AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES AT PILOT PLANT NO. 1 IN PODBEREZYE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004500390006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 23, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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6 (,yt'9 .'
INFORMATION REPORT
This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
CONFIDENTIAL _ U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
USSR `cow Oblast)
4ircraft Development Activities at
Pilot Plant No. 1 in Pbdberezye
DATE DISTR.
20 October 1954
NO. OF PAGES s
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
1. Source believed that the purpose of Pilot Plant Noa 1 in Podberezye was primarily
to acquire knowledge and experience from the deported German experts and only
secondarily to develop aircraft. Bb understood that Pilot Plant No. 1 did not
take an important part in the general development program by filling a specific
quota. There was litt]_A proof that aircraft developed at Podberezye were
actually produced, bm source believed that a small. series of the P-131 was
built.
Pilot Plant No, l was subdivided into 0KB I under Graduate Engineer B.C. Baade,
II under Graduate Engineer Roessing (fnu),,and a central. laboratory for
**Vial analysis which was required for the analysis of insufficiently marked
Soviet materials. The institute was adequately equipped.for all kinds of. tests
to determine tensile, compression, and torsion strengths. A well-egluipped pbyy-
aical laboratory operated under the supervision of Dr. Geertz (fnu). The
E~Iirector was held successively by seven persons, of
? Izotov (fnu) t first in line, and Pirilovskiy
director. The Soviet plant director, whose work was more
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of a supervising and administrative nature, had German assistants to coordinate
the activities. To avoid suspicion of having a pro-German attitude, the Soviet
personnel were correct and reserved to the German experts. Except for official
events when they were on some sort of duty, the Soviets avoided talking to the
Germans in public. Even those Soviets who were rather friendly at the plant
avoided contact with their German colleagues in the street.
3. In late 1951, when the mission of the German experts was almost completed, the
production of Pilot Plant No. 1 was converted to fuselage parts for a heli-
copter, e.g. conical light metal tubes, about five meters long and one meter
in diameter, set at intervals of three to four mm. These reflectors were con-
structed.-th utmost care and the bending was precisely checked and had to be
done over., even if it showed only small deviations. This work was mostly
accomplished by female personnel. Shortly before the Germans left, the plant
started to produce perambulators, a typical intermediate step in the pro-
duction process, which was usually followed by a basic change. As was told at
the plant and indicated by Soviet statements, Zavod I would produce turbojet
engines. Several days before the Germans left, crates with parts of turbo-
jet engines arrived from an unknown location. No information was available
on the expected capacity of the plant.
4. The development of the P-131 was continued with three airframes, the V-l, V-2,
and V-3 experimental models of the Ju-,287 which had been brought to Podberezye.
V-i became the first model of the P-131,which made nine or ten experimental
take-offs at Ramenskoye airfield in May 1947; V-2 had previously crashed in
Dessau; and V-3. was at first salvaged for spare parts used for the construction
of the P-131. Three days before the P-131 was to be flown in the big Tushino
airsbow, the slats failed to extend before landing. This was probably Caused by
the poor condition of the V=1,which, although designed for a maximum speed of
860 km/h, was not released for speeds above 600 km/h. When the safe landing
of the P-131 proved that the maneuverability of the aircraft was not affected
at low speeds, the P-140 and the P-150 were designed without slats, which had
been installed on the P-131 to prevent the tearing off of boundary layers at
low speeds. Further experiments with the P-131 involved the power plant and
various types of suspensions for the engine nacelles. On 12 October 1947, the
testing program at Ramenskoye was finished, the German personnel returned to
Podberezyef and Soviet experts dismantled the aircraft for the transport back
to Podberezye. During winter 1947-19/.8, the aircraft was subjected only to
minor improvements. In late April 1948, the P-131 (V--1) and the V-3 were taken
to Teplyy Stan airfield.. about 30 kilometers south of Moscow. After the first
take-off, the V-3 proved to be in a much better condition and was taken as the
basic development model for the P-110, and the P-131 was salvaged for spare
parts. In August 1948, the P-131 flight testing program was officially com-
pleted; the blueprints, ready to be used for series production, were shipped
by trucks to an undetermined destination,
5. Source concluded from the Soviet system of giving bonuses for the individual
development::stages that the P-131 was series-produced. According to the Soviet
bonus system, the first bonus was given after the designing work was completed,
the second one after the aircraft was accepted, and the third when it was put
into mass production. The bonuses for the P-131 had been received, partly in
Dessau and partly in Podberezye. During the winter of 1948, funds for over-
time work were unexpectedly available at a time when they were not required,
alt ugh no money had been available when it was urgently wanted. Since these
fundstiere exhausted after two months, it was suspected that this money
had to be earned again in overtime
work. It was generally assumed that most of. the first and into unauthorized channels, during the
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aumaner of 1949, the P-131 was being mass-produced in an under and aircraft
one aircraft per day.
