ATTITUDE OF NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TOWARD THE ARMISTICE AND UNIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A003600180005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 16, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002/02/05 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA003600180005-8
266
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY Korea
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
SUBJECT Attitude of North Korean Government
Officials toward the Armistice and
25X1 A Unification
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES 3
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
SOURCE:
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la Ifi April 1951 the North Korean army and the Chinese Communist forces fully
expected to retake Seoul with amass counteroffensive. When they failed, they
realized that, for the time being, they would have to abandon hopes of unifying
the country through the conquest of South Korea. By June 1951 North Korea was
steady for an armistice even if it meant.Taking.humiliECting concessions. In
July 1951 Brigadier;. general CHANG So-uin vice..chief of the Foreign Political
Intelligence Section, Ministry of Social' Security (I S)', aq,id that the de-
marcation line after the armistice would probably be chase to Sinmak (N 38-25,
E 126-14.) (BT-5855). Shortly after this statement, CHANG dud several of his
men made frequent trips to the Sinmak area., presumably to observe and direct
fortifications and to establish their headquarters for intelligence activities
along the demarcation line. During August and September'1951'the headquarters
and military units of the MSS Foreign Political Intelligence Section were trans-
ferred to PTyongyang from the nearby hills, and the sending of espionage agents
to South Korea was temporarily discontinued. At some time in the fall of 1951
CHUG was relieved of his post and sent to Moscow to attend a political academy.
He was replaced by Brigadier General KIM TQng-su (6855/2639/3178)3 who had
direct contact with the Soviet Advisors to,the 'MSS.. KIN had spent 20 years in
the Soviet Union and was a member-of the'. Soviet Communist PP,rty. In. December
1951 KIM said that if North Koreans felt they could win thewar, they would not
sue for peace, but unfortunately they needed to negotiate for a brefithing spell.
Also in December 1.951 Major General KIM Yang-Chun (6855/53,8/0193), then chief ,..
of the Foreign Political Intelligence Section, stated that the armistice would
actually take place, but the important thing to remember was that it Would be
only an armistice, not a peace treaty. He said that the North Korean army was
much larger than the mere 100,000,_or 200,000 man army as was generally believed',
and that unification would not be delayed 5 or 10 years as-might be expected, but
was imminent. Also in December KIM I1-soi.g wag reported to have said in a cabinet
meeting that 1952 would be a year of construction and rehabilitation and that the
following 3 years would be spent in rebuilding.
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2. In June 1952 Lieutenant General KIM Ch'un-sam (6855/504/0005),5 vice-minister
of the MSS said that the armistice would definitely take place despite the
opposition of United States capitalists who had profited by the war and wished
it to continue. He said that international opinion ind American public senti
ment were against continuation of the war. He also stated that after the ar-
mistice GermOny would become the center of international controversy and, there-
fore, Koreans should study the German situation which was far more vital and
significant than many Koreans realized.
3. In.May 1953 Minister of Internal Affairs PANG H~,k-se (2455/1331/0013), predicted
that the armistice would take place very soon and said. .that the fact that the
United States had to ask a fighting nation as small as Korea for an armistice
was the greatest shame in American history. It -t"a$ also 'evidence, he added,
that the "democratic" people of the world would ultimately eme'ge victorious.
KIM Chun-sam agreed that the armistice was not a peace treaty and that the
unification of Korea was imminent. He said that the Korean problem, as well
as that of the whole world, would probably be solved.n the near future; the
Korean war was a test of both "our" strength and.that.of the Unite3-States
He said that if North Korea's "Big Brother"' took part in'the conflict, there
was no question as to who would be victorious.-28 July 1953`Brigadier
General STM an8 vice-chief of the Foreign Political Intelligence Section,
said, however, that even though the armistice had been signed, Korea would be
divided for a few years 25X1 A
SECR T/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
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Approved For Release 2002/02/05 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA003600180005-8