(SANITIZED)USSR GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A006100150011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 4, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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MFOO RAKMOO REPO RV RxF(0RAAVMN REPO
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
E
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
COUNTRY USSR (Mlinc in F@ooo ObllO$o)/Co REPORT
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
DATE ACQUIRED
4 Dkrah 1955
55
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REFERENCES
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WORK ON ISLA
fiF1RF.T
GERMAN ROCKET GROUP
RE OF
Ballistics group
6. Work was done on the trajectory of an A.A. rocket, the R-1 13.
graphical method, of solving traiectory nroblems i kl Three
trajectories were studied in turn.
y WOLFF and he did not know
The work was allocated
who, among the Russians, was interested.
7. QUESSEL designed a special quick-acting electro-magnetic clutch and
FALKENMAYER, working on it in the workshops, made up a clutch using
laminated metal sheets which were bonded together with a very strong adhesive
(the laminated assembly could be machined without clamping the sheets together).
Aerodynamics group
8. CONRAD worked on a mathematical method for establishing flow
regimes of high Mach number through nozzles. it might be in
connection with the design of working sections for wind tunnels. The method
was partly graphical, partly numerical and, when asked whether it was for the
two dimensional or three dimensional case, it was for
the two dimensional.
Electronics group
9. the electronics laboratory was under-
PREIKSCHAT's leadership. an eight-channel oscillograph which
was originally designed by MOLLWO. As designed, the instrument was intended
for use with the ground receiver array previously described
It -could employ the Philips L.B. 8 valve and also a normal type of
German-made high speed C.R.T. Quantities of the latter were available in Russia
in the form of war booty. the basis of the
original layout but modified the design to make it capable of a more general
application , re-designing amplifiers, using new capacitor and resistor values, &c.
one set was completed and a second was about
three-quarters completed.
10. PREIKSCHAT, built an apparatus to determine
characteristics of antennae; he knew the Russians built a similar device becaus er
PREIKSCHAT left the Island a
Russian visited the Island from N11. 88 and said that they already had developed a
'
better solution to the problem. The Russians asked UMPFENBACH, (who was,
re-worked. The equipment was portable and was made to fit on the top of a
tower to take all forms of antennae up to a maximum wave length of the order of
50 cm. It could rotate at 20 cycles per minute. The equipment consisted of a
receiver including detector, amplifier, and modulator, of frequencies about 1,000
cycles per second. Only the top 1 to 1.1 metres of the tower was constructed,
including the rotating platform.
11. SCHMIDT worked on a standing wave measuring instrument for use in
waveguide work.
The same engineer also worked on a combined binary counting and frequency
measuring instrument. Using this it was intended that an unknown frequency of
the order of a few hundred Kcs. could be divided in step with a second standard
frequency; when the successive division of frequencies had produced two suitable
sub-frequencies, the two sub-frequencies could be compared, using the Lissajous
figure principle.
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12. worked on the development
of an electronic ca cu ating machine for the determination of optical paths: this
work was done at the request of a uniformed Russian officer
This officer was from an institute in Leningrad. The work was not classified, and
accounts of similar work are to be found in available open literature on the subject.
A vector method was employed for calculating the optical path through multiple
surfaces. CONRAD did the mathematical work involved,
When the Germans left, the Russians requested all
details (although the officer did not appear to be interested in their methods). All
material involved was handed over to the Russians.
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Design Group.
13. This group worked on the design of outboard motors during the last phase
of the stay on the Island.
Other Work
14..
special al ime er
UMPFENBACH in the development of the
15. MAGNUS's work on a course-setting gyroscope has previously been
-
referred to.
16. The Russians DRANOVSKI and KRASNUSHKIN
worked on the small test stand in 1952, when the Germans were no longer workin
17. It was previously reported that NEIDHARDT had worked on an
improved telemetery (MESSINA " N ")
ZEISS Group
19. This group worked on an electromagnetic stabilization device for power
packs of the order of 10 Kw. output. They also did some work on ultra-sonic
generators of large power; this work was theoretical and the Germans were unable
to discover from the Russians in what media the ultra-sonic emission was to be
propagated; the " ma neto-striction " principle was employed. The German
KORTUM, was working on this device. An ultra-sonic filter,
which he claimed to have developed himself, was subsequently found to have been
based on the description of a similar item which appeared in a U.S.A. magazine.
20. Another task given to the group in this period was the construction of an
astronomical reflecting telescope using a 22-meter diameter mirror. This work was
carried out by Dr. KUHNE (?) of Zeiss and PFAFF, now in Jena. They also
worked on an automatic device for control of this telescope to follow a star, thus
permitting photographs to be taken over a long period of time.
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Other Information
21. Security.-Secret papers, 'including the Germans' own working papers,
were kept in sealed portfolios and had to be taken out from security store and
returned each half-day-morning and afternoon. Papers had to be listed and this
was sometimes checked. Papers could not be taken out of the institute.
22. Transfer of Equipment.- the water channel was sent
from the Island in 1951 before ALBRING left and he was told it went to Moscow.
No men were transferred. Later in 1952 the wind tunnel was sent away, also to
Moscow; SKRIPNICHENKO was transferred away soon after the wind tunnel had
23. Influx of Personnel.-The members of the Russian group which came to
the Island in 1951 to familiarise themselves with the work, with a view to taking
over, were almost all_ young engineers apparently straight from Technical School.
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GUIDED WEAPON PROJECTS
Nomenclature
24.
projects.
designations given to various
the numbers R- to R-9 i Russian designations for German
rocket projects. G-l was the original designation
of the R-10 the various
modifications to the whole project (as it was later designated) were at first
known as G-1 (a), . G-1 (b), G-1 (c), G-1 (n), G-1 (o). G-1 (o) was the highest
suffix designatiop used.
was in tact the project later known as R-12 or an earlier project.
later known as R- 4.
R-10 Project
25. Experimental Programme.
work carried out or projected for the R-10 development.
the G-4 was the project
the experimental
(a) Ballistics of the Warhead.
(b)
Four types of warhead were designed for experiments with the A-4
rocket. They were to be separable and space was allowed for the
carriage in the warhead of telemetering equipment and measuring
instruments. The experimental firings were intended to provide data
on separation and behaviour of the warhead after fuel cut off, on
stability and acceleration, and on heating at re-entry. One or more
of the heads was to be of wood or to have a wooden liner, the intention
being to measure the amount of burning which took place
in the terminal part of the trajectory.
Some waterchannel experiments were carried out in order to obtain
aerodynamic data on the separation of warheads as a general problem.
Constructional Investigations.
no change in the cooling arrangements.
(iv) A programme of tests was proposed for such items as handling,
fueling, loading, on trucks, &c. A modified form of transporter
(i) Some motors were got ready at NIL 88 for static tests which were
done on the Island. These were of the original A-4 type. The
tests were intended to be part of the constructional proving
programme.
(ii) A series of tests were drawn up to prove the whole rocket body.
A typical item in this series was the test intended to obtain
data on pre-launch cooling. Full-scale models of parts of the
rocket were also made at NIL 88.
(iii) A series of firing tests were proposed. These were to be carried
out using the R-10 design of body but with an A-4 motor
modified (shortened and with increased fuel flow) to suit the
R-10 requirements. The motor was to give 32 ton (32000 Kg)
thrust but a separate gas generator was to be used (i.e., no gas
bleed from combustion chamber to turbines). There was to be
was proposed.
