CONSCRIPTION AND MOBILIZATION IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004200490005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 20, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002/07/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA004200490005-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
Conscription and Mobilization in
the USSR
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COUNTRY USSR
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This Document contains Information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of Its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form Is prohibited.
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
20 May 1954
NO. OF PAGES 2
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1$ TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
1. Each Oblast, rayon, and city in the USSR had a voyenkomat, In all large
cities, such as Leningrad, Kiev, etc, there was a voyenkomat in each division
or section. For example, each rayon within Moscow had a rayonkomat, whose activities
were controlled by the Moscow Municipal Komisariat. In addition, each Oblast
had an Oblast komisariat which controlled the activities of the voyenkomaty
in, the entire Oblast, including those in the rayony, in the small towns, and
in the cities. The military manpower procurement activities of the entire
Soviet Union were under the control of these organizations.
20 The voyenkomaty were not responsible for labor recruitment. Persons recruited
for labor were usually very young, sometimes as young as ten years of age, and
the voyenkomaty were concerned only with individuals 17 years of age or older.
Persons called up for labor service were generally recruited for trade schools
(remes.lenniye uchilishcha), in which they were taught trades and professions.
3@ In 1950, the central office for the entire conscription system for the city
of Moscow was located in the Moscow Military District headquarters. This
conscription office of the Moscow Military District was responsible for and
controlled all voyenkomaty and 'komisariats in Moscow Oblast, the city of
Moscow, and the districts of the city of Moscow. All voyenkomaty were directly
responsible to this office. This office was large and employed many people
(number and details of operation unknown to source).
!. The chairman of each voyenkomat was responsible to the Section on Mobilization
of the Moscow Military District, which in turn was responsible to the command
of the Moscow Military District
.
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5? A system similar to that of the Moscow Military District was employed in the
Other military districts and rayony.
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Reach voyenkomat had its own mobilization plan and was charged with the task of
providing the required number of men for military service in the event of general
mobilization. The chief in charge of each voyenkomat was responsible for pre-
paring this mobilization plan. The plan for each voyenkomat was in accordance
with the plan of the komat to which it was subordinate, and any modification
or alteration of the plan for the cities or districts was incorporated in the
plan for each individual voyenkomat.
he job of commissioner of a voyenkomat was very important. X1A
an that preparation of the mobilization plan was extremely difficult,,
does not recall the name of the office which wars at the top of the administrative
hierarchy for the voyenkomaty, but 0 it may have been the Ministry of 25X1 A
Defense, and this top office made continual checks on the status
of the mobilization plan of each voyenkomat.
In the event of a general mobilization in the USSR, I Imen
between the ages of 17 through 50 would. be called In To service-7-7771s is in.
contrast to the age limitation for normal. military service, which embraces
the 18 through 4+5 age group.
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an increase in military activity within the Soviet Union
can be readily determined by observing the activities in and around the various
voy(~nkomaty. Any noticeable increase in activity around the voyenkomat, such.
as an. increased number of persons entering and departing from the offices, may
indicate either a partial or general mobilization. Normally, activities of the
voyenkomaty are constant throughout the year with the exception of the one-
month period from 1 September through 1. October, at which time the annual i.n-
du.ction quota for universal military training is filled. Should any activity
similar to that which occurs during the 1. September through 1 October period
be noticed at some other time of the year, it would be an 25X1 X
indication of Soviet military mobilization.
10. In the event of a general mobilization, the first group of inductees will
probably be taken from the agricultural areas. During World War II the Soviets
learned the importance of keeping qualified factory workers (particularly those
working in strategic industries) on the job. Farm labor requirements could
be filled by old people, by children as young as 10 years of age, or by women,
and, 'therefore, the loss of persons taken into the military would constitute
less of a hazard to production on the farms than a similar loss would to the
factories. Therefore,,[- any abnormal. increase in. the number
of farm people seen enter..ng, or active about, the voyenkomat could indicate a
degree of military mobilization,
11a When called to service, inductees reported to.acommission of the voyenkomat
which issued the notice of induction.. This commission is made up of representa-
tive members of the Soviet Army, Navy, Air Force, MOB, a physician, and 'those
other military branches concerned. The chairman of the commission was the
civilian commissioner of the voyenkomat concerned. The chairman received the
numerical requirements for manpower from each of the branches of the military,
and was directly responsible for filling those requirements. The chairman
must fulfill these requirements, and failure to do so would bring considerable
trouble to the chairman. Fulfilling these requirements was difficult, as some
people, in particular armament industry workers, had deferments (bronya). The
chairman must locate a replacement for each person who holds a deferment.
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Approved For Release 2002/07/24: CIA-RDP80-0081OA004200490005-7