1. ELECTRONIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSONNEL AT KUCHINO 2. TREATMENT OF URANIUM CONCENTRATES IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A005100230003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 5, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. 25X1
SECRET - US OFFICIALS ONLY
COUNTRY
USSR (Kalinin, Moscow Oblasts)
SUBJECT
1.
Electronic
Personnel
Developments and
at Kuchino
2.
Treatment
of Uranium Concentrates
in the USSR
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO.
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
Low-Power
I. ELECTRONIC DEVELOPMENTS AT KUCHINO
Source
5 November 1954
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1. In Laboratory 3 (not Laboratory 1 as previously reported') a Zamboni column was
developed as a high-voltage source before September 1950. Aluminum, tin, or
zinc folios of 30 mm diameter were separated 1)3- absorbent paper. The folios
and paper were piled up and pressed together alternately one on top of another
in a glass cylinder so that a column about 200 mm high resulted.
2. The arrested Russian electrotechnician Andreyev was concerned with this task;
he also had to develop other galvanic elements and to take part in the galvanizing
of wires. Electrical measurements of power and potential were done with a static
voltmeter or with a ballistic galvanometer. About 1,200 volts were normally
reached; the 2urrent was a maximum of 10-7 (sic) a'nps.This was looked upon as quite
sufficient for the activation of an image conver,;er,which had been developed at
some place outside Kuchino.
3. In September 1951 the work was finished. Partly from the fact that the Zamboni
column was used as a source of potential and that apparently no main apparatus
was to be used, the Germans concluded that the image converter must be a portable
apparatus with which one could, for example, make observations at night around
a sentry post.
Small Dry Battery Elements
4. Some dry elements were also developed by Andreyev in the chemical section of Laboratory
3. These were to have the smallest po$sible dimensions and were to be used as heat-
ing and anode batteries in small portable and inconspicuous radio receivers. These
elements were only seen in the finished state and nothing was discovered about the
most satisfactory materials.
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The heating batteries had roughly the shape and size of a matchbox. One cell
gave 1.6 v. Usually two or four cells were placed to ether. For anode batteries,
smaller cells were produced in plate form (galetin;sic) with a diameter of 15 mm.
The plates were placed on top of one another and the lower surface of one plate
made good contact with the upper surface of the next by means of a graphite
paste; this also served to hold them together. The rim of a lower plate acted
as a lead to the plate lying on top of it. Fifteen plates together had a
height of 100 mm. At first the plates were made of lead but later, for reasons
of material economy, plastic plates were used; each had a hole in its base
of ten mm diameter, through which the graphite paste came into contact with the
under surface of the inlaid lead electrodes. Prepared columns of these plates
gave potentials of about 25 volts and could be loaded to a miximum of 5ma.
Frontier Protection Wire
6. Work on this project proceeded in Laboratory 9,in 1950,and 1951. The wire was to pro-
tect otherwise unguarded stretches of frontier, particularly in difficult places
of access. In experiments, about 40 meters of wire which resembled a single-
core telephone lead were stretched over poles. The capacity of the wire against
the earth varied when a vehicle or person passed under it. This property was
then used to alter the frequency of a tuned circuit; this then gave a differential.
frequency against a similarly tuned circuit remaining constant. Nothing is
known about the sensitivity of this system.
Submarine Buoy
7. Nothing further is known about this task.
Three-Stage Amplifier with Subminiature Tubes
8. In Laboratory 9, a three-stage amplifier was developed with a very large ampli-
fication factor (1 ), using subminiature tubes. This was to make the micro-
phone current of a tiny microphone, which was apparently without batteries,
audible in a loud-speaker. The unit was apparently to form a clandestine
listening device, with a microphone which could be fastened inconspicuously in
lamps, door latches, etc.
Soviet Quartz Crystal Group
9. Khazin, Soviet head of Laboratory 1, was particularly interested in
the production of quartz crystals by this group. In this group, headed by
the physicist A.A. Ostrovskiy, there were a number of good Soviet technicians
and polishers who made quartz plates and rods for prescribed frequencies.
These quartzes were for the stabilization of oscillators. Khazin headed work
on the development of the.Bp'ommy and Wullenwever D/F installations, and the
Gei:xmns thought that these,quartzes were prepared mainly for this work.2 No
quartzes were made for ultrasonic purposes. No further details are known.
