MANAGEMENT, RESEARCH, AND WORKING CONDITIONS AT INSTITUTE 160, FRYAZINO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A001000280005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 11, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION.. 'REPORT
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
USSR.. (Mosco r Oblast)
Management,. Rese h- and Working.
,:,,Conditions at Institute 160, Fryazino
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.Q. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form Is prohibited.
REPORT
DATE:.,,DISTR.
NO. _ OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT,
'REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS' REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
ii May 1953
13
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GtTVFFtAL. COMMENTS ON SOVIET SCIENCE AND INMSTRYoeeeeoaa see oea0 7
Positive Factors Affecting Soviet Technic-al' rficiencyye s e a e r s e s,a n o e s 7
Negative Factors Affecting Soviet, Technical Efficiencye . a e a e o e o p. 7
Soviet Dependence on Fiectronir s' Dev iopments in the Waste e a a o a a a 0 a. 8
Campaign for Closer Soience-Industry Tiis o s e e a e a o o e a e a e a.e e`a a s e a a e o e a 9
WORKING CONDITIONS AT INST ITUrE -160 e o n a o a e 0 a p a.a,.o er a n a.a n e e-a. s a e .e , e. e U
Salaries and'Wages?.y~a~anaaeoeaoooooaao.e, a.aoaoaeaoeooooee.ooaa.oaes,e.ea 11..
Controls over Employment Mobilityoa,,,,,000040eoeeoo0..a.. eesaaoa-12
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Institute :160, :located at the. workers" settlement of yazino.
ne Moscow, was engaged in the development and production
of ~;' ~+freque oy vacuum tubes. An enterprise of the Ministry
o ommunications Equipment (MCEI), it was directly supervised
the 3 tion-for Vacuum Techniques within that
m ai:~tx ,~ Other administrative units within this ministry
nclu ed. ,tic'n for. t~leretri-oal tarts under the
c irect ion of a certain TAWW, a t i~' dte l e.tioa 25X1
for tale 1s on, d, a d a , ~ for guided Niv eile;.
4teerin techniques. The e xiste e of the last twc mom'
assumption based. on the .25X1
knowledge that German specialists 7- I.
in ese ields of endeavor
were der.the supervision of the MCEI.
e ahd a Pryazino in 1946, the' MCEI the Radar 25X1
committey, nistry engaged in the construction of
large `;e1 tricaligeteratoreWand power, transmission Syretema
were separate, entities. These three . rganisations were merged
i:nta ;ox a .. i istry,, same"time . in 1947 and 1948. ' Therefore, there
must also be several etioh within the MOEX
oa ee xae ri th :the ,`p oduction of electrical, generators and
a er tra s issi'o 'systems.
Aoft tf' tee 160 u a8ee ectly' uperv :ee&. by the
n 't t y e, wan 'no intermediate` super'.
'
ques.. They
vi ?ory;' geno .' I tasmuoh. as the. Chief Engineer of the
tian was ~ the .ministerial official most directly
concerned. with`'.operatione ate .Institute 160 relations be-,,
tween- the. Tnatitute and the 'ministry were 'largely doterii. ed
by the,pereonal,ity- of the,-individual occupying this poet. 25X1
in . l four, persons occupied the position of hie f Engineer .
at' Fryezino; in chronolog ical. order;
a third person
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d , for erlydhief'Iigineer at Institute .160.
Institute' 160 . cone3s ted of two-major divisions, the researob
.institute proper engaged in the development. of v aouum tubed,
and-`the plant v h oh~ produo6d these tubes on a serial basis. '
T'he +ie f Director of Institute 160 was overall . supervisor
of operations`' there. His main assistants were the chief,
engineer, who dir eotly supervised the operation of the pro..
duoti'on ~ plant, and the acientifio -aireotorr who was in oh0ge
of the:research institute: , The 8rusiness airector (4er
aMetanisohe a ?.ter) and , the personnel a; hie '. of tai'"
. .
ns uEe repot a rectly to the Chief ireotor and were
responsible f or a.btivities, in both the research institute
and the plant. Although the personnel Chid' and his ?s.eotion
were ' evi dentl under, the administrative control of the chief.
