BERIYA PURGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004200800004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 28, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT Beriya.Purge
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of Its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO.
REFERENCES
28 May 195+
.1. When Lo P, Beriya became Minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet
25X1 Union after the merger -of the MVD and N= in 1953, he began, in
accordance wwith the resolution of the new administration to re-
organize. the State machinery, to cut dawn sharply (about 50 percent)
the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (both the central
administration and the provincial organs), supposedly dismissing
prince,ally.old and experienced workers. Simultaneously,Beriya ordered
the recall of most of the residents Zr-esident agent and more
exrienced workers from the M'JD offices abroad, with the exception of
tt i o office because of its special position.
2. Beriya reinstated in the positions of the central administration of the
Ministry persons close to him, such as Colonel General Bogdan Zakharovich
. 4cibulov (who. had been removed from the post of Deputy Minister of the
MGM USSR in 191.6), and others with whom he had worked in the past, including
those persons who hed been working with him lately in the organization of
the Ccacil of Ministers She Committee of Informatio7. The chief of the
1v B administration for , arovsk Wray, Colonel General Bergey Arsenyevich
Go 1 i4ze, etas ordered to Moso w and was appointed one of Beriya 1 s
dejluties. shortly before the removal of 8em6n Dekisovich Ignatyev.
There were many changes among 'the personnel who remained after the
dismissals in the central apparatus of the MVD. Most of the worke
rs
V40 occupied administrative posts under Colonel General Viktor Semenovich
Abakumov and. Ignatyevwere disa.,ssed. Some who were close to Abakumov
&
aa
I$zatyev,.especially those in the Investigation section and in the then
he
o m
Mi
i
t
..
--w----- ? Tf t
es
n
s
ry o
Itate Security, were at tested. Conditions at that time i
th
Mi
n
e
nistry of
Intel"rirl Affairs were remtniaQent of the.. years of the "big purges",
Re+cinsible workers had to go through the terrible times twice.-the purge
carried out by Beriya, and the more severe purge organized by Malenkov after
Beriyats arrest.
'SECRE1'
NAVY X IAIR
SECRET
X FBI
(Note Washington Distribution Indicated By "X", field Distribution By "#".)
oc t er
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4. Lieutenant General P4tr Vasil.&.yevich-Fedotov, who was inactive for about
two years after the establishment of the Committee of Information,,was
again appointed head of the First Chief Directorate (formerly the Second
Directorate of the MGB)o
5. To the general surprise of the officers of the Second Chief Directorate, the
former chief of Beriya's secretariat when Beriya was People's Commissar
for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lieutenant General tefan Solomon.ovich7
Mamulov,was appointed to the post of Chief of the Second Chief Directorate
of the MVD. General Mamulov belongs to the category of administrative
workers; he does not have much practical experience in counterespionage
or, especially, in-espionage work. Mamuloves lack of practical experience
reflected in a certain measure on the work of resident offices of the
MVD abroad.
6. The preparations for Beriya?s usurpation of authority began immediately
after the death of Stalin. At that time there were rumors in Moscow
among persons close to governmental circles, and especially among the
administrative personnel of the MVD,. about differences of opinion on
questions. of state politics which had arisen between Beriya and Malenkov.
These rumors seemed somewhat paradoxical because of the long and close
friendly relations of these two men.
7. Besides Beriya, the following persons took part in the plot: the Commander-
in-Pkief of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General gavel Artemevich7
25X1 Artexrev.,.(at one time he was employed by the M), and the commander of
.aviation in the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General Vasiliy
25X1 Stalin,
25X1 Goglidze, Kobulov, Dekanozov, and Merkulov were arrested later.
8. It was expected that Malenkov would put up an armed resistance 'because
the army leaders were on Malenkov's side. Therefore, General Ar'temyev.ordered
two divisions from the Moscow Military District to Moscow in time for
the coup dletat, One of the divisions was armored.
Shortly before the coup, Malenkov learned of Beriya?a intentions, probably
from his Party agents among the persons close to Beriya, who were
informed,of the preparations. In turn, Malenkov took counter-measures.
