POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR AFTER STALIN'S DEATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A003900670010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 25, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP80-0081OA003900670010-5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18. Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY
SUBJECT Political Developments in the USSR
after Stalin's Death
REPORT
DATE DISTR. 25 June 195+
NO. OF PAGES 2
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
1. The crisis which had been precipitated in the Soviet Union by the death of
Stalin and the premature culmination of the conflict between Beriya and
Malenkov is still very much in the fore. Although Malenkov succeeded in
breaking the neck of Beriya, the crisis remains much more acute than is
generally known. Notwithstanding perpetual purges, a large number of partisans
of Beriya continue to hold responsible positions and, for the time being,
Malenkov dares not liquidate them.
2. Malenkov's position depends to some extent on Khrushchev, who controls the
Party and who may be regarded as the future strong man of the Soviet Union.
3. The Army still maintains a wait-and-see attitude. As.in the Government, there
are two distinct trends in the Army; one desires collaboration with the Germans,
the other is afraid of them.
?.,. The removal of Beriya and the apparent inability speedily to liquidate his
partisans have produced much internal weakness in the Soviet Urlion and this
will continue for some time. As a result of the destruction of Beriya's police
clique, the most efficient weapon of oppression of the regime has been shaken
to the core and is, at least temporarily, no longer in a position to enforce
the former iron discipline and internal order.
5. Malenkov's pan-Russian tendencies are provoking resistance among the Asiatic
nations of the Soviet Union. Beriya was an Asiatic - a Georgian.
6. Compared with,Staltri, Malenkov is a mere nobody. This in turn has made MAO-Tse-tung
much more important in comparison. As the founder of Communist China, he
might even assume the role of leader of World Communism.
7. Whatever turn events may take in the near future, for the time being Malenkov
is weak. He needs nothing so much as time to regain his breath and, if possible,
some success in foreign policy to boost his position. He is afraid of war.
Should he, however, succeed in gaining control of the situation, he will start
to pulj the regime tooggether in the comin year to fQrtif his position among
the Se. ellites, and tai launch a more aggieBeiv& foreign policy.
(Netei Washington Distribution Indicated by 11111 Field Distribution
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP80-0081OA003900670010-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP80-0081OA003900670010-5
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8. It is,therefore,a great mistake to strengthen Malenkovts prestige by various
offers of non-aggression pacts or other agreements. What is still more serious
is the sense of insecurity and confusion such offers create among the oppressed
nations, as well as mistrust towards the West. That, in turn, paralyzes re-
sistance in the satellite countries.
9. It is clear that,if Malenkov should succeed in consolidating his position
enough to launch an aggressive foreign policy by, next year, it would kill
all centrifugal tendencies among satellite governments (especially in Czecho-
slovakia) and greatly reduce resistance among the oppressed nations.
SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/20: CIA-RDP80-0081OA003900670010-5