Small Two-Volt DC Servomotor,
10. In 1951 a German was asked by the head of Laboratory 3 for his advice on the
development of tape recorders. On this occasion the Soviet Levkin mentioned that
small motors were already available. Drawings of these had also been prepared;
these drawings indicated that the motors had a permanent iron magnet and a
rotor with an armature winding. They had a diameter of 20 mm and were used
first as contact makers. Disks were applied which gave dots and dashes by
means of cam switches. The German was of the opinion that these small motors
were for position signal transmitters in unmanned balloons. Small alterations
were suggested by the German to make these motors suitable for standard tape
recorders. It is not known whether these alterations were successful.
Beta-Rky Excited Emitter
11. The Soviets suggestion 25X1
for the development of a beta-ray cathode were Zhelezov., Dolarozhanskiy,and
Bergelson. Up to April 1950 a number of experimental preparations for the
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CS-G-48122
task were made to 25X1
build the pump stand needed for the experimental tubes. He receives three-stage
mercury diffusion pump of British origin. received 25 German Geiger 25X1
counters from war-booty stocks. Each consisted of a glass tube 30 mm in diameter
and 300 mm long and metallized inside. developed a circuit for 25X1
the amplification of the counter pulses and procured a piece of uranium glass
which he had seen in the chemical laboratory. This glass was a Quader (sic)
which measured 5 by 5 by 15 cros; approach- 25X1
ing the measurement of the radioactivity of the uranium when the task was cancelled.
12. At first this project was strictly secret; no one outside the project was to
know anything of it. Later, however, the Soviet Volkov and Bershadskiy, an
engineerswere drawn into the work as interpreters; these two and possibly the
latter's secretary were responsible for the other laboratories learning of the
project. This lack of security may have been caused by the retraction of the
task in April 1950.
13, further work on this project was carried on at a place
where the MGB felt the specialists were more reliable.
Printed Circuits
14. The task of working on printed circuitry was given to a German specialist in
Laboratory 1 (not Laboratory 3 as previously reported) in July 1949. To
learn more about the application of this process, the German demanded of Volkov
and Khazin more exact details of the type of apparatus which was to be produced.
It eventually became clear that the Soviets just wanted a sample. They had
apparently heard of this American: technique and wanted to use the process.
They showed no interest in the preparation of the necessary machine tools and
jigs or in the calculations necessary for the production of printed circuits.
15. The German specialist had to use primitive and time-wasting methods of making
jigs. The impression of the circuits an the ceramic plate was done by a panto-
graph (Storch-schnabel). For the capacitances, dielectrics with high dielectric
constants should have been laid into the ceramic plates. These were not available,
however, so that finished condensors had to be soldered in. A paste for printing
resistances was obtained only with the greatest difficulty. The institute at Kuchino
lacked the fine grinding mills necessary to produce the paste. Eventually, a
major who was responsible for supply obtained some paste,through unofficial chan-
nels from a plant which normally produced potentiometers. Volkov suggested that
the coils should be produced in such a way that they lay flat along the two
surfaces of the plate so that their enclosed surfaces were very small and the
coil values were very limited. The German strongly disputed Volkov about the
pointlessness of this. Volkov gave the task to another German. 25X1
16. The finished apparatus was to be used to receive a TV speech channel on 60 mc/s
FM. Two subminiature tubes were used and demodulation was carried out in a
primitive way by a superregenerative control 25X1
The ceramic plates were baked by chemist Bershadskiy. The sample prin
circuit was ready in May 1950 and was intended for demonstration purposes only.
Recording Machines
17. In Laboratory 3, there were two types of recorders in 1949. Both were table
models and copies of German units of the type produced by AEG in 1945. Both
used 19-mm-wide Agfa tape.
18. One of the types was known by the Russian code name Yantar (amber) and used
German tubes; for example, the RV 12 P 2000. The other type used Soviet tubes.
At this time, Laboratory 3 was working to replace the German Agfa tape with its
own product. Tape and wire samples were being tested for coercivity. By 1950
the quality of the tape had not yet reached that of the German tape.
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19. The laboratory received the task of developing the smallest recorder possible --
a pocket model. Wire rather tbBn tape was necessary for a recorder of this size,
so the production of suitable wire had to be considered before anything else.
A wire was developed in 1951 by the arrested Soviet specialist Ogorodnikov in
the chemical group of Laboratory 3. His wire was up to specifications: copper,
brass, or bronze core of 0.15-mm diameter coated with an alloy of 80 percent nickel and
20 percent cobalt to a thickness of about three )A-. The composition of this
alloy was so chosen that its theoretical expected maximum coercivity was 300
oersteds. Nothing further is known about these tasks.
