INTERPRETATION OF CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-00810A001000690005-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 25, 2009
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 21, 1953
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-00810A001000690005-0.pdf65.94 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001000690005-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT This Document contains information affecting the Na- tional Defense of the United States, within the mean- ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited. SECRET/CONTROL-US OFFICIALS ONLY SECURITY INFORMATION COUNTRY USSR REPORT DATE DISTR. 21' April 1953 Interpretation of Current Soviet Tactics THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTAYIVE. (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE) 3. present Soviet moves are designed to strengthen the position 25X1 of IIalen'kov and Beriya internally through an apparent relaxation of police state methods and externally through marginal "peace offers", which a nse to the Soviets but, which will Lripress wavering Western politicians and 25X1 peoples and tend to allay fears of general conflict between East and es it is most important that West leaders do not overlook the fact 25X1 that Soviet basic aims remain unchanged by this diversion and that a lag in implementing Western defense plans will give the new Soviet team an advantage in establishing the proper footing at home and maintaining a military edge over the the original charges against the 25X1 was aimed at reassuring him. The reversal of tactics is now favorable to Malenkov in attempting to gain the allegiance of the Soviet people. Beri.yals position is maintained unimpaired by the purging of Ignatyev et al. doctors were due to a stroke suffered by Stalin and that the removal of the doctors 4. The impact on Communist parties outside of t he Soviet orbit is reflected in the 25X1 confusion and insecurity of the present leaders, many of whom are loyal to Stalin. SECRET/CONTHOL-US OFFICIALS ONLY ,TA RMY INAVY X AIR X NO. OF PAGES REQUIREMENT NO. RD REFERENCES LA Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001000690005-0