.reotor~ lot t e ,nstitute, they, were under the 'functional,
of : Qoi'Liro :6.f `the. MVO.
mi,ly, the.4siness Aireotor and his d apartment were'
under :the. funot of of the Ministry of Finance..
1'h'sarteut call it a Reohnungeabteilung in 25X1
term?
01 ~.*As res no ible or all finan oi' he
net .tu e. That nietry of .Finance also supervised all
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ponstructlon work at Institute 160 as well as its transporta-
tion pool.
' 1ah..in& Pro cedures
6
The research institute was divided into sections consisting
of two to four laf-.,;,ratories; laboT',tories made up of two to
four groups a and g oups usually consisting of a senioi*
engineer, three four assistant angineersand a large
..umber' of technic ;; ans . The original annual plan for the
O..rystal Detector Laboratory was drawn up in about August of
each yearp The institute had already received orders from
the MCi I,, usually originating with military agencies., which
predetermined the general outline of the work each labora
tort' was expected to carry out. At this time, the Tabora-
.tory chief called together two or three of his best engineers
and together they d rew up the. annual plan. This plan was-
reviewed and approved by the section leader, the Scientific
Director, and, finally, the Chief. Director of the institute.
It was seldom altered by these. deliberations.
The plan was incorporated. in the institute's over-all annual
plan and was forwarded istry for action and axi-
proyal g
C) a y rew up the
.plans for the entire institute during this. period.
It is noteworthy that plans drawn up by a section chief always
contained a certain margin of error for him. He allotted more
time for the compl.etion of individual projects than was actu-
ally necessary. In this way a eection c1,1f
z
l
Incidentally-1 there w few qua"fied. Soviet personnel at
Institute 160 du ri n early ea, there . As a result,
mra.tc Or. ;-" ever l1
e was a
ways able
to report that '
projects under his supervision were completed'"
ahead of schedule or, if anything went wrong, were at least
completed on time. However, the plans issued to individual
engineers were not the ss:- me as drawn up and reported by the
section chief. Time schedules for projects assigned to
individuals conformed to realistic estimates, whereas the
same projects contained in plans on the section level. were
based on inflated estimates of time required.
10, Control of plan Az Ifilime:t within the institute was
primarily carried out by-means of monthly reports which
section and laboratory chiefs were required to submit to
their superiors. Political advisors in sections and labo-
ratories, the zamnachalnjki and dispechery, apparently were
also held re spbf6'i'6l:e Tor``checki "up "on?" The . fulfillment of
~`
r am ng Office had any direct plan-control functions.
eeearch Plans,.either the Party C ommittee at the institute,
nor .the i
.
_ _
__
__ __ a v?L i 1:11 U11UJ- J..1d.L U417jujZ' -
ion on this point Z
Activities of Parer 0omm,i.ttee
110 The conducting of meetings on the laboratory, section,and
institute levels for the purpose of discussing both political
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topics and institute affairs was the primary function of the
local, Party Committee.' Institute-wide meetings-began at 1700
hour4 (ane-,half hour before the end ' of the work day) and some-
times le.sted,as long as three hours. Apparently all Soviet
.workers and employees were required to attend these meetings,
as only theerman specialists were allowed to leave the
institute?grt nds on such occasions. The content of.the
.meetings and th manner in which they were conducted were all
but unknown as German specialists were not allowed to 25X1
attend them. rently some workers were influenced by these
lectures as they discussed in the laboratory the following day
political topics which had been presented there.
12, The Party Committee was also wholly or partially responsible
for conducting political courses production improvement cam-
Faignns, and State loan drives. it is possible that the Zavkor
also played.a role in the latter two activities. It was
difficult to determine Which of the.two. organizations had
primary responsibility, as directives regarding such matters
were issued over the signature of the institute dii"eotor, the
Party $ eoretary, and the chairman of the Z;avko.m.
13. Production improvement campaigns had little effect on our
research activities. In one campaign, research engineers
and technicians were encouraged to submit suggestions cones-.
oerning technical innovations. Even in such matters, it
appeared that each laboratory had its norm to fulfill and was
required to submit a certain number of suggestions. However
these demands were not too difficult to meet. It was a simple
matter to lift an idea out of an American technical journal, to
point up its applicability to Soviet conditions, and to submit
this as a suggestion.