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Further Information
26.-(a)
was about 1
000?K or 700'C
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the temperature of the cooled exhaust gases
This temperature was determined by the limitations of the aluminium (alloy) blades
of the A-4 turbine. It was suggested that the figure should be nearer 500? C.
(b) The original warhead design for the R-10 allowed for wooden construction.
The later alternative design of a steel head was made at the request of the Russians.
(c) Russian criticisms at the first (1947) R-10 conference were confined to the
general comment that calculations were in insufficient detail. This applied chiefly
to the question of structural design and stability. The single major change in the
design between the 1947 and 1948 conferences was the provision made for building
the mixing unit into the missile. Originally, it had been intended that this unit
should be in the ground equipment. The later decision was taken after further
thought by the control specialists, led by HOCH.
(d) The R-10 motor was to have a thrust of 32.000 K.
(e) While the design range of the R-10 was 910 Km.,
various engineering imperfections, chiefly of a structural 'nature suc a mig
arise in production, could reduce this figure to about 850. Km. minimum.
Consideration had been given to the possibility of firing the R-10 at ranges less
than the nominal but there were difficulties in the way of doing this
The stated accuracy of 1 in 1000 of range was a design figure.
there would be a 25 % fall of shot in an approximate square
of -91 Km. side-, t e square being the common intercept between the 50% zone
in range and the 50% zone in azimuth.
the re-entry effect had been considered but not calculated, in
arriving at the estimate of accuracy.
of the order of 200 to 300 metres.
R-12 Project.
this effect would only be
27. The R-12 project for a two or more stage rocket was chiefly carried out
by ALBRING, aided by KLOSE of UMPFENBACH's group. BERTHOLD was
also engaged on this work. two types of schemes.
(a) Schemes in which the two stages used conventional rockets, the complete
tanks and motors of the first stage being jettisoned at end of the stage
and
(b) A method in which the motor of the second stage was to be put inside
a tank of the first stage. At the end of the first stage the tank was
to be blown off leaving the second stage motor free to operate.
There was no apparent Russian reaction either way to the proposals on
multistage rocket projects. Work 1 ntarily in order
to proceed with the R-14 study, the Russians
would have accepted any study with little or no comment, whether or a single or
multistage project.
R-14 Project
29. The decision to proceed with the R-14 and R-15 proposals in preference
to the other AVANT proposals Although it was
nominally a ratification by Moscow of s recommendation
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KURGANOV obtained Moscow (presumably as represented by Director of
NIL 88) approval, and then called a meeting
Russians were not working on the R-14. Even if they had accepted the reports
and said nothing at all, it would have been no sure indication of lack of interest.
In fact, one or two queries were put to the Germans after completion of the R-14
study. The tasks specifically requested by the Russians included the work on rail
and road transport of the R-14 (instead of the German proposal for an under-
ground factory and associated launching site) and the alternative construction in
dural in place of steel,
30. Construction. the exact all up weight of the
rocket the thrust to weight ratio was 1.4. For a thrust
of 100 (metric) tons therefore, this would give an all up weight of 70,000 to
72,000 Kg., this was the method
11- construction instead of a steel one- was e a
The parallel study of a light
the request of the Russians.
possibly supplies o the high grade steel originally called or
may not have been readily available for this work. This was probably the only
the end of the body cone (the skirt) did not extend to
or~t the nozzle exi pane. t did not and that the final design decided
u on after further study of the re a ive positions of the C.G. and C.P.,
an earlier proposal did provide or
a lengthened skirt and thereupon described the version previously given by
PREIKSCHAT. In one version, the extended portion was arranged so as to be
jettisoned. The skirt was to have been of corrugated section. In view of the large
diameter of the skirt it was proposed to make this in two parts and remove it for
transport.
31. Warhead.-There were two warheads proposals. That proposed by the
C.Prmnnc was to he of wnnd_ but the Russians asked fnr a design in steel
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the designs called for a wall thickness of 40 mm. for the
woo en warhead an fox 20 mm. plus some insulating liner in the case of the steel
warhead. Both were cylindrical and separable, and on separation, the front fairing
cone was to be blown off in both cases. The weight of explosive was to be adjusted
so that the total weight of head would be the same in the two cases. Since, for
the form of warhead proposed, the velocity at impact would be only a few hundred
metres per second, the question of a kinetic, energy contribution does not arise.
at one time ALBRING had considered designing a
warhead which wouict prove a for a laminar flow so as to increase speed. (It is not
clear whether this was for the R-10 or the R-14.) The possibility of cooling the
warhead by means of water or other liquid was also considered, but no work was
done on this.
32. Propulsion.- the Proposed arrangement of
the R-14 motor (Fig. 9).
the motor size was about the same as for the A-4. thrust
7 transmitted to the missile frame through a double knife edge, as shown.
C
a ball and socket arrangement was contemplated but was not adopted because
o te friction problem. gymbal (" CARDAN ") suspension was
also considered and rejected because o t e excessive weight involved.
33. Guidance.-There was to have been no essential difference between the
system used for the R-10 and that used for the R-14, except that owing to the
height of the R-14 trajectory, the Germans were aware of the possibility of
difficulties in radio propagation through the upper layers of the atmosphere. The
actual guidance aerials were to have been located in the rim of the rear skirt but
the final positioning of these would have been a matter for decision
at a a er ge.
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R-15 Project
35. the R-14 project
rather than with the R-15 since the for hed the KIZZEN sta a whereas
the latter was only an AVANT project.
36. Guidance. some radio control was necessary to the
R-15 but it would prove a very difficult problem. This view was also expressed to
ALBRING by PREIKSCHAT. Small conferences were held to discuss the
guidance question and other points at which only Germans were present. There
were, however, conferences with Russians (unknown) who visited the Island to
discuss the R-15. The use of clandestine transmitters was an old Peenemunde idea,
but of little use to the A-4 (or R-10). This idea may have been revived in talks
on the R-15 which was more suitable for this type of guidance. The idea might
have been included in theR-15 reports sent to Moscow.
the inherent difficulty of stab'
narrowing beam as the target is approached.
K-1 Project
37. there was no connection between the
KOROLEV project and the German work on a lengthened version of the A-4.
KOROLEV's interest in a lengthened rocket 'before they left Germany;
KOROLEV had, he thought, made a prototype body in Germany. Later, at NII.88
sectione lengthened tank which was possibly a
prototype for s work. _ BL and other Germans had
with- the KOROLEV project by
through BOSH-KOTSUBINSKIY,
If this had been cones
rmation might have come
38. KOROLEV's own interest lay chiefly in the constructional and
propulsion fields. He was not much interested nor was he competent in rocket
electrics, nor in the general electrical field.
R-10 conference.
the A-4 but with special tanks and longer.
40. KOROLEV never quoted the range of the K-1.
of the 1948
It was like
which R-10 modifications (of the A-4) may have been incor orated. KOROLEV
said he thought the separable warhead was a good idea
KOROLEV would have adopte it.
previous estimate of the range of this rocket on this and similar assumptions as to
setting gyroscope unit developed by MA GNUS, the Germans asked for particulars
of the appropriate flight path and were given a diagram which showed the same
characteristics as those given in the Sanger-Bredt report (fugoid, or sinusoidal).
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42. SHINEL'SHCHIKOV requested WASSERFALL ballistic studies
probably in the summer 1948 which led the Germans to think they might be firing
them in the autumn.
