YUGOSLAV TREATMENT OF RUMANIA REFUGEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A002000130010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 10, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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'at
CENTRAL` INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This Document contains Information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within thenrean-
Ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.B. Oods. as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorised person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
COUNTRY Yugoslavia
Yugoslav Treatment of Rumanian
Refugees
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
10 August 1953
NO. OF PAGES 6
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
Policy of Yugoslavs Toward Refugees Between June 1948 and 4 August 1950
1. Soon after the Tito-Cominform break in June 1948, large numbers of refugees
from Soviet-dominated countries began to flee to Yugoslavia hoping to find
protection from Cominform persecution and an opportunity to continue their
flight to the West. However, from the summer of 1948 until 4 August 1950,
the Yugoslav Government did not differentiate between political refugees
and common criminals. It employed a policy of brutality and terror toward
all. The two following factors were probably responsible for this attitude
on the part of Yugoslavia:
a. The Yugoslavs had no desire of further alienating neighboring Cominforim-
dominated countries as long as there was some chance of repairing the
recently ruptured relations; and
b. In line with the governments of the satellite countries, Yugoslav
"Communist consciousness" still regarded the political refugees as
"class enemies."
2. Among the various political refugees who fled to Yugoslavia following the
Tito-Cominform rift were many Rumanians. Upon arrival on Yugoslav terri-
tory, all Rumanian refugees were detained in either the Kikinda or the
Becikeret (sic) refugee camps for investigation. After an arbitrary
period of time, certain refugees were assigned to work in coal mines at
Bosnia or Rudnik. The rest of the refugees who were apparently considered
recalcitrants or otherwise unsuitable for release, were quartered in a
concentration camp for political refugees at Zrenjanin.1
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3. Until 5 August 1950, neither the refugees who worked in the mines nor the
refugees in the Zrenjanin concentration camp had any type of organization
to represent or protect their interests, nor was such an organization
proposed or even allowed by the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs showed no indi-
cation that they were at all concerned with the refugsev,, inasmuch as no
particular attempt was made by them to penetrate the refugee communities
with spies or informers. Compatible with this apathetic attitude, condi-
tions in the camps and various working sites were miserable, and refugees
had no protection against the brutal treatment meted out by UDB personnel.2
4. Individuals or groups of refugees frequently disappeared from the concen-
tration camp or work sites. These persons were usually forcibly expelled
from Yugoslavia into neighboring satellite countries. The standard deter-
mining the selection of the particular refugees to be ousted is unknown.
5. In the spring of 1950 disturbances which occurred in the Zrenjanin concen-
tration camp alarmed t goslav authorities. One refugee, a former Rumanian
officer, was killed while attempting to climb the barbed wire Tense which
surrounded the camp, while another refugee was brutally beaten. A committee
of inquiry under General Ioja (lna) was sent to Zrenjanin.. Ioja "conducted
an investigation" and promised the refugees more work and freedom. Soon
after Ioja? s departure, groups of refugees were "planted" on the Trieste
border and allowed to "escape". On a later occasion, when Ioja again
visited the camp, he informed the refugees that Yugoslavia had become
involved in serious difficulties as a consequence of these escapes. He
announced that henceforth instead of being released, all refugees would be
permitted to work in Yugoslavia. Some of the refugees accepted Ioja's
offer, but the rest remained in the Zrenjanin refugee camp until it was
closed on 4 August 1950. Refugees still in the camp were taken to the
Trieste border and allowed to escape.
Chase in Yuosl Altitude Toward Refugees
6. With the closing of the refugee camp at Zrenjanin, the Yugoslavs adopted
a new policyihich lasted until about August 1951. During this period the
Yugoslavs probably were subject to increased pressure from the West.
