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December 22, 2016
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June 5, 2009
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April 23, 1954
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Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA004000060010-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT This Document contains information affecting the Na- tlonal Defence of the United States, within the mean- ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person Is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited. SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY COUNTRY USSR (Tyumen Oblast) SUBJECT Soviet Concentration Camps in the Vdrkuta Area DATE OF INFO. REPORT. DATE DISTR. 23 April 1954 NO. OF PAGES 3 REQUIREMENT NO. RD REFERENCES THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE) 25X1. 1. The commander of the concentration camp complex in the Vorkuta (N 66-22, E 70-06) area is an MVD officer, Major General Derevyankina . The political officer at Camp No. 14 is Senior Lieutenant Kech. The following are among the camp personnel at Camp No. 2s Major Malikov, Camp Commander Major Dikhtyaryov, Assistant Camp Commander Captain Makhalov, Supply Officer Captain Pokhomov; MVD Representative (Upolnomochennyy MVD) Senior Lieutenant Prokhorov, MVD Representative Senior Lieutenant Kalikin, Administrative Officer Sergeant Major Miehinko, Assistant to the MVD'Repreeentatives Sergeant Major Kiri~ova (female), Head of the Medical Unit.' 25X1 one camp, since many camps were located within a few kilometers-of each other:. Apparently, single guard units were responsib a or guar ng more . I .y_ 3. The city of Vorkuta,haa a. population of approximately 60,000 people. Vorkuta.has ,numerous new cultural buildings. The,city is ringed with concentration camps, the prisoners being employed principally in coal mines. There are, however, also 'other enterprises such as brickyards, sawmills d a c ent factory, which also empl prisoners of ' the area. The. cain numbers 1 ranged from 1 to 25X1 6o. Camp Nad.' '1, 2?, 3, 9,r,, ?9,,k X ! 55, and 60; possibly some of these camps are in an area other than the Vorkuta' area, (See sketch of the Vorkuta camp area on page 3.) 4. Camp No, 2 is located approximately 20 kilometers north of Vorkuta on a single- track railroad line. The camp is for political prisoners only. In December 1953 there were 2s7O0 prisoners at this camp. This camp operated one mine shaft, No. 7. The prisoners worked in the mine 12 hours a day, although the official work-day was nine hours. Crude mining methods were employed. SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY X ARMY X NAVY X AIR X FBI AEC Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA004000060010-0 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA004000060010-0 SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY The following nationalities were represented among the prisoners at Camp No. 2: Western Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians,, Estonians, Russsiana, Germans (includ_ in Vol a Germans) Moldavians- Chechens Georgians. Armenians un arians Pole,, apanese, and Chinese. Of the Germans, 120 were from erg as opposed to the Volga Germans. Ten of the 120 Germans were repatriated There were approximately 100 Russians in the camp. The Western Ukrainians and the Lithuanians were by far the largest two national groups at this camp, There were no Koreans at this camp. 6. There were among the prisoners at Camp No. 2 many who had been sentenced-for collaboration with or service in the German Army during World War U. There were, however,, no Vlassc-vites at this camp. Except for the Western Ukrainians, who were called Zapadniki (Westerners) in camp, the various Soviet nationalities got along well togefFer.r There was, however, some discrimination against the Germans by the Soviet nationalities, particularly, from former-collaborators who claimed that the Germans had let them down. The Western Ukrainians were clannish and nasty to all other, nationalities. There were a great number of informers among the Western Ukrainians. 7. From the beginning of 1952, the prisoners began to receive pay for their work and their rations were improved. Until August 1953, they received 100 rubles per month in cash and another 100 rubles were credited to their accottt. This money could be spent in the camp canteen. After August .1953, as the result of a strike (covered below) the prisoners? pay was raised to 150 rubles per month in cash and an equal amount was credited to their account. 