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The Russians (unknown) interested in this came, it was thought, from, NII.88
where the WASSERFALL project was worked on. no other
institute working on WASSERFALL except possibly the Ministry of
Communications, which might have worked on the control and guidance system.
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TAIFUN ro'ect
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43.
the TAIFUN 'combustion chambers being
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made were for a liquid fuel rocket.
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There were German specialists at NII. 88, however, who knew. both
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ypes e g., APEL in UMANSKI's workshop and HARNISC14 and MTIRT14 (n
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young man) working for UMPFENBACH.
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SATELLITE projects
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44.
" There were no satellites over the Island."
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11
GUIDED WEAPON TECHNIQUES
A.-Aerodynamics and Ballistics
Quality of Research
46.
work done at TsAGI was based on what ALBRING had told
about the data and results in some reports prepared by TsAAGI on model tests
in connection with basic research. ALBRING, in fact, drafted a ,letter to TsAGI,
criticising the results and requesting that the experimental work be redone. It is not
known whether the letter was sent on by the Russian director on the Island or not.
ALBRING complained that faults were apparent in every case. Some figures in
the data must have been wrong and these led to results not in accordance with
expectation,
47. Water channel work was done to obtain aerodynamic data on the problem
of warhead separation.
Heat Transfer
49.
learnt of heat transfer problems for the first time in 1947 applies only to
aerodynamic heating on rocket re-entry to the atmosphere. The Russians were
well aware of other heat transfer problems, e.g., in rocket combustion chambers.
They did not at any time, however, suggest to the Germans how the problem of
aerodynamic heating might be solved.
the Russians
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B.-Control Techniques associated with Missile Activity
Control Systems for R-10. R-14 Proiects
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have been used for the pneumatically operated servos in the R-10. and 700/.
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alcohol in the hydraulic servos in the R-14,
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the question of
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compatibility of fluid with sealing materials would not
The Russians had available good quality synthetic rubbers.
some difficulty might arise in using pneumatic ser
fact, BLASIG did experience trouble because. of compressibility.
BLASIG should have foreseen this trouble, which was due to an acceleration effect
on the mechanical parts such as the piston. If parts were so positioned as to
minimise the direct compressibility effect then there would be a corresponding
increase in friction effects: acceleration
effects would prove to be a major problem in the design of control gear and missile
servo systems, and in relav fnnctinnino
R-10 Control System
52. The gyroscopic stabilising system to be employed in the R-10 project
did not differ basically from that of the A-4.
53. Fig. 8 shows an edited version of the rough sketch to
illustrate Small gyroscopes which have previously- v sly
described as ` electrically tied turn indicators," " electrical spring rate gyroscopes "
and " mixing gyroscopes " are employed to measure rates of change in the angles
of missile pitch, yaw and roll. The gyros are electro-magnetically restrained by
suitable field windings. Voltages proportional to instantaneous position of the
gyro axes are picked off small centre tapped potentiometers and these outputs are
integrated through RC networks. The outputs for each axis are fed into a mixing
unit thus giving rough values of heading plus rate of change of heading in the
pitch and yaw signals. The rate gyroscope is considered adequate for roll
stabilisation as it is estimated that an error in roll of up to 10? is tolerable before
any significant steering error develops.
54. The pitch and yaw gyro field windings are arranged to receive input
command signals from a programme rotary time switch for about twenty seconds
after firing. This programme steers the missile into the fixed " axis " of the ground
receiver antennm array. The ground command system then takes over and
command signals are fed to the two gyroscopes via the airborne receiver.
Command signals (at a different level) are likewise fed to the mixing unit, first
by the programme switch and later by the airborne receiver.
55. The only items which are new in the above arrangements as compared
with. the A-4 are the small (" MARKGRAF ") gyroscopes and the capacity
integrating networks. The essential difference between the system described and
that for the A-4 rocket is that in this case the accuracy of steering is dependent
on the command control guidance system; the gyroscopes' function is solely the
maintenance of missile stability.
56. The facility for altering the
R-10 control constants as altitude varies was not in fact inc u ed in the German
design. if such a facility should be required it
could easily e incorporated. potentiometers in the
field winding circuits of the azimuth an elevation gyroscopes. These
potentiometers could be programmed to vary the control constants appropriately
'as altitude changed.
\ 57. Five sets of the gyroscope units for R-10 control were built. These were
intended for test in A-A rockets after Bahnmodell experiments had been completed.
At the time, since the radio system was not then completed, the gyro units were
to have been arranged as for the old A-4 system, the radio units being incorporated
later. In fact, no actual experiments were done by the Germans.
Selsyns
58. The Russian selsyns were from production stocks.
Gyroscopes
59.
In size they range from 0-70 mm. up to 120-130 mm.
propellant driven gyroscope
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an example of a powder
at Nil. 88.
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Potentiometers
60. A sine otentiometer. of a print
head of the test apparatus
Amplifiers
61. the Germans themselves made magnetic amplifiers
using Mumeta rom a rotar convertor which they had.
Statoscope
62. MPFENBACH on a constant altitude, measuring
device. the
mechanical development being done by UMPFENBACH. The instrument was a
pressure measurement device and employed a corrugated diaphragm which was
supplied from stock by the Russians before the design work was carried out.
Because these diaphragms were apparently from production stocks,
they were being asked to carry out development in parallel with Russian
wor on a similar project. The diaphragms were 130 mm. diameter and were of
" bronze." The operating pressure was 100 mm. water.
UMPFENBACH in de ection
measurements ; limit stow were fitted corresponding to pressures of the order of
1 atmosphere.
to permit a range of settings upwards from 6 km. height the upper limit was reduced
from 14 km. to 12 km. Originally, the Germans had proposed to measure altitude
from the ground and transmit a command signal to set the instrument. The
Russians insisted, however, that the instrument be capable of pre-settin on the
ground. which Russians were concerned with this project,-7 they
" came from ivrascow " and were known to UMPFENBACH as they had visited
the latter at NII. 88; they were believed to be from another Ministry.
C.-Propulsion
63. there was some interest in hypergolic fuels, but this was for
WASSERFALL. The Russians had such fuels, but work was not done on them
on the Island.
system for turbine drive when in Berlin, using solid propellant. LANGE, in
1946-47, when he had nothing else to do, wrote a report on the same subject.
Propulsion Research as part of work on R-10 and R-14
65. A programme of experiments was carried out on the small test stand
and parallel work was done in the chemistry laboratory. The work included studies
of the combustion of alcohol at high temperature, spectroscopic studies on flame
when the request was made or modification
Such work might be classified as Secret, in
which case he would not expect the Russians to say anything about it to the
Germans.
64. SIEGMUND said ,he did some work on a gas generator
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temperatures, and gas sampling for analysis. The chief work in this field was
that on the gas bleeding tests carried n>t nn the small test stand and the nrnoramme
for full-scale tests at Kapustin
which was prepared. Most of is work was carried out-by
Russian personnel, although design and detail construction. work was. left to the
Germans.
66. Theoretical work included the study of heat transfer in the motor and
there was a supporting experimental programme to investigate combustion chamber
cooling problems. The latter was suspended at the time of the R-10 study, but was
revived during work on the R-14.
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68.
D.-Guidance
there were to have been no differences, either in
principle or in instrumentation, between the systems for the R-10 and R-14 rockets.
