THE EXECUTION OF VIKTOR SEMENOVICH ABAKUMOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A005700860002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 25, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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COAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY USSR
1 CITCA! SECURITY REASONS
IF '.S R F!4T is PT T~~ E F!`RTflER
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by law.
DATE DISTR. 25 January 1955
NO. OF PAGES 7
REQUIREMENT No. RD
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPEAISAL OF CONTNIT IS TE ITATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE avow)
1. The announcement of the trial and execution of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov is a
propaganda move by the Soviet leaders consistent with the propaganda trend of the
last two years. The facts in the indictment are wholly without foundation and,
in many cases, the direct opposite of the truth. In publicizing this event, the
regime is attempting to persuade the Soviet people that it is a different type of
regime from that of Stalin, that it is genuinely concerned with the people's
welfare, and that it will not allow arbitrary arrest or false accusations by the
security services. Yet the present reemphasie on Stalin's role as continuer of
Lenin's cause is more indicative of the truth: the present leaders, schooled under
Stalin, are like him in being cruel and arbitrary, unconcerned with the people's
welfare when it suits their purpose, and intent upon expanding their power within
and without the Soviet Union.
Indictment
evaluation of the indictment of Abakumov
which appeared in the December 24 issue of Pravda:
"The defendant Abakumov, who was appointed by Beriya to the post of USSR
Minister of State Security participated directly in the criminal group
of plotters, and carried out for Beriya perfidious tasks directed against
the Coemunist Party and the Soviet Government." 25X1
a. That Abakumov was appointed as minister by Ba is untrue, despite the
(NOTE: Wad,L,gfta dl k6utise iadfsa/ad by "r, Fl.ld dWAWW60 by "*".)
The Execution of Viktor Semenovich
Abakumov
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SECRET 25X1
fact that Abakumov had at one time been deputy to Beriya when the latter was
chief of the NKVD. Abakumov was appointed Minister of the MGB by Stalin
approximately in April-May of 1946, on the day that the Peoples Commissariats
became Ministries. Although Beriya was forced to accede to Stalin's wishes
in this matter, Abakumov was not helped by Beriya to this position nor can
he be considnr,d a protege of Beriya. On the day the appointment was made,
several lereons,including Beriya,were present in Stalin's office when the
subjec, of i.rrvintment of a minister of the NGB was under discussion. Stalin
raised a pencil and slowly and deliberately lowered it to the list of r_,maes
before him. Indicating Abs1nmov, he said, "And he shall be the mix_ ter".
Stalin then looked over at Beriya. Beriya
appeared to brink for a moment and khen nodded. Proof that Abakumov was not
Beriya'a protege can be found in the fact that,after Aba)n mov became minister,
he issued a long order to all the operational workers in which he viciously
criticized the former Minister Merkulov, accusing him of sabotaging the work
of the MB,, of being inefficient in the proper conduct of operations, of
making improper use of personnel, and of playing favorites within the NGD.
Furthermore, Abakumov successfully removed all of the higher officials who
previously had worked under Merkulov: for example, the two Kobulov brothers
and Meshik,among others. When it is recalled that terkulov was a personal
friend of Beriya during the whole of his life and that Merkulov, the Kobulov
brothers, and Mieshik were shot along with Beriya,,ro ,must conclude that 25X1
Beriya would not have appointed Abakumov as Ministior of the NGB.
b. Nor could Abakumov have been a direct accomplice of the criminal conspiracy
group, carrying out wrecking assignments given him by Beriya. Abakumov was
in Jail at the time that Beriya was arrested and until after his execution
and probably did not even know that Beriya had been arrested. Therefore, he
could not have been an accomplice to Beriya's actions.
c. Approximately two or three months after Abakumov's arrest, an edict was read
& a meeting of the Party Aktiv of the NGB concerning Abakumov'a crimes. One
of the signatories of this edict was Malenkov. Briefly, it stated that an
investigation by the Central Committee of the VKP (b) had disclosed that the
present situation and the past work of the 1W were unsatisfactory, that
Abakumov was morally degenerate, and that he carried on acts with the purpose
of undermining the authority of the USSR. He was accused of being near-sighted,
inefficient in operations, and not giving proper direction to work under his
supervision. It further-stated, without specifying, that Abakumov and other
members of the NGB had not become cognizant that some of the enemW elements
in the USSR had attempted to create diversionary and terrorist acts against
the leaders of the Communist Party, the Soviet Government, and the Soviet
Army. After the meeting, each chief of a section (tdel gathered his sub-
ordinates and explained to them that this charge referred to the case of the
doctors who had attempted to poison Stalin, Malenkov, Beriya,and others.