14. The Party committee evidently had little influence in mana
gerial matters except in the question. of establishing fines
and other disciplinary measures. These questions were evi-,
dently decided by the Party Committee and not by the 2avkom,t
The Zavkom enjoyed far less prestige and influences at
Institute 160 than the Party Committee. The former committee,
was considered important only in matters referring to annual
and sick leave. .
15.E Only a relatively small percentage of the Soviet engineers
and workers at Institute 160 were members of the Communist
Party, As is true in all other countries, Soviet scientists
.and engineers were little interested in politics. Even
many Soviet engineers in leading positions at Institute 160
were not Party members. However, if he aspired to become
head of an institute or to occupy a post of similar responsI-
bility,,it was certainly necessary for an individual to be a
Party member. It was also true that a Party member would
always be given the nod for a particular job if he possessed
technical qualifications equal to his nearest competitor who
was not a member of the 'Party. . Furthermore, a few Soviets
at the institute utilized their Party membership to obtain
positions beyond their technical capacity. However, they
were quickly relieved, if necessary, by`non-Party members,
if they could not meet the requirements of the job.
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-MGB Offices and Activities
16? In referring to the Soviet security police, the Soviet employees
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17. There were several MV]) offices at Institute 160. First, it
? was evident that the personnel chief as welly as the entire . .
.personnel section cane under the Jurisdiction of the MVD.
This office was responsible for the security of the institute
Gxcept for documents;, as well es for some personnel duties, it
certainly maintained detailed dossiers on all personnel..Other
personnel functions, the calculation and distribution of pay-
tolls, came. under the authority of the iustitute.t s usiness
-ireotor.
18. It is interesting to note that the P-ersonnel !phi. d
a` group of German s eciaL.ists 25X1
IHe personally travelled with
personnel files and presumably turned them over to some .office:
in Berlin. He was also present at the Berlin Oberspreewerk
when these German epedialista were interviewed therefor jobs,,
19# In addition, there must have been, exi M D office which super
vised the activities of informer networks within the, institute,
However., this office was evidently independent of the personnel
section and probably functioned independently of the entire
institute. German informers reported to Soviet 25X1
agents who operated somewhere outeide, of Institute 160.
20,E Finally, the institute's Consultation affioe ~ 'ter uuxi b ero ,
which was supposed to provide services for the, erman speo, ' ate,
was also an M office, apparently subordinate to the Personnel
Chief. Indicative of this chain of command was the fact that
when a' German specialist unsuccessfully lodged a complaint with.
the gonsultation r,~ffice, the next higher place of appeal was y
the chief of the Y,ersnnnel eotionp
21. It was the primary function of the consultation offioe to
'aoo?rnpsn, German specialists when th ,q went on eight
or shonning t, urs to ' 'b i t .,no.
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at Pryatino 0 allowed to travel alone to,
probably beoauso of a shcr tage of, perso:nel. Later,
re uired to travel with a and when on such trips.
The consultation of fioe also is suoration 'oards to the
German sped'iali its prior to the currency reform, ordered
tickets for cultural aotivities in. Moaoow,and performed other
minor services.
A political advisor was assip ned' to almost every , s eotion or
large laboratory. These employees were oalleA samna,chalnik
deputy chic f') when assigned to a section andi~%%oa.er
dispatcher) when assigned to a laboratory. Tee 3n':.vi..
duals had very little understandin g of technical prob; ~,me
and simply carried out minor administrative duties. T.heychecked attendance, calculated percentages of plan fulfill
?ment,'et cetera. They also reported to their superiors
when morale was low in their ?sections and noted sources of
dissatisfaction. However, they primarily served as politios,],
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?`r~i," f ! it I
it 1 1:
commissars,?' In. all like)ih' r;'d, their main function was to
spy up?to observe th.i ac Q;vities and conversations of,
other employees in an efforE weed out political unreliables.
In e-w .th their political i tes,. they were also required
to hold br.e -pica1 leettare,; after wotk.ng hours. These
.lectures were anyth inspiaing, as they consisted of
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nothing more than a verbal r
on of the latest Pravda
editorial. Most of these men wed 'upid for more
ambitious efforts.
23. The' control .a? .p1 ulfillment apparently fell within
rangy as, although such activities on their part were
x~?r~t conspicuously significant. They simply collected monthly
reports, from individual engineers and calculated percentages'
of plan fulfillment.