69. Describing the R-10 guidance receiver array, the distance
between the vertical pair of antenna: as 2 to 3 metres, and between the horizontal
pair as 8 metres. This was possible because the accuracy of measurement required
from the vertical pair was less than that required from the horizontal pair and it
made for easier construction of the equipment. The positioning of the receiver
aerials was done as a unit since all four were rigidly mounted on a common
framework. the receiver would
be set to the correct angles (azimuth and elevation) i
experimentally on the Island using the 30-metre tower
transmitter was put on the tower for the tests, to obtain representa-
tive results it ought to have been the missile transpon er.
A complete ground station was built but it was not finisil after the work
started on the R-14.
70. using the aircraft in trials of the airborne equipment
would result in comparatively low Do ler frequencies, it seemed
to be effective in the tests. no proposed modifications to the circuits
to allow for higher frequencies w en a missile was used. no
modification would be necessary, but believed that the final answer would only be
obtained when a missile was fired. the
accuracy of the guidance test results. PREIKSCHAT said the tests were successful
but no accuracies were mentioned.
72. I A he method of ensuring successful
rocket entry into the " fixed beam." originally it was proposed to
use a radio system (i.e., radio common signals) wi a moving " beam," but that
later they were compelled to revert to a mechanical programme to get the missile
into the beam, this programme extending over the first 20 secs. or so of flight.
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design group and as porn ed out that PAUER had left Khimki before work
started on the 100-ton thrust engine.)
the development was a logical extension of the Peenemunde
PAUER was the most capable of the Khimki
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73. the idea of a moving " beam " was considered
but discarded. there were mechanical difficulties (associated
with the proposed selsyn drive) in the way of achieving smooth upward traverse
.of a moving -aerial array and that rigidity of the receiver array axis was essential
for successful " beam " guidance. If this " beam " is fixed the rocket can
be successfully programmed into it, but there is no need for entry into the beam
to be at any closely prescribed point.
74. The problem of upper atmosphere effects on radio wave transmission had
been a topic in the discussions on R-15 guidance. REIKSCHAT
discussed this with the Russians.
Bahnmodell
75. some actual components could be connected to
the Bahnmodell. Other parameters, e.g., missile inertia and aerodynamic
coefficients would be set in suitably reduced form, to an accuracy of about 10%.
The Bahnmodell was used to give qualitative answers on stability, &c., and was not
used for accurate computing. There was therefore no need to set in data to a higher
degree of accuracy than that quoted above. The final output accuracy would then
be of the order of 10%-20%. Consistency was reasonably good and he thought
that, over a period, it would probably be within limits of 5 % to 10 %.
Telemetry
76.
ESSINA " N " equipment in Russia either on the Island or elsewhere.
NEI HARDT was working on this development in Germany before the
e or a ion.
space was allowed for telemetry equipment to be built into the R-10
experimental warheads (see paragraph -25 (a)), no actual telemetry hardware was
ready to be installed.
77. Homi the seeking
devices which, were
being worked on by the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery. The statement,
previously reported, had been made to him purely to illustrate the type of work
the Ministry could be engaged on.
78. Batteries.-Dry batteries were available in the 100 volt to 1,000 volt
range. what was recognised as an ordinary type of dry unit,
used in Western countries for building up any required stock of cells using a simple
11 to 2 V dry cells. The Russians used all the usual types of dry and wet cells,
no knowledge of any novel development in this field.
E.-Electronics
79
were pentodes and triodes. Submina ure valves were not use on e
during the last phase SCHMIDT, in his work on a counting and frequency
meagurincy device] used ordinary miniature double triodes.
standards taken
from foreign 1 era ure mig ave nt:u in Russia before
production v available, but altered later to accord with actual
performance. a case of gas filled valves, used for voltage stabilisation,
supposed to have een f a certain specified ^ standard but whose useful range
diminished after a short time in use.
80. Printed circuitry. printed and potted c' rcuits from
nn ular technical literature w is ave ar icu ars of new techniques.
ey
were supplied they came too ate or is purpose. a request for
printed sine-potentiometers which he wished to use in his wor on the antenna
measuring equipment done in the last period on the Island
ctir, rn TT
. The subminiature valves
NEIDHARDT or any one else having worked
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81. "Components. from the point of view of
temperature effect, the electrical components in a missile system would be the most
critical. Electrolytic condensers, especially, would be -sensitive to temperature
changes and extremes. In Russia, the latter were available in two classes; for Low
Tension work, one type was suitable for operations down to -50?, while the other
type was for normal temperature working. The problem, however, was partly
eased by the fact that most equipment would, while operating, " provide its own
heating."
F.-Materials and Materials Testing
? 82. GOST standards were used throughout all work
Some materials were very good, some bad, but standards were tor e
most part maintained. He mentioned adhesives, paints and bakelites as being
resistant steel suitable for use in, say, fuel line valves.
generally of a high quality and when questioned specifically on these, cited
QUESSEL'S work on an electro magnetic clutch The adhesive
used in assembling the laminated steel core was prepare "y mixing two
constituents, was black in colour and very strong. A universal adhesive in general
use was KL 3 or 4 (or, perhaps KF 3 or 4). It was plastic-based and yellowish in
colour. An organic solution similar to, shellac was also in use as an adhesive.
83. one or two instances when the Germans had discussions
with the Russians on the use of special materials. For example, IORDANSKIY
and another Russian (KISILEV) were interested in the development of a corrosion
84. At both Bleicherode and Soemmerda, the Germans had discussed among
themselves the possibility of using wood in rocket construction.
that they were neither impressed nor interested in the possibility.
what the . Russian reaction was to the proposals ' but
85. the quality of the material used
he rudders of the rockets tested at Kapustin Yar. in 1947.
they were of graphite and when asked about the alleged difference in appearance
as compared with the standard A-4 rudder) any difference in
appearance might be due to a different surface treatment or nish applied after
machining. the rudders were made with
material of Russian origin. they were probably machined at NII. 88
from blocks supplied by Siemens aura. IORDANSKIY was interested in the
rudder problem, but he as primarily concerned with the question of the metal to
graphite attachment. at the 1947 trials this attachment
was slightly different from the standard (German) fitment. A Russian technician,
who worked under IORDANSKIY, was
also interested in various aspects of the rudder problem.
86. Materials Testing. additional information
about IORDANSKIY'S materials test laboratories at . 88. They were modern
and expensively fitted out; contained a lot of high grade equipment and
instrumentation ; were well maintained, clean, airy
assembly hall.
They extended along the whole of one side of t e arge A-4
87:.I I any Russian work being done on
photo elasticity. MAGNUS did
some work in this field at some time (in Germany) and that the Russians might
have discussed this subject with him.
G.-Missile Warheads
88. I I the Russians had been
told of certain erman proposals for fragmenting warheads for A.A. missiles
These discussions took place at
NII.88. The names of the Russians concerned were unknow HOCH
was involved in the talks, and probably QUESSEL. CONRAD also may have
been interested in the subject while on the Island. The discussions could only
have been of a general nature. Wartime discussions in Berlin on the suitability of
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17
various types of to the sion that blast heads were not suitable
for A.A. missiles whether the Russians subscribed to or
were even aware;: of this view. The NII. 88 talks were concerned with the
possibility of using a -warhead with preformed fragments and of disposing these
fragments along helical paths.
H.---Missile Testing
89. he Russians were interested in the question of noise in
missiles. The Germans told them of certain results obtained in wartime at the
Peenemunde test stand. maximum amplitude values
as occurring at frequencies of between 17 -and 20 cycles / sec. and at 200 cycles / sec.