3. The indictment continues:
"Committing the same crimes as Beriya, Abakumov took the path of adventures
and political provocations. Abakumov fabricated cases against individual
workers of the Party and Soviet apparatus and representatives of the Soviet
intelligentsia; then he arrested these persons, making use of the criminal
methods of investigation prohibited by Soviet law, jointly with his
associates A.G. Leonov, V.I. Komarov, and M.T. Likhachev, and obtained from
those arrested untrue statements and confessions of their guilt in serious
crimes against the State."
Actually, it must be stated that Abakumov was arrested because he would not take
the path of adventure and political provocations. Although the indictment states
that he obtained confessions from those falsely arrested and tortured, the truth,
as stated in the edict read after his arrest, was that he was unable to get con-
fessions and that actually he received no confessions from anyone. One must
read between the lines of the indictment: contrary to what is being said in the
indictment, the Government actually accused Abakumov, Leonov, Komarov and
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Likhachev of very inadequately beating and torturing their prisoners. After
Ryumin was appointed by Stalin as an IGB deputy chief, member of the MOB colle
and chief of the Section for the Investigation of Especially Important Affairs,
very few of the doctors in the Doctors' Plot left jail in good health as a result
of the interrogations used. The fact that Abakumov was inefficient in the eyes
of the Kremlin and was not cruel enough in his treatment of the prisoners is
shown by the dispatch of special experts from the Central Committee to investigate
the doctors' case. Abakumov was too intelligent a man to allow himself to be
drawn into these plots.
4. Another point in the indictment was:
"By sucl- means. Abakumov falsified the so-called 'Leningrad Case' in which
a number of 1 Jarty and administrative workers were groundlessly arrested and
falsely accused of serious State crimes."
a. The Leningrad case, itself, has . been brought before the public at this
time for the following reasons: the Soviet Government, at this time, is
going through a crisis and is attempting by various means to raise its own
prestige not only in the eyes of the Soviet citizen, but even in the eyes of
the Sovie-; Government and of Party officials of the highest echelons. This
part of the indictment seems to wish to point out that Beriya and Abakumov
were actually "vagabonds", who continually arrested and condemned all sorts
of innocent persms The present government, however, is attempting to
appear different,. They are saying,. 'Zook, : we are investigating the past 25X1
and releasing innocent viotima;' -you can 'trust us.".
b. "The Leningrad Case" can only refer to the purges
which took place in LeningrAd 1949-50. It is extremely unlikely that any
Soviet citizen would be inc:'.ined to interpret the "Leningrad Case" as refer-
ring to the situation involving the Party Central Committee decree of August
1946 on the Leningrad literary jom'nals Zvezda and teninraad. However, very
few Soviet citizens knew what had happened in Leningrad in 1949. In fact,
very few people outside of "sningrad will even connect the present reference
to the Leningrad case with the happenings in Leningrad in 1949.
c. 1 akumov's role in the events in Leningrad in 1949 was restricted to his
personally arresting N.A. Voznesenskiy. He acted hero as an instrument of
the Central Committee and not on his own. Stalin haO become suspicious of
the Leningrad group--A.A. Kuznetsov, Voznesenskiy, M.I. Rodionov, Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the RSFFR, and P.S. Popkov, all political
appointees of A.A. Zhdanov--because they had suggested that Leningrad be
made the capital of the RSFSR. They had also suggested that a Ministry of
State Security be established under the RSFSR.l Stalin accused Voznesenskiy
and Kuznetsov of attempting to create a Russian Federation with its head-
quarters at Leningrad which would be against the last interest of the USSR,
since Leningrad had historic associations with the Russian empire. Stalin
had a constant fear that Great Russians were attempting to replace him
because he was a Georgian.
d. Voznesenskiy was arrested by Abakumoviand Kuznetsov was arrested by one of
Abakumov's deputies. A rumor was circulated among the people in the DSSR
that Voznesenskiy had been only removed from his position as head of GosPlan
and was at home writing a book on economics. It was rumored that Kuznetsov
had done something incorrectly and had been sent to Khabarovsk as a secretary
of the Khabarovsk regional committee. However, members of the NO knew that
the two were actually incarcerated in an inner jail. Soon after the arrest
of Voznesenskiy and Abakumov, there was a general purge throughout the NO
in Leningrad involving chiefs of sections and higher. The purge was known
in Leningrad and Moscow through rumors and through talk by )(B workers at
home. Along the periphery and in the inland country, however, nothing was
known about the situation. About tVo or three months after the arrests,
rumors circulated that Voznesenskiy and Kuznetsov had been executed.
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e rumor wa;, true.
About this time Popkov was arrested; however, no ng was ever known of
his fate.
25X1
e. It was later officially stated among Party workers that Kuznetsov and i:.?--
Leningrad officials had been accused of falsifying the results of elections
in the Leningrad Ob= And Gornartkom in 1949. Popkov was up for re-
election as First Secretary and guzneteov was up for election to the
Leningrad Oblast Committee. Several voters cast ballots against the entire
slate, but the commission certifying the election felt that it would look 25X1
more proper if the election was unanimous. They took their problem to
Kuznetsov..who told them that it was their affair, thus indirectly count-
enancing the falsification. One of those who had voted against the slate
then wrote to Stalin informing him that the election had not been unanimous.
