scale, especially during the war. The Berlin-
Marienfelde plant was especially constructed for this purpose,
After the collapse of Germany] the German scientists were
obligated. by the terms of the capitulation to furnish technical
information on their-previous work. This included rockets,
guided missiles, glide bombs, radar-controlled air and ground
rockets, and controlled flakrookets.
The projects in the Soviet Union were
within this same framework of development. After about' one
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Great importance had been placed in Germany upon airborne
air-to-air rockets for fighting bomber formations. This project
was given number one priority in Germany during the last part
of the war. All other tasks had to be sidetracked-in favor
of this program. The whole project was moved to Rhein-Metall
Boraig range] including the automatic $F distance meter (range
finder) (Hoohi'requenzentfernungsmeeser and the proximity
fuse program (Zuenderlaufblattstellung). The fact that the
fuse of the rocket projectile exploded-automatically at the
most favorable distance is of great importance. In this re-
spect, Germany developed another system for greater ranges.
It was based upon the theory of fragmentation (Randsplitter)
and rocket.-bombs filled with mines (ssmall projectiles). in.
Germany it was generally understood that the incendiary frag-
mentation equipment could bring about decisive results in'ths
phase of the war at that time, but that it would not be a
permanent solution because.0 even at that time superior equipment
for planes,suoh as automatic fire-fighting equipment, was being
developed. It was expected that sooner or later countermeasures
for incendiary fragmentation equipment would-be developed by
the Allies. for this reaso% incendiary fragmentation.dould
only be effective for a rather short period of time. The
goal of Germany at that time was the destruction of B-29's.
Therefore, at the most1 the explosive charge had to be increased
by 30J. The next development in this line'involved the in-
sertion of small projectiles into the rocket bombs in place.
of incendiary fragmentation. This would have such an explosive
effect that even a B-2 bomber was rendered' incapable of con-
tinuing its flight., the eplosive was 400 grams 25X1
of tetramethylenetrinitram ne exogen) p :r projectile.
The projectiles had small inherently stable bodies which traveled
in the supersonic region. This opened up the road to success
in this project.
There were many different versions of this project in the USSR.
Some were shot toward the front, some toward the aide, etc..
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In the USSI, these projeots. were also. worked `on by a Soviet
counterpart... Different variations o do as lee) were
worked on in the Soviet Union
Th'ere'..wa.s one- who as range was around
1*200 meters and another whose range was approximately 1,600 -
2, 000 meters. The ?1, 600. - 2, 000 ureter mia Bile needed a much
larger power plant. The miisile"OF in the VSSR used
powder exclusively,',.
Another, prajectl _ .was ,the "i onja" (German code name),.
In German this means:"split". ;:The 9konja"is a small air-to-
ground rocket. It was a new development and was especially
designed for fighting tanks and armored vehicles. It was to
be used by low-speed aircraft (not over 300 km/h). It was
released in a power ;dive with relatively simple sighting
device. The rocket hold seven "mins" charges (miners geschosse).
When the rocket was rsleased~Oth9.;"mines" rotated slowly. The
"mines" had fins which were set Rat different angles. This
caused them to deviate from. the line of sight inn such. a manner
as to forma checkerboard patter. about'.the.target. By this
distribution of charges, the sighting errors and, flight dis-
orepanoies of the rockets were ;oompsnsated fort and it was hoped
.that at least one at the charges would hit. the target. These
projectiles were equipped,with,a hollow charge with a pene-
tration of 150 - .200.mm armor thiokrese. Those projectiles
were also equipped with an electrical detonator which was also
activated. through a pulse. gsnsretor during the fli ht. This
generator had been delivered some Years before.
the Soviets: insisted ari a rather .tight schedule for
this projectile. the Saviete.believed it to be
quite promising.. The utilization of this projectile, however,
would pose certain sighting: problems with a relatively fast
plane. Radar release of this projectile i8 impractical be-
cause there .is no ' specific' reflecting pointy in contrast to
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