GEOGRAPHICAL AREA CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL COLD WAR STRATEGY - LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100160015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 7, 1952
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT: Geographical Area Considerations in the Develop-
ment of a National Cold War Strategy - Latin America
Reference: ADPC memorandum dated 20 February 1952
1. The only "major" issue of conflict in Latin America is the basic
struggle between the Soviet Bloc and the West for political and ideological
control of the area. Stated in its simplest terms, our national goal is to
gain the confidence of these countries to the extent that they will support
the policies of the U. S. and the U. N. during peacetime, and will militarily
unite with us - and give us free access to their raw materials - in time of
war. The Soviet Bloc, which has no basic strategic aim in Latin America
other than to oppose U. S. aims and to include these countries in its ultimate
goal of world domination, attempts to counter our efforts by specifically
opposing our policies where possible, by emphasizing differences between
the Latin American countries and the U. S. and by fostering ultra-nationalistic
sentiments wherever found.
2. The following conditions tend to nurture and improve the Soviet's
position:
(1) The existence of many weak, unstable and corrupt governments,
and, in a number of countries, of dictatorships which have little or no
popular support. These conditions give rise to constant plotting of
rebellion and revolution. The resulting confusion and waste of produc-
tive capacity furnish frequent opportunities for Communist activity.
The general atmosphere of uncertainty in many countries plays into
the hands of local Communists in their efforts to create greater con-
fusion and prevent the successful functioning of democratic govern-
ments.
(2) The existence, in Argentina, of a dictatorship which is on the
brink of economic collapse and which, as a result, is resorting to
every conceivable means of putting the blame for the country's economic
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plight onto other powers. Although originally appearing to be a
very conservative political thinker, Peron's hatred of the United
States and England is driving him into a position where the only
direction he can turn is toward Communism. His earlier efforts
to adopt a "third position" are now gradually giving way to a
tendency, as yet relatively unnoticed and inconspicuous, to take
advice and guidance from Communists. Since Argentina is still, in
spite of her sorry economic position at present, one of the richest
and strongest powers in the hemisphere, the possibility of her
emergence as a Communist-controlled power constitutes a most
serious threat to U. S. interests in the area. Since Argentina is the
strongest single nation in the area whose policies are generally op-
posed to those of the U. S. , Communist parties and groups through-
out the hemisphere are beginning to adopt a policy of supporting
Fe ronism.
(3) The existence in Guatemala of a government dominated by
Communists. While Guatemala cannot, at this stage, be considered
a Communist state, the influence of Communists in its government
and their constant strong opposition to all U. S. interests constitute
a serious threat to U. S. interests in the whole area.
b. Economic and Social
(1) Probably the greatest factor contributing to the improvement
of the Communist position in Latin America is the existence of under-
developed and unbalanced economies which provide only very low
standards of living for the great majority of the populace, but which
simultaneously permit the acquisition of very great wealth by a few.
The lack of wealth, of social and economic opportunity, and of social
benefits for the great mass of the people all provide a fertile ground
for Communism, with its glib promises of equality and prosperity for
all.
(z) The failure of the Church to take a militant stand against
Communism, together with the friction and in some instances open
enmity between the Catholic and Protestant churches, has given
Communism an opportunity to develop without appreciable hindrance
from the Church.
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c. Psychological
The existence of an underlying enmity toward the United
States, springing primarily from a feeling of jealousy and from the
traditional dislike of the debtor for the creditor or, more simply,
of the poor for the rich. Coupled with the jealousy is some fear of
possible U. S. aggressive intentions based upon the historical fact
of our intervention in several countries during the past half century.
In many cases, the United States is made the scapegoat for all the
political and economic ills which beset a country. The fact that the
U. S. is powerful and has intervened in the affairs of nicaragua,
Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Panama in the past is
constantly underscored in an effort to show that the U. S. has im-
perialistic ambitions in Latin America. The discontented and under-
privileged people are frequently more than ready to use the U. S. as
a "whipping boy" to give vent to their internal frustrations, and
frequently the imperfect democracy practiced in some of the Latin
American Republics is held up as an example of the democracy which
we so strongly support and recommend. This places the U. S. in a
position of defending something which we actually deplore.
3. The circumstances set forth hereafter significantly impede the
Soviet program in its attempt to drive a wedge between the U. S. and the
Latin American countries.
(1) The successful culmination of the American Revolution and
the incorporation into U. S. political institutions of the enlightened
Western political concepts of the Eighteenth Century provided the
inspiration and model for the subsequent movement of liberation and
the establishment of free and independent Latin American Republics.
Therefore, despite racial divergence, a common political heritage
and common concepts of the relationship between man and the State
serve as a strong bond between the U. S. and the Latin American
Republics. The political heritage of Latin America is distinctly
Western, and her citizens are among the foremost proponents of
individualism and among the least likely to espouse willingly a
system of government based upon regimentation and the absolute
power of the State.
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(2) The strict adherence of the U. S. during the past two decades
to a policy of non-interference has demonstrated to responsible
persons in Latin America the good faith of the U. S. While our past
sins in this respect are constantly brought to the attention of the
people, there can be no doubt that the "good neighbor" policy has
borne considerable fruit and has convinced many that the "colossus
of the North" is not bent upon domination of its neighbors to the
South.
(1) The United States, together with other leading countries of
the "Western Bloc", are and have always been the principal customers
of Latin America, as well as the suppliers to Latin America of both
capital and consumer goods. Latin America must look to the countries
with whom she trades for the financial assistance indispensable to
their economic growth and development. The U. S. is, of course, the
chief source of new capital and practically the only nation now capable
of taking a creditor position with regard to Latin America.