Through .the military leaders who supported him, Marshals Konev, Zhukov,
and Bulganin., two guards divisions were ordered to Moscow on an urgent basis
from their,-,quarters in the Urals.
10. All the preparations for the arrest of Beriya and his accomplices were
carried.out by Malenkov in complete secrecy. Among the persons who took
part in these preparations were members of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Whom Malenkov trusted completely;
they were issued arms. The officers from the Chief Guard Directorate of
the MVD who were,on duty in the buildings of the Central Committee, the
Council of Ministers,; and the Kremlin were totally isolated and had
no way of even guessing of the plans for the arrest of Beriya, let alone
the members of the central apparatus of the MVD in general. For their
part, Konev and Zhukov selected the generals and senior officers whom they
trusted most and who could be relied upon in case of need.
11. One of the variations of Malenkov?s plan called for Beriya?s arrest at a
meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was scheduled for
the end of June 1953 (approximately the 26th or 27th). Malenkov,
however, was not quite sure that Beriya would be present at the meeting of
the members of the Central Committee because he had previously several
times failed to appear at such meetings and had begun to disregard Malenkov
in general.
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12- in spite of Malenkov?s misgivings, Beriya came to this meeting of the
Central Committees By the time Malenkov was ready to speak, all the
entrancesand exits of the building where the meeting was held were
blocked by armed members of the Central Committee, and the M VD guards
were removed . from. their posts.
13. During the meeting Beriya felt that something was not right and tried
to leave the meeting hall, but was not permitted to do so,. After
Malenkov had changed Beriya with criminal anti-State activities,
2hukov and Konev personally arrested him.
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Z5o
v ' b L cu um.ous in
uS
en his tearful pleas for freedom, and so ono
the picture of the transformation of this man, who only a, few minutes
ago was a haughty and self-assured statesman, into a flabby distraught
creature begging for mercy was tragic and left a ver
un
l
t
y
p
easan
feeling
with all those who were presents
It is characteristic that the special legal board for the trial of
Beriya and his accomplices consisted basically of responsible workers of
the Central Committee of the CPSU and the representatives of the
armed forces. The trial was held under conditions of great secrecy, and
very few persons, even from among the leaders of the M`TD of the USSR,
actually knew about what happened at this trial. Marshal Tvan
$tepanovich Konev was appointed chairman of the trial of Beriya and his
accomplices.
16. After the sentence of Beriya and his group had been carried out, the main
headquarters of the MVD had read at, closed Party meetings the bill of
indictment of Beriya's group. From the time spent in reading this bill
Of indictment (about five hours),, one can judge the quantity of sins of
which these persons were accused. In particular, Beriya wc;s accused
of inhuman cruelties and animal sadism with regard to individual persons
arrested by State Security organs. It frequently happened that
Beriya questioned personally some prisoner who was not giving the
desired testimony, and in such cases he applied refined tortures, in
comparison with which the horrors of the Spanish inquisition are
understood to be, child's play. In confirmation of these facts, the bill
ofindictment staff ed that the investigating organs had material evidence
in the form of the instruments of torture used by Beriye and found
during the search of his personal belongings.
17. Further, Beriya was accused of complete moral and personal corruption.
In confirmation, the bill of indictment cited the fact that during the
time which Beriya had lived in Moscow (since 1938) he had seduced a great
number of Moscow girls (the statement indicated "over two hundred"). Many
pages of the indictment w we devoted to Beriyavs romantic adventures;
examples were given of Beriya?s taking incognito evening walks along
the Moscow streets, picking out young girls of his taste, and
ordering the guards who accompanied him to bring the victims he had
chosen to his private house.(Beriya preferred to live outside the
Kremlin walls in a completely isolated, large private house in the
vicinity of the Vosstaniye Square.) The girls who, in spite of his
pet*,e ions, refused to give in to him, which happened seldom,
were`bjected to threats and terrorized. All his victims were listed
in writing,.with notations of a cynical nature made by Beriya on the
feminine charms of the objects of his desire. These notes were also
found during the search of his private belongings.
