DIRECTIVES FOR SOVIET EUROPEAN POLICIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A005800170001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 28, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP80-00810A005800170001-2
CLASSIFICATION 3ECR,,T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
IN FORMATION IRS l tT CD NO.
COUNTRY East Germany
SUBJECT Directives for Soviet European Policies
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
INFO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES 3
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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1. On 30 October 1954, Pushkin and his adviser Panin had a conference
with members of the SED Politburo. At this conference, which was
convened at short notice and which was attended by Ulbricht, 25X1
Grotewohl, Schirdewan, Oelssner, Rau, Matern,and Max Reimann.
Pushkin allegedly issued new directives for the fight against
the ratification of the Paris agreements. Pushkin urged that the
SED, in an effort to influence the opposition in West Germany and
other West European countries as well as the course of international
conferences held by the "Weltfriedensrat" and the "Internationaler
Frauenta#11 should make the following official declarations:
a. The GDR elections on 17 October 1954 rere an internal affair.
They were not to serve as a pattern for all-German elections
(Pushkin, allegedly, criticized the voting procedure applied
on 17 October).
b. The SED does not intend to impose the political and economic
structure of the GDR on West Germany. The SED only proposes
that certain reforms such as a land reform and a school reform
be carried out in a re-unified Germany and it also wishes that
the most important branches of the German heavy industry and
of the transportation system be nationalized.
c. As indicated by Molotov at the four-power conference in Berlin,
the Weimar constitution, after some amendments, could serve as
a political basis for a re-unified Germany.
d. The GDR Government and the SED accept the SPD action program,
according to which only the re-unified German people as a
whole is entitled to decide upon its political and economic
system.
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e. The GDR and the SED do not raise any demands prejudicing the
procedure applied for the reunification of Germany. The People's
Chamber and the GDR Government declare their readiness to
consider and answer without delay every proposal made by the
West German Parliament or the West German Government in regard
to the execution of free elections and a peaceful reunification
of Germany. The GDR Government and the SED expressly declare
that the population of both West and East Germany must have the
right to decide themselves and free from any outside intervention
on all questions of the future political regime and the structure
of the German economy.
2. Pushkin also gave the SED the order to refrain from all activities
designed to dists*b or damage the relations between East and West
Germany. In this respect, Pushkin issued the following directives:
a. Political propaganda to be conducted by the press and in public
rallies should be concentrated against the "armament-mad"
Americans, especially against Dulles and Adenauer.
b. Each individual who si -" --- 460~ w
the rearmament of We
means and, if possibl
the SED or those hour
_J0QMNHW 411111111114M
Council and the Peac? Mb That 12 leading
politicians of theEM- CDU travelled to West Germany on 1
November 1954).
3. Pushkin also stated that about 100 women had been invited to a
conference in Berlin organized by the Presidium of the International
Women's Movement. Members of the West German intelligetkWasiaM
politicians in opposition to Adenauer would be invited o the
conference of the World Peace Council scheduled to be held in
Stockholm on 18 November. The two conferences would be used to sharpen
the conscience of the world against the implementation of the Paris
agreements and the rearmament of Western Germany.
It was furthermore learned from GDR journalists that Pushkin was
dissatisfied with the French Communist party and the French
pacifists. The rally organized by them on 31 October 1954 was
a failure. Herriot and Daladier were also criticized by Pushkin.
The Soviet diplomat further stated that the opposition movement
in Great Britain, Italytand other West European countries was
rather ineffective. This was still more the case in regard to West
Germany. Pushkin believed it possible that the 96 integration of
the West German Government coalition and a growing opposition against
the intended Spar settlement would prevent the ratification of the
Paris agreements or would at least involve a considerable delay of
this ratification owing to new negotiations between Adenauer and
Mendes-France.
5. The Soviets do not expect an official ban to be imposed against
the West German Communist party. They believe that the situation will
probably net be ehamged after the verdict in the trial now pending
at the Supreme Court in Karlsruhe. On the other hand, it was
expected that the fight against the rearmament of West Germany would
increase class struggle to such an extent that police and administrative
SECBE
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP80-00810A005800170001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA005800170001-2
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measures may be taken against the KPD. The KPD was prepared for
such a development and had switched over from their fight in
West German industrial interprises to underground activities.
The possibility that the opposition against the Paris agreements
might assume violent proportions was not ruled out.
6. According to East German journalists, the USA was the driving force
behind all endeavors to have the Paris agreements ratified as soon
as possible. It was, therefore, the most important mission of the
world peace camp to delay this ratification as long as possible or
even prevent it. The prevention of the rearmament of West Germany
was considered to be the severest defeat which the US policy had
ever suffered in Europe. The failure to ratify the Paris agreements
might induce the Americans to withdraw from Europe.
Comment. The present report supplements revious information
on 4ew trends of the Soviet Europeaxa policy.
It 4pears that the Soviets believe to the possibility of frustrating
the paris agreements I~ithout making amy *eal concessions. The
into matron contained in the p sent rep t Qeo indicates that he
Sovi ts, in their figh' again these agr emend, place th eliance
more Vnd more on the W st.Gejeman opposition og"ainst Adenauer's course.
SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
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Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA005800170001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP80-00810A005800170001-2
CLASSIFICATION .i'
CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO
71.120 :'hou?d make the ing of; rcial declar.a
CO OF PA(;}` y,
NO OF ENCLS.
;U,;IED OEM"
SUPPLEMENT TO
i.954, Pushk.~n and his adv ~?r Panin had a confe~~r,c3
mvmher:z of the SED Pail i tburo. A-,,. tn i s confPrenct-. w;l:scb wuy
;0 ;n.,: t. nc;t c? and which was at'?eridk.d bJibr. ht,
.:crdewan,, O' 1 finer, Kau, a or'r.b nd iiax he i ar:r.
sued new directives (or the fi.. ht a-tri?a
iarr of the t'cin ?;;ed tr,.rt ,r.
he C po3~rlon in hest "er:lan} anal
an eFfcrt to influer
w-hy
a.- the course of internal: tuna-.
1 rt.rr.. c'.~s hc,.. a1G! Y~ ?~' the att.e:.,k 1,', -and the i1In.tt. i h r H '~,ro
friedennrand ~x
4
!':.t a ;R elrc ions on ber 19',1 were an era a -ti 1'
:got to serve at.ter?r_ (: r all e1 ecf,Y cn:
ai e&'edly, or glLiMed the aot. nc; p ure ~s.p -lied
JI.
i i;~ >:;v does not intend to impose ti: ) poly ti cfil and ecan;'mi i
of the GDR on 'lest Germany. The 3ED r'n1y t~pvse?
+ : ~~:?ta.i.r: reforr:As such as a land ?eforn an" a school
.'r' ti;arrteci out in a re-unified ';erma].y and it s,lao viitlm-