90. In 1946-47, FERCHLAND did some work on a project for a missile
testing laboratory. This project was to include provision for a vibration testing gear
suitable for testing vibrations in the frequency s m 0 to 50 cycles, and having
amplitudes of. up to 2 mm. ectruthe Russians were not very
interested in the project.
I,-General
Published Literature
91. Scientific periodicals Were readily made available in the library on the
Island, and Russian technical books could easily be obtained. The library was
very up to date. POBEDONOSTSEV had a copy of a classified report on rockets
compiled just before the end of the war.
92. Among papers published by the Institute of Automatics and Tele-
mechanics, by SOLODOVNIKOV, who was
interested in pro ems. stability of-control. systems, and by TSYPKIN, who was;
interested in the non linear mathematics of control problems.
93. There was.sait to be a very large bureau in Moscow, responsible for
translating foreign scientific papers. Also, translators in factories could make
contracts with the bureau for translation work.
Upper Atmosphere Research
94. Ithe Russian at the Ka ustin Yar
especially interested in upper air research
trials who was
was from the Academy of Science in Moscow and thinks he was an Armenian.
Only one or two of these heads were so fitted
particular missiles were used, or in what order these were fired.
Personalities with some experience
95.
which
GLUSHKO has a good deal of practical experience in propulsion work.
MOISEYEV and FRANKL are interested in rocket problems generally.
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ORGANISATION AND ESTABLISHMENTS
Ministry of Armaments
96. the Ministry of Armament would control the
whole missile programme or whether s cialised aspects of the work might be
under the control of other ministries. it would control the whole, but
the responsibility for research and development in the guidance field for example
might be that of the Ministry of Communications Equipment. In this connection
it may be significant that in 1951 there seemed to be a shift of emphasis to guidance
work. For instance, RYAZANSKIY, previously with the. Ministry of
Communications, too POBEDONOSTSEV's work at.:NII.88; at the same
time HOCH replaced as Head,of the German group. on the Island.,
7th Chief Directorat.
97. the offices
of this Directorate were located in a large building on Gorki Street,
from the Germai
Ministry o Armament building.
interpreter escort on one occasion. KURGANOV is believed to have succeeded
SPIRIDONOV as Chief Engineer of the Directorate. the
Directorate was responsible for research and development, he thought it possible.
that it would also cover large-scale production.
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Previous mention of the Minister's representative is now known to have re erred
to the Director of the responsible Chief Directorate-in this case the 7th.
N.T.S. (Nauchnyy Tekhnicheskn Sovet)
8. Membership.- inssihle additional member
was KHARCHEV who wore Air Force uni orm.
MOISEYI/V, TIKHONRAVOV an
GLUSHKO.
99. Authority. to whom N.T.S. was responsible. It,
was not responsible to NII. 88 although t is particular body was known as the
" N.T.S. of Institute 88." N.T.S. is certainly responsible only to some top level
authority. It may be responsible directly to the Minister.
100. Functions.-Nothing is known which might suggest that N.T.S. met
elsewhere than at NII. 88. the N.T.S. would be responsible
for all Guided Missile work and at least some unguided rockets.
e
Should this be not so then some at least might be expected to
members of any other responsible committee. The only evidence was that all
services and a number of other ministries and academies were represented on the
N.T.S. While some of the NII.88 members were believed to have been away
together at given times, it did not follow that this would be for an N.T.S.
Conference in some other place. N.T.S. actually had
executive nower to allocate money in support o programmes;
voting powers GONOR, POBEDONOSTSEV, FRANKL,
they would advise the appropriate authority as to how such money
should be a located.
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19
SPECHT. and DZERZHINSKI were at. one time in this Ministry and
would know more about it. VOSKRESENSKIY was at NIL' 88, where he was
head of the G the" und Eauinment Section but he was not in
Ministry of Ground
Equipment." 7
Academy of Artillery Sciences
102. one member
was TYULIN, who had been in Bleicherode and who was head of the ballistics
group which worked on the 1947 trials at Kapustin Yar.
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104. whether direct liaison existed between this
Ministry an the Ministry o rmament. Normally information on control and
guidance work on the Island would be passed to NII. 88. If any of the Russians
working on the Island in this field had direct connections with the Ministry of
Communications, F- I the erection. and
operation of any future radio control systems at Kapustin Yar would probably be
undertaken by a team from the Ministry under the general direction of KOROLEV,
or other responsible officer.
Ministry of Agricultural Machinery
106.
Ministry took over certain responsibilities for this t e of work in war-time simply " held on to these " at the end of the War.
Movement in the Moscow area
107. When the Germans first arrived in the Moscow area, they were
accommodated in a number of " camps." Initially they were confined to the limits
of these camps ; then, for a period of about a month or six weeks, they were allowed
to go " where they pleased "; thereafter, they were again restricted (in 1947) to
the areas immediately surrounding the camps, which they were allowed to visit
under escort for such purposes as shopping. During this last period, a permit
had to be obtained for visits to Moscow, under escort.
Residential Locations in Moscow Area
108.
residential camps to which German scientists had been sent
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approximate location of these on a small-
scale sketch map of the Moscow area. The locations involved were : -
109. Bolshevo.-The " camp " was in a very large, old, pre-revolution house
situated five minutes from the station * it was let to -the Ministry of Armaments
b the Film Ministry
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110. Valentinovka.~
consisted of old pre-revolutionary buildings, part o
Ministry which he likened to a " Cabinet Ministry."
111. Mamentovka.--There were two separate locations here. Mamentov a
was occupied by German scientists from Zeiss, Jena
Mamentovka 2, f f Mamentovka was occupied by ermans
from Bleicherode This building was he thrmwht rented by
the Ministry of Armament from some other Ministry.
112. Pushkino a small place in which only people
.of minor importance were accommodated.
113. Monino.-This location was in a very large building. The people both
lived and had their work rooms in this building; it was under the Ministry of
Communications Equipment.
114. Il'inskoye.
Here, the Germans, lived in small houses and hungalows_ rented by the Ministry of
Communications.
115. Zagorsk.-The largest size of test stand originally planned was,
for 30 to 35 ton thrust engines. However, it is quite possible that latger
test stands were contemplated. JAFFKE and PAUER were associated in the
development plans and in 1947 they visited the proposed site near. a village which
had in it an " old church," which was " visited by tourists." JAFFKE would not
talk about it. It was " TOP SECRET."
to Zagorsk.
$UKHOMLINOV went
Byuro is very ordinary; such an office would exist in practically all factories, and
the number would have significance only within the actual works. It could occur
several times within a single Ministry, i.e., at different sites. The K.B. at NIL 88
worked on the building layout for the Island.
117. Khimki (Engine factory).-The only work in
connection with Khimki (of which GLUSHKO was Director) was in connection
with the building of a test stand for a 25-30-ton motor.
Kimry L
. 119
work done at Halle by the SIEBEL group in 1946.
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21
120. Airfields.-There was a large civil airfield near Khimki or on the road
to Khimki or Kalinin; it may have been on the left-hand .side of the road from
Moscow and there was a Metro station nearby. There was also a small military
airfield somewhere along the route from the centre of Moscow to Pushkino.
121. New Institute in Khimki Area.-This apparently accommodated a large
number of personnel among whom all Germans known to be there were specialists
in some part of guidance activity. Regarding this latter fact, it would
be strange if it were not subordinate to the Ministry of Communications, since
many of the Germans believed to be employed there were previously employed
within that Ministry. new institute is a large one; the work was
sufficiently important to merit the occasional award of a Stalin Prize.
