NATIONAL MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BRAZIL TO DISCUSS THE PROGRESS OF THE STALIN RECRUITMENT PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A003200010003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 31, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OP CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
SOURCE:
1
,A national meeting ("ativo") of secretaries of organization of State Committees
of the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) was held in Rio de Janeiro from
27 October to 1 November 1953 to review the progress of the Stalin Recruitment
Plan and to outline future steps. to be taken to bring it to completion. Also
attending this meeting were the organization secretaries of the Enterprise
Committees of the Central do Brasil Railroad) the Light., Power and Tramway
Company of Rio de Janeiro; the Public E4riployeese Union of the Federal
District; the Companhia America Fabril9 and the organization secretary of
the Enterprise Cell of the,Standard, Electric Company. This meeting was
presided over by Diogenes de Arruda Camara,, organization secretary of
the National Committee of the PCB.
The following is a set of notes containing statements made at the meeting
by Diogenes de Arruda Camaraa
SCHEME OF CONTROL OF THE STALIN RECRUITMENT PLAN
The second national meeting to organize the control of the Stalin Recruitment
Plan was very positive. Many experiences were discussed, some positive and
others negative. Once these experiences are generalized, they should be
spread rapidly throughout the Party in a simple aid accessible manner.
What is a reasonable generalization of these experiences? Such a
generalization should take into account the typical facts of Party lifes
those which are not the most common, but those which press most acutely
on the life of the Party; those which are born, and those which die; the
new and the old.
What are the conclusions which should be reached as a result of our meetings
First Conclusion
It may be observed that virtually nothing has been done to correct the
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REPORT NO. 25X1A
National Meeting of the Communist Party DATE DISTR. :31 Decemberl9.53
of Brazil to Discuss the Progress of
the Stalin Recruitment Plan NO. OF PAGES ~S
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
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weaknesses pointed out in the first national meeting to organize the control
of the Stalin Recruitment Plan suggested by the Executive Commission rf the
National Committee. We met and we discussed a great deal,, but virtually
everything continued as before. Few units put into execution the measures
and the advice given by the national directorate, and for this reason we
are not fulfilling our quotas. Everything possible and necessary in the
execution of the Stalin Recruitment Plan has not been done.
Second Conclusion
The rate of growth of the Party is not uniform, but is decreasing. tole should
have achieved 70% of the quota of the Stalin recruitment., but we have
achieved only 41% nationally. The Metropolitan Committee, which has a large
quota., has not yet reached 50% fulfillment. In many important
municipalities w':th large concentrations of workers the rate of growth is
very low. In Sac) Paulo in spite of great recruitment efforts, we have
reached only 35% of our goal. The most serious thing about this is that
the rate of growth is diminishing in the large enterprises. In the Federal
District recruitment has dropped off frc,m 100% achievement in the large
companies during April, May and June to 14% in July and September. We
should examine in every Party unit the causes of the decrease in the rate
of recruitment.l
This decrease is not normal in the life of our Party., principally when we
are carrying out a campaign, of recruitment. The Party should always
grow and should always recruit.
Experience a howl us that this growth is always in proportion to the amount
of help given by the higher units to the lower units and in proportion to the
control exercised over the units of the Party with respect to the task of
recruitment.
The capital, of Sao Paulo bad done little recruiting before being invited t
this meeting, The campaign was bogging down in that State. When they felt
that they had to render an accounting on the plan., however,, they mobilized
themselves and recruited many new members for the Party. Little has been
done to recruit women., youths? and rural dwellers in the present recruitment
campaign.
Third Conclusion
The doors of the Party still aye not open to the working class. Recruitments
are made almost always from persons already known, already matured., already
sympathizers. There are almost no examples of recruitment outside the spheres
of influence of the Party. We must not publish our newspapers only with the
idea of distributing them among the great masses but also with the idea of
preparing the necessary conditions for recruitment,
There is a lack of audacity in the recruitment which is due to our failure
to combat foreign tendencies in the Pasty., principally sectarianism. The
bad examples of the comrades of Recife., Minas Gerais, and of the Light
Company in the Federal District are evidences of this. The Party has great
prestige in the Light Company of the Federal District. This may be seen
in its quota of Cr208,000, with every favorable condition for it to be
collected and even surpassed, Nonetheless, recruitment in the Light
Company is far from taking advantage of the present possibilities in that
organization.
