SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A002200260021-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 30, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
COUNTRY USSR
Sociological and Economic Conditions
in the Soviet Union
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within they mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code. as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorised person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form Is prohibited.
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
S'ECRE'T
(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated by "X"; Field Distribution by "#"?)
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30 Sept. 1953
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--S AC ET-
IRTFORhb1TIMT of SOCL L PRCBLw. S d~ COT~ITIaitS OF
LIFE Di THE USSR
I D D E X
1.
.5.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Introduction
Psychological effects of STALIN'S persona
influonce on the Soviet n ntality.
The Economic Situation in the USSR.
Corruption.
Food.
Accommodation.
Railways.
SOCHI
itnti-Semitism.
Religion..
2, Psyehologfeal effuet of STALIN 's personal. influence on the
Soviet mentality
did._r}ot and do not realise how poxrorful STALIDT. was and haw
enormous wp!S his'porsonal influ,~nce.:on the mentality of an avorago
Soviet citizen. the.Puss`ian people worn accustomed to
be ruled by dictators and in.-the: history of iiussia there had been
Many-strong aid mighty men: who. through their despotic will and
persistence had ruled and .formed, the mentality of their people. It
would be hard to say who was the strongest man among them but=
STAL,I1 was at least quite as powerful if not more so
than Peter the Great or Ivan the'Terrible.
STkI possessed an extraordinary knovlodge of the
Russian pay odor in goneral and of his closest collaborators in
particular. He knew how to talk to them, havy to deal with thou, how
to push one against another. iiis met:_ods were-perfectly elaborated
ebn it appears that he stuai9d the people- and played a cat and
-SrBCM,T- /riouso
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mouse game with then/
in MOSCOW whore all officers and civilians onployod there with the
Central institutiopei practically lived in constant fear of the
"boioved loader". The higher one was established the more one was
frightened of his personality. STIJZI lmew a great deal about
various people's personal affairs and weaknesses. But people
boli.ved that he know everything. The Gerorals well known for
their gallantry or their rudeness who were prepared to oppose
everyone turned pale and bocaiso silent ;and soft when informed that
Yosif Visearyonovieh wtshod to sao them. Ana Yosif Vissartonovieh
knew how to talk to his visitors. the exam to
of General CHIMIRIS, Head of the Transport Department in the Defence
Ministry, an energetic, able, but incredibly rule man. There were
so nucny complaints of his bel viour that finally STALn was informed
STALIN was responsible :'or .pracsti,oally
everything : that - haRap,ened in the USSR during the last quarter "of- "a
century. He allowed criticism of evoryono and everything; exoopt
such. For the self-criticism (S MQh'I~'ITIIiA).
himself an the I vLIN. as
:vas an excellent source-of information for him-and i'rom the ': "eolf-
criticism" he could choose who and what he-neade4. Of ooureo'the
S&1d0IGtiT.II~Is ended on the Red Square in MOSCOW.-. The I "vtGl~i was.
always right.
ST,IJZI made autou tons and litt).o
idols of the Soviet Civilian and Military executive staff Who serve!
the great idol - ST.'11I1. (PRI STi M YY BYLI AVTODaY I ID(1L) U
BOI IOVO IDOLA).
The results of this twontvfivo years of training are obvious
training. During{ that .period an average 1russicnfrightonoas
torrorised and properly taught reconciled himself with the system
and became.politieaI.ly weak. IZi: POSLYMNII91 " SI
OHELOVYEI{ FRiI.CIRIISI A I 'oB=AIt POLITIC,EMSIC! ).
The nation is so weak morally an so
terrorised that it would not raise evon'a finger to dostroy the
ragiir.until someone from outside pushed it.
this system of political, training has. also its weak points.
The most important of them is that when the "great Mail' died all
medium and small idols were shaken-and lost a groat deal, of their
disappear. the whole system would collapse at once.
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I
-SJX i T-
The Economic Situation in the USSR:
the rain reason for constant Soviet
economic- difficulties atxl the poverty of the population lies in the
enormous efforts made by the whole of the Soviet Union for the-
industrialisation of the country. all planning of
development of the heavy industry was wrong from the very'bdginninp;
of the Sovietisation and Socialisation of Russia.
Russia was too weak and too backvrircl to.
endure all economic experiments introduced by the Soviet Governuront
after the period of lalita.nt Comrnunisr i (1917-1922) . The Soviet
Union has been pushed on the wrong track of rapid industrialisation
which according to the Government plans ought to be achieved
without foreign help. The real catastrophe began When STALIN started
his first Five Year "Plan and the collective farm 3ystom in
agria.1ture_.
Artificial doveloprx:nt of heavy -industry which was carried
out at the expense of light industry and agriculture was disastrous
for the li;,ht industry, destroyed the economic a!xl social structure
of the peasantry and agriculture arid impoverished the whole
population to such an extant as perhaps never before ihinalorn
Russian history.
The notorious slogan "to ovartala3 end outstrip the
capitalist countries" (DCGtd.,,T I PYERMTAT) alas a real tragedy for
the Russian people who did not wait to overtake an3rone but just.to
.Another anomaly of the Soviet economic policy is the fact
that the-fihcle system is based on Forced Labour. One can support
the developmunt'of the economy. by Forced Labour provided that one
believes that this is real "socialism" but one cannot base the
economy on millions of cheap slaves.
