THE NEW MALENKOV POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A001900290001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 7, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/12/04: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001900290001-9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET)
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SUBJECT The New Malenkov Policy
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO.
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
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7 August 1953
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FOR C WCAt SECURITY REASONS
THIS T IS NOT TO RE TURTIIER
TRANS TIED WITHIN TIE HIiIi(O
Irto
"' 101 r
OF Td UNITER STATES, MTI{N
(EXPRESS MISSION Of THE Riur
INN OFFICE.
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i=:=one must not exclude the possibility that
Malenkov is actually dismantling the governmental apparatus set up by Stalin
25X1 in order to set up his own apparatus, based, however, on the same ideological
principles and on the same domestic and international political planes. As for
25X1 the many "friendly" proposals made in recent days by the Soviet Government to
the Western powers, from Korea to Berlin, the experts
25X1 I state that such a policy does not deviate from the known Soviet thesis
of "coexistence" of Communist and capitalist countries.
2. But here we are dealing actually with Stalin's theory and the implementation
of the Stalinist policy. We are not dealing with "deviationism". Moreq}rrer,
it appears that this political shift had been planned (though perhaps under
another form) during Stalin's lifetime. It is recalled in this connection
that in one of his last writings Stalin had ruled out the outbreak of a third
world war between the USSR and the West and that, instead, he had "prophesied"
that the war would break out "between capitalist countries" within the Western
Bloc. It is further recalled that at the last congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (19th Party Congress), in 3Lis official report (the preparer
tion of which had been assigned to him by Stalin) Malenkov supported the thesis
that the West will be strangled, not by war with the USSR, but by the loss of
its markets. Lastly, it is recalled that Stalin's last decisions were the
proposal of a vast trade agreement between the USSR and Argentina, the offer
of wheat to Great Britain, and the offer of an "economic concession"'to India.
3. It appears that this new phase in Soviet foreign policy was decided during!
Stalin's lifetime or, at any rate, a little before the time of his death.
This new phase involves a shift from the cold war to a "cold friendship" with
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regard to the Western powers. The now shifts in Malenkov's policy conform
fully to Stalin's thesis and Malenkov's own thesis announced during the
19th Party Congress,.
4+. The reasons which probably influenced this shift by the Soviet leaders even
during Stalin's lifetime were provided in part by Soviet domestic policy
problems and in part by foreign policy problems (assuming that the supposi-
tions made in this report are correct). It appears that Stalin had come to
realize that his policy of keeping the West constantly in a state of alarm and
harassment, instead-of causing the West to disintegrate, actually had unified
.it. The very serious problems which divided the Western powers (for example,
the German question between France and the other Western powers), the problems
arising out of the US-British differences in connection with the question of
world influence, many other problems in Europe and the Far East, which the
USSR could use to divide the West, all this became of secondary importance in
.the face of the cold war promoted by the Soviet Union' . The West forgot the
Saar question, Britain forgot or pretended to forget US competition in her
markets, France allowed the US to build military bases in North Africa,
Australia, and the Philippines accepted the idea of Japan's rearmament, and all
this was possible because the West's primary problem was the necessity to
defend itself from probably Soviet armed aggression. For this same reason,
the US invested billions of dollars in economic aid and weapons for the countries
that had alighed themselves with the US to meet the eventuality of war against
25X1 the Soviet threat. he Soviet leaders had recognized
their error with regard to the cold war even before Stalin's death, and that
they had decided to shift to this new phase of "cold friendship" for the
disintegration of the West,
5. Another cause of Soviet preoccupation was the situation in the Satellites
and China. The continuous and drastic purges in the Satellites show that
the USSR never succeeded in completely taming the "Peoples'Democracies".
In past months there have been very evident signs of the more or less chaotic:
situation prevailing in many parts of the USSR itself. It appears that Stalin
himself had decided to attach special importance during this period to reinforcing
Soviet power in the USSR and in the Satellites.