The Zone Committee of Aracatuba in Sao Paulo is an opposite example. The
Party there is ue:ng built into a mass movement; it is being closely
associated with the masses. In turn, this mass movement stimulates the Party
itself. Another example is that of the Maritime Zone Committee, which is
very sectarian and has not taken advantage of the exceptional conditions
created by the recent strikes for recruitment an masse. Only i2 % of its
quota has been attained. We do not utilize the delegates who have been to
the Soviet: 'anion to create propaganda about the Soviet Union and about
Socialism., which represents an important inducement for new recruits.
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These delegates could say convincingly to the working class what they
observed and. felt in the Soviet Union, where the age-old dream of humanity
in search of happiness and the predictions of the founders of scientific
Socialism have become a reality. The happy people of the U.S.S.R. have
ended the exploitation of man by man; the working class lives much better
without the capitalists.
Fourth Conclusion
Too little attention is being given to consolidating the new recruits ntooo
Party cells. For example, we recruited 150 U}ew members among the textile
workers during the recent strikes, but only 10 of them have actually been
brought into the Party. This explains the small number of rapid courses
that are being given in Party units, the lack of study circles in the cells
of the Party, the deficiency which is observed in cell meetings, and the
great number of Communists who have not done any recruiting. We are not recruiting
and consolidating the new members simultaneously.
Recruitment should be carried out b, the cells tnemselves because it is only
in that way that all cell members will c.rry out the task of recruitment
efficiently. This fact is shown by the example of Standard. Electric Company.
All new recruits should either be compelled to meet in the celluhich recruited
them until a new cell is formed, or should be transferred to another
enterprise cell or neighborhood cell. Communists should never be permitted
to remain outside of a cell and without Party tasks. A Communist not in a
cell is like a fish out of water; he dies.
Fifth Conclusion
There is little concern with consolidating the cells of the Party. Because
of this,, little attention is given to the daily problems of the cell. No
effort is made to educate, to aid politically, and to control the cell
secretaries. The cells, and principally the enterprise cells, are not taught
how to play their role of the vanguard. There is much confusion between
the role of the calla or the leaders of the working class, and the role of
the union councils or salary commissions in the enterprises.
The National Textile Conference,which was held recently, revealed serious cases
of the underestimation of the Party cells. Cell meetings have been held
with the attendance of 3, L, 5, or 6 cell members of a cell having 10, 15,
20, or more members. Examples the Ba,ngu and Carioca factory cell meetings
were attended by 4 and 6 members respectively.
The enterprise cells do not meet frequently enough because of lack of
attendance of representatives from the higher units. Months have passed
without, meetings. The Metropolitan Committee habitually fails to contact
the enterprise cells. For this reason it does not have a clear picture of
their condition and does not help them as it should. There are numerous
examples of this. The Bonsucesso District Committee has not given aid to
the enterprise cells, Not eves the Metropolitan Committee demands with
sufficient energy that the District Committees really concentrate on the
large enterprises. The same should be said. with respect to the District
Committees of theLona Norte, of Meier, and of the Zona Sul, which do not
help the enterprise cells to get out their factory poster news sheets. In
the Federal District the enterprise newspapers are edited largely by
intellectuals who are not connected with the enterprises. Factories such
as Standard, Cruzeiro, Dangu, and Nova America do not have enterprise
newspapers. The Sector newspapers, such as 0 Rolo of the textile workers, the
newspaper of the metallurgical workers, and others, are not published
regularly.
The neglect of the cells of the large enterprises is very great. The contest
stimulated by the Executive Commission of the National Committee is not being
taken advantage of. The Executive Commission established the following:
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The cell of an enterprise of more than i 000 workers obtaining the
most recruits will be allowed to have its entire secretariat attend a
course of the National. Committee;
The. political secretary of an enterprise cell of an establishment of more
than 5,000 workers who recruits the mos will, be giver, a trip to the
Soviet Union next 1 May,
The cell political secretary of an enterprise of more than 5.,00C wcrker .
who places second in the recruitment campaign will be awarded a gold
watch}, trademark Pobieda (Soviet), worth twelve thousand cruzeiros.