description of the P-1 wi its swept
orw and x turbojet engines. Source believed that the Jumo-004,
which was the power unit installed in the P-131,, was being quantity-produced.
According to unmistakable features, including the typical noises of the
Riedel-type starter unit, the shape of the exhaust cone, and the extension of
this cone during take-offs, Yak-1.50 frequently landing at Teplyy Stan were
believed to be equipped with Jumo-004s.
6. In August 1948, off for the first test flight at Teplyy Stan
airfield. in September 1948., oply taxiing tests were
performed. one of these runs the aircraft almost crashed at the end of
the runway because Engineer Fritz Freytag, engineer in charge, had ordered
the P-140 to accelerate over more than half the length of the runway and to
speed up to more than 240 km/h. These experiments were intended primarily
to t !&M+. the M4164'114,.
{ : "" .ii"1.LViu 1n tine spring or
1949? wit of the test flights were performed at highs eds? the
BDe9d achieved wn altitude)
there were difficulties with the
to design a pressurized engines. At Soviet request, efforts were initiated
gunner a station equipped with a twin-barrel
gun to be shifted about 90 degrees to each aide. It took a long time to con-
vince the Soviets that firing traveraely to the direction of flight would be
of no effect=in such a fast aircraft. The two versions of the P-140 included
the P-l"rha bomber, and the P-14 t.. a long-range aircraft with auxiliary
tanks. ese tanks were installed in the bomb bay after experiments with
wing tip tanks had failed. The experiments had failed because of vibrations
at`t a wing tips, because the center of effort was located too far forward, and
because the.,cefiter' of effort shifted when the tanks emptied,which made trimming
extremely difficult. No performance data were available of either version of
the P-140. yn;sufluuer 1949, the testing program ended abruptly because, source
believed, the Soviets bad learned all they were interested in.
7.. Informa# on obtained on the history of the P-150 was only fry entary. Although
the P-150 was definitel
an ind
d
y
epen
ent development of Graduate Engineer B.C.
Baade, the comment of the TsAGI Institute on the aircraft stated that the "air-
craft showed all the typical characteristics of good Soviet designing." Gradu-
-
.te Engineer RasAe see ,+sa
all
natitute, except for the negative dihedral-ofth vw3
g
hi
h
,n
s)w
c
was demanded by
TsAGI after wind tunnel tests when the aircraft had already been completed.
Dr. Backhat (fiu), who did the required recalculations., and Graduate Engineer
Waltzel (), the designer of the original wing, stated that the redesigning
of the wing was rather difficult. The modification was suggested in order to
reduce to serious rolling and yawing of the aircraft. Source learned that
the original negative dihedral of one and a half degrees was to be increased to
three de
d +1 4. 14
rees a
g
n
Tone ac the wing tips almost touched the age o this modification was
ground during landing.
8. The P-150 was powered by two improved versions of the Soviet-built Nene with
era which were suspended from under the wings by cowled pylons leading
forward. Each power plant had a thrust of 38400 kgp without) and
4, kgp withy afterburner. The maximum diameter wa
1
60
.
s
meters; the length
was not remembered. The aircraft carried a crew of four in the cockpit, in-
cluding the pilot, navigator, radio operator, and gunner, who also was flight
mechanic. ;The wing span was about 24 meters and the wing area about 52 sqm (sic).
