GHEORGHIU-DEJ (GANZ) SHIPYARD IN BUDAPEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A004900040003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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COUNTRY i-fungary~
SUBJECT Gheorghiu-
in
Budapest
This material contains infor;nado x e. iect'rg the Na-
tional Defense of the United States wlthtn the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, Ti.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
SECRET/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
INFORMATION REPORT
REPORTI I
DATE DISTR. 22 September 1954
NO. OF PAGES 7
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
fI ~tITICAL lfITM MASRMS
ft- PUT IS HOT TO BE WHO
TRAMP,11 TED W THM THE WNW
FRO N;
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. 10 sT'ii~.S' tt'3t`Ii1'w
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. YtillRi n'D ~iit' Fiu`J v t $rt T MEMO-
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
~. Ohiurghiu-De j shipyard (formerly Ganz Hajogyar) is located at 206 Vaci-ut,
Budapest XII1.
b. The site was flanked on the east by the Vaci-ut, an arterial road. To the
west was an arm of the Danube, divided from the main stream by Szu yog Is-
land (Szunyog Sziget), on the northernxpart of which was the Meszhart ship
repair yard. The remainder of the island.was occupied by week-end houses
and a popular inn (Illik Halasz Csarda) at the southern tip of the island.
To the north of the site, the approach bridge.to'the Ujpest railway bridge
crosses over both the V{ci-ut and the arm'of the Dane to the island. At
the southern-most point of the site there was.a jetty for the ferry which
carries visitors .across to the island. 'The site was divided into two parts.,
The larger part (#2 on the sketch) was the yard and premises of the shipyard,
while the southern part of the. site (#3 on the, sketch) was the crane factory:
2. Production.
at. The range of production was as follows:
(l.) Ocean-going cargo vessels of 1,150 tons. No. ships of any kind other
than these are built.
(2.) The ship bodies of floating cranes and components of bridge cranes.
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(3.) Castings of all kinds orc' ed by concerns all over the country,
particularly castings of cylinders for marine and railway Diesel
engines.
(4.) Tanks for tank cars and other vehicles transporting or storing oil,
petroleum, and other liquids.
b. No details of the productive capacity of the plant can be given, but current
production both of the shipbuilding shops and of the foundry was believed
to be well above normal capacity. -
c. A precise breakdown of current production cannot be given, but it was known
that the value of total production (shipyard, components for cranes, foundry
and tanks) in summer 1953 was 336 m. forints a year. Half of this value,
i.e. 168 m. forints, came from shipbuilding. As the "plan price" of this
type of vessel was 14m. forints, the annual production at the current rate
.of manufacture would be 12 ships. However, this rate of production was
reached only recently and was well above past production. It was the result
of the introduction of higher norms, productivity competitions, intensive
productivity drives, ruthless exploitation of labor, and of lowering the
quality of both materials and workmanship (more unskilled men doing the
job of experts).
d. In September 1953 the immediate aim was to produce at least 12 vessels
per year and at the same time to increase the production of components
for cranes and foundry products. A Hungarian delegation was sent to
Gdansk to study Polish shipbuilding methods. On their return, several of
the delegates stated how impressed the delegation had been; in "one of the
yards" 5,000 to 6,000-ton standard type vessels were being produced in a
series and by "continuous flow" manufacturing methods.
e. A breakdown of past production cannot be given but four or five years ago,
ships of 1,150 tons were taking three to four months to build, whereas now
similar ships are being completed in 30 to 35 working days. Shipyard fac-
ilities and plant capacity were the same at that time, but the quality of
materials and workmanship was superior.
f. There were no production priorities. Ships and cranes were considered im-
portant for the fulfilment of export commitments, while the foundry served
a large number of Hungarian enterprises and was the most important foundry
3.
Mater
in the country.
ials.
a.
The sources of materials were as follows:
Loerinci Rolling Works
Di6sgyoer Iron Works
Ozdi Iron Works, Ozd 3
Rolled steel, sections,
etc.