122. Krasnoyarsk / Krasnogorsk.
Krasnogorsk as the town where some Zeiss personnel were working but
ulvc
uoes not now of any association GLUSHKO may have with it.
GLUSHKO is still at Khimki.
123. Shchelkovo.
specialists at two places in is area.
chemists was employed. At the other
electronic valve technicians (ex-O.S.W.).
the presence of a number of German
a small group of
there was a larger group of
Main Assembly Buildings (Previously known throught PW reports as Corpus II)
125,
a the test rig for electrical components o the
centre section and (b) the Dosit on of attachment of the tail section.
Siemens spot-welding fuselage jigs in a ui ing
e assem ly line was laid out basically for demonstration and
that only roc ets were assembled. these arrived in completed
sub-assemblies there was no requirement for the -whole of the Mittelwerk embly line
the line laid out post-war at Kleinbodungen. JASPER was in charge and would
ve e full information. At one end of the building there was a workshop for
bakelite components.
126. IORDANSKIY's materials Testing Laboratories
were located on the first and second floors of a new extension running the whole
length of the main assembly hall. These rooms were extremely well equipped.
127. machine shop in the assembly building=
all machine work was done in the next building
where oil drillin machinery was manufactured
.
A-4 Motors were not assembled at Factory 88
128. WASSERFALL Test Stand. It was
situated " on the left, near the main entrance tote airfield." The erman, '
HARNISCH, worked on it.
129. Main Administration Building.-This was located at the side sate to the
factory on the Moscow-Yaroslavl road
building was identified as having a cupola type root being on the northern side
of the entrance. The ground floor containing the library and conference room was
reached by a flight of steps. The conference room appeared to be used by the
librarians but was cleared for meetings of the N.T.S. On the floor above were the
offices of GONOR and POBEDONOSTSEV.
The-
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130. CHERTOK's Building.-This was. anew building several storeys high
located behind the-administration building but connected by a bridge.
131. - KOROLEV's Construction Bureau.-This was located on the opposite
side of the factory entrance road and was a modern multi-storied building.
132. G.S.P. 7 was the name given to a project section in the Ministry of
Armaments. A group which came directly under its direction worked at NIL 88.
Kapustin Yar Range
135. The general area of the range consisted of undulating semi-desert
country with occasional deserted villages. The Germans were in the area from
mid-September and arrived back at NIL 88 in mid-December, by which time the
wCaLner was wet ana transportation taciiities were cur
spent in transit occupied one week in each direction.
136. In discussin the KOROLEV rocket (K-1)
the Germans assumed the firings of that rocket had taken
place at Kapustin, in the. autumn.
this would be the usual time for firings as the weather
was suitable, fields were then cleared of crops and people had left the summer
residences in the area. It was suggested to him that if the area were to be
a permanent range, then the Russians would probably not bother about such items
as annual crops and local summer residences. at the time
of the 1947 firings he believed that even if permanent plans had been made they
had only just started to build at the range head. No doubt, if the range were a
permanent one such details would not in future influence programmes; the range
area would then probably be evacuated.
the Russians had started to make provision for permanent static test areas
Kapustin Yar.
The general area consisted of two' main locations : --
(i) the base accommodation and administrative area;
(ii)
The Base Area
137. This consisted of a railway siding within sight of Kapustin Yar where
were parked the main part of the FMS trains on two parallel lines. A few units
were taken further up to the operational area.
138. Nearby was a general dump alongside the line, consisting of machine
tools and various pieces of equipment in addition to building construction
materials. Everything was out in the open and covered in sand through being
completely unprotected.
139. Some 2 km. from the FMS siding, and 3 km, from Kapustin Yar was a
small airstrip.
140. This was believed to.be
at a distance o a -an-ours drive by car over a roug track. Approach by rail
was on a different line to that of the base sidings, and the line apparently left
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the main Kapustin Yar-Astrakhan line at a point further south-east crossing a
gully not far from the main line by a wooden bridge. .
The operational area consisted of : -
(i) A horizontal test stand.
(ii) A. static firing test stand.
(iii) A firing point.
141. The Horizontal Test Stand _ -This was located 5 km. from
the firing point and 5 km. from the static firing stand. It consisted of new wooden
buildings and a railway siding on, which were the laboratory coaches of the
FMS train.
142. The Static Firing Test Stand This consisted of a stand,
overhanging a gully. A deserted village wit fruit trees was located 1 km. away
down the gully and another was 3 km. further. Near the test stand was a siding
on which were the repair waggons of the FMS train.
143. The Firing Point 0-This was 3 km. from the static firing test
stand and 5 km. from the horizontal test stand. There were no particular land
features nearby. Two bunkers were sited some 200 yds. from the actual point
and a Messina-Hawaii station was located nearby (ref. sketch). This was reached
by a track. F.M.S. Waggon the firing waggon, was located at an
unidentified situation 3 m. away.
General Infnrmntinn
transport aircratt used to carry them the area was a seater twin-engined
aircraft. In addition he believes that there was a small bi-plane which was used.
possibly to carry out survey or reconnaissance flights to the target area.
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146. As regards the number of rounds actually fired during t
VIEBACH's estimate (12) is probably correct.
any day in which there was more than one fixing, although it.. is
pos on one . day .there may have been two. firings. The German group
were at at the range for a period of two-and-a-half months, of which the last.
7-14 days were required for clearing up 'and preparing for their return to the Island.
This would mean that the firings were spread over a period of approximately
two months.
147. The Germans had suggested that sound recording gear could possibly
he used at the target end of the range,
Immediate renorts as to whether the bring was good or not, were
team at the impact end of the range but no Germans,
there was a Russian
some type
of detection apparatus must have been employed to mark the fall of shot,
approximately at least. Although a telephone system was in operation
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(there were any lines to the target area. The firing records were kept in
an office on the F.M.S. train, in TYULIN.'s charge.
148. Later, after the German group moved from NII.88 to the Island, the
Russians are believed to have tried to evaluate some of the trials results. Their
first attempt was apparently not satisfactory, and WOLFF, SCHULZ, MULLER,
VIEBACH, PEHLE and MATHIES had to go to NII.88 to inspect the original
data in the F.M.S. train there.
150. Minor repairs were carried out at the site whereas major repairs
necessitated return of the components to. NII. 88. 0 never heard of
components being sent to Stalingrad for repair. Some welding operatives
came from a Ministry of War factory in Stalingrad
during the 1947 trials. he Russians would set up suitable
facilities on the site if t e range were to be in permanent use. The rockets for
the 1947 trials were stored in well-built buildings which satisfied all storage
requirements. There w r 1 lar workshops at the range in which repairs
could be carried out. liquid oxygen was supplied from
Moscow in German-type vehicles. he loss rate at 5 per cent.
per day. The journey from Moscow might be as little as three days, but
the deficiency on arrival corresponded to about 35 per cent.
(NOTE.-If the daily loss rate (in German W.W.II vehicles) is materially
in excess of 5 per cent. capacity then the supply point would be expected to
be located much nearer Kapustin Yar than is Moscow.)
151. Delays in the firing programme were often due to hold-ups at the static
.test stand (this was not used during the later firings), or to having to await the
arrival of V.I.Ps. Norma ll there was no set time for firing and when a rocket was
ready, it could be fired. the best time for firing would be
in the afternoon when the sun would have moved out of the line of sight. There
was no difficulty in administration of personnel in order to obtain early morning
firing, as tents were available at the sites. Sometimes they started work at 4 a.m.
and fired at 8 a.m. Under reasonable conditions the Kine-Theodolites could follow
to beyond fuel cut-off, i.e., to 15-20 km.
