THE CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-00810A002200260022-5
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RIPPUB
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S
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11
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 12, 2010
Sequence Number: 
22
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Publication Date: 
September 30, 1953
Content Type: 
REPORT
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200260022-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION COUNTRY USSR (Ukrainian SSR) PLACE ACQUIRED The Carpathian Military District This Document contains infonnsUon affect ag the Ma tlonal Defense Of the Uq$ed dtat s wi the.mean- ing of Title 18, Sections 70.9 and 7W, of th .a. Code, as amended. Its tranm 1asion or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorised person Is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form Is prohibited. REPORT 25X1 DATE DISTR. 30 Sept. 1953 NO. OF PAGES 1 REQUIREMENT NO. RD REFERENCES THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE) STATE X ARMY NAVY IX AIR x FBI AEC Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200260022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200260022-5 - R'"FOMI(Id OF 0,LC-ATH1X %;ILIT$RY.)XSTRIM 1. Introduction. 2. Gonotal. 3. The O,3orational and Strategical Situation of the Carpathian Military District, 4. Political, and. Economic,Probloms., 5. Information on location of Soviet. troops and Government institutions. ?24 .n,_. orml; Ilurir 'the first. porioa of the Soviet '-occupation of south- oasto5rn Poland the i ilitar3r Dist riot,, to iahich aolon2od the fora r Mininistrativo ROUions (in Poll.-Th ~'OJI Is!ODZTWG') of _LY 07.' (oxcvpting westv'rn.part) d'.21 'OPOL and b'T ? 1SIXAOIV - wasp officially called LWOW Military District(LVOySIa'I VOY~^ 'IY OI RUG). Later. on rho :.throe above mentioned rogr ons plus former QzachoslovakRuthenia fo=mod the Carpathian Military District (?:3II`ARPATSTM V0:' ::IZ Oi CTG) with its in L 7OL Tho orational and Strategical Situation of the Carpathian Ijiilitaar District: The Carpathian -i ilitaary District has con 1otoly difforont aoo raphica]. 'a'na stratcigical position from any other"RNostorn or Central Military District. in-Emropaan Russia. Formed from the torritnri.cs which, never bolon_od to Russia and which had. an entirely di'forent socinl,,anc adononie structure the Carpathian r .litary District is situatca: in a: gaogra hiC_gorizor between bland, zochciisJovaICid, liw!Z.ary. a.igl ~.oumania. Prom the 3eographioal point ,of view the- Iistrict =tarritory 'is ;dividdd'by the 'Carpathian range into two. parts, the Northern (formerly- Polish) and thv'-Southern (formerly Czo.choslovak).. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200260022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12: CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200260022-5 -SECRET- -C2- t.1tu:~ All Milit Districts in the USSR are graded according to their strategical 3 ire#-olasa Districts such as MOSCOW, LTATING L, . - the CAUCASUS. There are also the sown-class'districts mainly in Central Russia such as VOLGA, GOR1I or VORRIEdYEzH..' The Carpathian District appears to be placed bi the MOSCOW authorities between the first and second class Districts. As the first class Districts are the large static bases which. dispose of large numbers ;of troops and are prepared to form, maintain at~d supply a eonsido:rablo number of reserve units, being in fact not only Districts but a:Lso Army Groups (or as the Russians called thorn "Fronts"), the aooond class Central Districts liI VOR ZE,GORKtY and VOLGA are gonora.Lly oonsidored as strategical reserves of the .Supremo HQ (REZERV' GLAVNOVO ICOM41MoV,Ai,+YYA). Troops of these Districts are completely roac1y for action at any time having allnacaseary His and Supply Units ready. But they are not prepared fora largo soak formation of rosorvo troops and are not considered as supply bases, :having avery limited numbor of the rear establishment unita and supply dumps. The Carpathian District, Judging. from its supply reserves, repair dumps and workshops, appears to be placed botwoon the first and second class. Districts. Its supply dumps and repair units are of somi- static type or in other words they arc static but ready at any time to become mobile. It might-be that this difference in structure of .theCarpathian District is accounted for by the fact that a very largo percentage of teueign and hostile population lives in the District territory, and that the central authorities consider a mass formation of reserve units from the local population too clangorous for such a geographically exposed territory. On the.other hand it appears that troops of the Carpathian District pro assigned"to look after", Poland and Hungary and. 