Lang Machine Factory
Ship's engines motors)
Vaf em
Scrap
Argi Depots
Coke (imported)
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Industrial Chain Factory (Ipari IAncgyar)
Ganz Electrotechnical Factory (Villamossagi Gyar)
Elektroimpex )
Nikex )
The Screw and Bolt Factory (Csavararugyar)
Steel Wire and Cable Factory (Aceldrot- 48
Sodronykoetelgyar)
Kontakta
RLkosi Matyas Trust, Welding Electrodes Factory
(Rakosi MNtyas Elektrodagyar)
Small Pumps Factory (Kisszivattydgyar)
The Vehicle Equipment Factory
(Jarmuefelszerelesek Gyara)
Anchor chain cables
Electrical equipment
Nautical instruments
Ship rivets, screws
Welding rods
Pumps
Door handles and other
fittings
b. The following deficiencies of materials were in evidence:
(1.)
Plates were frequently stratified and not uniform in composition.
These faults were discovered only when welding or bending opera-
tions were in progress.
(2.) Anchor chain cables were made of na terial below international
standard.
(3.)
4. Customers.
Welding wire was of unsatisfactory composition and the coating was
of poor quality. Consequently, the weldings were porous and did not
amalgamate properly with the material of the plates.
a. The whole production of ocean-going freighters of 1,150 tons were exported
to the USSR; at the current rate of production this was 12 units per year.
Since the and of World War II, 48 of these vessels had been delivered of
which 42 or 45 were under reparations, and the rest under a trade agree-
ment. The commercial side of the transactions was handled by Nikex
(the Hungarian foreign trade organization for products from heavy industries)
and?Stanko Impex (sic) a Soviet enterprise.
b. Internal consignees were as follows:
(1.) Darugyar (crane factory)
Ship bodies for float-ing cranes of 100 tons,
50 tons, 10 tons and
5 tons capacity, as
well as components of
bridge cranes.
(2) Ganz Railroad Car and Machine Factory Castings of cylinders
(Ganz Vagcn es G4pgyLr) for the Jendrassik
marine and railroad
Diesel engines. This
was the chief line pro-
duced by the foundry.
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(3.) Various Hungarian engineering works
5.
Castings of all kinds.
Incoming materials were transported by rail and truck. Outgoing products were
transported as follows:
a. Completed ships by water.
b. Castings by rail and truck.
6. The shipyard used electric power only, which was obtained from the national
grid; there was no alternative source of power in an emergency. Power consump-
tion data are not known.
7. Labor.
The total number of employees was 2,200,including 300-350 women. Work was in
three full-strength eight-hour shifts each 24 hours, with six working days a
week, less the usual rest days as in all other industries. Of the manual work-
ers, only about 35-40% were skilled. The general standard of efficiency among
the skilled workers was low and there were not enough of them. The availability
of labor was unsatisfactory. There was a permanent lack of welders and boiler-
makers. The men disliked working at the shipyard because the work was hard, the
manufacturing methods not mechanized, everything had to be done by physical
labor, and the tools were antiquated. In May and June 1953, there were two
fatal casualties while welding; both were due to the worn out and antiquated
welding equipment. The workers lived at Ujpest, Rakospalota,,and in the 13th
district of Budapest. Transportation to work was by streetcar and train.
8. Machinery.
a. The following machinery and equipment was available:
Lathes of large size number not known
Planing machines of large size number not known
Large drilling machines number not known
A minimum of 150 welding machines
Plate-bending machines and moulds number not known
Two or three Cupola furnaces
Moulding installations number not known
1 sand mixer
Manual tools used in shipbuilding, i.e.
pneumatic rivet hammers, drills and cutting tools number not known
The efficiency of the equipment was low; machine tools were very old and
in insufficient numbers.
b. The shipyard had a test room with non-automatic air conditioning. There
was also a Mark Siemens M (mobile)III X-ray testing apparatus for control-
ling weldings. This equipment was of old design and too heavy and cumber-
some for efficient working.