8. The daily food ration at this camp for the prisoners was as follows: 200 grams of oat meal, 650 grams of soup, 23 grams of meat, 27 grams of sugar, 800 grams of bread, 50 grams of white rolls, and 20 to 25 grams of fa-t. The above ration was know as the "northern ration" (severny~die ok) and was much larger than the rations in concentration camps artier to' the rt was also more substantial than the average daily food consumed on many kolkhozy. Persons who refused to work had their daily ration reduced to 350 grams of bread and soup. 90 Motion pictures were occasionally shown to the prisoners. The frequency with which movies were shown depended upon the prisoners' achievement of production norms. There were loudspeakers in all barracks buildings. Newspapers and books were also available to the prisoners. 10. The guard personnel wore red shoulder boards with blue piping. Some troops with dark blue shoulder boards occasionally appeared for special checks. The interior guard consisted of-middle-aged guards who were friendly to the prisoners. The exterior guard personnel were much younger and unpleasant. 11. There were 5,000 prisoners at Camp No. iLt. One of the prisoners was an old Trotsky- ite who had been a prisoner since 1932. This camp contained a power plant. All particulars on this camp such as food rations, pay, attitude of Western Ukrainians, recreational facilities,, etc., are similar to those at Camp No. 2. 12, There, was no sign of organized anti-Soviet activity in the prison camp. On the basis of observations made at Camp No. 2 it is clear that prisoners were afraid to discuss politics because of the existence of informers among the prisoners. There were probably groups of friends among the prisoners who trusted each other and per- haps discussed political subjects. There were two young Russian prisoners in Camp No. 2 who had been sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for distributing anti-Soviet leaflets in Moscow. It is not known whether these men any organization and what sort of leaflets they had distributed. SECRET/CONTROL .,. US OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA004000060010-0 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA004000060010-0 SECRET/CONTROL, - US OFFICIALS ONLY -3- 13. Stalin's death did not bring about any improvements in the prison camps, judging from observations in Camp No. 2. kctually,the guards became worse. Improvements had been introduced a year earlier. Judging from extremely limited political conversations,riothing good was expected from Malenkov by the prisoners. Thp post-Stalin amnesty affected prisoners with five-year terms only, but it did include political prisoners in this category. In general, prisoners who were released had to remain in the Vorkuta area, but some released prisoners with families were sent to free exile settlements in Siberia and Central Asia. The prisoners learned of the 17 June riots in East Germany through Soviet newspapers and loudspeakers in July. Some of the prisoners expected immediate war and thought that arms would be dropped to them by the Americans. 14. As a result of Beriya's arrest a general strike by the prisoners in the Vorkuta area took place, lasting from 22 July to 1 August 1953. Camps No. 2, 3, 114, 29, 30, and possibly others were involved in the strike. The strikers insisted that, since Beriya had been denounced as a traitor and a foreign agent, they were being held illegally, as they had been arrested by Beriya. Soviet citizens demanded immediate release or transfer to free exile areas. Foreigners demanded repatrimtion or transfer to PW camps. Major General Derevyankin'as well as another high MVD official came to Camp No. 2 and probably other camps to talk to the prisoners. The result of the strike was a cutting down of the work-day to, nine hours, the removal of numbers from uniforms, higher pay (see paragraph 7), and the removal of certain restrictions. In some camps there was violence on the part of the guards who tried to force the prisoners to go back to work, but this was not the case at Camp No. 2. The strike wasviewed as a great success for the prisoners. 15. 16. Germans were released before the completion of their,sentences. They were repatriated to Germany by train traveling a somewhat circuitous route. ,Leaving Vorkuta, the train proceeded through Enta,, Ukhta (N 63-314, E 53-42), Kotlas (N 61-16, E`146-35), Voroahiloirgr&d (N 148-314, E 39-20), and then west to Brest-Litovsk (N 52-07, E 23-42). In the early part of the journey they traveled on a separate prison train; later, through Brest-Litovsk and Poland,their car was hitched on to regular passenger trains. Diagram of Camp Area SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA004000060010-0