THE CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80-00810A002200260022-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 12, 2010
Sequence Number:
22
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 30, 1953
Content Type:
REPORT
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Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80-00810A002200260022-5.pdf | 640.47 KB |
Body:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
COUNTRY USSR (Ukrainian SSR)
PLACE ACQUIRED
The Carpathian Military District
This Document contains infonnsUon affect ag the Ma
tlonal Defense Of the Uq$ed dtat s wi the.mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 70.9 and 7W, of th .a. Code, as
amended. Its tranm 1asion or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorised person Is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form Is prohibited.
REPORT 25X1
DATE DISTR. 30 Sept. 1953
NO. OF PAGES 1
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
STATE X ARMY NAVY IX AIR x FBI AEC
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- R'"FOMI(Id OF 0,LC-ATH1X %;ILIT$RY.)XSTRIM
1. Introduction.
2. Gonotal.
3. The O,3orational and Strategical Situation
of the Carpathian Military District,
4. Political, and. Economic,Probloms.,
5. Information on location of Soviet. troops
and Government institutions.
?24 .n,_. orml;
Ilurir 'the first. porioa of the Soviet '-occupation of south-
oasto5rn Poland the i ilitar3r Dist
riot,, to iahich aolon2od the fora r
Mininistrativo ROUions (in Poll.-Th ~'OJI Is!ODZTWG') of _LY 07.' (oxcvpting
westv'rn.part) d'.21 'OPOL and b'T ? 1SIXAOIV - wasp officially called LWOW
Military District(LVOySIa'I VOY~^ 'IY OI RUG). Later. on rho :.throe above
mentioned rogr ons plus former QzachoslovakRuthenia fo=mod the
Carpathian Military District (?:3II`ARPATSTM V0:' ::IZ Oi CTG) with its
in L 7OL
Tho orational and Strategical Situation of the Carpathian Ijiilitaar
District:
The Carpathian -i ilitaary District has con 1otoly difforont
aoo raphica]. 'a'na stratcigical position from any other"RNostorn or
Central Military District. in-Emropaan Russia. Formed from the
torritnri.cs which, never bolon_od to Russia and which had. an entirely
di'forent socinl,,anc adononie structure the Carpathian r .litary
District is situatca: in a: gaogra hiC_gorizor between bland,
zochciisJovaICid, liw!Z.ary. a.igl ~.oumania. Prom the 3eographioal point
,of view the- Iistrict =tarritory 'is ;dividdd'by the 'Carpathian range into
two. parts, the Northern (formerly- Polish) and thv'-Southern (formerly
Czo.choslovak)..
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t.1tu:~
All Milit Districts in the USSR are graded according to
their strategical 3 ire#-olasa Districts such
as MOSCOW, LTATING L, . - the CAUCASUS. There are
also the sown-class'districts mainly in Central Russia such as
VOLGA, GOR1I or VORRIEdYEzH..' The Carpathian District appears to be
placed bi the MOSCOW authorities between the first and second class
Districts.
As the first class Districts are the large static bases which.
dispose of large numbers ;of troops and are prepared to form, maintain
at~d supply a eonsido:rablo number of reserve units, being in fact not
only Districts but a:Lso Army Groups (or as the Russians called thorn
"Fronts"), the aooond class Central Districts liI VOR ZE,GORKtY
and VOLGA are gonora.Lly oonsidored as strategical reserves of the
.Supremo HQ (REZERV' GLAVNOVO ICOM41MoV,Ai,+YYA). Troops of these Districts
are completely roac1y for action at any time having allnacaseary His and
Supply Units ready. But they are not prepared fora largo soak
formation of rosorvo troops and are not considered as supply bases,
:having avery limited numbor of the rear establishment unita and
supply dumps.
The Carpathian District, Judging. from its supply reserves,
repair dumps and workshops, appears to be placed botwoon the first and
second class. Districts. Its supply dumps and repair units are of somi-
static type or in other words they arc static but ready at any time to
become mobile.
It might-be that this difference in structure of .theCarpathian
District is accounted for by the fact that a very largo percentage of
teueign and hostile population lives in the District territory, and
that the central authorities consider a mass formation of reserve units
from the local population too clangorous for such a geographically
exposed territory. On the.other hand it appears that troops of the
Carpathian District pro assigned"to look after", Poland and Hungary and.