24. These individuals moot likely were MVD agents, although it
e. possib~ that the posit, one were filled by Party function-
aries. -1t is Worthy of tote that one zannaohalnik aooompaniea
our group back to Germany, a task normally assigned only to-
MVV employees. Furthermore, the amnaohalniki associated
closely with the Personnel Chief of the in ittute..
25. Section 1,, the security section was responsible for safe-
guarding classified documents at Institute 160.,. In all likeli-
hood, this office was under the.jurisdiotion of the MOEI,al.
though it is possible that it too was controlled by the MVD?
26R . German specialists were denied access to some classified
documents at Institute 160,whioh presumably reported on
research work carried out in the field of electronics else-
where in the Soviet Unto
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oviet.research workers were not encouraged to oommunioute'
with one another and facilities providing for the exchange
of information were limited. Even within Institute 160,
not all Soviet research workers were allowed free access to
all sections in the "institute. Furthermore, the German'
specialists would have undoubtedly received second-hand in
formation regarding classified documents if they were widely,
circulated among the Soviet specialists at the institttt,e..
27. Police controls at Institute 160 had no apparent direct.
effect on operations there. However' the police-State
system produced some- strong, indireo ,negative effects..
First, ,it encouraged Soviet engineers, and scientists to
avoid responsibility, to "pass the buck"., And,seoondly,. it?
discouraged them from undertaking projects which could
possibly fa-11o.
98. The explanation is quite simple. Soviet technicians feared",
failure.above all, as an unsuccessful project could easily
result in a lose of job and statue or even arrest as a
.saboteur, It was almost amusing to.observe Soviet scientists..
or engineers discussing for.days on end the pros and'oons
and"ins and outs" of a project. They wanted to be very
sure of themselves;. And even after these hours of talk, .
they would often fail to reach a decision,among'themselvee
but would settle the matter by referring to a precedent,
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described in an American technical journal. In such cases,
they eagerly accepted American practices as a defense against
dir ct personal responsibility in the e vent that things went
wrong.
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GENERAI- COMONTS ON SOVIET SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY
y...
ositive Factors Affeoting Soviet Technical Efficienc
29.
there are several features of Soviet research
efficiency. First, the Soviet Government has developed a,
system to force people to work and to work hard. The average
and industry which have a positive effect on its over-all-
is innately lazy
and not prone 'ta
,
hard,-work but the ovtet authorities have met this problem
witli :I3raconian,measures. They force workers to be present
at work at the required hours by meeting infractions with,
harsh punishment. Soviet workers are forced-to work hard
.
by means of the incentive-forming norm systeia. And, finally,
they are kept working by continual propaganda calling for
increased and better production efforts.
30?. The Soviet Government's thrifty policy of conserving Its
own natural. resources is another positive factor in Soviet
industry. Soviet authorities think twice before exporting.
raw materials abroad which might be needed by their own
industries in two years or so? They prefer to impart raw
materials 'at relatively high prices rather than reduce their.
own natural resouroes.
31, A further positive side of Soviet industry (although probably
not affecting efficiency) is. the virtual absence of unemploy.
meat in the Soviet Union, Full employment-and the numerous.'
activities which fill the none=working hours of-Soviet`workers
engage their attention and resources to such an extent as to
hinder the development of dm
gerous political ideas.
Ne ative Factors.Affectin Soviet Technical Efficienc
32.. Soviet planning procedures have negative as well as positive'
effects on industrial efficiency. One striking feature of
Soviet planning methods is the fact that quantity and not
cost was the factor which determined the production of
strategically-important industrial products. Once-Soviet
planners established that it was necessary to produce,-for
.example, 100,000 vacuum tubes per year, this number was
produced no matter what the'cost may have been. This policy
had both obvious advantages and disadvantages. One die
advantage was the w aste of man-power which, resulted from it,.'
33. The poorly functioning distribution system of Soviet
industry was both an example and a cause of inefficiency.