The comrades of the Central do Brasil Railroad of the Federal District, and
of the Prefecture of the Federal District have not yet been awakened tc the
recruitment. We come and we go? but those groups do not recruit. The
Metropolitan Committee., for its part., does riot aid them and is not taking 4be
necessary measures or the recruitment.
Sixth Conclusion
The work of the Party :still is being done by a few active members and there is
no concern with incorporating a12 the members into Party work. This is the
reason for the complaints and laments that the tasks are too many. This
happens because the laws of the Party are not respected, particularly the
supreme principle of leadership collective leadership.
That is why the assistentes3 are everything in the cells; they do and undo,,
and the cells are no , ears . It is for that reason that there is so muT.h
confusion between cell meetings and cell assemblies. The majority of
Party members are not stimulated to participate in the active life of the
cells., and with this comes the lowering of the role of the Party as an
organization of the masses.
Seventh Conclusion
The Party's method of operating is bureaurati?:. and formal.. The cells of the
Party are not contacted frequently. The tasks are not given to the bases
In a clear manner so that the tasks may not be superior to the capacity r:rf
each group. The tasks are distributed me?nanic..ally to all units with n,:,
distinction between, the peculiarities of each and the way in which each
acts. Formalism is expres jed in the hurried generalization without foundation.
What is right for one given group may not be for anot,heri what was right yesterday
may not be today; what is correct today may not, be tomorrow. Therefore; it
is necessary to end bureaucracy and fcL alis.rrz in the Party units.
Eighth Conclusion
We still do not understand that the completion of the tasks of the Party is
a law of the Party., always demanding much force and much energy. Many times
we start and than stop with the first difficulties encountered in the execution
of the tasks. We must combat this. Victory in our tasks does not come by
itself., but is won in daily struggle. That is, for example, what is
happening with Ithe 0'ampaign of Signatures of the Brazilian People in Homage
to the Great Staling which is not being pressed continuously. This is also
the case with the Metropolitan. Committee which durin a long period ceased
its attendance at the Naval Arsenal (Enterprise Cell, which up to now has
not carried out one recruitment.
If we do not understand this,, we shall stop with the first difficulties
encountered in executing the Stalin Recruitment Plan, which should be considered
by all of us as a question of honor. The tasks of the Reconstruction Plan and
all the other tasks of the Party must not be forgotten. In order to execute
them we have to get out of our lethargy. We must extirpate in all Party
groups the remains of spontaneousness, which makes dii'ficult the advance of
our work.
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Ninth Conclusion
There is little speed in combatting the deficiencies in the error's oftahe
work of the Party. In the face of these iiffi.culties, we try to wash our
hands like Pilate. We write vainglorious eulogies to ourselves on the
tasks already accomplished. In many committees of the Party difficulties
are found but not combatted. We do not learn from the lessons of other
struggles,, nor do we take measures to place ourselves at the height of
the new struggles which are opening. Wkly doer this happen? Because
.criticism and auto-criticism still do not circulate freely in all Party
groups. Some comrades here did well to cri_icize State directorates and
even the National Committee itself. The comrade from the Light Company acted
very well in criticizing his own committee. These criticisms are just
and necessary. Criticism within the bases is being initiated, although
timidly. It is lamentable that the editors of the Voz 0 eraria did not
understand and reacted wrongly to the criticism of the comrades of the
Light Company of Sao Paulo. 149 must understand that the voice of the cells
is the voice of the Party itself. It is with criticism and auto criticism
that we shall end the weaknesses in our work, and end the self-sufficiency
of teas majority of the directors of our Party. It is necessary to stimulate
auto-criticism and criticism more,, in order to start a fight against
placidness and complaceny,, which are found in many Party groups. The cadres
should be educated on the basis of criticism and auto-criticism of their
own errors.
Party experiences still are not known generally? and theyshould be the patrimony
of all the Party. Reports are made which are dry,, without life, unconnected
with reality. Mfr-itten reports are made,, but uncollectively in all state.,
municipal,, and enterprise committees. Reports are made hurriedly at Party,
meetings in a 6uperficial way because there is no collective work. The
facts are not analyzed.
Reports are not stated homogeneously. They are more a summary of the facts
than a report and are absorbed with current questions. The reports do not
have the principal elements: analysis and generalization. We know that this
is more difficult,, but it is valuable to establish a just and clear orientation
on the basis of generalized experiences in order to indicate clear
perspectives for the work of the Party.