VHF Transmitter and Receiver
20. The ID-7 tube was used without success because the pulse was too long. The re-
ceiver was to be built by N.N. Fedorov in the electrophysical section. This
was to be a detector receiver working without a source of current. Such re-
ceivers were to be placed in munitions or supply dumps to set off an explosion if
enemy capture were threatened. The task was abandoned because it was impossible
with the weak detector current to perfect a relay.
21. In 1949 the Germans working with Volkov were commissioned to evaluate American
literature on transistors and to draw up a plan for installations necessary for
their development in Kuchino. After an intense study of available literature
(particularly the work of Shockley, et al., in I.R.E. in 1948)..the Germans drew
up plans for transistor development stating that mass spectrographs, Hall-effect
measuring instruments, vibration-free crystal cultivation apparatus, etc., were
needed. Nothing more was heard of this project.
silicon detectors had been produced at Fryazino,
The Germans at Kuchino therefore thought it quite possible that transistors had
been developed at Fryazino.
Spark Gaps
22. conducted some work on this subject at Kuchino. He said that previously
at Gorkiy he had been able to produce pulses of one)- sec with a power of several
mw. The pulses were to modulate radar transmitters. The production of pulses
by means of spark gaps instead of by tubes is an economical method; said
he had introduced it to the Soviets. He said that when he went to Gorkiy he dis-
covered that the Soviets had no experience in this field; he found no modern work
on the subject in Soviet technical literature.
23. In Kuchino, producing pulses of 10 msec and 50 kw. These
pulses were to be produced singly by_ pressing a.button.._ The production of radio
pulses was conducted in connection with the development of a VHF transmitter
using the LD-7 tube. Aluminum was used as the electrode material. Four kv
were used as the potential source.
24. The German specialists at Kuchino understood that there existed in the USSR a
program to copy all types of American subminature tubes. Units which were to
be supplied with such tubes were already developed before the tubes were avail-
able; American subminature tubes were used in: such cases. The first examples
of Soviet subminature tubes appeared at Kuchino in about 1950. Three types
were seen in 1950 or 1951: a triode, an Hg pentode, and a power pentode. The
quality of these tubes was not particularly noteworthy. The Germans thought,
however, that first-quality tubes were not delivered to Kuchino. Ma;iy.tubes
failed in their first use through breakage of the heating coil. Others had
limited lives. There was a wide dispersion of electrical data for various
samples of the same type of subminature tubes.
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II. TECHNICAL LITERATURE AT KUCHINO
25. Up to the end of 1950, foreign technical periodicals appeared in the
library of Kuchino institute, at most six weeks after publication. After
1950, however, entry of the majority of English-language periodicals seemed
to be hindered in some way by the West: the institute only received copies,
usually photocopied, which were of interest, and then, only after a delay of
about six months. In original copies, the advertising was usually subject
to censorship. Often the instructions to censor a particular part arrived
only after the periodical had been in the library for some weeks, so that
it was possible to get a good idea of the intentions of the censors. "Help
Wanted" ads were particularly liable to censorship; they indicated the salaries
and other material conditions offered to applicants. Articles critical of
the Soviet bloc or long, detailed articles with biographies were apt to be censored,
apparently to conceal the differences of living standards between East and West.
The censor used black paint or scissors on offending passages. Sometimes
whole pages were eliminated.
26. Permission to see foreign literature was granted on a restricted basis. and
depended on the type of literature. The following three types of periodicals
or extracts were subject to different rules:
a . Technical,
b. Social science,
c. Political.
Only the free or arrested Soviet who could prove their"need to knoi'received
permission to read the first two types. Control over the technical periodicals
was much less strict than control over the political ones. The group permitted
to read the political literature was the smallest of the three.
27. The majority of Russian-language technical books in the library were translated
from,or based on, foreign works whose authors were often not named. Only in
the field of mathematics were there quite a few works by Soviet authors, Smirnov,
for example. The Soviets who interested themselves in technical literature
particularly wanted popular periodicals intended for the layman. Origine,,1
contributions were scarcely studied by them. According to sources the following
Western periodicals were in the Kuchino libraryi
Acoustical Society of America Journal /U-S
Alta Frequenza.taliarr
Bell System Technical Journal j
Electrical Engineering AUSJ,
Electronics ,U~
Journal of Applied Physics j7
-
Nature fu-S, UK, or Frenc
Philips Research Reports ffl)utch
,
Philips Technische Rundsclau Jerman edition of Dutch publication,
`
Physical Review ,U
S7
Physikalische Bl.tter ,,fW_est German?