ftti
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The gross weight was about 55 tons. The turbojet engines were fueled with
kerosene with a purity degree of 0.82 to 00849 usable to a minimum temperature
of 55 centigrades below zero. The maximum speed at an altitude of 6,000 meters
was 1,030 km/h. At altitudes below 6,000 meters, the aircraft had to be flown
at lower speeds. The landing speed wa about 29000 km/h (sic)
,
the extendable Seppeler Propeller
l'unetioning as emergency power generator be still in operation at this speed
The service ceiling was between 11,000 and 13,000 meters; the radius of action
was 2,000 ion with load, a range which similar Soviet types allegedly could not
reach unless flying without load. The flight endurance was about five hours,,
which was con.c1 ded from the fact that the program of the servo control system
was set for a period of five hours. Source stated that the data heard in
Podberezye varied frequently.
9. The wings, a development of Graduate Engineer Waltzel, were designed with
supporting top and bottom chord of welded sheet metal fitted with inserted
spacers lacing spars and ribs. There were no fuel tanks installed in the
wings. The swept-back angle of the leading edge was 35 degrees. The wings
slightly tapered toward the rounded wing tip caps. The wing profile had its
ma.mum thickness in the center; the leading edge was comparatively thin.
The full-view pressurized compartment was fed with air from the fourth stage
of the axial flow compressors. The entire cockpit was jettisonable; no
ejector seats were installed. The emergency exit in-the compartment bottom
would be of little value in case the aircraft were upside down when the crew
had to bail out. The P-150 was fitted with a dual-wheel tandem landing gear.
In order to give the aircraft the required angle of incidence, the rear land-
ing gear retracted slightly during the take-off run. The front gear could be
steered. In Shulshenko?s new publication !- a`ft Desiggs, published in
1953 by pborongiz in Moscow., a front and a side view of the P-150 with the
original dng sha were given as e_
ment. Source
believed that 11 on into German was 1anned.
raduate Engineer Boris von Schlippe works on calculations for
the afterburner which would provide an increase of power of about 19 percent.
The installation of the afterburner., referred to as "bag", extended the length
of the power unit about one meter. It was planned that., with an unchanged
outer diameter, the exhaust area be adjusted by pressing the "bag" to elliptical
shape. This problem caused a d .,., ...,.. _. _ ~
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The blueprints specified
aperture w1th a diam ter of 520 mm, The exhaust aperture of the
afterburner was to be about 30 percent wider. The temperature of the exhaust
gases was given as 1,600? C. Hot air for the deLcing system of the
wings was to be taken from the fourth of eight axial compressor stages and
directed to the leading edges through distribution tubes and mixing nozzles.
The heating air was to escape to the rear h leaks in the
The "warm"'fire extinguishing system was to incorporate a powder pellet which,
gnited, would press tetra (sic) into the burning power unit. This system
had allegedly at advantages compared with the cold system util.iz carbon
dioxide a., I 25X1
I The densely riveted upper half of
e se-
lage served as main feel tank. The armament included a 23 mm twin-barrel tail
gun which was remote-controlled from the cockpit and adjusted by means of an
extedable periscopic gunsight. The bomb sight was n of the
Borden type sight. A radar set was available. various 25X1
types of radio sets had been installed for experi,men purposes. No antennas
were visible externally. The instruments were reportedly similar to the
German instrument system. In 1952, the instrument board was fitted with a
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control panel, allegedly for a new type of ant
t
Later it was learnee-d.---- 25X1
I
that flight tests revealed difficulties
with this servo control system,which, because it could not be moved to neutral
position, always left a rudder displacement (sic) at an angle of one
a degree. In gusty weather it was, therefore fourth of
the aircraft was , impossible to determine whether
out of trim because of a t or becua e of the li!iiil contr 1.
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The tail was fitted with two square flaps which were extended as and-
brakes. No information was obtained to indicate that the experiments with
ribbon brake parachutes which had been conducted with the P-140 were performed
with the P-150, or that rockets or deflection of the exhaust 'et were utilized
for braking purposes, ,,CV4
kg pressure re m rcj e off- pumps be tested under 5.8-kg and 18-
.full -mviao,. ._-
Nesting program of a servo con ro sys em.
p armed that the control rods and th
l2 t re x7a ontrnl The
servo control system operate oIlla
r~
10. In summer 1952, the P--1;7 was di
place, which was referred to need for truck shipment near
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w
i
wi
ch
l
be
uce
E th the material available, same summer, sing e-eng ne Je gAt-er-5
e
approac a Bor airfield at night. Podberezye was located a few kilometers
from the field, in the approach lane to the field,
approaches even in bad weather, and with a ceiling of o precise 25X1
nly 100 aircraft coming in for landings at intervals of ely
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1 meter Cme;e=rs=.