'form:a natural, link botweon the troops in-the USSR and those stationed in Hungary and Poland. Therefore the organisation of the Carpathian District is mobile and there are no essential static supply dumps whose destruction or heavy damage by local sabotage organisations could.do a great. harm to the. Soviet Armed Forces. There is one weakness, hcn7ovor,..in the operational side of preparations of the Car athian District: which was: either not quite cleared yet or also, - -somuthitlrr dogs notw~ k in is Transport and in particular roads. I The railway network in the Carpathian rdilitery District in comparison with the Soviet railways is very denso and technically well constructed and oquippod(permanent way, signal and block system, workshops oto),_'As the Soviet peace and war-time transport systoa is based almost entirely on railways it was obvious, that first of all the Soviet Government would restore the Carpathian railway network which,was heavily destroyed during the war. cBy 1950 the. reconstruction work and also conversion from the European t{o the Russian gauge had boon accomplished. Only a large number of-station buildings were still in their greater part oith?r in ruins or under reconstruction. But generally speaking in 1950 the'Carpathian District railway network was restored and tied up with the Soviet network, ready-in case, of emergency to carry all burdens of strategical transport. -SECRET- /The -1 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200260022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200260022-5 The Wea](MAR of e Carpathian District'railway network, is the Carpathian: range of mountains. For the southern centres-of the District are'connected with LWOW and the other northern first.olass junctions'oniy by three single track linos rqntiing through mountainous country with'anumber of vulnerable bridges and viar7nnta AnA shann oraAianta_ the Soviet soldiers always feel much bettor when they have safely passed these mountains, which are in fact beautiful and not so terrifying. But these throe lime crossing the Carpathian range through the UZOK Pass, SKOLE and the TARTAR Pass are roallyy vulnerable and the blowing up of a couple of bridges could completely cutoff MJKACEVO, UZHORCD and?:CHUST aa. their. "Soviet Motherla~3", damage-to these three lines would affect only a small section of the Carpathian District railways. The maid and the most important part of the 'Carpathiafrailwa network is based on the quadrangle formed by four first class junctions - LWOW, T 2 0POL, STANISLAPOW-fT and STRYJ. Serious damage to these junctions would affect traffic even beyond the Carpathian District boundaries). If the railway network is in`general restored and by Soviet standards well maintained, an entirely different position exists with the roads. `The road network in-the Carpathian District is much denser and much better than in the adjacent Soviet territories. It is based like--the r ailways onthe quadrangle LWOW, TARNOPOL; STNNISLAWOW and STRYJ. The 'roads there are ' quite solidly built. and some main road sectors, could be used s.s triple carriago-ways They ,have chiefly a gravel surf'aoe which Used'to be in quite a goocl state of repair'sand good for all types of motor transport in all seasons. There are some macadamized roads such as L 'OW-STRXJ,.,LWOW-GR?EK JAGIEIWI''S~ and further to the west; partly LWOS~-TARNOPCL highway', and some sectors of the other main.roads (e.g. CZCRTKOVJ-KOPYG DICE and others)... The highway LWOW- SSRYJ-SI{OLE-MUXACEVO BERII30VO has a gravel ?. surface south .of ~STRY.~. F . except for the highways LWCW-STRYJ and LWOW-PE MYSL which wore more or loss maintained all other roads were in a '.vary 'bad state. Of repair. the LWOW- TAWOPOL highway as a-very good. onobu-~-then gradually it became worse and worse and in 1950 was as bad as the others. The mason for this bead state-' of roads is that.-they are "maintained" in' a Soviet way or in 'other words they. not-maintained at all. The best Highway LWOW-NRn EV0, Yddch extremely bad south of LWOW. had been n-a vbrry good one, was in 1949 The mexi.mugn speed possible there was 30 . km per hour*' /J+. Political 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200260022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12: CIA-RDP80-00810A002200260022-5 Ilk -3ECl - -C4- 4. Political and Economic infornation: the Soviet Government had a number of .ifftccultice to overcome. In spite of the: different national features of_the native population and the different economic structure of both tho.Polish and Czechoslovak parts ofthv. Carpathian Military District the Russians found an identical atmosphere and identical difficulties .both north and south. of the Carpathian-Range. The Russian national policy was,:.different