Presumably, in an effort to placate Western allies, the Yugoslavs at last
acknowledged the refugees as a special group and proposed some plans for
the solution of the problem. This effort, which lacked strong motivation
and was implemented without determination, had the following characteristics:
a. A branch responsible for the handling of various refugee groups was
created within the Ministry of Internal Affairs at Belgrade. The
officers assigned to this branch made frequent inspections of the
various refugee areas. General Ioja was made chief of the Rumanian
section of the Refugee Branch;
b. Upon arrival in Yugoslavia, Rumanian refugees were no longer sent to
refugee camps but to a newly-established rest house in Vrsac. After
a debriefing period the refugees were allowed to settle in assigned
areas, where they lived under superficial surveillance but with suffi-
Some succeeded in escaping but others were apprehended and sentence
to terms of one to three months in prison. Even after release from
prison, some of the refugees re-attempted to escape; however, at no
time did the Yugoslavs appear to regard these attempts at escape very
seriously;
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c. A Rumanian club was set up in Svetozarevo3 by the local UDB. The club
was equipped with a radio, piano and library of Rumanian-language books;
and
d. The UDB appointed Stanoiu (fnu)4 "president" of the Rumanian refugees.
Stanoiu, although disliked by the Rumanian refugees, was the group's
principal link with the UIM. The UDB attempted without success to
organize a pro-Tito committee among the group of refugees who disliked
Stanoiu. Later, the UDB endeavored to utilize two of the refugees,
Galin (fnu) and Constantin Alimanisteanu,ih,.forming a pro-Tito refugee
committee. These efforts also failed.
New Phase in Yugoslav Attitude Toward Refugees August 1951 - March 1952
7. A new period in Yugoslav-refugee relations began in August 1951 and continued
through March 1952. This period reflected a new approach to the question of
treatment of Iron Curtain refugees. Factors responsible for this new policy
were:
a. The desire for internal consolidation;
b. The crystallization of a Titoist "Communist consciousness"; and
c. The reorientation of the Yugoslav external policy toward the West.
8. The new policy was presumably drafted by the Refugee Branch. of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs, but was not an instrument devised deliberately to
attain new political objectives. The policy was based on a vague recogni-
tion of the potential value of the refugees as eventual political assets;
however, the lack of clear directives and objectives precluded proper
exploitation. The new policy of the Yugoslav Government toward the refugees
was manifested as follows: .
a. The UDB reached the conclusion that it was essential to separate the
refugees who might be potential political assets from those who were
obvious liabilities, Hence, all refugees judged to be of good behavior
and of opportunistic or flexible views, retained their relative freedom.
Refugees who were out-spokenly, anti-Communist or anti-Titoist, or who
encouraged or incited fellow refugees to resist Yugoslav intervention
in refugee matters, or who had a record of attempted escapes, were sent
to a prison camp in Kovacica.5 Later, they were transferred to a
refugee camp at Jesenice. whence they were tacitly encouraged to
attempt to escape
b. Special attention was given to newly-arrived refugees who gave the
impression of being of potential value under the new Yugoslav refugee
policy. These individuals were given excellent treatment, first in
the rest home at Vrsac6 and later, at the Hotel Praga in Belgrade.
c. The Yugoslavs .,disregarding his unwillingness, appointed Stefan Raica as
president of the Rumanian refugees in Svetozarevo on 19 December 1951.
d. The UDB selected the most promising of the Rumanian refugees and offered,
them tempting advantages if they would be willing to work for the UDB
abroad. These missions would entail reporting on the activities of
Rumanian refugees abroad, defecting specified refugees, reporting any
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anti-Yugoslav attitudes held by individuals or groups, and encouraging
and inciting splits within various refugee organizations.
Present Policy of Yugoslav Government Toward Referees
9. The last phase in the Yugoslav treatment of satellite refugees was initiated
in January 19529 at which time General Dusan Mugosa7, member of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Serbia, allegedly delivered a speech
before the Central Committee in which he expounded his views on the import-
ance of the refugees relative to the future of Titoism in the Balkans.
Mugosa?s recommendations were evidently approved by Marshal Tito, inasmuch
as the Central Committee granted Mugosa the authority to investigate the
refugee problem. Later, Mugosa delivered a second speech in which he out-
lined the facts he had uncovered during the course of his investigation,
and requested the authority to implement his views. As a result, the
responsibility for the handling of Rumanian refugees was transferred from
the Refugee Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to General Mugosa,
who was to act in the name of the Central Committee. Clear-cut objectives
were defined and new tactics which would fit into an overall political
problem were applied. The most recent policy of the Yugoslav Government,
as directed by General Mugosa, has been manifested as follows;
a. During early spring 1952, a decision was reached to-form a Rumanian
National Committee in Svetozarevo. Stanoiu, who was appareht the
best qualified candidate, was again appointed "president ad interim."