Swept-back wings observed in the moonlight indicated MIG--15s. Nooiinformmation
was obtained on the LA 17 or on new versions of the MIG-15.
12. No information was obtained on Soviet plans and intentions regarding the
development of a strategic bomber force. Source believed that, in spite of
its insufficient range, the P-150 would be used as a strategic bomber. Accord-
ing to Soviet tactics, it would probably be used as an atom bomb carrier until
a suitable aircraft model was available, even if it were impossible for
the aircraft to ret .. The 11-28 was reportedly the only ma - rodu 'et
bomber. ced 25X1
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C60 a hotel , and, one night the P-150 was sent via
Moscow to Ramenskoye airfield. In May 1953, the testing pro eni of
16 flights ended with a crash landing by the Soviet pilot,w o had flown all
the test flights and who was usually accompanied
data obtained. The conversation between the Soviet pia lottaandwtherGerrmaanndco-e
pilot prior to the crash landing was monitored and proved that, although he had
been warned, the Soviet pilot, who apparently was still under the influence
of alcohol consumed or May Day, landed in the direction of the low evening
sun. The aircraft pancaked and hit the ground very hard, seriously damaging
the landing gear, especially the rear wheel, and the wing roots. The German
experts stated that repair was impossible. Since the flight testing program
had been completed except for some problems with the power plants, the repair
of the P-150 was cancelled. Graduate Engineer Baade, who did not want to
give up his development and made an effort to repair the aircraft, provoked
opposition from all German experts who feared that the repair might keep them in the USSR for another three years.
All German experts in Podberezye believed that
that P----50 was being mass-produced, especially as the Soviet development of a
related aircraft had failed
havin
b
,
g
ecome too hea t
vyo carry any load.
Western developments of fighter aircraft To avoid the effort and expense of
their own basic research acti
iti
v
development which would meet their
dther
u se sretuirementssand
eh
tc
cou
d
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he believed that the P-150 was
the largest aircraft ing developed in the USSR and the Soviet -built B-29
the largest aircraft being produced. During the summer of 1947, 10 to 12
Soviet-built B-29s were seen at Ramenskoye airfield. These aircraft apparently
had difficulties with propellers, which showed strange deformations or were
broken off, and were constantly being worked on. Regarding the Soviet develop-
ment of rivals to the P-140, source stated that, in the summer of 1950, an
Il-28 was spotted flying over Podberezye. It was said that two years were
required to redesign the rudder assembly which had caused a speed limit of
450 km/h;and that after the remodeling, the aircraft had become a little too
heavy for the power plant. The original layout of the rudder assembly was
not known. The alleged Soviet rival development to the P-150 was, according
to rumors, too weak, particularly at the tail; there were heavy vibrations of
the tail section when the aircraft increased speed. It was generally known
in Podberezye that the required reinforcements were equal in weight to the
calculated load, and that Tupolev, the reported designer of this aircraft,
was in disgrace because of this and other failures.
13. Regarding scientific potential, source believed that the Soviets were not yet
capable of keeping abreast of Western developments; he felt that, as a
result of the liquidation of the Russian intelligentsia during the revolution,
there was still a lack of qualified personnel. The few outstanding scientists
available were urgently needed for the evaluation of foreign material rather
than for independent research and development activities. Mistrusting people
with a good general education, the Soviets trained their technical and
scientific personnel in very limited fields only. Soviet engineers
who, although qualified to work in more technical fields, were restricted
to their specific work and never discussed other technical problems unless no
other Soviets were around. A typical example of the drawback of this "narrow
gauge training" was that of Graduate Engineer Alekseyev (fnu),,who, as the
second in a line of five or seven consecutive chief designers at Pilot Plant
No. 1, completely failed in the attempt to design a twin-jet fighter. Because
it was easier to rivet, he ordered that a light metal similar in appearance to
duraluminum be used for parts of the P-140 outer skin, which had to be re-
moved again. The TsAGI Institute was equipped at least with one modern wind
tunnel to meet the latest technical requirements. Professor Bock and Engineer
Theo Schmidt, the latter referred to as "Flatter Schmidt", mentioned the
good technical tialifications of the Soviet personnel working at that institute:
TsAGI was primarily an industrial advising and super-
v1s1ng institute rather than a research institute, because the model
of the P-150 had to be submitted to TsAGI after the aircraft was completed.