6. It is now certain also that the Soviet leadership was divided into various
groups fighting among themselves for Stalin's succession. In addition to
the official announcements that ZhdAnov's death was not due to natural
causes (this has been denied officially only by the Malenkov government), there
25X1 are irrefutable proofs that Zhdanov was purged.
immediately after Stalin's death, Malenkov carried out a radical (and not
at all constitutional) reshuffling.of high Government and Party leaders.
8. Nothing in particular is known about difference .between the USSR and China.
25X1 However' in past months there has been
a serious misunderstanding between Moscow and Peiping in connection with the
war in Korea an the olicy. MAO Tee Tung's absence at Moscow
25X1 was also noted, Malenkov's appointment of V.V. Kuznetsov
as ambassador to e p ng. in own that in a few days the Soviet and
Chinese Communist governments will hold an important meeting proposed by
Malenkov'personally. It appears that MAO is turning to the policy..of
It is. not known by whom he was purged, but now it appears that he was purged
by Malenko'v.l.s, men, The supposition that Zhdanov's death was caused by the
Jewish doctors is not generally acceptable, but it is now an historical fact
that a few weeks after it was officially announced that Zhdanov had been
done away with and after Stalin had ordered a large-scale investigation against
the "assassins," Stalin himself died and Mal??enkov came to over. (It is well
known that he was Zhdanov's rival for Stalin's :eiociebion,
Malenkov ordered the release and rehabilitation of the "confessed assassins"
and the arrest of their accusers, on whom Stalin had bestowed the highest
honors and decorations of the USSR. It is probab7,o that the doctors were
in,ocent, but that, despite their innocence, Malenkov had every interest in
preventing light from being shed on Zhdanovla death. It was also noted that
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9.
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'fpeaceful coexistence" in Asia in an attempt to destroy politically (something
that is not impossible) Chiang's Nationalist Government and become a UN member.
It appears that MAO was not satisfied with the policy imposed;on him by Stalin,
a policy which called for Communist China to be "defended" and represented
at international meetings by Soviet diplomats. Moreover,,, it is, believed that
at this time Malenkov does not wish to make an enemy of MAO and that he has
promised to support Communist China's policy in exchange for Chinese promises
of closer collaboration between Moscow and Peiping. However, we have learned
that nothing specific has. been decided thus far regarding close collaboration
between Moscow and Peiping and that details of such a collaboration will be
discussed during the weeks to come.
These reasons, both domestic and international in characterl
el1ed Stalin to contemplate a change in tactics in his foreign
at home, any concession a
interna
prestige not only on the domestic plane, but also on the Cominform tional
plane.
had comp
policy. For the same reasons, Malenkov is even more compelled to change these
tactics. Stalin had a myth in his favor. Malenkov, to strengthen his position,
needs a long period of prudent domestic polic and very prudent foreign policy.
For these .reasons, E 11 __F 1the
"peaceful"-proposals made by the USSF an China.to the West are su s an i.ally
sincere and can be implemented at once, but that these proposals do not mean
that Malenkov intends to deviate from the"Stalinist orthodoxy". He needs more
than anyone else the myth of "leader" and needs also to continue throughout the
Communist world.the policy of the USSR as a "model state".
It is also quite probable that, by extending his hand.to the West Malenkov
hopes to draw the West into negotiations in which each the aroicipands would
make some concessions to the other. Now, any
L u e o the crea ion of thlarity
the USSR would enhance his popularity and contr
Malenkov myth. While price reductions in the USSR enhance'Malenkovts pope
th t he can obtain in foreign policy will enhance his
2 5X1 Malenkov is not destroying Stalin's neologies, but his govern-
25X1 mental apparatus, to set up one of his Malenkov?g own, and that he is
2 5X1 striving also to create his own myth. This is something which cannot be
accomplished in a year or two. However, the status of "operation Malernkov"
25X1 cannot be determined at this time. At least a few months must pass before
25X1 we can.estimate the direction and world impact of the new Soviet leader's
policy.
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SECRET,`)
Approved For Release 2003/12/04: CIA-RDP80-0081OA001900290001-9