Popular Mechanics Magazine ffl
RCA ReviewflW
Reviews of Modern Physics C7
Scientific Instruments
Televisicn ,US or Frenc7
Wireless Engineer [UK]
All leading East German technical periodicals were in the library.
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III. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON KUCHINO
Code Names of Projects
28. The project for building the first sample of a tape recorder was known
under the Russian code name Yantar (amber). Informant did not know any
other code names.
29. MGB Unit 568 had its headquarters in Moscow-6 All official mail was
distributed to the various departments by a courier from Moscow. Other mail
for Kuchino bore the address "Department 568 K". Soviet prisoners at Kuchino
could correspond with their relatives through a Moscow postal box, the number
of which was changed from time to time.
German prisoners could correspond in the same way with relatives in the
USSR, but not abroad.
30. The prison camp was a department of the Lefortova prison in Moscow which
used the same postal box number as the Kuchino camp. However, source thought
that Butyrskaya prison may later have become the main prison for supplying
the Kuchino camp. These Moscow transit prisons had hospitals to which sick
prisoners from Kuchino were taken.
Series Production
31. About 300 men and women worked in the production department at Kuchino. Of
these, only a few of the men were prisoners. Small series of transmitters and
receivers for agents were produced here. The Germans learned this.from-Soviet
fellow-prisoners who worked in the department. No further details are known.
Changes in Organization
32. After informant was sent to another camp in September 1951, his information on
the installation was gained only from Soviet prisoners who had been there.
Informant thus learned that:
a. At one time in late 1951 or early 1952, there had been a big transfer of lab-
oratories to Marfino; little remained in Kuchino except the production sec-
tio4 Laboratory 8, and the library.
b. The deaths of Stalin and Beriya had no effect on the organization or
administration of the institute, but.there were arrests and demotions.
Zhelezov was finally employed as an assistant at Marfino.
c. In 1953 source. heard that Marfino was eventually to be closed and, by the
end of 1953, Kuchino was to be restored to full operation.
Radio Monitoring
33. The Soviet prisoners believed that the reason for point a. (See preceding para-
graph) was that a foreign station had broadcast a report on the existence of
the Kuchino prison. The Soviet prisoners said that this information had been
sent to the West by a secret transmitter in the institute itself. One of the
Germans, however did not think that a secret transmitter could possibly have
evaded the careful radio listening posts. He himself had experienced how
carefully the supervisors worked. When the institute began with a newly de-
veloped transmitter, it was barely 24 hours before radio monitors in Moscow
got in touch with the head of the institute to ask what authority he had for
illegal transmissions.
History of the Institute
34+. In Unit 568 there were about 20 prisoners of particularly. long standing, e.g.,
Fedor Stepanovich (snu) had been a prisoner since 1932 and had been sent to
Kuchino before World War II. In 19+2 he had gone with the prison camp to the
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lower Volga in the neighborhood of the Urals (sic) and had returned with the camp
to Kuchino after the war.
35. The prisoners in Kuchino knew that the MGB controlled similar prisoners camps in
Marfino and in Spiridionka near Moscow (the Monastery of St. Spiridion). There
possibly was an institute in Leningrad.
36. Nothing is known of any MGB (or other) research or other work on bacteria, drugs,
or clandestine weapons.
Material Supplies
37. In Kuchino, everything was at one time or another in short supply except iron,
brass, copper wire, special hard paper, and mica. The Germans believed that
there were no real shortages of materals but that the distributive organizations
had failed in their function. Standard screws had to be specially made. Ceramic
materials for HF insulators were in short supply and of poor quality. The quality
of paper, even for writing purposes, was miserable. There were no paper con-
densors available. Polystyrol and Supertinax were nonexistent. Light metals
were rationed. Informant was not surprised that ethyl alcohol and precious metals
were strictly controlled, since he felt that the MGB could not entrust them to
prisoners. From 19+8 on,,Soviet-made tubes which were copies of American types were
available. These came from Leningrad and were generally of poorer quality than
the original tubes. Tubes built with argon first appeared in 1950; they were copies
of the American types 2050 and 887.
Discussions between Soviet and German Prisoners
38. The Soviet prisoners, many of whom were scientists or-technicians, did not
speak very willingly about their living conditions when they had been free.
