1. INSPECTION OF FUKIEN COASTAL AREA BY EAST CHINA DEPUTY COMMANDER 2. SHIPMENT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO FUKIEN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-00810A002700400009-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 11, 2003
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 26, 1953
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-00810A002700400009-9.pdf108.53 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80-00810A002700400009 cG ~b 3 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT 25X1A COUNTRY China 25X1 SUBJECT 1. Inspection of Fukien Coastal Area by East China Deputy Commander 2. Shipment of Military Supplies to Fukien 25X1 DATE OF INFO. 25X1X 25X1 This Document contains information affecting the Na- tional Defense of the United States, within the mean- ing of. Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited. REPORT NO. DATE DISTR. NO. OF PAGES REQUIREMENT NO. REFERENCES 26 October 1953 25X1A On 1 September 1953 SU Yu (4725/5940), deputy commander of the 3 Field Army, left Nanking for the coastal area of Fukien,,where he was to remain for three weeks before returning to Nanking. SU was accompanied by more than twenty persons, including leading cadres of the 3 Field Army Headquarters, the Political Department, and the specialized troops headquarters. Objectives of the inspection trip were as follows: a. To inspect army, airforce, and naval units, b. To inspect coastal defense works. c. To meet with cadres of army level to transmit orders from the 3 Field Army and discuss defense problems. d. To discuss with Fukien Military District officials plans for the early conquest of Chinmen (N 211-28, E 118-24) and other Nationalist-held islands.1 e. To analyze the combat experiences of Chinese Communist artillery units during the Nationalist attack on Tungshan (N 23-45, E 117-31) on 16 July. During September the Supply and Service Command of the East China Military Area loaded a total of 1,500 tons of foodstuffs and military supplies on railroad cars at Nanking and Shanghai for shipment to Fukien on the Shanghai-Hangchow and Chekiang-Kiangsu railways. These supplies, which were transshipped to Fukien by motor vehicles, included 500 tons of foodstuffs, 150 tons of arms and ammunition, 20,000 padded cotton uniforms, gasoline, medical supplies, transportation equipment, and construction supplies. In the past the Supply and Service Command had maintained a stockpile of military supplies in Fukien sufficient for 100,000 men for about three months. During July and August transportation difficulties had prevented CONFIDENTIAI% 25X1 25X STATE 25X COM AAVS E7#PACFLTS# ? CINC . FEAF CO I Approved For Release 90041 CIA-RDP80-00810A0027004000M 1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80-00810A002700400009-9 CONFIDENTIAL) 25X1 25X1A adequate supply movements and this 1,500-ton shipment was intended to return the Fukien military stockpile to its normal level. 25X1A 25X1A 1. Comment. Chinese Communist forays against several of the lightly e nor en coastal islands have already forced the Nationalists to withdraw from four of these islands; Chinese Communist activities against Chinmen have been limited to sporadic shellings and several small raids, on one of which a prisoner was taken. 25X1A Chinmen is defended by approximately 4 5.,000 Nationalist troops and the Chinese Communists are believed at present to have neither adequate forces nor a sufficient water-lift to attack the island. While the probable recent return to Central and South China of three veteran armies of the 1 Field Army from Korea will increase Chinese Communist offensive capabilities in South China, no new forces have yet been identified in Fukien nor has any large shipping concentration been noted in the Amoy area. This report, if valid, probably indicates merely the continuing resolve of the Chinese Communists to take Chinmen, rather than any ipmediate intention to attack the island. CONFIDENTIAL/ 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80-00810A002700400009-9