(2) The assistance which the U. S. has extended to Latin America
has created obligations which cannot be overlooked. The programs
initiated and carried out by the Office of Inter-American Affairs and
under the Point IV Program, as well as assistance rendered by the
U. S. military services, have created favorable reactions wherever
they have been undertaken. These programs have generally resulted
in improved educational, agricultural, and military facilities and have
reflected to the credit of the U. S.
c. Social and Psychological
(1) The people of Latin America are naturally drawn toward the
U. S. by many social and religious ties. Greatly increased travel of
Latin Americans to the U. S. and increased inter-marriage have
created a relationship difficult to destroy. The fact that our countries
have been established on the moral principles of Christianity and that
we mutually subscribe to the theory of the independence and dignity
of the individual create further social ties. These ties are being
constantly woven more closely by virtue of the steadily increasing
number of Latin Americans who receive their education in this
country.
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(2) The native temperament of the people, due primarily to
their Latin background, makes them extremely difficult to discipline
and organize. This factor has contributed importantly to the failure
of the Communist Party everywhere in Latin America to build a
mechanism comparable in any sense to the highly disciplined mili-
tant parties which exist in most other parts of the world.
(3) The very strong influence of the military throughout Latin
America is another factor which impedes the Soviet program. Since
the Army constitutes the dominate factor in practically every country
and since practically all Latin American officers are strongly op-
posed to Communism, this influence has constantly impeded the
growth of Communism.
4. The principal Communist vulnerabilities in Latin America may be
summarized as follows:
a. The organizational weakness of the Communist Party with regard
to both internal party structure and inter-country party organization. This
weakness results in part at least from the "Latin temperament" of the
people and in part from the lack of forceful and dynamic leadership.
b. The materialistic and anti-religious aspects of Communism render
it susceptible to attack in an area like Latin America where the vast
majority of people are traditionally Catholic and where religion as great
fundamental strength.
5. There does not exist any overriding adverse factor in Latin America
which must first be solved before we shall be in a position successfully to
prosecute a program of covert psychological warfare.
6. There are no major strategic factors which now block or cripple
Western efforts in Latin America.
7. Among existing potentialities in Latin America which need vigorous
reinforcement for maximum exploitation, the following may be mentioned:
a. The Point IV Program. In any long-range plan for the improvement
of the U. S. position in Latin America, the most important factor is
economic. If we are to raise the low standard of living which now con-
stitutes the greatest advantage which the Communists hold, we must give
economic assistance to the Latin American countries on a scale far
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greater than any now planned. A mechanism should be established
whereby such assistance can be given without carrying with. it the feeling
that "Uncle Sam" is putting its neighbors to the South on a dole. Too
often in the past the U. S. has been first generous and then niggardly,
and by its abrupt changes in economic policy has undone the good which
some of its economic assistance has accomplished.
25X1 C
b. USIE and through all of the American
media which reach Latin America should be increased and should be
slanted toward the problem of demonstrating the inherent danger of
25X1 CCommunism and proving to the Latin Americans that this danger is not
remote from them. Great improvement could also be made in the field
-propaganda in its attempt to persuade the Latin Americans that
the "American way of life" should be their way. Too often the emphasis
is on the material prosperity of the U. S. rather than on the social,
cultural, and other advantages which that prosperity brings.
c. The present rather weak and uncoordinated efforts of religious
groups to combat Communism should be vigorously reinforced. Tremen-
dous advantages to the Western program would ensure if it were possible
to persuade all religious groups to unite in a campaign attacking Com-
munism because of the Godlessness inherent in Marxist doctrine. At the
present time there are too many instances where Catholic and Protestant
groups are fighting one another, as in Colombia for example, instead of
uniting in an effort to attack their common enemy.
8. Existing strategic policy toward Latin America is considered to be
generally satisfactory. The only alteration which might improve conditions
pre -requisite to successful "cold war" operations would be the adoption of
firmer policies toward Argentina and Guatemala. Should Guatemala be
successful in its attempts to strangle and possibly expropriate the United
Fruit Company and if the U. S. does not take vigorous steps to prevent this,
it will be difficult for this country to avoid finding itself in a position similar
to that which Britain now occupies in the Middle East.
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25X1 C
a. The following are suggested as the most feasible courses of
action which can be taken within the next twelve months in Latim
America:
(1) A greatly increased propaganda and psychological warfare
program.
(2) An effort at the highest national level to persuade religious
leaders of all faiths to join in a concentrated campaign against
Communism based upon its anti-religious, materialistic foundation.
(3) The initiation of a large-scale program for the economic
development of the vast undeveloped area immediately to the east
of the Andes. The ostensible impetus for such a program should
come from the various Latin American countries concerned, and
the U. S. participation should be entirely covert. It is emphasized
that the initiation, rather than the accomplishment, of such a program
is what is needed. It is believed that such a combined effort on the
parts of the countries concerned - which would include every country
in South America except Uruguay, Ecuador, and Chile - could create
a factor of unity which is now so seriously lacking. If those countries
were to unite in a sort of international TVA for South America - thus
offering to the common man great hopes for an increased standard of
living, there would be created a positive force to counteract the negative
approach of Communism.
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(2) That the concepts of national independence and individual
freedom are common to the Americas and that while U. S. policy
consistently supports these goals, Russian policy consistently and
25X1Cbrutally opposes them.
25X1A
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