Stanescu was.instr4ucted to draft proposals for the formation of a
"Rumanian National Committee". These proposals were to make provision
for the establishment of cadre sections and contain plans for agitation
and propaganda. In April 1952, Stanoiu submitted his proposals to
Mugosa who rejected them and offered numerous amendments. Stanoiu,
who was under the impression that he was indispensable, refused to
caegt the amendments. Just about this time. Captain Ion Ghinea, a
former political commissar in the Rumanian Air Force, landed in Yugo-
slavia in a stolen plane. Ghinea, an apparent opportunist, sensed the
opportunity presented by the impasse between General Mugosa and Stanoiu
and shortly, after his arrival In Yugoslavia delivered a pro-Tito speech.
Consequently he was accepted by Mugosa as a more appropriate candidate
for the projected "Rumanian National Committee". Stanoiu retired to
Vrsac where he fomented dissatisfaction against Ghinea and Mugosa.8
Ghinea was appointed president of the Committee of the Association of
Rumanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia, which was provisionally
established at Svetozarevo on 7 July 1952.9 The Committee was composed
of 15 refugees who were to elect a five-man central committee, namely
a president, a secretary-general and three members.
b. Simultaneously with the formation of the above committee, Yugoslav
authorities became aware of the decreasing numbers of Rumanian
refugees in Yugoslavia (the "base" of their national committee) and
decided to make every effort to halt the departure of Rumanian
refugees from Yugoslavia. The refugee camp at Jesenice was disbanded
and all refugees were interned in a newly-established camp at Gerovo,
from which escape was reputedly impossible. In line with new
directives from the Central Committee, the camp authorities instructed
the various refugee groups to set up "national committees". The
Rumanian refugees established the National Committee of the Rumanian
Emigrees from Gerovo on S August 1952. Reorganized on 15 September 1952,
this committee was merged with Ghinea?s Committee of the Association
of Rumanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia on 13 February 1953.
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c. The Yugoslavs skillfully exploited the desire of Rumanian refugees at
Gerovo to reach the West. They first permitted the refugees to write
to foreign embassies in Belgrade for aid in reaching western countries,
and later prohibited such correspondence on the grounds that the
various embassies would not permit refugees to enter their countries,
the implication being that refugees were undesirable elements. With
this hope of reaching the West shattered, and the possibility of work
in Yugoslavia prohibited to them, the Rumanian refugees were thrown
into a state of despair. This policy was rescinded, however, and the
refugees were encouraged to remain and work in Yugoslavia. This
appeared to be a substantial concession and many refugees accepted it
as the happiest solution.
d. Rumanian refugees are recruited for physical penetrations of their
homeland.
e. The Gerovo refugee camp was disbanded on 1 March 1953, and its residents
were allowed to settle and work in specified areas.
This has been reported as the receiving center for Rumanian refugees.
5. This attitude on the part of the Yugoslav authorities has been
mentioned previously. various
Rumanian refugees who opposed Yugoslav (UDB) intervention were sent
to concentration camp at Kovacica.
ConaiderAd as the lar~ Rumanian refugee center in Yugoslavia
Reported variously as Eremia or Remija Stanoiu (Stanoju or Strahoju),
who was president of the Rumanian
Refugees, founded in Kragujevac in February 1951.
Organizer of Albanian Partisan bands during World War II and organizer
of the Albanian Communist Party in November 1941. Mugosa'also directs
the activities of Bulgarian and Albanian refugees in Yugoslavia.
Stanoiu was not highly regarded by Yugoslav
aut oritieso who were anxious to get more impressive personalities
into the Rumanian Political Re
as having the matter in hand.
(General
Mugosa was anxious to make Gheorghe Grosu head of the association
rather than Stanoiu, who was favored by the refugees.
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IAt this time, Gheorghe
Grosu and Ion Ghinea were both named to the Executive Committee of the
Association.
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