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co Internal transport and mechanical handling was by cranes, tractor-drawn
cars (with rubber tires) and railway freight cars. The latter traveled
on standard-gauge track system of the works' railway siding.
9. Quality and Quantity Control.
a. The methods used for controlling quantity in the shipbuilding industry were
different from those in other industries. Operations were directed by
means of a dispatcher network, but its organization is not known.
b. Quality control was at a low level of efficiency. The staff of inspectors
consisted of 92 persons, more than half of whom were not experts.
c. Assembly was slowed down by numerous deficiencies in quality of the com-
ponents produced by the various shops and the work turned out was sub-
standard. Moreover, work in general was slipshod and negligent because
too many of the workers were non-skilled and underpaid, particularly the
welders. They worked too quickly; their only aim was to increase their
wages. The high percentage of rejects in the production of castings for
Diesel engines, up to 70-90% was an example of the bad work turned out.
10. Bottlenecks.
a. Serious bottlenecks known to have occurred in the past were the following:
(1.) Shortage of plates
(2.) Shortage and poor quality of welding rods
(3.) Shortage of labor
(4.) Lack of nautical instruments
(5.) Poor quality of electric switches
b. Serious bottlenecks affecting production,in September 1953 were the follow-
ing:
(1.) Poor quality of welding rods
(2.) Low standard of craftmanship among personnel
(3.) Bad work owing to general fear among the workers of being subjected
to investigation by the political police for suspected sabotage.
C. A serious bottleneck for the whole concern would result if the foundry, the
machine-tool shop.or the slipway were damaged. If the foundry were unable
to operate, a serious bottleneck in other industrial concerns who depended
on the shipyard for their supplies of castings would result.
11. Security.
The site and premises were not protected by armed guards. There was only an
organization of the works' fire brigade and civil guards, who wore arm badges
and who were on duty by day and by night.
12. Organization.
The general organization of the shipyard was similar to that of other large
industrial plants in Hungary. It was subordinate to the Shipbuilding Industry
Trust in the Ministry for Metallurgy and Mechanical Industry. The shipyard
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had under it two small ship-repair yards;,,,.:; the Iszer Workshop (Iszer Telep) and
the Lacskovic Workshop (Lacskovic Telep). 3oth are small yards located on
Szunyog Island facing the shipyard; they engaged in minor repair jobs. There
was a larger repair yard on the island which was not subordinated either to the
shipyard or to the Shipbuilding Trust. It was believed to be a repair shop of
the former MFTR (Hungarian River and Ocean Shipping Company, now Meszh4rt),
where maintenance of ships was carried out.
13. The identities of executive personnel were as follows:
Director: Ferenc Gvonrgv. 'engineerl
Chief engineer: Pal (fnu),who had held the position for four or five years,
was believed to be an expert in ship building.
Legend to the enclosed sketch-map of the Ganz Shipyard.
1. Vaci-ut (main thoroughfare)
2. Gheorghiu-Dej Shipyard
3. Crane Factory
4. Main entrance to the shipyard
5. Entrance to the crane factory
6. Main gate to the crane factory
7. and 8. Jetties for the ferry
9. Ilik Halasz Csarda, an inn
10. Works railway siding
11. Electric streetcar
12. Terminal of the streetcar
13. Ujpest railway bridge
14. Lock
15. Approach railway bridge across the road and the arm of the Danube
16. Danube
17. Arm of Danube on opposite (western) bank
18. Arm of Danube, along which the slipways of the shipyard are located
19. Szunyogsziget or Nepsziget (alternative names by which the island is known)
20. Ship repair yards which do not belong to the shipyard.
Annex: Sketch-map of the Gheorghiu-De.i Shipyard in Budapest
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Annex: The Gheorghiu-Dej (Ganz) Shipyard, Budapest
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