'form:a natural, link botweon the troops in-the USSR and those stationed
in Hungary and Poland. Therefore the organisation of the Carpathian
District is mobile and there are no essential static supply dumps whose
destruction or heavy damage by local sabotage organisations could.do a
great. harm to the. Soviet Armed Forces.
There is one weakness, hcn7ovor,..in the operational side of
preparations of the Car athian District: which was: either not quite
cleared yet or also, - -somuthitlrr dogs notw~ k in
is Transport and in particular roads.
I The railway network in the Carpathian rdilitery District in
comparison with the Soviet railways is very denso and technically
well constructed and oquippod(permanent way, signal and block system,
workshops oto),_'As the Soviet peace and war-time transport systoa is
based almost entirely on railways it was obvious, that first of all
the Soviet Government would restore the Carpathian railway network
which,was heavily destroyed during the war. cBy 1950 the. reconstruction
work and also conversion from the European t{o the Russian gauge had
boon accomplished. Only a large number of-station buildings were
still in their greater part oith?r in ruins or under reconstruction.
But generally speaking in 1950 the'Carpathian District railway
network was restored and tied up with the Soviet network, ready-in
case, of emergency to carry all burdens of strategical transport.
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The Wea](MAR of e Carpathian District'railway network,
is the Carpathian: range of mountains. For
the southern centres-of the District are'connected with LWOW and the
other northern first.olass junctions'oniy by three single track linos
rqntiing through mountainous country with'anumber of
vulnerable bridges and viar7nnta AnA shann oraAianta_
the Soviet soldiers
always feel much bettor when they have safely passed these mountains,
which are in fact beautiful and not so terrifying. But these throe
lime crossing the Carpathian range through the UZOK Pass, SKOLE and
the TARTAR Pass are roallyy vulnerable and the blowing
up of a couple of bridges could completely cutoff MJKACEVO, UZHORCD
and?:CHUST aa. their. "Soviet
Motherla~3", damage-to these
three lines would affect only a small section of the Carpathian
District railways. The maid and the most important part of the
'Carpathiafrailwa network is based on the quadrangle formed by four
first class junctions - LWOW, T 2 0POL, STANISLAPOW-fT and
STRYJ. Serious damage to these junctions would affect traffic even
beyond the Carpathian District boundaries).
If the railway network is in`general restored and by Soviet
standards well maintained, an entirely different position exists with
the roads. `The road network in-the Carpathian District is much denser
and much better than in the adjacent Soviet territories. It is based
like--the r ailways onthe quadrangle LWOW, TARNOPOL; STNNISLAWOW and
STRYJ. The 'roads there are ' quite solidly built. and some main road
sectors, could be used s.s triple carriago-ways They ,have chiefly a
gravel surf'aoe which Used'to be in quite a goocl state of repair'sand
good for all types of motor transport in all seasons. There are some
macadamized roads such as L 'OW-STRXJ,.,LWOW-GR?EK JAGIEIWI''S~ and
further to the west; partly LWOS~-TARNOPCL highway', and some sectors of
the other main.roads (e.g. CZCRTKOVJ-KOPYG DICE and others)... The
highway LWOW- SSRYJ-SI{OLE-MUXACEVO BERII30VO has a gravel ?. surface south
.of ~STRY.~. F .
except for the highways LWCW-STRYJ and
LWOW-PE MYSL which wore more or loss maintained all other roads were
in a '.vary 'bad state. Of repair. the LWOW- TAWOPOL
highway as a-very good. onobu-~-then gradually it became worse and
worse and in 1950 was as bad as the others. The mason for this bead
state-' of roads is that.-they are "maintained" in' a Soviet way or in
'other words they. not-maintained at all.
The best Highway LWOW-NRn EV0, Yddch
extremely bad south of LWOW.
had been n-a vbrry good one, was in
1949
The mexi.mugn speed possible there was 30 . km per hour*'
/J+. Political
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4. Political and Economic infornation:
the Soviet Government had a number of
.ifftccultice to overcome. In spite of the: different national features
of_the native population and the different economic structure of both
tho.Polish and Czechoslovak parts ofthv. Carpathian Military District
the Russians found an identical atmosphere and identical difficulties
.both north and south. of the Carpathian-Range.
