YUGOSLAV-SOVIET MEETING AND AFTERMATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A007600570008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 9, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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This mater si oo $.mI Mtanatton fiffiesUft the IMt s i Dimas it tea I WO" BHtw wtthia tea meaning of tea MWOMMO laws. TWO
1$, U.B.C. Haas. 13 ad 1M, tea trapalelMNn or rnaMtten at WkWk in a w ~ to an unauthorh" penal Is puahfbttea by law.
COUNTRY Yugoslavia
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
DATE ACQUIRED
Yugoslav-Soviet Meeting
and Afterlaath
REFERENCES
DATE DISTR. 9 August 1955
NO. OF PAGES 5
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
1. At the end of Movember or the beginning of Decesber 1954 the Soviets took
the initiative in establishing contact with the Central Committee of the
Federation of Commaniste of Yugoslavia (PCY) in order to normalise the
relations between the two Parties. The Soviets said in their written
statements to the Central Coat ittee, of the FCY that the Soviet Cono moist
Party had studied the accusations against Yugoslavia and Yugoslav leaders
and had ascertained that Doris was to blame for the mayor part of events
which toot place. la addition, according to these statements, lliloven 25X1
Djilas, as a maaber of the Yugoslav leadership, was anti-Soviet and, in
his attacks against the Soviet Union vent so far that he acted as an
anti-Marzist. With the removal of Djilas in Yugoslavia and Doris in the
USSE, the gain dbsiacles for collaboration had been eliminated, however, 25X1
Consequently, it would be necessary to forget the unhappy past and estab-
lish close contact between the two Parties for the purpose of a full
collaboration which had proved its effectiveness in the past. !ha Soviets
pointed out that both Parties were ltarzist and had the same aim.
2. In addition to the above approach the Soviets proposed several practical
actions which could pave the way to the collaboration between the Parties
along the Party line:
a. The Soviets pr sod to disband all the Yugoslav refugee organisations
in the UM and Satellite countries.
b. The Soviets would discontinue all intelligence and "conspiratorial
activities" directed against Yugoslavia.
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c. The Soviets would undertake certain necessary propaganda activities.
d. Tito would be invited to visit Moscowe
e. The Soviets and Yugoslavs should publish official statements regarding
their rapprochement.
3.
It is not known whether it was Tito personally or Kardelj who maintained
contact with the Soviets for the purpose of discussing the Soviet proposals.
4+. A few weeks after the Soviet proposal was received in Belgrade the matter
was discussed in a meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the
FCY and the following answer was sent to the Sovietst
Yugoslav.. were. not responsible for the 1948 break.. The Central
Co ittee of the Soviet Comounist Party and not only Berie and his
gro4p were responsible.
b. The Yugoslavs broke off relations with the Soviets because the Yugo-
slavs did not agree in principle .with the Soviet views and practice
concerning the relations. of the Soviet,.Commupist Party and the Commu-
nist Parties of the Peoples Democracies. Still more important is the
fact that Yugoslavs do not accept the Soviet -views concerning 'the.
relationships between the governments of the Peoples. Democracies and
the government of the USSR* In Yugoslavia, Djilas was not a person
X -much importance that anything connected with the break?of 1948
could be attributed to hie -pers.onality.., nor can the reasons foe! ,the
break-be attributed to any personality as.,an individual.. The.*tter_
is musk more serious; it is a matter of princ ipla.,
Yugoslavia as a state is deeply.interested in the normalisation of its
relations -with the-.Government of the USSR and. neighboring countries
and Yugoslavia VIll do everything that stands, in its .power to promrate
this type of normalisation.,
d. Under. no condition would. Yugoslavia' accept the revival of t0bmt..pre-1948
relations with the USSR because Yugoslavia wishes ,to -be independent:.
