THE KOREAN WAR AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004000290008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 16, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/04/30: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA004000290008-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY USSR (Far East)/Korea/China
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
DATE OF INFO.
3.
4.
Korean War
the UN forces had succeeded in occupying, all of Korea. The Soviets realized
that active intervention would have meant the start of the Third World War,
for which they were in no sense prepared. Soviet involvement in the Korean
War was limited to staff planning and operational guidance (exercised through
a special Soviet headquarters in Manchuria), the assignment of pilots, and, of
course, the.;, ,protrAdjon of military supplies.
16 April 1954
the Soviet Government never had any intention of ac-
yarTaci,pammng in Korean War, and would not have done so even if
resentatives were sent from Moscow to 25X1
Peiping to discuss the Korean conflict after the failure of the original cam-
paign and the advance of the UN forces to the Yalu.
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN, THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
the Korean War was originally a purely Soviet-North Korean
affair an , with the Chinese kept au courant, there was no question of
Chinese participation until the UN advance Yalu River. Special rep-
the North Korean attack was launched on specific Soviet 25X1
instructions. The basic assumption was that the US would not react and would
not send troops into Korea. In this connection, the Soviets were fully aware
that the only American troops in the Far East were the two poorly-equipped,
poorly-trained, and under-strength divisions then stationed in Japan. The Soviets,
then, had counted on a blitzkrieg that would have been won before the US could
intervene effectively, even had the US intended to do so. The unexpected US
intervention and the consequent successes of the UN forces in autumn and winter
1950 vitiated the Soviets' original plans and placed the USSR in a most embarrassing
position.
the following: a) the ac a e war was imposing an excessive strain on
the Soviet economy, and b) that the Soviets wanted to regain face,by suggesting
STATEE y I X I ARMY X NAVY X
SECRET
the initiative for beginning armistice negotiations in Korea 25X1
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an armistice. Another possible reason may have been that it was hoped that
the initial armistice talks would give the Chinese and North-Koreans a breathing-
spell that could be used to re-group their forces for a new attack.
5. whether the Army, the Party, or the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was the most critical of the handling of the Korean War. However, there 25X1
were two schools of thought within the General Staff: one held that the whole
war had been miserably botched, while the other felt that the war was going as
well as could be expected and that the U .'N would eventually be defeated
in the field. The latter was the more general view.
6. the Soviet diplomatic representation in North Korea did 25X1
not play any significant role during the Korean War. The Soviet representa-
tives simply passed on the Moscow directives to KIM Il-sung. Captain Anatoliy
Erastovich Vasilyev, former member of the MVD rezidentura attached to the North
Korean Government,, when the North Korean Government fled across
the border into Manchuria in , the Soviet Embassy fled with it and was more 25X1
or less scattered in the general rout. Vasilyev also stated that Colonel Ivan
Alekseyevich Vashkin, MVD rezident attached to the North Korean Government, was
severely disciplined for abandoning his post without permission during the 1950
retreat,
7. KIM 11-sung visited Moscow in 19+9 as the head of a North Korean delegation.
On at least o n-Asion while he was there he had a personal conversation
with Stalin. im ortant decisions
had been reached. 25X1
after the start of the Korean War, that they may we have een
connected with the eventual 'North Korean attack.
8.
Sino-Soviet Relations
the Soviet leaders do not trust fully the Chinese and the
North Korean leaders, but has no information n the possibility of differences
the Chinese and Soviets.
while the Soviets insist that the C nese turn over to ,em a ypes
a
of information they possess, the Soviets in turn give the Chinese no more than
they have to.
9.
the Chinese 25X1
--
because of the naval blockade by the US Seventh Fleet. the 25X1
US naval blockade was considered by the Soviets as a very shrewd move.
had planned to attack Formosa in 1950. Although the Chinese laced enough
landing craft and other vessels, it was the opinion of both the Soviets and
Chinese themselves that a successful attack on Formosa could be ,made using a
25X1
Chinese plans in southeastern Asia
when the Soviets recognized the Viet Minh reg me, a military m ss on
an n e Bence personnel were sent from Moscow to make a study of the situation.
Several meetings i etween Ho Cii i Minli arel- tom '?" viet E `:tli.n,
were held on Soviet territory, Ho 25X1
Ch:ih r'.,Lih often ;meld meetings witi Kku T11se-tuns; somewhere n Ina.
Approved For Release 2009/04/30: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA004000290008-8