COMMENTARY ON SOVIET POLICY SINCE STALIN S DEATH AND ITS EFFECT ON BERIYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A002200160039-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: August 31, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/08/06 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200160039-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This Document contains information affecting the N11-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code. as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is p-ohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form Is prohibited.
2bX1
SUBJECT Commentary on Soviet Policy Since
Stalin's Death and Its Effect on
Beriya
PLACE ACQUIRED
25X1';
.......... .....
DATE DISTR. 31 August 1953
NO. OF PAGES 3
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
25X1
25X1 The following report does not neces-
el i;ly.'refleCt'the opinion o'?', s agency. it was written after 25X1
the 10 July 1953 anna=eement of the arrest of Lavrent .y P. Beriya.
1. Although the news about the removal. of Beriya was surprising, it was not completely
unexpected. There was bound to beta struggle among Stalin's possible successors,
but no one could, nor yet can, foresee its outcome, even after the elimination
of Beriya. It would be absolutely' wrong to attribute to Mslenkov liberal ten-
dencies and say that Beriya favored the oid Stalinist line.. There most likely
have not been any major differences in opinion between the two concerning Soviet
global strategy, but still it was necessary to eliminate Beriya.
2. It might also be wrong to conclude that the recent riots in various parts of the
Soviet bloc represent weakness on the part of the Soviet State. Soviet global
strategy has found itself since the Korean war in a blind alley and has had_ to
devise new methods, completely different from the old one that Failed, i.e.,
the use of power. Judging from certain signs be could perceive in 1951 in
OlpechoSlgvakia, source believes that the an was devised in that year and
started, to be implemented approximately af, er the 19th Party Congress in
October 1952. There has been complete continuity in Soviet policy, despite
the fact that the'tactice-have been reversed,
3. The first basic daudition of the new plan was the necessity for the removal of
Stalin so that new 'policies could be inaugurated. That is why Stalin had to
die. It was then possible to start a completely new line, and the main effort
had to be concentrated.on the task of making the Western world believe that
the change of heart is a real one and that Moscow means it. This effort has
been started very cleverly. Instead of inviting the West to sit down at a
conference and make concessions, Moscow tried to prove first by acme deeds
its willingness to end the cold war. The Kremlin has achieved more in the
STATE EV X ARMY x NAVY
]C AIR
IX FBI
fAEC TTocl Ev x
Approved For Release 2OO3iO8iO6 IA-I21-00810A002200160039-8
 Approved For Release 2003/08/06 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200160039-8
SECRET
past few months by doing almost nothing than Stalin achieved with a great de-
ployment of force in the past seven years. Today great differences on how to
treat the USSR exist among the Western allies.
It is believed that the first open signs of Moscow's peaceful mood, which have
so greatly affected especially Western Europe, were only a test for Moscow as to
whether to adhere to the new policy or not. The test has been successful, and
Soviet leaders have defitely decided to continue the new line. Moscow's long-
range aims have not changed a bit but, in view of the circumstances, completely
new tactics have been adopted. New concessions will certainly be made by Moscow,
especially in Central Europe. The concessions will be so real that even the
greatest doubters will be convinced. That is the aim of the Kremlin. The
United States still maintains its negative attitude toward the new rulers in
the Soviet Union, and these Soviet concessions will be aimed at splitting
public opinion in America and at obtaining from the US Government the willing-
ness for a settlement. In view of the concessions that will be offered, it
will be almost impossible for the US Government to turn down the offers,
especially since the alternative will be prolonged. trouble all over the world
and possibly war.
5. What the Soviets clearly want to achieve now is a period of peace for them,
during which the pressure on the Soviet bloc will relax. They would like to
bring the USSR. again to a period like that from 1929 to 1936 for a new build-
up of force. The method they are using at present is the most appropriate for
that aim.
25X1
6. A. possible explanation of why the Soviets will dare to make various real concessions
and where these concessions will be made follows. 25X1
that the USSR has not believed that war vats imminent and that the Soviet Union
would not start a war at the present period. Now Moscow has arrived at the con-
elusion that it does not have to fear war started by the West and, for that
reason, has changed its tactics in conformity'with its new global political
s,r.ategy. This means that Moscow can now make certain concessions that would
look absolutely unjustifiable from a military standpoint, such as abandonmet
of certain areas. Such moves will tend to confuse further the picture of the
real situation in the Soviet Union as it is now seen by the West from a military
viewpoint.
There are already signs of such moves within the Soviet orbit. The advantage of
such a change from purely military planning to political planning will be tre-
mendous for the USSR. It will mean, among other things, that the Soviets will
stop the armament race and divert more goods to the domestic market, thus pla-
cating the population, which, after 36 years of Communist indoctrination, is
judging most everything from a purely material point of view.
8. The Soviet Union will, no doubt, concentrate now on Asia, where it has much more
to gain than in Europe. That is why the concessions will be made in Central
Europe and under no circumstances in China. The Soviet rulers may have arrived
at the conclusion tiM it would be more advantageous to have in Central Europe
states that are semi-independent, or semi-dependent, such as Czechoslovakia was
from 1947 until 191+8, that cooperate more or less willingly with the USSR, than
to have slave nations that revolt.
9. For these reasons, it is believed that the Soviet Union will make concessions in
Central Europe soon. These concessions will be the price paid by the USSR for
a period of peace witfoit p3essures on its system. If the Soviets are successful
with this plan, it will mean the gradual retirement of the US from European
affairs. In the long range, however, it will also mean that the Soviet Union
will be ready to take back'teee concessions at any time,, whenever they have
served their purpose.
10. The latest events in the Soviet Union appear to support this policy. Beriya
vas identified with the old tyrannical regime and therefore had to be eliminated.
Malenkov got rid of a rival at the same time. Soon also Molotov will have to
go because he is a symbol of ruthless international Soviet policy. These changes
Approved For Release 2003/08/06 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200160039-8
 Approved For Release 2003/08/06 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200160039-8
..3.
in leadership will make the new Soviet mood more credible in the West and more
palatable to the Soviet population.
ii. The removal of Beriya itself will probably not have a profound effect on any
satellite leaders. However, as a result of the new policy which necessitated
Beriya's removal, undoubtedly all the old-time satellite leaders will soon
disappear. The present treatment of Rakosi does not mean a thing. He defi-
nitely is out, and it makes little difference whether he will be tried later
or left for some time in token Party leadership.
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/06 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200160039-8