OPINION OF SOVIET POLICY AFTER STALIN'S DEATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A001300560003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 26, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/11: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001300560003-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRE
DATE DISTR. 2-9 May 1953
NO. OF PAGES 2
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
1, Stalin's last work, The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, and Malenkov's
speech at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 show that the anticipated main
weakness of the USSR is the development or a deep conflict between the authorities
which set up production schedules and the working force itself. Stalin himself
demonstrated that this conflict has deepened more and more and that the Soviet
Government considers this extremely dangerous for the State.
2.. Soviet policy as outlined in the article by D.I. Chesnokov, editor-in-chief of
the magazine Kommunist' (ex- Bolshevik ), in issue No. 2 of 1953 of the maga-
zine would have as its essential goal the defeat of capitalism by socialism.
This policy is bound to manifest itself in the maintenance of competition and
of strife in all domains, with the exception of armed conflict; that is, in the
economic domain (or in Marxist language - the social) and in the cultural domain,
which includes the ideological and the moral.
3. The elements of this Soviet policy will be the following:
a. The consolidation of the Soviet State.
bq. The consolidation of the People's Democracies and the "democratic" groups
in capitalist countries.
c. The denunciation of "warmongers".
d. Resistance to all foreign policy capable of opposing the interests of the USSR.
e, The organization of the Soviet "Fifth Column".
f, The exploitation of contradictions existing at the heart of the capitalist
world and resistance to all that might unify and strengthen the capitalist
world.
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SECURITY INFORMAT.ON
Opinion of Soviet Policy after
Stalin's Death
E
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/11: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001300560003-3
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II
4. Most of the commentaries which have appeared since the death of Stalin assert.
that Malenkov's policy is entirely different from that of Stalin in both ex-
ternal and internal spheres. Such an interpretation is considered erroneous.
In reality, the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 showed that the USSR was
going through a crisis that obliged it to modify its internal and external
tactics, but it also indicated that there would be no change in the founda-
llowed by the Kremlin. This policy appears
f
li
o
cy
tions themselves of the po
always to be founded on two theses. From the external point of view, the leaders
in the Kremlin always believe that the crisis of capitalism, although artifi-
cially moderated at times, will eventually become worse. From the internal
point of view, there is always the question of the imbalance between production
schedules and labor productivity.
5. These two theses were developed in Stalin's last work (The Economic Problems
of Socialism in the USSR), and present tactics will be based on this rather
than creating a new situation.
6. The reasons for the change of Soviet tactics observed since the 19th Party
Congress arise from the following factors: the relenting of the economic crisis
in the West and the existence of an internal conflict in the USSR. Therefore,
in order to maintain for the State its role of direction in the construction
of socialism and to overcome the internal conflicts, the State will continue to
econo the
use
ocsystcem of purges a certain elimaking some beralism thatnalreadysexin the isted priorlto andhe 19thlc
domain,
Party Congress.
7. The new government would only profit from the situation created by Stalin's death
by giving to these indispensible and long-planned measures the appearance hchanges fundamental to the regime and by using them for propaganda ends. this policy of partial retreat should not in any case be considered a renunciation
of the develppment of the centralization and the totalitarianization of the State.
On the contrary, the reorganization of the executive power would demonstrate that
the principles of Stalin concerning the structure of the state are maintaining
their strength. It is only the propaganda that is changing form.
8. The new "liberalism" will not change in the least the principles of internal
and external policy of the USSR nor will it modify the role which the Soviet
Government plays as supreme regulator of economic and social life.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/11: CIA-RDP80-00810A001300560003-3