Stalin used this charge as the basis for the arrests which followed. Kuz-
netsov had attended the election as Party representative from the center 25X1
and was held doubly responsible for the falsification.
f. Malenkov'a actual role in the Leningrad
he must have played a leading part, since he was 25X1
at that time a secretary of the Central Committee and he was trusted by
Stalin. Although Malenkov probably ]slew exactly what was going on in
Leningrad, he was afraid to use it against his enemies and to inform Stalin
fully. Malenkov probably was wary of Stalin's capriciousness, fearing that
the affair, if fully explained, might redound on him. Melenkov and Beriya
y have made a trip to Leningrad at this time.
ma
5.
ti
relationship between Malenkov. and V.M. Andri nov, who replaced Popkov as
First Secretary in Leningrad, Malenkov certainly sanctioned
his appointment.
25X1
The indictment further said:
"At the trial, there were also established many other instances of fabrication
of criminal cases and a criminal treading under foot of Socialist law by
Abakumov and his confederates. Now the people who were falsely accused by
Abakumov and his confederates have been fully rehabilitated."
In this section, the Soviet Government is attempting to show its subordinates
how humane it is, to give to those now in prisons some hope that their cases may
also be investigated and that they may be freed, However, this is, of course,
only a false hope. A certain number of Party workers have been released, but the
majority of those arrested who have in the past oz*nlv criticized the Soviet
Goverment will probably rever get out of jail. important
personalitie' will be released, since these prisoners are in prison by order of
the present G,vernmment and it would be impossible for the blame for their
arrests to I- put on Abakumov.
25X1
6. Finally, the indictment said:
"In order to conceal the-crimes committed by him, Abakumov prohibited the
transmittal to appropriate quarters of the statements and complaints of
the arrested persons, addressed to the Central Commnittee of the CPSU and
the Soviet Government."
a. The above accusation refers to the certain percentage of complaints stating
that individuals were poorly fed, poorly treated, and beaten. Al]. such com-
plaints are controlled by the MGB and never reach the-Central Committee.
Whenever such a complaint reached Abakumov himself, he would severely punish
those responsible and would issue orders to the department concerned to mend
its ways. However, those punished were few and far between, and only in
sufficient numbers to show a superficial humanity. The majority of complaints
addressed to the Central Committee were returned the next day by the "bagful"
to the MOB for research. No one in the Central Committee ever looked at them.
If, at any time, some complaint, through personal connections, reached one of
SNIT
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the leaders of the Government or the Politburo, it would also be returned
to the MGB with the 'ollowing notatio._: "Chief of the Molotov security
area to the Minister of the MGB: This complaint is directed to your
attention for your action". Nothing more.
Concerning the men tried along with Abak
25X1
Leonov was a majoror enera 25X1
Concerning I.A. Chernov and Broverman 25X1
Chernov, during the period that Abakumov 25X1
was minister, was chief of the MB Secretariat with the rank of colonel.
He was not arrested at the same time as Abakumov. Ignatyev removed him
from his position because he had been chief under.Abakvmov and it would have
been embarassing to retain him in this position. Chernov remained unemployed
for several months after his removal. Chernov was later transferred into
some Moscow directorate, that is, either in the M3B in Moscow or in the
covnterinteL.igence of the Moscow Nilitarv Okrrig.
Broverman was Chernov's deputy, with the rank of lieutenant colonel.
25X1
25X1
Broverman was another Ber ya, in the sense t he was 25X1
extremely intelligent as was Beriya. Broverman's job was to write and com-
pile reports for Abakumov,as well as all speeches and orders. In other
words, he carried on all the functions of the mi^ister and Abakumov only
signed the papers prepared by Broverman. After Abakumov's arrest, Broverman
was not arrested and worked as deputy chief of a section of the MGB in
rbscow. up to March 1953 Broverman had not been
arrested and continued to work in this job.
Conclusions
7. Abakumov had been arrested and was shot at the present time because, as Minister
of the MGB, he was.the most efficient and intelligen+ one in the history of
the USSR. He was shot because he had had free access u., oGalin, because he nad
had audio-surveillance put on the houses of all the memberq of the Politburo
and all marshals of the Soviet Union. As a result, Abakumov was well acquainted
with all the doings of the Communist Party and therefore had become the worst
enemy of its leaders.
8. Publicity was given the trial and execution in accordance with the propaganda
line of the last two years. The present emphasis upon people's rights and upon
coexistence is indicative of the present weakness of the Soviet Government. Co-
existence is an abe:rdi
Ten years ago there would never
25X1
have been any talk of it.