152. Firing procedure followed normal German practice.- There was a
central time marker station which was ' linked with all Kine-Theodolite stations.
The latter gave out their individual readings of bearing from just before firing
until about 10 seconds afterwards. Local pre-warning was given by loudspeaker,
and control was from one bunker. There was a " count-down " in minutes from
zero minus 5 or 3 minutes, then in 5-second gaps from zero minus 1 or 1, and
finally in seconds, before the word " Agon " (fire).
153. Communication with. the target was bad, and normally the Russians
went there by air, but there were tracks which were believed to lead to the same
area.
154. The actual firing was done by two entirely separate teams. One, a
military team, was associated with the F.M.S. train and was under the
intro
of WORM F.V The other, a civilian team, was controlled by VIEBAC
The two teams were separately responsible for alternate
rings.
155. first heard of Kapustin Yar as " FILIALWERKE II of NII. 88 "
in 1950. is was at the time of the special trials arrange
drive system utilising gas bleed from the combustion chamber.
=t will now be a permanent establishment with a resident s a but a o - er
groups will visit there from time to time to carry out tests.
Other Ranges
a range was
t ey cou re roc ets to a grea er range (than e A-4). C
Kapustin Yar was not suitable but that there were other places.
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PRODUCTION, STORAGE, -TRANSPORT, &c.
25
Standards
Russian factory propaganda films, of which there were 'a great many.
or examp e, a film showin new techniques of electro- olishin
another on cutting metals under water
films illustrating the best way of performing particular tasks (i.e., on
time and motion study) which were good propaganda, but these
displayed as on inatin from an idea of or invention by a worker.
a technique vhich involved injecting white droplets h i
as the working medium to trace fluid flow in wind tunnels.
the high quality of certain adhesives As to pro-auction,
standards could always be maintained by adequate control.
158.
all work
the use of GOST standards. He
certain materials were poor in qua ity and of ers
were of good quality, generally speaking prescribed standards were maintained.
Inspection
159. the meaning of the letters OTK.
they stood for ESKOGO KONTROLYA " (Technical
Control Section) such a section is maintained in all places
where work is being done... The stamping of these letters on an article,
did not per se mean- that the article was in series production. The control
(i.e., inspection and testing) operated in the workshop (i.e., at the bench or "on
the floor ") and also at the end of the operations (i.e., final inspection), both in
production shops and in research and development workshops. It might be
administered by the military in some cases. the presence
of the letters on a product gave no indication w a ev r or quan i tes produced-
these might range from small numbers (much less than 1,000) up to really large-scale
production. It was not, however, placed on those parts which were produced
on the Island for their own use.
Special Machine Tools
160. regarding the availability of any special machine tools
for precision work, a escribed in detail a jig borer at NIL 88,
There was another identical jig borer on the Island which
was, however, of Russian' manufacture, although it too was referred to locally (both
by the Russians and the Germans) as the " SIP."
Quality of Man-power
161. t o highest skilled workers would be found in
mass-,p ion tactories ratner an development .establishments. More money
could be earned by production operatives since it as more difficult in estahlish-
ments to fix norms and hence to earn large wages.
arranged, usually through knowing the right people " in spite of the high priority
which might be accorded development work.
162.
slip gauges.
average skill
transfer from one factory to another could 'often be
the use by individual. operatives. in NIL 88, of
the workers concerned must be above
slip gauges were used by possibly one in
our o t e operatives m t e institute. a certain percentage
of biLybIv trained men woul nave to beretainea in any estannshnientF_
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163.
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Russian made Selsyns.
ese were from production and said that the bakelite parts were moulded.
This, indicated quantity production. The . instruments were packaged i.n
production type -containers, appropriately marked with type numbers, factory
markings, &c. These examples were seen on the `Island in 1952;
they were an overflow of some production stock of which a quantity might have
been. held at NIL 88.
164. in component production there was no special
reason to suppose that t e Russians would be less well-equipped than the West and,
in fact, he believed they would solve the problems involved. Asked specifically if
this applied to control gear, he production of Sperry-type
gyros and control systems and selsyn sys ems, as examples. These were in
production and were to be seen in catalogues. presence
of a component description in a catalogue did not prove it was in production.)
The standard of production necessary for successful guided missile operation
could be achieved by ensuring adequate technical control.
Timescale for Production
165.
the time required for rocket production.
it wouliccit ke two, years after the first successful test firing of a complete
rocket such as the R-10 or K-1 for series production of the missile to get under
way. the Russians plan a development schedule rigidly .and fix
a_ time by which the work should be completed.
All would therefore report that they were ready
a e p anne time, although this might mean that they would have to fire rockets
which were not as good as they should have been; in fact the conditions under which
development took place in Russia were similar to those in war-time Germany.
if a firing programme went badly wrong they would hold up
any preparation for production. because of the pressure to
adhere to an inflexible development programme t e ensuing firing programme
would be protracted by normally avoidable difficulties.
166. no one in a position of high responsibility could
really know details of results of firing trials and senior authorities would have to
rely on the reports of chief constructors who might withhold unfavourable reports
so long as the rocket apparently functioned successfully. KOROLEV might not
tell the Minister the truth if firings were not completely successful, bu
then probably recommend postponement of production, at the same time ding
that the firing programme must continue.
167. The Russians find it very difficult to understand that a rocket which
works all right on,a ,test stand may not work well in flight ; that one cannot fire
ten per day for three months but that one has to continue one by one to a
" successful " test. they might even go back to the research
stage if a major failure occurre at t e firing of the first complete rocket.
168.. the Russian firing programme might be to build
two or three rockets and to fire these. If they were successful, about 100 rockets
would be made and fired. Should a succession of say ten failures occur all firing.
would cease.
Possible R-10 and R-14 Production
169. In estima a tw to reach the production stage after
first successful firing, tin no great difficulties would be met in
the manufacture of the R-10; electrical components were available; the most
difficult components, namely, the combustion chamber and turbine pumps, were
similar to those of the A-4 whose production problems were known to the Russians.
the Russians would carry out a programme
similar a or the R- when producing the R-14. Assuming they had
proceeded with the R-10 or some oth r , they might have learned a lot from
their experience of such work. they would need to produce 100-200
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rockets for a three years development programme for the R-14. They would not
start production before the successful firing of a complete rocket. They might,
however, think about production and might even start planning production of
certain components.
170. On the other hand, the R-14 was a new, type of rocket; it would require
new turbines and pumps; and new tools would be required. Also the combustion
chamber was different from that of the R-10. t would have
taken the Germans three years to have made one (i.e., up to a end of 1952). It
might have taken the Russians longer due to their cumbersome organisation and
methods of working and their lack of background. Indeed, the Russians
themselves said that an R-14 programme would take a long time. If the Russians
had accepted the idea of an underground factory, production would take a longer
period (than the two years estimated as being necessary for R-10) after first
successful firings. The supporting experimental programme . would call for the
provision of a suitable. test stand and construction of a 100-ton thrust motor
with a combustion chamber operating at 'a pressure of 60 atmospheres.
Development cooling tests would have to be run (i.e., a scaled-up version of tests
already done by the Germans on the 1 ton test stand on the Island). '
171. a possible time scale was 1 year or more probably
2 years for completion o successful firing trials (1954), production to start 2 years
or more later, i.e., end of 1956 or later.
the alleged firine of the KOROLEV rocket;
the firing was not so good and KOROLEV
must have had trouble. These remarks were made in early 1950 following firings
to have taken place the previous Autumn.