The reports should have analysis and generalization,, criticism and auto-
criticism, and they should open perspectives for the continuity of Party work.
What does all this signify?
It signifies that we still do not understand the importance of the Party to
the victory of the Brazilian revolution,, it signifies that we do not understand
that the Party is the only proven army to conduct our people to revolution.
This is why the tasks of construction of the Party are not executed with the
tenacity that tney require.
The political tasks which we have for our goal demand new measures. Our
successes in the struggle for the conquest of power will depend on the strength
of the Party.
How may we confront this? A correct answer t` this question embraces the whole
work of construction of the Party. Few committees present measures for the
completion of the Stalin Plan. The Metropolitan Committee has nothing; to
indicate what concrete measures it plans to take to achieve victory in the
Stalin Plan,, although there is every favorable condition for this. Others
say that their plan is not good,, but they do not say what they are going to
do to improve it. Our theme should be the theme of the Bolshevist Party,
resolutions must be executed.
To complete the Stalin Plan five measures are necessary,
1. Give more aid and control to the completion of the tasks of the Stalin
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Recruitment Plan.
2. Intensify the responsibility of every Communist toward Party affairs.
3. Elevate the will to work and the combativeness of all Party groups.
4. Improve the organizational work of the Party among the masses.
,5. Increase the rate of execution of the tasks of the Party.
Let us examine each one of these measurers
1. More aid and more control is necessary in the bases of the Party. The control.
should be systematic and should be exercised by the most capable members
of the directorates who should contact the bases more frequently and assist
concretely on the political and ideologics.l planes. This must be done in
order that there may be no repetition of the incidents which occurred in the
Prefecture of the Federal District and in the public transportation company
of Sao Paulo., where there is little aid and control. We should examine
why some cells grow and others stagnate and disappear. The example of the
cell of the Light Company described here shows us that., where care is taken
of the Party,, the Party is strengthened.. If some units of the Party do not
grow but are weakened, it is because the tasks are not planned and not
controlled. The plans established in all the units should be completed from
the beginning to the and.
2. We must find new ways to elevate the capacity for initiative of all Party
members. In connection with this,, the observations made here by the
comrade from the Light Company of Rio are just. It was because of them that
we referred to the cell of the Light Company,, which perhaps has suffered
least of all the country from the illegality of the Party. It is necessary
to establish some conditions for Communists without which the limits of the
Party will remain undetermined. These s.atu ory conditions should be
observed.,,and the leaders of the Party should take care to see that this is
done. To do otherwise is to confuse ourselves as a mass organization. The
Party cannot be taken lightly? as a ometziing to be entered and left at will.
It should be a fortress of the proletariat. Our principles should be
observed. Each member of the Party is responsible for the wiiole Party;, and
the Party is responsible for each one of its members.
3. We must stimulate the wil..l b work and the aa,ombativeness of the Party,
particularly of the enterprise cells. The organizations of the Party should
have their own life and Initiative, and for this it is necessary to do the
following
a. Make the cells understand their mission of being the vanguard and their-
tasks of connecting the working class to the units of the -'arty, and of
winning the great masses to the political line of the Party. The cells
should be attentive to the feelings of the masses. The calla should
recruit new members for the Warty and collect monthly wontributi.on,e fr?orm.
all. The cells should organize political study and develop critinism
and auto-criticism.
be Educate the secretariats of the cells,
is the key to success to make them good leaders. This
.
c. Generalize and circulate the experiences of the cells. (For example;,
cite the cases of Standard, of the Light Company, and of Mocangue+,, which
managed to multiply the number of their Party members and to connex.,
them to the mass. They acted with audacity and without sectarianism in
linking their groups with the masses. The secretariats of these cells
met frequently, almost every day, and carried with great mobility
their day by day tasks to all the cell. members. d'hey controlled the
execution of the tasks and helped the comrades who had the least
experience. Because of this,, the Party multiplied its members in these
enterprises and increased the circulation of Voz 0 eraria. In Mocangue
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they carried out partial paralyzations in protest against the
imprisonment of a comrade by the reaction. This did not give the enemy
the opportunity to react against the Party because there the Party is
tied to the masses and is organized into union councils in all sections
of the enterprise,)
It is necessary to improve the work of the Party among the masses in order
to organize them, Any task of the Party should reflect the interests of
the masses. To do this the method of persuasion should be used with respect,
to the masses., because it is impossible to advance without convincing the
masses., and it is impossible to convince them without demonstrating? Without,
this we shall not win the masses to the orientation of the Party.