The most casual foreign observer in the SovJst'Union'quickly
noted that consumer goods, for example,matches, might be
plentiful in eve%;,' shop for a period of ten months and then,
inexplicably, were nowhere to be found. :Soviet industry
faced'the same problem in procuring raw materials and un
finished products. This problem was caused by faulty distri-
bution.due to"misplenning. The parts which were needed for
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rapid industrialization would be faced with this problem.
there was a greater shortage of skilled workers 25X1
n, the Moscow area than in Leningrad. Leningrad possessed
a pool of skilled workers, who had a professional tradition'
of several generations' standing,
Soviet Dependence on Electronics Developments in the hest
35. I.nformati on < contained in American and British teehnie l
journals was of decisive importance in the development of
the Soviet electronics industry, No Soviet scientist has'
put f 'th any work in the field of electronics which can be .
characterized as real research. Their activities have been
almost entirely limited to copying or improving prototypes'
produced in the United States and Western European countriea;r
36. All American and British technical journals were available
at. Institute 160, both in the institute''s library and in
the.Moscow library All American 25X1
scientific and tec n ca ourna s were available, even
_pular Mechani2~. It is noteworthy that Poula Mechanics
and. Po ullaar Science were not on, hand in these libraries duZ-?
.ng Ta few years at Pryyazino.: .:These ... 25X1
publications were probably withdrawn because they h bled
Soviet readers to compare their living conditions with those
in the United States., At any rate, it was certainly true
that they were the two American magazines most sought out
by,Soviet employees of Institute 160. It is also logical
to"assume"" that their interest in American life was the
primary reason for reading these magazines as the technical,
knowledge contained in them was of negligible impportance.
.It-is also interesting to note that any editorials as well
as the biographies of Soviit -born or Soviet :--educated
contributors had bey, deleted from the purely scientific
American .journals prior to their appearance in the institute's
library,
37. No.Amer,ican journals were available for a period of three
months in 1951. The normal flow of these publications
resumed after this brief lapse. It was generally assumed
by German specialists at Institute 160 that the United States
Government had hindered the procurement of these publications
by Soviet agencies during this period,
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`a particular production may have already been produced but.
they lay gathering dust in a warehouse and never arrived at
the spot where they were needed. This compelled many industri-
al enterprises to strive for self-sufficiency, which in turn
"bred further inefficiency.
34. Another important problem affecting industrial efficiency
was a distinct shortage of skilled workers and engineers in
the Soviet Union. Any country going through a period of
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the Soviet readers of these scientific Journals 25X1
were not i uenced in any way other than by the techniaal
knowledge which they obtained from them. These individuals
undoubtedly recognized that,if it were necessary to obtain
information regarding technical developments in the United
States, Amer'?a? - gy was leading in the field of 25X1
elect4onics. doubt if this factor increased their
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admiration of the United States or strengthened any feeling
regarding the universality of science and men of science,,
39... It is doubtful that the Soviet electronics industry based its
operations on-.formation received from covert intelligence
sources in the United States.
a e eve oilmen raasistors was the most important
American contribution to electronics in recent years. One
day, a Soviet engineer at Institute 160 approached with
the first American publication of this development
u e y was an extremely imporitant innovation n. e':.''..
field of electronics, the.Sovie t engineer submitted aa'appli-
cation to the MOEI requesting permission to carry out research
in this field. Institute 160 received not only approval of
this request from the ministry but an order to begin such
work as soon as possible. 1 . Here, the initiative came, from an
individual reading an overt publication and'not from any
intelligence source.
Campaign for Closer Science-Industry.Ties
40. ,A campaign to promote the more rapid application of ecientifie
discoveries to industrial purposes was the ob ect of-much talk
at Institute 160o, F
Soviet scientists
e emse ves to be hindered by such measures.
41. As a Possible explanation of this policy,
L ___]the Soviet Government realized that 8overt scientists
were bringing forth few new ideas in comparison with Ameri~oan
scientists. It is entirely possible that. Soviet. scientist's;,
in attempting to defend themselves, introduced the.idea
that the practical application of their ideas and nqt the
paucity of their discoveries was to blame for the relative,
baokwardness.of Soviet science.
Canabilities'of Soviet Electrical Engineers
42. the shortage of trained personnel,. both
soien ists and.engineers, was the primary limitation on the,
further development of the Soviet electronics industry.. In
particular, there wasa great shortage of engineers in the
age group of 35 to 45; engineers'who had the necessary
experience to supervise the efforts of younger colleagues..