However, they were very interested in hearing about living conditions in the
West, continuously asking the Germans exactly what living conditions were like.
A Soviet technician could not get over the fact that his opposite number, with
a wife and child, could obtain a three-room apartment with central heating
and hot water in the West. The prisoners were interested in the salaries of
various professions and wanted to know how their opposite numbers spent their
salaries, e.g., how much for living accommodations, food, and clothing. Often
the furniture and equipment of a typical apartment had to be described by the
Germans. The Soviet prisoners, even a former colonel and the director of a
factory7never had the luxury of a double bed or twin beds when married. Man
and wife would sleep in one small bed; in .a poorer family, children would
sleep at the end of the bed.
39. The Soviet prisoners wanted to know about the prospects in various careers in
the West, particularly in technical careers. They seemed disappointed that it
was necessary to pay for schooling or for higher education in the West. The
Germans were also asked about unemployment in the capitalist countries. Apparently
the Soviet people learned a great deal through their contact with the West during
and after the war that the government wished to hide from them. There was no doubt
that the higher living standards of the average person in the West made a very
great impression on the Soviet prisoners.
40. The Germans felt that a Soviet citizen was most subject to arrest when the MGB con-
sidered him a danger to the regime. The grounds given were often different and
quite implausible. According to the Germans, the slightest word or action by a
Soviet indicating that he considered the West was in any way better than the
USSR would lead to his arrest. For example, a colonel who was a prisoner in one
of the camps and who had taken part in the fighting in Berlin was arrested be-
cause he had brought an American gold coin or medal back to the USSR as a souvenir.
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He showed it to a number of people as an interesting curiosity. He was
arrested by the MGB on the charge that he had obviously received the money
from Americans for espionage. Everyone realized that this was ridiculous
and that the real reason for his arrest was that he might cause people to
think about the superiority of the US, which had gold coins, over the USSR,
which had none.
141. Another example of grounds for arrest involved a Russian automobile designer
in one of the prison camps. He had been given the task of copying an American
car after long study in the US. When he had Finished his work, he said he was
very dissatisfied with the first sample of his own work. Nevertheless, this
was taken as an expression of inferiority of the Russian model as compared with
the American. He was arrested.
4+2. For the following reasons, informant felt, that Soviet research and development
can never reach the same level as in the West:
a. The planned economy -- Scientists are so completely hamstrung by the system
of planning that they can never work to their full capacity. The offices
which issue materials for a development contract expect a complete list of
material requirements before the start of any work. When the plan is
drafted, arbitrary cuts are made on the grounds of economy. After the
approval of development costs, it is impossible officially to submit a
supplementary plan or pay cash for any materials required for completion.
Extra requirements can only be filled by bribery or by barter. The plan
assumes not only that the approved money has been correctly allotted, but also
that plants well meet planned deliveries.
b. Personnel -- The preliminary education of technical and scientific personnel
is insufficient and too one-sided for successful research work. In addition
to political subjects, the many institutes teach technical subjects so
elementary that, later, specialists in different fields find it almost im-
possible to understand each other. Only the few scientists of the old school
have extensive knowledge. Because of the gap in higher education caused by
the Revolution, the continuity and traditions of science are lacking and, con-
sequently, successful development and research work can only be achieved with
difficulty. At present, remarkable advances have been made by the Soviets
only in mathematics; foreign scientists have been deceived by that. In all
technical spheres, achievement is far behind that of the West and it limited
to imitation of western developments. Creative achievement in the technical
and scientific spheres has not existed for a long time. These circumstances
cannot be altered for a long time, so the USSR will not be able to compete;
with the West for a very long time. In general, there were very few Soviet
specialists who were competent to carry out satisfactorily the tasks given
them. Even those few could not exercise full competence because of the
shortage of technical help. Leading Soviets understood too little of tech-
nology. They were inclined to look at every specialist, particularly the
Germans, as a magician who could produce something out of nothing. It was
remarkable that high bonuses were paid to the laboratory heads even when
their workers had merely succeeded in copying well-known Western apparatus.
c. Scientist prisoners -- The intelligentsia are filling many prisons and
work camps. Forced labor has destroyed all the traditions of teaching
institutions. The MGB realized that the imprisoned technicians represented
"floating capital". Consequently, institutes were formed to use imprisoned
specialists in their own fields. The success of these institutes was limited
since institute and laboratory heads were.not specialists but MGB officers.
The specialists knew how to sabotage work, or at least did not accomplish
as much as if they had been free.
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