CIA/THEATER COMMANDER RELATIONSHIPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100180016-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: June 9, 1952
• Content Type: MF

Approved For ReIea 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-010654QO0100180016-1 195
~UN
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
25X1A
SUBJECT : CIA/Theater Commander Relationships
REFERENCE : a. ?, mo for ADPC, subject, "Comments on Staff Study on
the Function and Status of the Political Adviser in
a Military Theater of Operations."
b. Letter from John Hilidring to Dr. Greenfield dated
August 7, 1950.
1. The problem under consideration at the present time concerns itself
with clarifying the relationship between Senior CIA/opc Representative
and the Theater Commander in time of war.
2. To a minor extent, this reflects past discussions on the relation-
ship of a political adviser to the Theater Commnder, and hereunder are
set forth some attempts at deriving insight into both of these areas.
3. The traditional American concept of waging war has been motivated
by a two-fold desire to achieve victory with efficiency and speed in such
a way as to minimize American loss of life. It has not been traditional for
Americans to consider the subtleties of the political consequences of
military actions, probably because of our traditional reluctance to engage
ourselves in European politics.
4. World War II has shown conclusively that the United States has
reached a point in its development where any actions taken oficially or
unofficially, whether they be political, economic, or military, have the
Applgy ffo~A ~~i~ ~a1 -- cQti Qs01w~ ~ $g{~a ~olitical,
UP.RPT
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :_,C!ltf 80-01065 0100180016-1
economic, and military wMe kl
5. The problem can best be considered if it is broken down into
its component parts:
a. The relationship of political adviser to military commander in
time of general war is discussed in reference a.
b. The relationship between CIA/ope and the military commander is
on an inferior level to a, above, and is more technical in nature.
Since Opc actions of a military nature would be guided by, and with
the consent of, the theater commander, other activities in support
of political policies would be guided by the policies and guidance of
the Executive agencies responsible for directing such policies; ie,
Department of State, the National Security Council, and the PSB.
6. It would seem that there would be little problem in determining the
exact relationship between Opc and the military commander if the larger prob-
lem of clarifying the relationship of the political adviser to the theater
commander in time of general war could be clearly determined. Reference a
includes the recommendation that this problem be considered by the National
Security Council, It is not known whether this recommendation has received
any follow-up.
7. It is of doubtful importance that the present situation in the
Far Eastern Command should be accepted as an example on a smaller scale of
both the relationships in question above. The Korean situation is confined
to a particular area and is not a general, but an isolated war. As such,
it has far more political overtones than would a general war with the USSR,
for instance. Tacit support for this contention may be seen in the fact that
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01065A000100180016-1
+. 2 -
 Approved For ReleaW2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01065 00100180016-1
SECURITY INFORMATION
1cArthur, who expressed the old traditional concept of victory with
efficiency and dispatch was overruled. This overruling was probably the
result of an awareness on the part of American policymakers that victory in
combat does not necessarily mean victory in the field of politics.
8. The JCS has considerably delimited the political prerogatives
of the theater commander and it is clear that the JCS intend that political
power as was exercised by MacArthur and Eisenhower shall be a thing of the
past; that policy guidance will henceforth be transmitted directly from
JCS to the field. This further supports the contention that there is top
level awareness of the political implications of military actions; it will
serve to check the theater commander and make him responsive to the Executive
will, and it may successfully provide long and even short-range guidance,but
the inadequacies of this setup are evident in such a thing as the Koje
uprisings. In this situation the JCS had to wait for two weeks for a report,
and, in the meantime, the political damage had been done. It is possible that
a political adviser for the Far East Headquarters might have helped to resolve
the Koje dilemma in some of its political aspects.
9. In the event of a general war, the role to be played by CIA and the
political implications of that role have not been clearly foreseen, but it
is reasonable to assume that many covert operations can maintain themselves
during a period of general war and be reactivated when hostilities cease, to
form the nucleus of an indigenous governmental organization which can support
the military occupation government. Attached reference b outlines military
government problems which arose during World Wax II and explains in outline
the need again for proper political guidance for military commanders.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01065A000100180016-1
 Approved For Rel ,,se 2001/03/04 : g f E180-01 OUA000100180016-1
25X1A
10. It might be stressed that political training on the operational
level could many times alleviate much of the demand for political guidance
on the upper levels, simply by virtue of the fact that mistakes would not
RHa
be made if the individuals concerned with political liaison military
occupation were sufficiently trained to interpret American interests in
their spheres of activity.
25X1A
~MJR:blr
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: Cfigw0-01065A000100180016-1
 ECRET
/"-ppiuvt:u rvf FwwdA vv uvoivLF . LIM-I'[UrOV-v iv -
M z -s" ROUTING AND RECORD S.ET
INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet
and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient)
before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.
FRO
25X1A
NO.
DATE
TO
ROOM
NO
DATE OFFICER'S
REC'D FWD'D INITIALS
COMMENTS
195E
2..
4.
5.
6.
7..
8..
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM Apprc ved Fo
r Releas
e 20
R MENTPRINTINGOFFICE
FEB 1950