SOVIET RELATIONS WITH WARSAW GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00926A002000010020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 7, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/15: CIA-RDP80-00926AO02000010020 8".1-HUM
DATE DISTR. ? Mar 50
COUNTRY Poland/USSR
SUBJECT Soviet Relations with Warsaw Government
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50
U. S. C.. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
OF 175 CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON 13 PRO-
HIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.
NO. OF PAGES 3
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1. *Five members of the Warsaw regime have direct telephone communication with
Moscow. They areg Jacob Berman, Boleslaw Bierut, Stanislaw Radki.ewiez,
Stefan Wierblowski and Marshal I{onstantin Rokossovsky. Apart from these five
men, no one knows with whom they are oommunicating'and from whom specifically
are they receiving their instructions. It is obvious for people who contact
him that Berman is the top liaison between Moscow and Warsaw.
2. If high government dignitaries ask Berman. for instructions, he either gives
.his orders immediately, or tells the dignitaries to call again in thirty min-
utese It is not always, possible to obtain connection with Moscow within
thirty minutes, and it should be, therefore, assumed that a high Soviet auth-
ority resides in the Polish capital. The place of residence of that author-
ity is most probably located in the Ministry of Public Security, at 6
A:oszykowa Street. As regards the identity of that authority, two names are
mentioned, General Malinov and Henryk AAnsterdamaki, But these rumors have
never been confirmed and it can be assumed that talinov* and 'Atasterdamski'
are code names concealing high Soviet offioials,.who may. change from time to
time, It is certain that the Soviet Embassy is not the main source of ruling
power in Poland. It is also certain that Berman gives his decisions precisely
at the promised time.
Soviet Ambassador Lebiediev is the dean of the diplomatic corps. But the
real. chief of the Embassy was at first Pieutin (now in the United Nations?)
and after him Counselor Jakowlev. But Moscow's decisions relating to the
policy of the Warsaw government do not pass through the Embassy channels,
Other Soviet offices, located mostly in the suburb of Praga, have a technical.
character (transport, control of railroads and stations) and cannot serve as
an intermediary for political decisions,
*It would be wrong to reduce the entire problem of ruling Poland to one person
or one institution, Such assumption would be contrary to the practices estab-
lished in Russia and in the bolshevik party. The machinery of the Soviet
Union is adjusted to the principle of a 'two-ohannel' decision. There are no
exceptions from this principle. The government is doubled by the party; each
technical department head is doubled by a political deputy. There are no im-
portant matters the decisions on which would be taken by one man, Such is the
structure of the Soviet Union, and such procedure has been adopted as regards
the sovietization of Poland, Government policies are decided by ,the party
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CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
Ell NAVY NSRB
AIR FBI
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politburo and must be implemented by all Ministers concerned. The Central
Committee of the PZPR takes its decisions collectively, by a majority vote,
but the personal influence of some members is often decisive,
*The Soviets entrusted the Central Committee of the PZPR with working out plans,
projects and time-tables of the sovietization of Poland, These plans are sub-
mitted for Moscow's approval. It can be said, therefore, that the Central
Committee has the right, and even the duty, of initiative. More so, the polit-
ical career of various Central Committee members depends on their ability to
work out and propose such plans which would further the sovietization of
Poland with the least material and political expense, Blind obedience and the
executing of instructions is not enough to promote a political career, but must
be supplemented by enterprise and initiative. Such enterprising men are Bierut,
Berman, Radkiewioz, and now also Wladyslaw Wolski, the Minister of Public ?,min-
istration. Vino is no longer ranked with the most trusted Poles, In the most
important matter, of course, no one can assume the responsibility without con-
sulting Moscow.
6. ,But once Moscow has announced its decision, it is up to Bierut, Berman. and
others to implement the decision in any manner they deem proper (e.g, the con-
duct of elections, the continuation of the talks with the Catholic Bishops,
the pressure against the Church etc.). In implementing the decisions of Mos-
cow the ttwo-channel' principle is adhered to most strictly, Bierut, for in-
stance, must co-ordinate his views with Berman and vice versa, In home affairs
the deciding factors are A.1exander Zawadzki and Roman Zatbrowski, in military
and security matters Radkiewicz and Rokossovsky, in foreign affairs Wierblowski
and Modzelewski (the latter is ill).
7, "The heads of all departments of the Warsaw government are doubled by political
deputies, In case of a conflict between the Minister and his deputy, Berman
performs the functions of an arbiter. The following are the names of the Min-
isters and their political deputies in some departments,
Ministry of Public Security - Radkiewioz is doubled by Mietkowski, but
Gen, Konrad e. may replace Mietkowski.
Ministry of Education - Skrzeszewski's political deputy is Trojanowski,
and not the Socialist Henryk Jablonski who acts as Vice-Minister.
Economic Departments - Hilary Mine is doubled by Eugeniusz Szyr, But
attention Should be paid to Eugeniusz Siolkowski, Mine's cabinet chief,
who is a trusted man of the Ministry of Public Security, and to Henry
Rozanski, in charge of the economic treaties division, who is an expert
on trade relations with Russia and highly regarded by Moscow,
Prime Minister - Needless to say, Berman is the Prime Minister of Poland
and not e o own Cyrankiewicz4.
General Staff - Wladyslaw Korczyc is doubled by Gen, Waolaw Komar, chief
of ArmW Iigence. The setup in the Ministry of National Defense is
somewhat different with three Vice-Ministerial positions, now occupied by
Edward Oohab9 Stanislaw Poplawski and 1Rladyslaw Korozyo. It is not clear
whether the Vice-Minister for supply, Gen. Mieozyslaw Jaroszewicz, a Pole,
is still in office after Korozyo's appointment,
8. "The co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Soviet Embassy
in Warsaw is limited to formal and technical matters, Important matters are
handled on a higher level, The director of the Eastern Department and the
chiefof the Soviet division in the Foreign office do not know personally
M. Lebiediev, who talks only to Berman, Modzelewski, and now Wierblowski.
9. '"71ie Warsaw Ambassador in Moscow, Naszkowski, is allowed to communicate only
.with ,A?leksandrov, director of the IV department (satellites) of the Soviet
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Foreign office, apart, of course, from formal visits. The Warsaw Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has only a representative-technical character. The Soviets are
not interested in the political departments of the Ministry which have no power
of decision. However, the Soviets infiltrate with their trusted men the tech-
nical divisions of the Ministry, e.g., diplomatic couriers (all trusted men of
the Soviets), cipher office (all Soviets), and the radio-operators of the short-
wave transmitter in Wilanow. This transmitter calls, according to a pre-arranged
time-table, all foreign outposts, sending them new codes and ciphers. All polit-
ical outposts have their own receiving stations, and the more important ones
operate transmitters.
10. *The Soviets do not need to resort to drastic methods as regards their rela-
tions with the Warsaw government,, because the aims of both governments are
identical. Lebiediev is always kind and polite. The Soviets demand that the
Warsaw Foreign Office employees look presentable and behave correctly.
Lebiediev often rebukes Polish diplomats for untidiness or bad behavior.*
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/15: CIA-RDP80-00926AO02000010020-8