SOVIET POLICY AND INTENTIONS IN EUROPE AND IN THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004000150005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 16, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA004000150005-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 111, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its 1;ransmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The :reproduction of this form is prohibited.
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
16 April 195+
NO. OF PAGES 4
REQUIREMIENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
Europe
1. The events of 17 June 1953 in East Germany disclosed the falseness of Soviet
propaganda affirmations that the East Germans were satisfied with Communist
policy, and revealed the true nature of the "friendliness" of the Germans for
the Soviet Union. Only the presence of Soviet troops and the use of force kept
the East Germans from going further. Were the Germans to be allowed freedom of
action, or, more accurately, should there be no interference in German behavior
in East Germany, the Grotewohl-Ulbricht government would be swept aside and the
leaders, Ulbricht.first of all, would be killed by the Germans. There were
rumors and also definite information to this effect in Modcow. at the'titie.
Beriya made the following statement to a special MVD commission which he sent to
Germany to investigate the disturbances of 17 June: "Socialism in Germany is non-
sense. A German is used to having white bread with butter every morning; instead,
we are offering him socialism!"
2. After 17 June, the Grotewohl-Ulbricht government announced a so-called "new line"
Which consisted of the following:
a. Halting forcible consolidation of farms into agricultural cooperatives, a form
of collectivization of agriculture.
b. Relaxing.of measures against private owndrship.
c. Attempting to reduce the flow of refugees from East Germany through the measures
listed in (a) and (b), and through the return of confiscated property to persons
who had previously fled.
SECRET
STATE X ARMY
Soviet Policy and Intentions in Europe
and in the Far East
NAVY
FBI AEC
25 YEAR
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d. Lowering of production norms at industrial enterprises and similar measures.
The Soviet Government was forced to sanction all these measures despite its dis-
like of them, Furthermore, in order to resolve the problem of Germany in general
and to prevent further disturbances such as those of 17 June, the Soviet Union
was forced to agree to a Four-Power Conference in Berlin,
3. The East Germans, naturally, hoped for some results from the conference; and their
attitude toward the Soviets and the East German Government, during the period from
the June disturbances to the opening of the conference, was outwardly, and to
some extent genuinely, loyal. Since the Berlin Conference did not produce an
agreement on the German problem, the Soviets gave "greater independence" to
East Germany. The Fourth Congress of the SED was called in order to announce
future plans to the Germans and to report, in general, on the results of the
Berlin Conference,
4+. Since the Soviet attempt to.estrange France from its Western Allies was not success-
ful, and the Soviet plan to set up a united German government first and to hold
elections afterwards was not accepted, the Soviets applied for admission into NATO
for the purpose of destroying it from within and isolating the United States,
It must be added that, in introducing the proposal for the creation of an all-
German government first and holding the elections afterwards, the Soviets had a
long-range plan aimed at tying a united Germany to the Soviets and eventually
alienating it from the United States. It was believed that this would bring about
an American withdrawal from Europe under pressure from the European powers. The
Soviets envisioned that the next step would be the engendering of dissension among
European powers and that they would finally fall, one by one, under Soviet
domination in the guise of liberation of the peoples of Europe from cap,dtalistic
slavery. In effect, this would follow the pattern established in the countries
of Eastern Europe and China and-pow followed in Korea and Indo-China.
5. The Soviet Union achieved the following results at the :Berlin Conference:
a. No changes were made in the situation with regard. to Germany and Austria,
which was what the Soviets wanted. In other words, Soviet troops are to
remain in East Germany and Austria, the countries which are, in effect,
Jumping-off areas for possible military action. The occupation troops
also serve the purpose of guarding the satellite nations so that the latter
would sense the presence of Soviet "support" behind their backs.
c. The third Soviet achievement at the Berlin Conference is that Communist
China has been invited to the Geneva Conference, at which the problems of
Indo-China and Korea will be discussed.
6.
7. According to present-day Communist doctrine, colonial and dependent peoples are
waging a struggle for liberation against their oppressors; and, in order to
demonstrate to the world the validity of this doctrine, the struggle must go on
continually. If the Communists fail in Korea, then the struggle in Indo-China
must be stepped up; should the effort there also fail, the struggle must be
started somewhere else, for example, invasion of Formosa in order to get rid of
CHIANG Kai-shek. In any case, a struggle must always be in evidence in order to
show the world that the colonial peoples, supposedly inspired by the example of
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8. At the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union and Communist China can be expected
to attempt to force France to quit Indo-China. Failing this, they will seek
to continue the present fighting. As a last resort, they may agree to the
creation of the same kind. of demarcation line as that existing in Korea, but
this would be a temporary measure only.
9. With regard to the Korean question, Communist China, by pre-
arrangement with the Soviet Union, will be placed in the role of spokesman for
the Communist bloc, while the USSR will support the position of Communist
China and North Korea with regard to the Korean question
sts.
25X1
Should the Geneva Conference be success-
ful, that is, should the question of Korea and Viet Nam be settled, then China
would immediately embark upon an invasion of Formosa,
10. Soviet leaders are convinced, and leading members of the Soviet Government have
so stated, although in restricted official circles, that the fact that China now
has a Communist government does not mean that the battle for China has been won.
On the contrary, the most important and the biggest phase of the battle for
China lies ahead. The capture of Formosa, by Communist China, was originally
planned for the spring of 1953. or, at the latest, 1954. The implementation of
this plan was delayed by events in Korea and even more so by the death of
Stalin. Stalin could instruct MAO Tse-tung directly with regard to Formosa,
asking him how long the "nuisance" there would continue and predicting that
Communist China would enjoy greater prestige once Formosa, and,CRIANG Kai-shek
were removed from the international scene. Comments to ,his effect were .made by
members of the Central Committee of the CPSU when MAO Tse-tung and his delega-
tion were in Moscow before Stalin's death.
11. The present Peking government, and specifically MAO, enjoys greater independence
now than during Stalin's lifetime. In the future this independence will be con-
tinually growing without endangering friendly relations with the USSR, inasmuch
as Communist China receives considerable economic aid from the USSR, especially
technical and military aid, the patter in the form of training, advisory, per-
sonnel, and war materiel. There are more Soviets in Communist China than in the
satellites. Those Soviets who return from China say that the Chinese are very
close andfrdendly to the Soviets. China, further, is at present isolated from
the capitalist world., Some leading figures in the Centrs,l,,C=mittee of the
CPSU made unequivocal statements to the effect that,after the death of Stalin,
the first place in the Communist movement should be occupied by MAO. Any line
followed by the Soviet Government, in foreign. as well as In Internal ,policies,
will leave its mark on the policy of the Peking Government and on this would
depend the authority of the USSR in Communist China.
12. Changes of Soviet envoys in Chin,--Panyushkin, Kuznetsov, and then Yudin--did
not have a favorable reaction in Peking, although Yudin, as a leading Communist
theoretician, has a. greater stature than either of the other two and is a
typical Central Committee representative. Kuznetsov probably went to China
because he had been there before and had met MAO; Yudin, more solid and intelligent,
is, however, better qualified for the job and would serve the Soviet cause much
better. Yudin has had no prior work in Far Eastern Affairs. A former editor of
Bolshevik, he has worked with the Cominform in Bucharest.
13. Soviet officials did not believe the Soviet Union would r the Korean War 25X1
The Soviets would
nave 'inued to give only material support to the Chine8e. The Chinese had
not wanted to enter the Korean War but were pressured into doing so by the Soviets.
ere h
d b
--
a
een a garde conference between the Soviet 25X1
Union and Communist China on the question of whether or not the Chinese should enter.
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