25X1
Co am a gun crack
25X1
and will continue to crack for same For example, the satellites have
begun to build socialism in their countries but nothing has come of it. Their
standard of living has considerably decreased in the period under question.
9. It is very difficult for anyone who has not lived in the Soviet Union to under-
stand the whole system of agriculture, industry, and life in general. The majority
of the people in the Soviet Union do not believe what is in the papers. They have
been so flooded with propaganda that easy no longer pay any attention to it. The
newspapers are useful for only a few things, such as wrapping fish.
10. As an example of the distrust the ordinary citizen would have of the daily press,
an article in acurrent Pravda concerning the "Tremendous Growth of
25X1
consumer
ma". Articles such as this have been appearing this year and the
year before this and the year before that.
25X1
25X1
The-Soviet Government also attempted to deceive the public by
25X1
means of spreading rumors. In the summer of 1953, there was a lecture on the
growth of material wealth in the USSR which stated that the Soviet Government had
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purchased all of the future grape harvests I and that plans were being 25X1
developed on methods for storing these grapes. Other rumors had it that the
Soviet Government was arranging to purchase all the velvet products 25X1
F=-70r a large amount of or a lar a amount of leather 25X1
or fruit ordered 71E Yet everyone 2 Al
knew that in the Soviet Union grapes could be purchased during only two weeks
out of the year and apples during only six weeks of the year, and then only in
Moscow. The provinces received nothing. When choice items finally arrived in
a g.)vernment store, the director of the store would call his friends, who would
buy,- everything first and leave nothing for the public.
11. Another example of the use of rumors is that,when the Soviet Government lacks
ready cash for its budget, a rumor is circulated that a new monetary system is
in process of being formed. Remembering the last reform and the losses suffered
because people kept their money in their mattresses, the public rushes to the
banks to deposit its money. When all the mone-* has been drained, the Government
publishes an article condemning someone for a false rumor. As an illustration
of the falsificatior which the Government practices, there is a story about a
plant, imeni Kalibra, which had a photograph of a large crowd around a desk with
the caption that another bond issue wag in full swine and that the people were
this was a photograph of the counter were so.Lct sausages . 25X1
12. For these reason not believe that the twona nncla will have 25X1
appreciable effect upon the people or upon the B. at 25X1
the present time unauthorized methods of operation by the NGB have been stopped.
Yet rules have always existed which forbade the use of physical torture. No
single chief had ever given sanction to the torture of prisoners, but no one has
ever said anything against it when it was used. NGB investigators were con-
sidered good only when they obtained results and confessions. For example, if
an investigator had a prisoner who claimed no guilt and the investigator
reported this to his superior, he would be told that he was a poor investigator
and did not know how to handle the affair. Naturally, the investigator would
begin to apply more pressure on the prisoner to obtain more results. The
superior would use this as an object lesson, saying: "See, you are learning
more", and so more pressure would be applied and a confession finally obtained.
13. After 1946 Beriya had absolutely no control over the NGB. Often his former
assontates would come to him and discuss their problems and operations and only
thus might he have been able to influence the workings of the NGB. Malenkov
has known for twenty years that torture was used and is being used in the USSR.
For propaganda purposes, the Governmont needed a scapegoat and found him in
Beriya. But no released iwAte from a Soviet prison would ever admit that he
was mistreated while he was in jail;for,if he did,it would be "curtains" for him.
14. Abakumov's trial and execution are not related to the doctor's plot. If they were,
Abakumov and Leonov should have been released. Abakumov had been arrested
originally because he would not arrest the doctors. was arrested and shot
because he did arrest the doctors. the doctors' episode is 25X1
a closed chapter. The Politburo ^onsidera it a mistake to have published all of
the happenings,and any similar episodes in the future will be undertaken with
great secrecy.
15. Abakumov's trial and execution were not publicized to justify the action taken in
the "Leningrad Case". tside from high Party and NGB members in Moscow and Lenin-
grad, not enougr p?racns knew anything about the affair. No one in the provinces
knew anything about it. Since the Soviet people in general would be unable to
understand the reference, it would require a great deal of explaining. No one
who knew of it would attempt to explain it to others for fear that he would be
accused of improper interpretation.
ICommeuts
1. There has not h'i n a. separate state security apparatus for the RSFSR; its
functions, are 'candled by the state security organ of the USSR through a
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plenipotentiary. At
potentiary of the KG
present, the title of this official would be Pleni-
B for the R.
2. There is a Kalibr In
strument Factory in Moscow.
25X1
3.
term 1GB to cover those functions performed
by the im prior to
March 1953, when the GB and the MVD were merged. It 25X1
is believed that the
se functions
are now exercised
by the KGB
Similarl
.
y,
25X1
after the 19th Party Congress, Praesidium would be ^.orrect. v
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