The relationship between the Yugoslav. and. Soviet ..Cccm milt Party is a
secondary matter which will depend on the development of the relations
between the tier Soveraments.,. The IVY .wishes to. preserve Its,. tau..
political independence and is willing to. mol3*bo r tte. wit* U Central
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in the same may as it colla-
borates with the 'Socialist parties in Western European countries.
a. The decisions regarding the disbandment of Yugoslav refugee orgnise-
tions, diaeontinvation of unfriendly propaganda, etc. were received
with satisfaction. Emever.,. there are still. other qurat temvt.m tiling
Yugoslav citisos.ia the USSR and the Peoples Democracies which remain
to be settled.
f. As a prerequisite to any further action regarding the Soviet proposal
Yugoslavia requests that the leaders. of the USSR admit publicly before
the wile world their, mistakes in rd `tc Yugoslavia. As far as
Tito's visit to Vloseow is concerned, this could not be even a subject
of discussion at the present time. ROimver, Yugoslavia would be very
pleased to receive in Belgrade a top level Soviet delegation. This
would be the most correct may of proving the sincerity of the'Russian
proposal.
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Both-the Soviet approach and the answer of the Central Committee werekept
secret.
.v
5. For a relatively long period of time after the answer of the Central Committee
of the PCT there ward no known contacts between the Yugoslavs and the Seriets.
Malenkov, a + wboae:regime the action was initiated, was removed, and
Bulganin needed time to come to this batter. During this period, of -time
.Molotov side a statement in a speech that Yugoslavia had deviateddfrem ths, ..,
road it followed in 1945. Yugoslavia took advantage, of the-opportunity and
reacted strongly, criticizing Molotov through the press.
6. Ten days to two weeks before the public announcement of the . arrival of the
Soviet.de3apticn, a circular was passed to the membera of inner circle of
the FCY stating that the Russian delegation would arrive in Belgrade;.. The
circular.- stated that this information must be kept secret until the,ppdhlina-
tion of, tae .official announcement. Thus the announcement vas a great
surprise.-2!ia ereryonrs alcapt a few people at the top:
7. Following - the' announcement' of the visit, about 800 numbers of the Stet
security se fiver headed by General Seror arrived in Belgrade, first s4.4~1e13~ ,.
group and tarter a-.larger one.,.. In their. contact with- the M)B (7408"T: Intelligemse 'Servioo) ' the Soviet s'+acnritr. Off icers , did. not spare eomgliareats .
They stated ? that:. the lD was an excellent police. force which they fully,
trusted. Thelma stated, however, that they did not trust the Yugeslay Via.
The Soviet security officers requested' that all the streets tbrom&l -v.%i*
the delegation Mould .peas be thorougy secured.. This included halt all the
windows en' the 'buildings be closed, and that a peliseman be, plead'
lead in:esop
apartment -'$'iah, had' wimdovu facing on the street. Further the Soviet. dePloyed
their own a the way they wished -and were alio!Wed to move in the town as they
wished.
8. The ambers of the Soviet security force wore civilian clothing-with...'"the
characteristic Russian cut and could be easily reeognizedw
9. The UM broutit to Belgrade a large number .of their -men and gilitia, ?,,..;.
10. The Russ ass. brought with them several heavily armored ZIS a.3.iot~al4uN+o?
Since Situ ,led' to ride in a covered vehicle,, none e! : the Ruse am
delegates'r+ede in a 5~ ...
11. A great -part at, the discussions and ;..u: c ,
negotiations took p~i oi on #.~ ?~]~ of
Brioni in the fors, ot. direct. coafarenoes 'between Tito and Zbrasnshaw, Tito
used to tabu Xbrushchaw in a oar out for a drive which sight last .
hours.- ,This. died the spa with other ski Of, the Sor..t del..iti ; t.
to a Isomer. extent,.,
12. ! ruahchav'_cfs , S like le. man who
freely p0lntta, out :that he does ztot:~dll lMe
himself that he.p.sesses a great knowledge of theoretical matters. During
the trip through Slovenia, Ebruuhchev told ' 8ve sir Vukmanovic-Tompo that
the Yugemla'.r, :Roe-lo ra?: Qouhcils were actually 'a 'lure of anUehism and
trade ''dmigm~a?? sptotem , hecanse there was no ro .at -ascertaining who we.
responsible, Attar T. o? s eWlanations, toiotOkebev stated that the matter
deserved ds ilyd' stsiyt, and the 'Suet. th'lAts knew nothing about ib
lhrushehev oomeludM by stating that' the 3O 'iet system of running Industrial
plants and' . ea mo. -ei~el enterprises is better' the' Russiane, if for no other
reason than that they are used to it,,:
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13. At the first luncheon with the Soviet delegation Tito addressed- his guest?Sr
as "Gentlemen". Kbrushchev interrupted him smilingly and stated: "Comrade
Tito could as well call us 'Comrades', which is drat we actually are."