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s
These anoria.lous economic structures, lack of real planning
superstructure of the Government apparatus as well as the general
inhuman attitude tovrards the suffering masses of workers, peasants
and minor classes of the populatio / mean. that.. all achiovements
of the Soviet Union cost an enormous amount of money as ll as
thousands of human lives and do not improve the everyday life of an
average Soviet citizen.
.
ovorywhere, includingldOSCOW , poverty and. shabbiness
more or loss human' conditions of life begin in the Armed
Fords from the rank of Captain up wads aml among the civilians
from a high ranldng leader up".
Railway stations. ind ,.trains arz N11 of :poor.., filthy and shabby-
people travelling Cvcl:-phones why and whore`.. r dust. s'eckin-; a roof
whore they could spend a night. - fif course- trio 'min streets of 'MOSCOW
or seaside resorts like SOCHI and othoislook' much batter, even quite
good, but those pyots arq not for the average Soviet citizens.'
Workers are poor end hungrl. They earn 500-750 roubles per month
and need for an nverag familyy 12. roubles per clay for bread and
potatoes. Even if they could eta id such.;, . starvation diet they have
no money for clothing., for improvemon . t of, their quarters or any
amusements.. They can only survive.
factory property following "the. example of their superiors. In the
collective farms peasants steal. the. kolkh.oz:property. Bribes maim
life much east r provided that one has'enough money with which to
bribe. Hooligansrobbers and nickpockots -York successfully in the
dark streets.
being extremely low.
Ccrruption?..
The difficultios'and privations of life as well as the old
traditionsof .corruption result. in the moral staizdarr_1 in the Union
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t
_;R_
in fact GORICCY and STAL111G.20 were
6. Acconimcdation:
the lolring problem is everywhere
Food:
food shortages in Russia are a consequenoe of'war t'e&orves made by
the Government as well as of help given by the USSR to Korea and
China.
In 1951 there wore no shortages of food in ICZ V and shops
wore full of mw:nufaoturod goads. In 1952, oxci:pt for white broad
Which was available in sufficient quantities, there were shortages
.of everything. In order to obtain 250 grans of butter or some
flour people spent usually 12 hours in the queues. It the same time
in the sr,-all towns in thG Ukraine, there was a great shortage, of
broad.. ::'Mnufacturcd goods one could obtain mainly "PG BL.TU" (in
an illegal w.,y). In particular there: was, a great shortage of wool.
In GORJCCY and in S?J.'ALLiG1UD tho situation was much worse
than in MV. There was a great shortage of ovekything and even
people in the streets lookoa much worse in all respects than in
always far behind ISEV because the former are much more
intlustrial.isod than KLEV, being situated in comparatively poor
regions.
very acute, In mrti i situation in GO MY appears to be
hopeless. if in ITV the a.ccomuoxation
problem is fax from being goal then in GORICrY it is ton times
worse and Ctia not irn rove in ec3uparison with the pro-ear period.
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the lodgin difficult is also a typical
consequence of the wrong economic policy. then the
Soviet Government started its industrialisation policy thoro was
not enough time and money to build dwellings for the rapidly
rowing town population. The Government began to build wooden huts
for workers instead and in consequence the Soviet Union is.at
present at least ten years behind schedule in the aooonanodation
p7Co 3.u s.
as
rayol~ comfortably and
nvMof course
fast in the v1jry clean "Soft'.
the "hard" coaches were neither eocd:aatablo nor clean. The speed
-.,S_F.CBM- . /of
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of those 'tfast?'-trains w not a wcry striking one because the
approx .1,000 Ion distance from S1 &I1flC.RAD to SOCILI via TIKiOR=SKKAY;:
and ARI:IAVIR ,vas covored in 44 hours W. approx .1,600 In ciistanco
botwoon- SOCHI anI KIEV via ROSTOV.pnd? DNYLPROP1:'TROVSIi the, train
cDvoracl.?in 4.8 hors, i.e. an average speod of 23-33 lea par hour.
8. SOCHI:.
the Black Sea resort SOCHI
looked like a foreip'country". It was
elean..indoors'-an . outdoors, no ahorta-So of anything, and "even the
Militia were i aJeAn white uniforms".. SOQHI is a first class.
aoaside resort fivourisod by the bib bosses. aMl'therefore evory+hisig
there is ba' 'r tOeImU&i: ; prieaa tccr fmita. v4 h. math more
oxponsi a then in MOSCOW.
Ant; maliemj
anti-$ondtiom is very strop in the
TJSSR. o ?ws ire.. rAjod rw rind, by'voryone, in particular
in the Art tod Fosse. there io, no hostility
to.rarrla- any othe7r eat ori- u? cwe.. o 4 AA PQQD;A ars :tired or
Jews 0.=' Yii X W Lx Mdl )ke.i?.
Ro ion
worshippers on. Sundays and .a : ~onei lerabiv numbor..or, yo hs. attend
church. 'But ohi;tdron are ps ieetl3,p i,l.litarato. rcteli~;iatie
nsttora because the paxeAts 4o not .tesaeh, thorn religion, ''o ng
Af ;Ud of perambqfd4ta?
Party mmob=s visttfng Via' xs rope d ana if that
"caeasuro. doeo not Work, ase-; a o1 aL frcm the i-arty. AM,en
oxpollbd fanner I?t+artJr memb?'r " can-be~~ ~,~~p0nly a janitoe (TO(33 MERE
TOLKO V DVORNIi#I} boeausa. no one wool .ttmploy him.
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