Furthermore, there were hardly any engineers from 28 to
35 years of age at Institute 160. War losses were probably
to. blame for this situation.
4'3. On the other hand, a large number of electrical engineers
up to the age of 28 were graduating from Soviet universities
and educational institutes in recent years. There were some
ver. 'intelli,ggent and gifted specialists in this age group
employed at'"Tnstitute 160.,'Engineering was one profession
favored with relatively good wages in'the SovietUnion,,a
faotor'whieh attracted many gifted-students to this field.
44. the Soviet electronics industry will no longer
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Even more indicative is the feat
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be -CCffrx'onted by this personnF 1 bl
ea pro em aiter tern years or
,save, passed and this
n
ew generation has acquirwd the,
xeeaees experience, it is quite possible that the Soviet
electro os industry might then possess th
engines in the world. e finest grpup flf
4l The c iet eduoetion syste
with m provided engineering s.tud,eats
;aot,. Soviet engineers on the whole were better mathematicians
than Gerza " engineers with similar educations,l baokg-ciunde.
Cel.lernoe in mathemati?.a was the most f avorabIs aharaoteristicof Soviet prefereioax
n
engi
eers
.
4'6? . However, Soviet awriree-ra leslr'?A .t--
--
P ysios and, "general engineerin~,go.~ a?3'haa~K+e~eir engineering treini
wars too highly epeoialiaed
T
i
.
h
s was their mostis
serou drawback] as the- various engineering epeoialities rregtly,
Overlapped in practice..:iraotieal work does not eon1 ors to
the ' rather'arbitrary categories .defined by eduoati onal
institutions. For example, the Soviet special'ists. in klyi
txons. at I tit ite? 160 were unable to .handle any problem
involving the use of measuri
i
t
m
ng
ns
ru
ents but bad to Dll
o in a radio expert from- Moscow to deal with thief matter. It-
is t aken for-granted in Germany that a klyetron specialist
knows enough about measuring instruments to deal with the
problem..hfmself., One can draw an- apt parallel with the
Soviet medoal education systemo. Medical training there
was highly spe.oi:alized and most Soviet doctors were specia~-
-iota of one sort or another. As a result, it. was' imp?ssibie'
to find a good diagnostician who - was able to - refer you-to,;
the correct mpeciial i st
4' XMM$r,. fa
pecifio ,information conoernin tba
which 'S.talin; Prizes were awarded. loweveri- 1, # 'Cxrtereet..
lug to, notee that,. on -two. separate - oeoasio ,
and. teohn ;oio were ' rk en,gir ee
granted telin a der work 25X1
performed. , In one case, the Soviet dirfttor'
as well :as ,.the. Soviet engineer who handled. the : eo io
(as : oppoe,ed to the the 1 side of `the :problem reoehwed. 25X1
Stalin, Prizes for orystal.r eotifier' d6teot.ore..
IMUMVp the laboratory director,..,reoeived the .largest. -
In -addition to this monetary bonus, he was grante4 a 'r-oe#,~a
iu .arime.a or the Caucasus fc~r 'hi rnn elf and, t oxtty*
25X1
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?53? T`his bonus system did not bring about more efficient opera
AT .
additio,al task. In recent 'yearn these contracts
were genera' .
ally'awarded,only when special priority projects were received
from the ministry which had to be completed in a oerta
specified time.
,.51. German employees at Institute 160 seldom 're?eived bo4ussS.
They were frequently distributed to Soviet - engineers, but
generally only to laboratory chiefs and. to persons o0 cupying
positions of greater responsibility. These leading personnel
received bonuses every, month Which, on the avera e - ;amounted' ,
30 percent to 50 per cent of their basic monthly,ealariee.
52? Bonuses were distributed when the various, laboratories and
sections completed research or production plans on time or
ahead of schedule.. A stipulated amount, of money was presumably,
met aside for bonus payments in the contract drawn up between
Institute 160 'and the. MCEI,whioh originally set forth the planned pro jest, This money was released. as the various.etagee,
within the.projeot were completed on time.
curreno reform, when prices were high. An engineer simply
approached his.section chief, asked'for and was granted such
a special assignment. The only effort required was to put his,
signature to a contract pledging himself to parr out' an
ever this was not always the case in reality. It was quite
possible for an engineer to accomplish his naryad work as
,well as'his normal work within the customary-hours of work.
