1. THE REMOVAL OF ABAKUMOV AS MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY 2. RYUMIN AND THE KREMLIN DOCTORS' PLOT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004600810001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 19, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
Ing of the BDlonage LAWS, Title it U.S.O. Sea. 793
and 794, the ttanvnlsalon a revelation of which In
any manner to an unauthorlad parson is Prohibited
by law.
COUNTRY USSR
1. The Removal of Abakumov as
SUBJECT Minister of State Security
2. Ryumin and the Kremlin Doctors
Plot
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
REPORT
DATE DISTR. 19 August 1954
NO. OF PAGES 5
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
642361
1. In June 1951, the Ministry of Stnt.e Security of the USSR was headed by
Colonel General Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, as Minister, with the following
de uties: Lieutenant General Sergey 'Lvanovich Ogoltsov? Colonel General
Sergey Arseniyevicg Goglidze; Major General ZYevgenly~Petrovic] Pitovranov; 25X1
Lieutenant General Selivanovskiy (fnu), in charge of counterintelligence;
Lieutenant General Sergey Romanovich Savchenko; Lieutenant General [Afanasiy
Sergeyevich Blinov, in charge of services and supply; Lieutenant General
Stakhanov fnu),for the Milits 1a; and Colonel General /A'rkadiy Nikolayevic7
Apolonov, for MGB Troops. 25X1
2. Abakumov had become Minister in 1946, thanks, as far as source knows, to the
personal action of Stalin. As the Chief of the Counterintelligence Directorate
(Smersh) during the war, he had acquired great prestige and authority, which 25X1
he kept to the very end. He became all-powerful and paid no attention to
the opinions of many officials of the Central. Committee of the Communist
Party. He assumed a superior attitude with regard to all the other ministers,
which led them to complain about. and criticize Abakumov. All this contributed
to a desire on the part of certain Central Committee leaders to get rid of
Abakumov. Beriya, too, played an important role in influencing the decision
to replace Abakumov.
Committee of the Party. On one occasion he was called there four times
during the course of a single day. This activity was interpreted by the
rank and file of the MGB as an indication either of a change in the
operational policy of the MGA or of diffi es of Abakumov himself.
(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by 'W', Field distribution by
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 7. Stalin then appoirted a commission consisting of Malenkov, Bulganin, Beriya,
and Ignatyev to check on the work of the investigating Unit for Especially
Important Affairs in particular, and of the M'GB in general. After the
conclusion of the investigation, there was published a decision of the
Central Committee of the Party concerning the disorganized work of the
agencies of the MGB and the loss of vigilance on the part of the top echelon
of the MOB.
$. In June or July 1951, an order signed by Stalin was made known to members
of the MGB, announcing the appointment of Lieutenant General Ogoltsov as
Acting Minister, MGB. No mention was made of Abakumov in the order, and
it was assumed that Abakumov either had been removed from his post for cause
or had received a special assignment.
9. At about the same time (summer 1951), a wave of arrests swept through the
upper echelons of the Ministry of State Security and also through the
Investigating Jnit for Especially important Affairs. Abakumov, Selivanovskiy,
and the Chief of the Investigating Unit for Especially Important Affairs,
Major General Leonov (fnu), his Deputy, Colonel Kamerov (fnu), and Pitovranov were
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put in prison. Deputy Minister for Services and Supply, Lieutenant
General Blinov, was discharged. Deputy Minister for MGB Troops,
Apolonov, was also discharged.
10. At the end of August or the beginning of September, the Management Section
of the Central Committee appointed Ignatyev, who was a member of the
Commission investigating the MGB, as Minister of the MGB. In addition
to Ogoltsov, who remained as First Deputy Minister, the other deputy
ministers were Colonel General Goglidze, Lieutenant General Savchenko,
Lieutenant General Ryasnoy, Lieutenant General Obruchnikov (fnu),
Lieutenant General Stakhanov (fnu for the Mi1ita+va, and A General
Tvan Ivanovich7 Maslennikov. Deputy for MGB Troops. Ryumin 25X1
the MGB kollegiya, and also Chief of the Investigating Unit for
Especially Important Affairs. The Deputy Chief of Administration
(Zamestitel U ravl aXxahchego Delamil of the Council of Ministers of the
U ,95R, whose name was unknown to source, was appointed Deputy Minister
for Administration of the M3B.