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18. The crimes of Beriya and his accomplices against the State formed the main
part
f the bill of indictment. This part described at length the
espionage Beriya did-for foreign intelligence organizations and his
aitti-Soviet subversive activity in the sphere of Socialist construction.
The statement was simply a paper with greater detail than the official
annoimeement of the Soviet Government about the arrest of Beriya and
his aceompliceso
l9 The same evening the employees of the central apparatus of the M4T.,,
were ordered to destroy al1 pictures of Beriya o Shortly afterwards
began. the arrests of the leading personnel of the I+DO Malenkov appointed
a, special commission of the Central Committee under the chairmanship of
25X1 5ikolay Nikolayevic Shatalin
with the task of carrying out a general purge among the personnel of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (central administration as well as
provincial branches), In other words, there began the hunting for and
the destruction of Beriyats.partisans-large and small.
20. Several days after Beriya"s arrest, Party meetings were held in each
administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on orders from the
Central Committee. These meetings bore the usual character expressions
of indignation towards the "enemy of the people" and self-flagellation
for the laok.of the.required political and "Chekist" alertness. Usually
at such ,meetings some scapegoats are found for sins which until then have
been 'known to no one, and secret enemies of the Soviet regime are
"denounced". This is what also happened at the meeting of the workers of
the Second Chief Directorate. One of the speakers declared that the chief
of a department, a specialist in intelligence, Colonel. Fedoseyev, was a
partisan of Beriya and that he should be handed over to the investigating
organs. According to 'the speaker, Beriya perso Illy was training Colonel
Fedoseyev fora trip to Yugoslavia, where he was to conduct some kind of
very important negotiations on state affairs with Marshal Tito. In proof
of his worrds,, the speaker, added 'tha't a personal. letter addressed to Tito
was found in Beriya's private safe, and that it was this letter -tha:t
Colonel Fedoseyev was to deliver to Tito. Fedoseyev most categorically
denied the accusations; however, he was later arrested.
21. After Beriyaos arrest a thorough purge was made of the personnel of 'the
central apparatus of the MVD, its oblast and kray administrations, and
also the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the union republics, especially
25X1 in Georgia and Armenia. Many of the leading workers were arrested.
22e as a result of the measures taken
an the liquidation of the remains of "Beriyaism", the system of the State
Security organs. became incomparably more democratic,, and that the
struggle against bureaucratism, bad organization, and arrogance of individual
chiefs was carried on decisively, especially in the Second Chief Directorate.
For example, Colonel A.M.Korotkov, who-was noted for his rudeness and
his contemptuous attitude toward his subordinates, became almost a saint
as a,xesult of these measures.
Pernnel Connected with the Beriya Purge
~IIY~inA IYAII I I ^I I Awl II I ~~Wnh
2'x.0 Army General vsevolod Eikolayevich Merkulov, an old "Chekist", worked
with Beriya in the Caucasus for a long time. He was a very well educated
and, cultured man,, and during World War II he wrote several plays, one of
which, entitled Engineer Sere, was produced in 1941.4 by the Moscow
Malyy Theatre and met with great success. Ee'was noted for his calm
dispostion and was respected by the workers of the central apparatus of the
MOB of the USSR. In 191+6 he was removed from the post of Minister of
State Security, allegedly because of the failure of several important
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State affairs, and also for political short-sightedness, which caused
him to fail to understand the post-war international political changes
and insist that the organs of State Security should be pointed inside
the country. This view, expressed by Merkulov at a meeting of the
Politburo, was not shared by Stalin, who approved the opinion of
General Abakumov, a participant in the conference. The latter pointed
out the necessity of directing all the efforts of the organs of
State Security towards the struggle with the external enemy- the United
States of America (from that time on, it became patriotic to call the
USA "Enemy No. 1"). Shortly after this meeting, Merkulov was removed
from the post of Minister, and Abakumov was appointed in his place.
