1. POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN THE USSR 2. FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A001600270009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 16, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
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by law. The reploductson cc am so= Is peambtted.
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COUNTRY US
SR (Moscow Obl
ast) REPORT NO.
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SUBJECT 1.
Political At
titudes in the USSR DATE DISTR.
16 July 1953
2
Foreign Radi
o Broadcasts in the
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.
USSR
NO. OF PAGES
5
25X*)ATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
REQUIREMENT NO
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POLITICAL CONDITIONS
toward Political Problems
Soviet Attitudes
25X1 1. the average Soviet citizen
25X1 as a - e-woo supporter of the Soviet government.
This was particularly true of the younger generation. They certainly appeared
to be active supporters of the regime, to judge by their participation in politi-
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the average Soviet citizen extremely patriotic. The Soviet 25X1
Government has apparently develo Brea er support from the population by its
nationalistic propaganda than by propagating C anunist ideology. 25X1
sT
STATE ARMY MAW t ox AIR FBI AEC
46 Wa Ua Db M-01, w Iwdir t.d Sy X"; Fi.M D -Ibelion By "#
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r,ne average Soviet citizen greatly respected Stalin and
propaganda glorifying him had been effective
Soviet
ropeated,wor for wordy the various glorif in
slogans and-descriptions applied to Stalin.
It is noteworthy that the possibility of achieving communism
was a topic of conversation more frequenty in IM the be..
fore. Perhaps this was the result of a propaganda campaign
which was devoted to the sugoessful'fulfillsent of the first
postwar Five-Year Plan. Local propagandists frequently
made reference to Stalin's speech in 1946 regarding long..,
term production goals and claimed that communism could be,
introduced once these goals had been attained.
25X1 5? the average Soviet worker was convinced of the
e o0 of achieving communism. First of ill, it is
natural for his to believe in something that would prove
beneficial to himself. Secondly, Soviet propaganda was in
general a very effective instrument. By way of illustration,
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7.
highly regarded and made good use of the numerous career--
building and vocational faciliti
nogorsk area.
some children of German specialists who attended the Soviet-
run school in Yrasnogorek came to believe in the truthfulness
and correctness of Communist ideology, despite the-fact that
they were able to view Soviet living conditions with a cer-
tain degree of objectivity and were subject to the influence
of their parents at home.
Regarding those aspects of Soviet society which set with
the particular approval of the Soviet population, my Soviet
colleagues were especially proud of the'rapid development
of Soviet industry and technology. For example, theyoon-
sidered their newest jet fighters, the construction of large
electric power oomplexess and the IWscow subway as outstanding
achievements. The average Soviet worker or technician wad
the consumer-goods industry was the only
ea ure o ov a life which was the subject of constant
criticism by the Soviet population. The inefficient dis-
tribution system, the fact that not enough goods were
available to most demands, and the fact that a shopper had
to spend so much time 1u searching for a certain article
were all subjects of frequent complaints. Undoubtedly, the
Soviet citizenry in voicing these complaints was simultan-
eously condemning not only the end results "but also t"- eause
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of the situation) namely, the policy of developing basic in-
dustries at the expense of consumer goods. However, this
aspect of state policy was not openly attacked.
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Soviet
00 25X1
Corning forei
gn relations,
epeated the genera nee 25X1
.of the offici
al propaganda that the West, especially
eme
theQressive
policies of the United States, was to blame
for p3'esent E
ast-West tensions. 1 ::1 25X1
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the anti-
ercan prop
aganda campaign had definitely turned public 25X1
opinion agai
nst the United States. 2~C1
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10.
11.
12.
wo incidents which illustrate the effectiveness
or Soviet propaganda regarding the ubiquity of American spies.
In one case, a Soviet engineer employed in a responsible
position told me in all seriousness that he was convinced that
50 per cent of the German specialists were working for Ameri-
can intelligence agencies. Another incident concerned three
elderly German apecialists, all of whom were more than 60
years of age. These three gentlemen were taking a stroll
in the vicinity of the nearby sanitorium for high-ranking
Soviet Army officers, located at Arkhangelskoye. A
collective farmer working in his fields saw them and re-
ported to the polio. that American spies were snooping a-
round the sanitorium. Not very much time passed before'a
military police patrol appeared and picked them up for ques-
tioning. The three were released on establishing their
identity.
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Engineers and other technicians sent to China were offered
extraordin4rily good terms of employment.
+7?i t. ,narti ni na.ted in a "total war
The Soviet people had
The ou re o
the war in Korea considerably InTenaxirea these anxieties.
This acute nervousness diminished in succeeding monthsp
although it was subject to a brief renewal brought about
by the entrance of China in the Korean War.
14. It was not directly stated that they feared American aggres-
sion, that a new world war would begin with an American
attack on the USSR. However, this was undoubtedly the
popular impression,to judge by their acceptance of other
propaganda themes branding the United States as an aggressor
nation. gave no indication
that they ou e the o cis ne c aiming that the United
States had launched the war in Korea.
Foreign Radio Broadcasts
15-
16.
Jall apartments.in the Krasnogorsk area
at least 50 per cent perhaps 60 per cent to
70 per cent) o all Soviet families owned wired loudspeakers*
very interested n acqu r ng ra ios. The 'VEF'? and `'Baltika
models were the most popular radio sets. Imported radios of
German manufacture were in less demand since they were not
covered by a guarantee. The "VEF" and Baltika' sets were
guaranteed for six months.
particular wave bands or to domestic broadcasts. There
was no increased emphasis on wired loudspeaker networks.
a os so in ovie stores were no% m e o any
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18. It is interesting to note in this connection that larger,
more powerful radios, capable of receiving broadcasts from
abroad were more in evidence in Soviet stores in later
years. Previously, the small 'Rekord ' radio set 25X1
~it did not have short-wave reception) w&s the mos
popular model.
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Miscellaneous Comments
19. The Soviet ;economist, Professor VARGA, once gave a lecture
for the German specialists at Plant No. 393 in the latter part
of 1949 or the beginning of 1950. He appeared in a regular
lecture series sponsored by the Central Council of Trade
Unions. VARGA was introduced as the renowned Hungarian-
born Soviet economist.
20. The German specialists living in Krasnogorek were housed
in four large apartaent buildings. These buildings, prior
to our arrival, had been the site of an Antifa school,
where German emigrants and selected prisoners-of-war were
trained as propagandists and potential Party functionaries.
It was rumored that the son of GDR President PIECK and
former Minister RAU had been trained at this school.
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