in the former Polish and Czech territories. In Poland they forcibly deported the greater part of the Polish population or rather they continued mass deportations which- they had stafYt'bd `in the 19 9 +1 peried. in 1945 they deported Poles to Poland and'a very considorable.number.of the Ukrainian` population ' to the USiR "In the former CzooI> territory they left the bulk of the native population considering them as Russians and therefore the n:ober.of new settlers in the Czech Part of the District leas comparatively very small. in LWOW in 1946 the deportation action was prat ica. accomp s e and a curtain number of Poles remained in the ton chiefly workers who. desperately opposed i3,oportation andvihooi`the Russians, apparently tired of'. difficulties whi,c:h they .hrl already: had with the stubborn in LWOW certain people .chiefly technicians and skilled workers wore not allowed to move to. Poland,,. In. fact after the mass deportation of .Poles the Russians changed theirpolioy.'and'as they needed the technical staff they ordered t1iQ remainder of the Polish technioians and_.sjdlled workers to'stay. almost. everywhere the Ukrainians wore partly. deported and in 1950 all villages and small towns were inhabited by the mixed Soviet and looal population. The now settlers arrived from all parts, of the USSR chiefly :froze central provinc s,(TAMBOV and VORDlr'YEZH) and from the Ukraine. Foland, mmense They arrived in L?STOW and gasp?d to see how well those Poles lived those" (PRIYE1 TALI VO LVOV I Er3ZIllULI a c KAK PRYEISRaStsO:ETI POLY.AIQ TAX T311). They found a cultured town and nearly empty. Themost,shabby flat in n r', v as such bettor than the normal accommodation in a Soviet town. (RUSSKIXE I1ASHLI GORCU =um= I PO(PI PUST45Y. SAIt?3YA z AIffi 1J YA ,KVARPIRA VO LVOVYE 3174 GOR$ZDO' LUGHSBB LXUBOY KVAI CIRY 'V SOVXPTSiai;II GCRCDAIti.) The Russians occupied empty houses arid stated to live` happily'. But very soon the Government began "to civilise" I,WOW in a, Soviet Way and in 1950-the town was a eaa as full and crowded as any other Soviet spot. But it was still incom-qparabay :bettor than er othor Sovie own. There were also in LWOiv: a largo number of Soviet Jews who arrived as new settlers and began to buy? and sell everything. Thar oocupiod chiefly all key positions in, the commercial'ontorpriseo. -SECRET- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA002200260022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/12 : CIA-RDP80-00810A002200260022-5 indifferent, they worn happy there and0 they hoped to stay there for, good. There wore however some shadows in their happiness. The main :cause of this was the fact that there'wa$,.a very strong and very deep Frontier guard belt all along the new. Polish frostier and the whole of the territory was crowded with MVD Special Troops. remained in LWOW at approx 30,. This appears to be exaggerated. The attitude of the Polish population there was and remained extremely hostile towards the Russians. It was not a ma.tter:of Communist policy but purely a national hatred. (Before 1939 LW017 had. soon Russians on once in its history = in 19].4.-15 for aprox-ton months) the local Poles were not afraid to express .their hostile foel,ings. They used to toll the Russians,opehly "Just wait, our people will come back and then they will, show you" (PCDOZHOITYE,Ni siI VYEM1UTSYA I .V1M POIUZHUT ). The attitude of the Russians was rather in the Carpathian Military District there was go scale gueri :varfare: and sabota,.ge, action there directed against the Soviet regime and the Russians.. This was officially referred to by the Russians as "the ''3h'df1Rk action" but Range thelooal.population.,.among which was a? very large percentage of Hungarians, was just as hostile towards the Russians as on the-Polish side of the Carpathians. (The population in those parts of the USSR had never soon Russians intho,i history before 1944-). the atmosphere there was even more intense than on the Polish side because there. wore, very: few nowRussi.an settlers and the local population was in agroat majority. The Hungarians in.M'tJXACEVO, UZHORCD and in other toyms-cursed the Russians openly. They-had even different prices in themarkst for-the natives and for the Russian. newcomers. There was vary little subversive activity on this side of the Carpathians. There.. were uany Jews from the USSR occupying the b.st positions in th? commercial enterprises and . trading.. Being very unpopular in their native Soviet Union the Jews in the formor-Polish and Czech territories became very pro-Russian and felt much better thorn than at home. were organised military operations on both anti-Soviet-and Russian sides. In particular larger. scale. operations took place?in.the wooded and mountainous Carpathian areas vhero the Russians, chiefly M