MORALE PROBLEM IN ALBANIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A005600130006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 14, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP80-00810A005600130006-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
25X1
This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 19, U.S.C. Seim 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
bylaw.
SECRET -ii. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
COUNTRY Albania
REPORT
SUBJECT Morale Pr,tlem in Albania
DATE DISTR.
lb January 1955
NO. OF PAGES
25X1
DATE OF INFO.
REQUIREMENT NO.
RD
PLACE ACQUIRED
REFERENCES
This is UNEVALUATED
Information
THE SOURCE EVALUAT:ONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
1. The morale among government official,am eficers, 9arty members and
the intelligentsiswin Albania is quite .1.uw. peop1( are subjecteu to many
abuses and their ecnnomic plight is demoralizing.
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2. An army officer who was a loyal Communist and who had never entertained the
idea cf defecting to the West, allowed himself to be captured by Yugoslav
soldiers while on a clandestine military mission in YUgoslavia because his
enthusiasm for Communism in Albania had waned and he decided that it was not
worth fighting and dying for. Abuses in high places, the poor standard of
living endured by his family and the miserable conditions of the mass of
people contributed to his decision to surrender rather than fight. There
are still many Communists, but they have lost faith in the promises of Commu-
nism and in its system of government.
3. There are many officers in the Sigurimi (Albanian 1.80 who are at heart decent
man, who help the people in a quiet way and who overlook small offenses committed
by the people.
4. Propaganda directed to Albania should make a distinction between real and
nominal Communists. By all means, let Mehmat Shehu and his entourage be
attacked; but it is an error to attack all Communists and all government offi-
cials indiscriminately. The latter group should be appealed to and induced
to see the realities of the situation in which they live and urged to change
its ways.
Ordinary officers and officials, whether party members or not, must be given
SECRET - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
STATE X
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
FBI
A EC
(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "AP.)
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nr.F=ALS ONLY
some hope for the Put7lre. They meet be astrzeed that they not all be
considered by Wei; ae peeeeeuted and livAlated after
liberatien. Thee' eheeld be tIll ehet 1!: they ehange their tack Ahey will be
acceptable to the Wt and attee will be left rrta to carry on
in a free Albania. Tle?e pteeeet eieeentent eheeld be eeploited and com-
pared with the hepes nt the tree until their faith in the present system
has been completely Naid9nrired ei ven te take action to improve
their lot.
6. An internal leeolttien in Albania will enly be reoesible vten the morale of
the Communist :arty member has teee leeeken and wttn the people's faith in
the system has been lost. One tng eeAt mind when viewing the
Albanian scene. Sine Werld Wee- II, Albariane neve become politically minded
and it will be difficult to impeae eel them the type. of regime which governed
prior to the war. If the people want King Zeg, or the Balli Kombetar or
Mustafa Kruja, they will vete roe them, but these political leaders and parties
must realize that the old ways haere gone and that they must introduce enlightened
principles of government.in a liberated Albania. Meanwhile, it is most impor-
tant to bring unity among the Albanian exilea. They must concentrate their
efforts on a single purpose and not diaeipate their energies in quarrels among
themselsee,
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7. The people in Albania knceeef the extetenea eT the National Committee for a
Free Albania - NCFA and have here In its pregram. The authorities frequently
attack the Committee. The leeflets uent be the RUA reach the people both
in the toerne and in the ccuntrye altleo-Igh the police take prompt measures to
collect and destroy the leaflete. Theee leaflets are of value and the cartoons
are recalled long aftew they have been read. It is important to remember, however,
that the Albanian pule must rot he given the erroneous impression that the
West plans tmmediate Uberatien of the ne4ntey when in point of fart no immedi-
ate action is centemplated. Mieleeding the peeple only breeds dieillulionment
as it has already done in F":)Mtl iretexeen.
8. The government makes e7ery elf:fo!t ti2 build up the morale in the army. Recruits
are made to sing -while they ronrch and everts events are encouraged. Discipline
is strict and the army gives the generel appearance of being a well organized,
well disciplined erdt. In feet, tewever, merale is law. Conscripts are only
concerned with the day they will be released. The economic condition of
their families is aggravated by tiral-Aenc. They are given no leave and
are badgered Ttonstantly vetth p1it, eeepeFeeda at meetings and lectures.
Soldiers are dimortert vlth 1,-1, and nanny have gone AWOL although of late,
the number of noldlerm AWOL ham eo:,,eed. Thec deeerters are mostly men from
Northern Albania or from the fronr
9. The organization and training of the men in the army is good. A large number
of officers and reglelar non ccmmIAPld ,.:IttYxers are good soldiery and are
enthusiastic about ther work hnd rlA.Cy te make any saerifices. Despite the
fact that most conscripts do not share thie enthuliaemy the army is a good
fighting erganization and would give H. geed aeeount of itself if called to
fight for the country.
10. Many army officers wile were mlrztro p.4xty were enthusiastic in their
support of the war againet Creees ln Ttere einre also many deserters.
A group of 50 eoldiere left thi? t*.r7,nt, the :fighting bTlt they were
caught before they t.cvlsi scatte!r.
11. Given certain cirr.:01mm1aw7em
of a radical change in
to the change. Tn
desert in conHide ,!Jd
mn in the ran aw the possibility
they might lend their support
Hdirm could be expected to
th&i. homes.
PI-72-7IAL3 C:NLY
Approved For Release 2007/11/01: CIA-RDP80-00810A005600130006-3