COMMENTS ON THE CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A006000320003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 24, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00810A006000320003-0
C fiRAI IELLI E CE AGENCY
This material contains information,, affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the ransmisslon or revelation of which ifn any manner to an unauthorized person 1s prohibited by la 25X1
SECRET
SUBJECT Comments ron the Change in Leadership DATE DISTR-.
in the Soviet Union
REQUIREMENT NO. _RD
24 February 1955
2
REFERENCES
cr't iprc t:VlM I.Ib.TlfANS ARF DFFINITIVE_ APPRAISAL OF CONTEA11 $S"'TENTATIVE.
1. Recent changesin the leadership of the Soviet Union signify the end of 25X1
collective management and the beginning of real dictatorship by the party.
N.S. Khrushchev is completely responsible for the demotion of G.M. Malenkov.
Whether the former publicly claims personal leadership or not, he is the
only real powe in the Soviet Union..jThe Council of Ministers will become
relatively unimportant. Bulganin's speeches will be ?full of attributions
to the Central'Comlnittee.
2. Malenkov had been unpopular in Party and Government circles. He was con-
sidered, only any apparatchikL _ 25X1
conspire with Beriya to give the latter power; but that later, either from
fear or dissatisfaction with the role alloted him by`sBeriya, Malenkov con-
fided the.Plotto Khrushchev. The latter has never since fully trusted
Malenkov.ry Since the death of Stalin the Central Committeehas blamed Malenkov
for all failures and mismanagement, the reduction in 25X1
the number of IF,
after Stalinf',s death was badly handled, resulting
in serious confusion, with no ministry knowing its proper responsibility.
He claims the anti-bureaucracy campaign was mismanaged. In some cases up
to half the personnel in a ministry was fired, but provisions for the trans-
fer of those dismissed to productive work in the ministry's enterprises was
ulting in swarms of unemployed disgruntled bureaucrats.
Malenkov actuallytmade'Yerrors in agriculture when con- 25X1
ducting the agricultural program befoae the September plenums. The Central
Committee, i e , Khrushchev, had deciddd to increase the production of consumers'
goods, but roust the expense of heavy industry. Malenkovv went too far in
administering the program, overemphasizing consumers' goods and underemphasizing
heavy industry( For the first time in Soviet history, managers and engineers
engaged in the production of consumers' goods were Jailed for errors such
SECRT
STATE AIR S FBI AEC 0CIe x
ARMY NAVY
(it! u-.:aiaington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-00810A006000320003-0
 Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006000320003-0
as failure to fulfill norms; this punishment previously had. been reserved
exclusively for those engaged in heavy industry.
3. Khrushchev is extremely popular among Party and Government groups. The
West has underrated his strength before Stalin's death. While Malenkov,
on the Secretariat, concerned himself with working with Beriya and directing
the agricultural program, Khrushchev concerned himself with policy questions.
After the death of Zhdanov, Khrushchev was the strongest man below Stalin on
the Central Committee. He got along well with all members of the apparatus.
He was also popular among the peasants, since as Secretary of the Ukrainian
Party Committee he made a practice of frequently visiting kolkhozy and con-
sequently was closer to the people than other leaders were. He was also
popular because of his struggle against the Jews. post-
war Kiev and Kharkov were so full of Jews that others could not find work.
When L.M. Kaganovich was sent to the Ukraine, he did nothing. When Khrushchev
was again in charge, he dismissed Jews. Since Great Russians are habitually
anti-semitic, this increased Khrushchev's popularity. This popularity among
the people is relative, that is, Khrushchev is preferred to other leaders.
1$. Khrushchev used his party position skillfully. After the arrest of Beriya;
he filled the MVD with Party men and did the same to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
5. Bulganin is an extremely limited person and will have no authority. At
Khrushchev's instigation he will gradually make changes in the Council of
Ministers. A.I. Mikoyan will probably be completely dropped since he was a
partisan of Beriya. V.M. Molotov and K.Ya. Voroshilov have no ideas of their
own and will do anyone's will. They will probably remain. Before the 9
February announcement, G.K. Zhukov would be Minister
of Defense, not so much because of any increased role of the army but because
he is needed as the only genuinely popular leader in the Soviet Union.
6.
ushchev simply did not trust Malenkov for any Party work. Malenkov's 25X1
new ministry is small and easy to. run.
7, no change in Soviet foreign or domestic policy, since Khrushchev 25X1
i
thi
s
s ZoA-1
has controlled both for some time. Regarding Formosa
policy, although probably worked out with the Chinese when
not Chinese
Soviet
,
,
Khrushchev visited China. This -nnlinv is an experiment designed to test the
position of the United.States. the Soviets are not will- 25X1
ing to commit forces on the Korean scale.
8. Any belief that China and the Soviet Union may split is wishful thinking.
This might have happened under Stalin,who wanted to keep the Chinese under his
thumb. But the post-Stalin policy, attributed by source to Khrushchev, pic-
tures China as an important buffer area to be maintained at all costs.
Comment: On 9 February 1955, Malenkov was appointed Minister of 25X1
Electric Power Stations and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
Approved For Release 2008/03/05: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006000320003-0