50. ITarZad assignments were very easy to obtain before the
.- - w--- -- - .. r,_ . . - wr r To , ++wpw.
applied only to work over and above a monthly.quota ` o
49? In addition to their normal salaries, both Soviet and 'German
engineers at Institv%(._ 160 were occasionally allowed to work
according to a form of contract work (A kordarbe-it , referred
to in Russian as ?'' arIad'-, Engineers were occasionally Able
to earn in this manner an additional' amount of money equivalent
to.50 per cent of their monthly salaries. These contracts and,
the additional pay involved were theoretically granted only
when the oontra'otee carried out a special project in addition
N.A .64- - - -
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_11-
WORKING CONDITIONS AT INSTITUTE 160
Salaries and Wages
- -
,w _ __ ~.i --....... ~. .-~~ ~...ww ? rw~w wr ~w rhii YiAf~
..'
institute to draw up plans in such a way_as, to guarantee
more efficiently if the amount of money set aside for?bonusee,
had been included in basic salaries and if the - ministry it
self had drawn up sensible plans corresponding to , . the time
actually required for their completion. ,
54.. The basic salaries of engineers, research scientists, and
other res
onsible
l
p
personne
were determined according to t
.wo
criteria; the position occupied by an individuals and the'
academic degree which he held. Although engineers in lead-
ing administrative positions received higher salaries than
other engineers with the same academic degree, salary differ-
ences. were mainly determined by academic standing
A Soviet
.
engineer, who held the degree of'ka~ondidat, received a higher
salary than the section chief who euperv sed him if the
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section chief had a lower degree. However, there were.. some
Soviet engineers at Institute 160 who were employed under
special ~oonaitions . These individuals, because of. 4h-e'i
unusual experience or abilities, were paid salaries' normall,given only to persons having higher academic titles,
55s The chief director of Institute 160 received a `basic salary
of 61000rubles per ,month,, It was rumored that bonuses
which he received added another 4000 rubles to this 'sump,
The chief engineer and the scientific director of the;.
institute were paid a-pproximately'the same salary. Engineers
with the degree. of ddat were paid basic safariea xat i
from 3,,000 to 4,000 rubles per month,, depending on their ate
and experience, A laboratory 'chief with the degree of -
per ' mon hs An asQirant, who did not hold a Job c alling for
aoministrativ,e' responsibilities probably received from 1$00
to' 2,000 rubles per month as a basic salary. An engineer..
without a. higher. academic degree and administrative res-
ponsibilities was paid a -basic salary of about 1#200, rubles
per month,
Controls Over Emplorm.ent Mobility
56,. Recent university graduates 'employed at' Institute 160 were
required to work fora stipulated peri~ me at-blace'i
of em to ent designated b the MCEI
their wishes to plants in Novosibirsk and Tashkext. Further.
more, many engineers who wished. to transfer to another plane
4f employment were unable to do so. They presulmably were
,required to submit an application for transfer?to the MCEI
t=111 their laboratory-or section chief. The approval of
application, evidently depended eoneid erably upon.
the recommendation of immediate suupervisora Iff a section
chief approved such a request, axe, .'applioant experienced ' no-
greatdifficulties in obtaining. a transfer. ut it is note-
worthy that those who were successful.generally`were the-leash
qualified engineers*
some of the more talented university graduates were ,able to.` .
ohooee `between employment, in Moscow or Pryazino. .Many such
.engineers were encouraged-to renounce their natural. prefer-
once for working in Moscow by offering them relatively
favorable housing in Pryazino.
58. All other Soviet engineers were' sub-J,e:a.t. to some controls on
their employment mobility as.evidenced by the fact that
many 'employees at Institute 160 .were.transferred against
given some freedom. of choice in job assignments. Appajreri?
57. On the other hand, recent university graduates were evide
Comments: In all probability# the MGB and not 25X1
Personnel S'eotion and other security agencies at Institute 160.
he was the agency which controlled the activities of the
Soviet colleagues were probably not aware of , 25X1
MGB, It'is also quite possible that the Ministry of State Control
and not the Ministry of Finance supervised the institute's.aooount-
Ing and finance offices.
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recent o anges transferring certain functions of the - to the
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