Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 26, 2008
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 2, 1955
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-00810A006000360009-0.pdf122.28 KB
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006000360009-0 OI~G~OQG Q~000~ RE DU O~l~OO G?3G~Q~OOO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EpOQ This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by 25X1 SUBJECT Comments on the Change in Soviet DATE DISTR. MAR 2 9g125X1 Leadership NO. OF PAGES 2 25X1 REFERENCES 25X1 1. Even in Stalin's time there was collective leadership. The Western idea of a dictat:br within the Communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organi- zation of the Communist power structure. Stalin, although holding wide powers, was merely the captain of a team and it seems obvious that Khrushchev will be the new captain. However, it does not appear that any of the present leaders will rise to the stature of Lenin and Stalin,so that it will be safer to assume that developments in Moscow will be along the lines of what is called collective leadership, unless Western, policies force the Soviets to stream- line their power organization. The present situation is the most favorable from the point of view of upsetting the Communist dictatorship since the death of Stalin: 2. There will not be a dramatic purge. Inasmuch as the MVD has already been cleaned up and the Party.and,the Army have not been in the hands of Malenkov's favorites, there can be expected only a normal replacement of officials in the reorganization of the top-level administration of the Party and the Govern- ment. 3. It is hard to draw any parallel between present events and those of the 1920's when Stalin was ascending to power. There is now no organized opposition inside the Party or in the Soviet Union in general. As the Communist rulers, and evidently also the Soviet people, see it, there is a grave outside menace. 4. Since the death of Stalin and the blow which was given to the power of the secret police, the Soviet internal situation has been in a state of flux. The new Soviet setup needs time for consolidation. The struggle between national-minded"Titoist" elements in the Soviet leadership and those who think in terms of the more orthodox international line instill going on. 5. No improvement in the food situation can 'be expected. The promises of Malenkov to improve the poor material conditions of the masses were not kept. Inasmuch NAVY FBI AEC EpOQir HN FOR A ~Dm Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006000360009-0 QEpQQU Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006000360009-0 SECRET 25X1 -2- as the Communist leaders were unable to keep this promise, particularly because of accelerated war preparations, they had to find a scapegoat, and thus Malenkov resigned. 6. Bulganin impressed those who had worked with him in the State Bank, in- cluding a famous expert on banking, with his high intelligence, mild manners, and capacity to learn in a very short time the most special and difficult problems. 7. It is difficult to anticipate any withdrawal from the Soviet foreign policy line unless there are concessions from the West with regard to the ratification of the Paris agreements. There is a possibility that a continuation of discord among the Soviet leaders may lead to a soft- ening of the Soviet position and to a recognition by Molotov of his incompetence in the conduct of foreign relations. The Soviet leaders however, have recognized that the balance of power has changed in favor of the West. They are now endeavoring to change this balance as can be seen from the shift to accelerated war production, and the attempts to disrupt Western unity. The aggressiveness of the Chinese Communists may also be a part of thi endeavor.- A stiff position,on the part of the West toward the US9R probably favors the continuation in tower of the n6rA stiff elements in the Soviet leadermhin. F Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006000360009-0