11. At the same time, a considerable number of Party functionaries from
various Party organs, particularly from the Central Committee and
the Moscow city and rayon Party organizations, were assigned to duty with
the MGB. Some of these were appointed to leading positions and others
as ordinary employees. It usually worked out that the chief of a section
was an experienced MGB man and his deputy P Party worker. This was the
case in the operational d.irector'ttes and particularly in the Investigating
Unit for Especially Important Affairs, as well as in the Fifth Directorate
and the Personnel Direotoratr. This srr,r:ngement continued though
Ignatyev"s tenure as Minister and until the appointment of Beriya as
Minister of the merged MSTD/MGB.
12. Some of the persona arrested with Abi:kumov, were later released and no
longer considered to be under suspicion. Thus, Pitovranov was released
in November or December 1952. This action was the result of Malenkov's
intercession with Stalin,who agreed that a mistake law:d been made with
respect to Pitovranov and that he no not an enemy of the people.
Selivanovakiy was also released and appointed chief of the military
counterintelligence directorate .try one of the military districts (off).
13. The actual arrests of the Kremlin dactora were not made until fall 1952,
over a year after the case against them had 'been initiated mad several
weeks prior to the official announcement.
14. The doctors were incarcerated in either, the MGB Internal Prison or
the Butyrskiy Prison, since all persons whose cases were handled by
the Investigating Unit for Especially Important Affairs were put in
one of these two prisons. Source believes that the doctors remained
there through their period of imprisonment.
15. The reversal of the official opinion with regard to the doctors' guilt
actually took place shortly after their imprisonment, and before Stalin's
death. It was?then that, while no official action on the doctors was
yet taken, Ryumin was relieved of his MGB posts and transferred
to a job as chief of a section in the Ministry of State Control. While
Ryumin was used as a tool in the furtherance of the Soviet policy of
anti-Semitism, it would be correct to consider him as a moving spirit
SECRET
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16. When Beriya became minister, Pravda published a denunc%tory article
reviewing the Kremlin doctors' plot and stating that. the conclusion had
been reached that the former heads of the MGB had not acted correctly
in arresting the doctors.
17. The doctors were freed. Beriya and his Deputy Minister, 5ogdan zakharovicb
Xobulov, called on each doctor separately, saying the an evil joke had been
played on them, that Beriya had uncovered and smashed the plot, that the
doctors were honest men, and that they had been freed on the order of Beriya.
Kobulov particularly emphasized to the doctors that they must always be
grateful to Beriya because he had uncovered the injustice toward the
doctors and had freed them. It is true that not all the doctors were
freed,because one or two had died while in prison.
18. After the arrest of Beriya and his proteges, Ogoltsov was released from
prison in September 1953 and Ignatyev was restored to membership in the
Central Committee and appointed as Secretary of the Bashkir Party Committee.
Ryumin was released from prison at the end of August or in early September.
25X1
25X1
As early as July, it had been recommended that this be done.Source heard that be ad he
wife were both seen in Tushino in September 1953.
19. Source believes that Ryumin's subsequent arrest and execution do not
necessarily mean that he was tried twice for the same crime. He may
have been arrested and held in prison in the first instance without
the formality of any trial at al.l. This happened time and time again,
and was not considered unusual.. Or he may have boon tried two or any
number of times for the sums' crime. This tin is not necessarily
unusual. However, source feels that the first variant is the more likely.
the reason for Ryuminte execution is that the Xremlin 25X1
is hoping to attract not only the Jewish doctors (70 percent of the doctors
in the Soviet Union are Jewish,aecording to source) but the Jewish
population in general to the side of the Government. The Soviets wish to
show to the Jewish people that the Government does not want dissension
between the Jews and the Great Russians and that the Government will
not march against the Jews. not only that the Ryumin 25X1
execution will not close the matter, but that, is all probability, "a new
wave of purges will roll over the MM"%
be freed, since he had been imprisoned on Ryumin's evidence. Now that
Ryumin has been executed, them is a possibility that Abakumov will be
released. Abakumov, however, is charged with other crimes, although they
25X1
25X1
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22. If the less important crimes are cast aside, there is a good chance
that Abakumov will be released. However, the Soviets have only two
alternatives. They may either free Abakumov and give him a post
of very high responsibiliby in order completely to exonerate him, or
they may let him sit in prison until he dies. There is no other
possibility.
1. Ryumin's initials have been given in the press as M.D.