The Russian national policy was,:.different in the former Polish
and Czech territories. In Poland they forcibly deported the greater
part of the Polish population or rather they continued mass
deportations which- they had stafYt'bd `in the 19 9 +1 peried. in 1945
they deported Poles to Poland and'a very considorable.number.of the
Ukrainian` population ' to the USiR "In the former CzooI> territory they
left the bulk of the native population considering them as Russians
and therefore the n:ober.of new settlers in the Czech Part of the
District leas comparatively very small. in LWOW
in 1946 the deportation action was prat ica. accomp s e and a
curtain number of Poles remained in the ton chiefly workers who.
desperately opposed i3,oportation andvihooi`the Russians, apparently tired
of'. difficulties whi,c:h they .hrl already: had with the stubborn
in LWOW certain people .chiefly technicians and skilled
workers wore not allowed to move to. Poland,,. In. fact after the mass
deportation of .Poles the Russians changed theirpolioy.'and'as they
needed the technical staff they ordered t1iQ remainder of the Polish
technioians and_.sjdlled workers to'stay.
almost. everywhere the
Ukrainians wore partly. deported and in 1950 all villages and small towns
were inhabited by the mixed Soviet and looal population.
The now settlers arrived from all parts, of the USSR chiefly
:froze central provinc s,(TAMBOV and VORDlr'YEZH) and from the Ukraine.
Foland, mmense They arrived in L?STOW and gasp?d to see how well
those Poles lived those" (PRIYE1 TALI VO LVOV I Er3ZIllULI a c KAK
PRYEISRaStsO:ETI POLY.AIQ TAX T311). They found a cultured
town and nearly empty. Themost,shabby flat in n r', v as such bettor
than the normal accommodation in a Soviet town. (RUSSKIXE I1ASHLI
GORCU =um= I PO(PI PUST45Y. SAIt?3YA z AIffi 1J YA ,KVARPIRA VO LVOVYE
3174 GOR$ZDO' LUGHSBB LXUBOY KVAI CIRY 'V SOVXPTSiai;II GCRCDAIti.) The
Russians occupied empty houses arid stated to live` happily'. But very
soon the Government began "to civilise" I,WOW in a, Soviet Way and in
1950-the town was a eaa as full and crowded as any other Soviet
spot. But it was still incom-qparabay :bettor than er
othor Sovie own.
There were also in LWOiv: a largo number of Soviet Jews who
arrived as new settlers and began to buy? and sell everything. Thar
oocupiod chiefly all key positions in, the commercial'ontorpriseo.
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indifferent, they worn happy there and0 they hoped to stay
there for, good. There wore however some shadows in their happiness.
The main :cause of this was the fact that there'wa$,.a very strong and
very deep Frontier guard belt all along the new. Polish frostier and the
whole of the territory was crowded with MVD Special Troops.
remained in LWOW at approx 30,. This appears to be exaggerated. The
attitude of the Polish population there was and remained extremely
hostile towards the Russians. It was not a ma.tter:of Communist policy
but purely a national hatred. (Before 1939 LW017 had. soon Russians
on once in its history = in 19].4.-15 for aprox-ton months)
the local Poles were not afraid to express .their hostile
foel,ings. They used to toll the Russians,opehly "Just wait, our
people will come back and then they will, show you" (PCDOZHOITYE,Ni siI
VYEM1UTSYA I .V1M POIUZHUT ). The attitude of the Russians was rather
in the Carpathian Military District
there was go scale gueri :varfare: and sabota,.ge, action there
directed against the Soviet regime and the Russians.. This was
officially referred to by the Russians as "the ''3h'df1Rk action" but
Range thelooal.population.,.among which was a?
very large percentage of Hungarians, was just as hostile towards the
Russians as on the-Polish side of the Carpathians. (The population in
those parts of the USSR had never soon Russians intho,i history before
1944-). the atmosphere there was even more
intense than on the Polish side because there. wore, very: few nowRussi.an
settlers and the local population was in agroat majority. The
Hungarians in.M'tJXACEVO, UZHORCD and in other toyms-cursed the Russians
openly. They-had even different prices in themarkst for-the natives
and for the Russian. newcomers. There was vary little subversive
activity on this side of the Carpathians.
There.. were uany Jews from the USSR occupying the b.st positions
in th? commercial enterprises and . trading.. Being very unpopular in
their native Soviet Union the Jews in the formor-Polish and Czech
territories became very pro-Russian and felt much better thorn than at
home.
were organised military operations on both anti-Soviet-and Russian
sides. In particular larger. scale. operations took place?in.the wooded
and mountainous Carpathian areas vhero the Russians, chiefly M