Several other responsible workers of the Ministry of State Security
were removed simultaneously with Merkulov, including the first Deputy
Minister, Colonel General B.Z.Kabulov. Merkulov was appointed Chief of
the Chief Directorate for Soviet Property Abroad, which was a sharp
demotion. Kobulov turned up in the same department, as did other MGB
members who had fallen into disgrace. This department was jokingly
called "The Chief Directorate of Sinners". It should be noted that
Beriya did everything possible to have Merkulov retained in his post;
but, in spite of Stalin's high regard for him, to everybody's surprise,
he did not succeed for some incomprehensible reason. From then on,
the relationship between Beriya and Abakumov became strained, which
caused much talk in the Ministry. It is noteworthy that the Minister
of Internal Affairs, Sergey Nikiforov.ch Kruglov, and his deputy,
Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, who were considered as men promoted by
Beriya, likewise became unfriendly towards Abakumov, especially
Serov. 'Serov openly dropped remarks of a very obscene character about
Abakumov, and called him an "upstart", "humbug", "coward'", etc.
21.. Former--Commissar (Third Rank) of State Security, Chief of the First
Chief Directorate NKGB (where he worked for a short while in 1941-42)"
was Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov. The employees of the Second
Chief Directorate who worked with him were amazed at his rudeness
25X1 and arbitrariness. E:- I
Dekanozov literally terrorized the workers in the Chief Directorate,
calling many of them, without cause, "spies" and "traitors". His
behavibr indicated that he had solid. support in the top circles.
Dekanozov was not interested in operational work and did not engage
in it. After Dekanozov's transfer to work in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, a number of very important operational telegrams to foreign
representatives were found unsent in his personal safe. acw spite of
this and other serious shortcomings in his work, Dekanozov was not
held accountable and, what is more, was appointed Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs in charge of personnel. According to the stories told
by persons who worked with him in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Dekanozov continued to act in the same way, and sometimes went so
far as to get into arguments with Molotov, which, from the -viewpoint
of,employees of all ranks in the Ministry, was completely unbelievable.
Dekanozov's behavior finally gave Molotov a, chance to insist that
25X1 Dekanozov should be-removed from the Ministry.
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His unbelievable romantic adventures, some of which were scandalously
publicized in the Ministry, served as a valid reason for Molotov to
decide t6 dismiss him.
25. ColorilGeneral S.A. Goglidze, an old "Chekist", had worked for a long
time with Beriya in the Caucasus. For more than ten years he was chief
of the MGB for the Khabarovsk Kray, and at the same time held the
post of representative of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the USSR for the Far East. He was very influential in the
central apparatus of the MGB and was close to Merkulov and Beriya.
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He sometimes-even-met-Stalin unofficially. After Abakumov's appointment
to the post of Minister of State Security, the position and influence
of Goglidze were considerably shaken. Abakumov considered him a.rival
and did everything possible to discredit hirr.. -This is illustrated by the
fact that during the, period, from 1947 to 1950 a number of ctmmissions
were sent to-.check on the work of the administration of the MGB for
the Khabarovsk.K'ra this had not happened before 'Abakumov"-s time.
the methods of work of ese au ting commissions were often-.biased.
After the arrest of Abakumov, Goglidze's authority was strengthened
again. Shortly afterwards he was appointed Deputy Minister of State
Security and stayed in this post after-the merger of the MVD and MGB..
Colonel General B.Z.Kobulov, an old "Chekist", worked with Beriya in
the Caucasus. $e was Markulov's deputy, carrying out the immediate
direction of the Lormer7 Second Chief Directorate (counterintplliaimneoa
According to many authoritative persons who had contacts with Marshal
Konev in his work, the idea that Marshal Konev has extraordinary
abilities as a commander and that he proved this during World War II
is false. There is no doubt that Konev.owes his.military successes
exclusively to his Chiefof Staff, Marshal Vasiliy Danilovich Sokolovski
28. Apparently Malenkov has decided to follow the example of his predecessor
and utilize at trials the type of persons who are able, on orders from
above,.to say unhesitatingly that black is white and almost believe it.
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