NEW VIEWS OF NORTH KOREAN ARMY AND GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ON UNIFICATION OF KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A006200560001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 18, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/07/18: CIA-RDP80-0081 OA006200560001-4
INFORMATION' -REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the NA-
tional Defense of the United states within the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws. Title 18. U.S.C. sees. 79S
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
REPORT
SUBJECT New Views of North Korean Army-and
Government P.ereonnel: On- Unification
of Korea
DATE DISTR. 18 March 1955
NO. OF PAGES 2
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
THI $OU CE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
TKE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
7 25X1.
l.. The lowest-ranking Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and North Korean Army
personnel were convinced there would never be another
war between North Wand. South Korea. They recognized South Korea as an
independent state. The majority of high-ranking officials in North Korea,
who were 20 to 30, years old,- were of the opinion, too, that the ideas of
the older generation are outmoded and their policies obsolete.2 The
officials felt that-although North and South Korea had been enemies,
condition's warranted mutual respect and trade unification. While
the past approach had been to spread the slogan, "Down with the power of
Syngman RHEE."- they have come to accept RHEE's position and advocate mutual
assistance. They maintained that to cling to outworn policies is to
retrogress. The young officials contended that this new approach should
not be considered inconsistent or the result of pressure by a stronger
power. They maintained that it is a progressive, constructive, and healthy
move consistent with the present international situation. They asserted
that anyone, including the chief of the MIA himself, who ridiculed this
sudden change in policy would be backward in his thinking. To demonstrate
the validity of the. new policy they pointed out that since the international
situation precluded the unification of Korea by force, they were appealing
to South.Korea to unify the country by peaceful means. Propaganda slogans
posted around Songjin (N 40-40, E 129-12) (EA1701) were either those
hailing MAO Tse-tung,.KIM I1-song, and Malenkov, or those dealing with
economic recovery, such as, "Fight for the Success of the Economic Plan:"
and "Unify the South Korean.Economy!" There were none denouncing the
United States as imperialistic or branding Syngman R=-as a puppet.
STATE X ARMY X NAVY X {R X FBI. AEC
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3. The North Korean citizens generally favored the Chinese Communists over the
Soviets.3 They know that the railroad line between Pyongyang and
Sinuiju was rebuilt by the Chinese Communists and that 70 percent of the
goods sent into the country are!of Chinese manufacture; whereas 30 percent
originate in the USSR. They also know that the monazite metal from such
areas as Sonch'on4 (N?39-48, E 12455) (XE64o7) is being taken to the USSR.5
increased respgct, luxury is condoned, and restrictions on black-marketeering
have been lifted.
Comments 25X1
Comment._XIM Il-song, who claims to represent the younger element,
will probably demonstrate leadership by exhibiting to ROK citizens the
reconstructed roads, buildings, and. bridges of Pyongyang. In order to
ease the manpower shortage he will probably attempt to lure ROK citizens
into North,Korea by not mentioning the ideological problem foot?some time.
Accordingly, inorder to publicize the idea that the Government exists
for the benefit of the people and that the North Korean officials are
considerate'of t)te public welfare,.dishonesty in public office is being
stringently controlled, the rights of the individual are being accorded
2. Reference here is evidently to the older belief that war-for the
unification of Korearremains inevitable.
3.
4. Possibly 8inch'6n is meant, as reports cited in Comment #5 refer to
Sinch'on as being a~'monazite mining area.
to paLf
or the military aid rece
mining ore was sent to USSR
ived prior to and during the
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