Tito ' repliedi "That4eraine to be seen." This was met by general lauj ter?
on the part of ell'ihqfguests and the luncheon continued in a very friendly
atmosphere.
14. According to PC`I members, Tito has made clear to the Soviets his stand
regarding the. further development of relations 'with the Soviet. Union. Tito
has allegedly stated that progress in the development of the Yugoslav-Soviet
collaboration would depend on the Soviet relations and policy toward the
Satellites, this being the ground on which the Soviets 'could prove the
sincerity of their intentions. The Soviets allegedly promised that they
would change their policy toward the Satellites; to a great Went, but that
such s- ehafyas. required time because of the sensitivity: 3f 'the''matt 6k,
15. Besg .te'tl '-fist thafi~ the lecal authorities 'requested the attendance of the
population, to greet the Soviet delegation only the evening before they were
due to' arri~ e', the streets were crowded with people
16. The instrgetions of the ICY organization bat?the slogans in connsebion with
peace and, Wits ee-existence be??shouted we -not -carried out,,. fir :110616 fa-
and non-Pert people piled Tito and the Party ' ("Tito Partite'").
17. The pesph metal satisfied - that the representatives of 'the great '8 met ton
some, to Ttwigsslavia because this ? visit meant *'Yugoslav victory In 'ea 11.
strwggl+e tad the proof as to "*ho -vex right".' 'there were- =4 'who.foor
tblt the v.alt of the Soviet delegation night be the first itep otmarda''tdre-
reign tot; prw-1948 relations. Th1s fear ? is slowly disappearing, . hOW*ver ?
18. The favorable attitude of the population hard the foreign policy of. the
ugoelav AoveraaeAt` is lessened by the very, low standard of living ' h'
skptM me cignv c! ?ieproreneat. large z there of people attribute it to
the high expenses connected with frequent travels abroad by Tito and other
Yugoo av high-ranking officials as veil' as. the visits' of foti'eigik' a!'fie4 is
to Tugs laviaa.
19?, Altheagh the IVY members fairly satisfactorily follow `the Party 1,*- *~ , the low
standard at living is'a reason for general discontent-which eves IrWftrty
me~iers eaten r-h~l' : .dew ever, the ICY webers endorse the foreign policy of
the regime and there are no signs of revival of pro-Soviet feelings 4a
them'.
20. The 'Ynioh irirb -eenferenee in Belgrade caused 'a general- -denture t ti a
of the Ytysila~r Cds4~etri ets even themes who secretly hoped that ' Vi* .
interasrl t'~wntt''isi in Yugoslavia would one day develop in favor of the
Soviet Union resein disillusioned. Act=14 the Cominfortsists in =qgps7,alia
fiai* ad:. ' Now that the Savior. for 'whom tlCey sUft red have
are pelitlbsiM
left that li, hwd's ttsy have become innocuous'.
21. The 8a+riet ''Eihidrn' has new been given- the sewn r g tar to the Uig.. and (Aber
Western' ceilmtrttisa ? is the field of cultural pr..imnd r'. The Center att.
Soviet ' Gulttay (bs $ewi jetske lulture) Is active and its fil`as, oontWenoes
and stage'ehavl ~ ire- 41611 attended6 ' the 'Soviet personnel in Belgrade are
free to,-W' TA1m s social contacts with thi elation, and they take advantage
of this freedel.
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22. See., 8 W1ri t-pergam",1, live in the building in which Mitra Mitrcrria (farmer.
tri * Dji .s) .lirt e, and recently they started eking 'Xitra,, s .d.Uhter
xit4 their ehil drS to the Center of Soiriet Culture.
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