No information was obtained on the wind tunnel. Source believed that such
Soviet chief designers as Ilyushin and Tupolev had their own designing offices
working on rival developments and that they were also being supervised by TsAGI.
It was learned that Professor Bock had worked for some time on calculations on
pro llers.
poor interpretations of foreign material and the unfamiliar-
ity that some of the authors had with the technical fields involved. The
Soviet standard publication on aerodynamics showed serious gaps, inamuch as
pages of formulas and calculations ended abruptly when they started to make
sense. This was caused by the Soviet theory- of specific trainin-a as
the authorts inca city.
When the German experts in Podberezye were offered
noses or scientific publications, Graduate Engineer Waltzel (fnu) forwarded
a sensational study on thin sheet metal procedures and Engineer Otto Richter
submitted a draft for a publication on measuring methods at high-speed flying.
After a long period, Richter received 100 rubles and a note telling him to
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D
write two more studies in continuation of his first work. Richter, who, in
the meantime, had found some mistakes in his first draft,was working on the
corrections when he got hold of a Soviet publication by Dr. Chauskiy (fnu)
on the same subject containing identical errors. Dr. Chauskiy had copied
the work and received the 5,000-ruble bonus. Although he was aware of the
danger in generalizing Imore than 70 percent of the
results obtained by Sovie science and research were based on foreign acti-
vitand that, for a couple of years, Soviet scientists will have to
utilize ideas and results obtained by Western countries in the fields of
aerodynamics, aircraft, and aircraft-engine designing.
15. Chief Designer Alekseyev's attempt to use another light metal alloy instead
of duraluminum for the outer skin was the only metallurgical experiment
observed. The material used instead was designated AM-95. WM-95 (sic; VM-95?),
or DM-95. The Soviets occasionally used welding instead of riveting. No
details were available on the methods and advantages. Synthetic materials
and glass were not being used at Podberezye. Source noticed that the Soviets
used an excellent finishing varnish for plywood aircraft wings. One broken
wing which had been lying outside a workshop for more than a year did not
show any damage to the varnish. The P-150 wing was supported by the top and
bottom chord, made of strong sheet metal. Since the TsAGI Institute did not
object to Graduate Engineer Waltzel's design of the P-150 wing, it was con-
cluded that the equipment required for the production of such wings was
able in the USSR.
th
e Soviets used anti-G suits
the Soviets, com-
pare with the West, Were o y marginally interested in arctic fl
i
y
ng
and that this problem never u,ose in connection with the P-150, because an
additional version would have been constructed otherwise. No special measures
for winter flying were observed at any of the airfields. Source believed that
the Soviets would improvise if required. They did, for instance, when they
had no cranes at Teplyy Stan airfield to exchange the power units of the P-140.
The mechanics loaded the two turbojet units on two trucks, moved them carefully
under the wings, retracted the landing gear until the wings touched the engines,
mounted the engines, and extended the landing gear again. Al]. airfields
observed had concrete runways. During the first landings of the P-131 and
P-l40, fragments of rubber, including several layers of cord, were torn from the
tires. Since there was no other way to solve this problem, the aircraft had
to land on the sodded.landinn field for the remaining test fl.i hts which they
successfully did.
g gear wreckage in Lukovitsy was not ob-
tained-during the landing after the first test
flight, the P-131 bent the front shook absorber leg about 90 degrees because
a steering gear was reversely connected. Except for auxiliary fuel tanks no
measures were observed to have e
of fi hter unit
1.1 Comment: Dr. Geertz ; was previously reported as chief of the
office for measuring techniques in Podberezye.
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