It is necessary to increase the rate of work on the Stalin Recruitment Plan.
We must work with tenacity a, passion., and love. We most follow the example
of the district Committee of Osasco in Sao Paulo, which in three months hui'
the Party in all the enterprises. All the members of this District Committee
contribute to the Party. Another positive example is found in the cities of
Jundiai and Santos., Sao Paulo,, where things were not going well. We must
combat liberalism in the Party., personal and collective irresponsibility.,
and stagnation of the work. Where the tasks are not progressing., they must
be stimulated. Stimulate in every way the initiative of the bases and the
members.
In order to increase the rate of work we. need a new work style, We -must keep
the fundamentals in constant view and remember that the construction of the
Party must be concentrated in the large enterprises, Each Party group
should have its policy of concentration., whether it be for the construction
of the Party or to work in an organization of the masses. In short,, it is
necessary to give a revolutionary impulse to the Stalin Plan. Only thus may
we reach the end of the plan with the stipulated tasks successfully completed.
Another important question which should preoccupy us is the question of the
instability which may be noted in the directorates of the Party within the
Federal District, It is necessary to combat trais instability because it
generates instability within the Party itself.
We do not, understand that we must work collectively. We have a false idea
that it is the individuals and not the groups of the Party which rescIve
everything, We must work well with the groups of the Party. We must work
collectively in the directorates of the Party. We must adopt the method
of criticism and auto-criticism so that., as we have seen in practice,, it
will not be necessary for us to make changes in the directorates.
Fas cations
Be Included in the Stalin Recruitment Plan
1. Stimulate the recruitment of women in each district with special competition.
The National Committee is establishing a spe~,ial prize for the State Committee
which recruits the most women aid organizes the most feminine cells. The
Metropolitan Committee will institute the "Zelia Magalhaesn prize.
2, Stimulate the recruitment of farmers and rural dwellers in the districts.
The National Committee will give a mimeograph machine to the State CommitteR
which recruits and organizes the greatest number of rural dwellers.
3. Include the sale of our newspapers (five copies of Voz 0 eraria for each member).,
and of our books and pamphlets, in the recruitment _PMs o district
committees and cells of the Party. Provide for the creation of libraries in
the districts and in the cells and the creation of enterprise newspapers
in the enterprises of more than 500 workers.
1, Zuke a part of district and enterprise cell plans the obligatory organization
of union councils in the enterprises of more than 500 workers.
5. Encourage district committees and cells to hold courses of short duration and
to create circles of study in the bases., particularly in the bases in the
enterprises.
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6. Hold during the first part of December the Metropolitan Conference of cells
of metallurgical enterprises of more than 2400 workers.
Suggestions
1, Hold semi-monthly control meetings in each district.
2. Make a controlled check on recruitment an obligatory part of the order of the
day at meetings of all Party groups until the end of the recruitment campaign.
3. Hold control meetings on the recruitment campaign'in the enterprises of ea:h
dietr ict.
24. The Metropolitan Committee should hold, by 30 November, a control meeting on
the recruitment campaign in the enterprises of more than 2,000 workers.
5. Organize and plan the propaganda of the Stalin Recruitment with registrations,,
banners, and handbills.
25X1A Comments.
The quota for the Federa' District is 50,000 points, according to the
point system set out in a previous report. In the Maritime Zone Committee.,
for example, 109000 poinaes correspond to 334 new recruits. On this basis
it might be calculated that the Federal District, has a quota of five times
this figure, or 1,670 new recruits, however, it is not known whether
recuperated former members were included in the Maritime Committee figures.
Also-, it is likely that the average recruit in the Federal District will
have less point value than the average recruit in the maritime industry,
since recruitment in the Federal District is general in nature and
includes intellectuals, women, and youths. Thus it seems likely that
the, number of persons to be recruited in the Federal District is actually
considerably more than 1,670.
2. This probably refers to the quota to be collected in the Campaign for
Fifteen Million Cruzeiros.
3.
Persons from higher Party units who attend meetings of lower units for
purposes of guidance and control.
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