173. Native programme.-~
Russians could have developed and what waste likely time scale.
whether they would prod ce the - the R-10
the final rocket would be a mixture. uce t could be in production now
(July, 1954) if the work had continued un er pressure right through to the produc-
tion e. the known factors in the time scale in detail, Ll
7sta the possible progress as follows : -
(a) In 1948 the R-10 project was completed.
(b) In 1949 further design details were gone into
firing of the KOROLEV rocket.
of the
(c)' Tanks longer than the standard A-4 tank, were made at
Nil. an ermans had to instruct the Russian welders on the
techniques involy
had been made.
(d) Many of the components for rocket pr uc ion were, being
made on a small production basis at NIL 88. These included such
things as the aluminium castin for the Rudder machine.
(e) In 1950 the Russians, did experimental work on combustion
chambers (Gas blee in tests using the German experimental plans
and equipment. in 1951
experimental work should have been completed it no major difficulties
had arisen and the firing of a successful rocket could have been made
by the end of 1951.
allowing two further years to plan and start production,
the first rockets (possibly a compromise between R--10 and K-1) could have come
off production at the end of 1953.
Storage
174. The Russians paid a good deal ot attention to the question of storage.
There were, excellent storage conditions,. from the point of view of temperature
and humidity, in the building on the airfield at NIL 88. The Russians had been
given the German instructions for A-4 storage in 1946-7.. At Kapustin Yar the
A-4's 'were stored in well built buildings which satisfied all normal requirements
for good storage conditions.'
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175. The " lacquer " on the missiles fired at K.Y. in 1947 was black and white
paint; it was applied on site to facilitate visual observation and photography, and
Was not a protective finish. it did not stand low temperature
conditions well.
176. the protection of components and
equipment generally. domestic steel equipment was always well
protected in stores with a thick yellow oil, unidentified, which was viscous at
normal temperatures but became hard in cold weather. Tools were also protected
in this way. This oil or grease was widely used all
components, stored before final assembly to be similarly protected. The technique
of bonderizing metals is well known to the Russians.
Operations in Extreme Temperatures
. 177.
components most sensitive to temperature were the electrical ones but as they
" provide their . own heating " outside temperature is less critical than it might
otherwise be. , Electrolytic condensers might be the most critical of the electrical
components The Germans did some calculations on the body
expansion/ contraction. within the temperature range -50?C to 50?C. There was no
comment by the Russians on this. the R-l0 would operate
Transport
179. Special transport for missiles.-The Meilerwagon used for R-10
transportation would be different from the original German vehicles used with the
A-4. There would be no inspection platforms, or heavy electrical connections.
180. The warhead could be carried on the Meilerwagen and would be
separate from the main fuselage as it would have to,be attached, while the rocket
was in the vertical position. The warhead would be carried on a V cradle whilst-
in the travelling position. Because of the shortening of the motor compartment
and consequential alterations in weight distribution, the lower U cradle for
carrying the fuselage was to be moved - metre towards the tail of the rocket.
181. No Strabo cranes were initially designed, nor was a command firing car,
but the Russians said "Let us have some."
182. The design of the firing platform waggon was modified by strengthening
the supporting legs and by incorporating a foam fire extinguishing jet in the top of
the flame deflector pyramid..
183. Rudder transport: Some Russians (names unknown) were interested
in the problem of transporting the carbon rudder vanes at Kapustin Yar in the 1947
trials. These were carried in special packing cases of the type previously used in
Germany, but the cases were Russian made.
Oxygen production on the Island
184.
Eac set had a 21 metre vertical column, built up in sections. The sets used
on a Island were Russian-manufactured and the manometers had Russian
.
calibrations. They had 2-stage piston-operated compressors giving a maximum of
200 atm. and driven by electric motors.
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29
Troop training
185. VOSKRESENSKIY interested himself in troop training. He; was the
,leader of the training group at Bleicherode and worked in parallel with VIEBACH
who also trained a firing team.
(NOTE.-He was also chairman of the discussion group on Ground
Equipment at the 2nd N.T.S. conference on the R-10.)
the
Russians would have learned handling techniques, &c., and firing drill at the
Kapustin Yar range.
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RUSSIAN PMLOSOPHY IN THE U E OF G.W.
ussians would prefer an aircraft type o ve c le to a roc e
187.
wor was not continue on the project. even
'the Russians had accepted the various project reports an a ma a no
comments on these, this would not necessarily indicate lack of interest. In fact,
one or two queries were put to the Germans after the R-14 study was completed.
Tasks specifically requested by the Russians included a design for a mobile
operational column for firing the R-14 (in contrast with the German proposals for
an underground factory with associated launching site) and also a design study of
the use of
188.
dural instead of steel
(a) In 1947, POBEDONOSTSEV told) (that much high-level interest had
been aroused by the SANGER-BREDT pronosals that the project
had at one time " lain in front of STALIN '
absence of any Russian reaction to this criticism.
BREDT proposals adversely
criticism had not gone " right to the top."
(b) GAYDUKOV and one or two other Russians had, at the time of the visit
by the commission from Moscow to the Island in mid-1950, commented
on the fact that the R-15 required much less fuel than the R-14 and
t
the cost of materials
in the R-15 might well be higher than in the R-14.)
(c) Although the R-14 project had been worked out in considerably greater
detail than had the R-15, about the same degree of interest in each
was shown at the time of the visit to the Island of the above-mentioned
commission. This, eflected Russian lack of favour
for the R-14. No one iscusse t e R-14 project seriously
At the same time, he does not know whether the R-15 was iscusse
in detail with ALBRING or not.
W the R-14 design constituted too radical an advance
on the R-10 project for it to appeal to the Russians as a practicable
weapon. the Russians had gone ahead with a project
similar to the R-10, but in the case of the R-14 any such decision would
be fraught with the risk of discredit in the event of failure. Such a
man as KOROLEV might have gone on with an R-14 programme
but even he might have misgivings. The ultimate decision would be
taken by USTINOV who might not be in possession of all the facts,
(e)
on the R-14 some at least (say 10 or 12) of the rocket technicians would
i the Russians had decided to proceed with work
have been detained in Russia for a longer period, just as HOCH and
others had been detained for further work on guidance.
(f) The work on the course-setting gyroscope and on the statoscope in the
last phase on the Island was done at the request of the Russians.
both these items might have been under development
in support ot a project such as the R-15. In particular, the maximum
height range of the statoscope was the same as the nominal flight path
of the R-15 (14 Km.).
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31'.
189. I I the development of a 100-ton
thrust motor at Khimki could have any significance in connection with possible
subsequent development of the R-14. the Khimki motor might
quite possibly be considered in relation to the (later) R-14 and that if a man like
GLUSHKO, who did not care to work with Germans, were interested or involved
in an R-14 programme. then any. Germans would probably be excluded from the
work.
this tended to contradict the argument implicit L
it was possible that the SANGER-
BREDT project might find support in some other Ministry such as the Air
Ministry to which GLUSHKO was responsible, and that the 100-ton Khimki
motor was a possible motor for the boost phase of a SANGER-type missile.
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R. STATION
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D,R6GTION OF Fs-sgoT
OF 12 To IS SEAT
TRAwsPORT RwcafrT
AcTCA TAKR' OPP
Rou