SED COMMENT ON VOLKSKAMMER ELECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A006200100010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 24, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/07/18: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006200100010-4
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
INFO.
CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
East Germany
DATE DISTR. 2) March 1955
NO. OF PAGES X
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES. WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 14. SECTIONS 793
AND 794. OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVEL-
ATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT RT AN UNAUTHORIESD PERSON
IS PROHIBITED BY LAW THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.
fjhe resistance which it _dT$d. It
the stabilizati
Five-Year Plan.
from the Soviet
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1. wSw tip 4&mMis fw IS lirterm*
SED quarters stated that the SED was well aware that this form
of election was a provocation of the population and was bound to
have r ter the election. The party took upon itself
this b I , to gain the acclaim of the USSR. The SED
resolves any conciliatory gestures and to rule more
on 49 a
tendencies in Wesferri_ 'erm
have decreed this severe m
2. The differences between the tactics of the SED leadership and
the concession tactics employed by the Soviet leadership have
widened, probably because of recurrent fears by the high-ranking
SED functionaries that they may be sacrificed in the event of
greater readiness for concessions by the USSR. There appears to
be no concrete tactical SED plan for the reunification of Germany.
3. Asked if it would not have been more effective if a limited number
of negative votes had been admitted in the election, a high-ranking
SED functionary answered that if they had admitted 20 or 30
percent of opposition votes, there would-have been evidence-of a
substantial opposition in East Germany and possibly the necessity
of admitting an opposition party in parliament. This answer shows
the attitude of the SED toward free elections suggested by Molotov.
4. The last-minute prepara SMIM11, ~
e of election proves
go-MR
that Geneva as well as slymn 'EDC failed to give the
SED leadership added sel they became less
MU- MO sWXM et 0116 U~ia aM t possible
ss~ aw at 11i W Part's aseffisomes.
CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T
X NAVY NSRB DISTRIBUTION
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