DEAR DR. GREENFIELD:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000100180020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: August 7, 1950
• Content Type: LETTER

4
Approved or Releasb 1/03/
Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield
Chief Historian,
Office of the Chief of oilitary His
Department of the kray
-Faehingtana, D.
Dear 1.)r. Greenfield:
STATINTL !
0100180020-6
Tab A
The Kennedy :srren
Yashington, D. C.
August 7, 1950
it i* an impossible task for a man who has spent five turbulent
years in Military Government (three in the 1,4r Department and. two in
the Departasnt of 5tate) to set dovn his impressions in one letter.
7koren to comment on D. '4inbergis splendid outline is quite oat of
the queetion because I have semothing to say - end sone of it rather
lengthy on each of his topics. Ahoutall I can do here is to :uprose
the opinion, with a brief justification, that 5Pr. Weinberg has, reaohed
an amazingly aeourate estimate of his task.
As a professional soldier it is contrary to all of my basic in-
stincts to say that more attention should be paid to GHQ than to, the
combat units in the field. However, Military Gievernment in l'Ooald
II Was a queer operation and if you really wish to onderotand it and
to draw the principal lesoons from it, you must know what went on at
the Government level. You can find iaportant errors in the field
ooeratians, and great achievements too, but if you want to put your
finger on the cease of co,standing mistakes of military government
you will find, I feel sure, that you most trace .soh event and occur-
once back to Washington.
I am wit, ours that Military Government officers who *greed in
the field will bear me out. They will vention.the wild disorder in
which they were uprooted from their training centers in the United
..',tates in December 1943, and rushed by all available transportation to
only to fuse and fret in a British mud hole for six er seven
months. 74hy? It is an *portant story and it must be put under the
microscope. The answer, of course, can only be found in an emnbette
of messages between AMU and the *lir Department. The fellow in the
field will want to know why the Italian Plan wasn't read on time; Ay
it emitted any mention of the co.-belligerent status that we were to
give to Its-4, why suddenly and without warning was Victor Immanuel
lifted onto his throne by the Allies? by after going to oll the
trouble of getting 60 million dollars tram Cowes* to feed Italians
didnit H1ZVdring ship the food? liorwas the signing of the French
Civil Affairs Agreement delayed until Sieenhower had set up his head.
quorums in Versailles.. These are a few of the events that the officer
ard men in the division civil affairs team will point to as his major
problems. These and nearly all ether major problem: of military
government units can be unraveled and explained only by examining the
reattpprartethf otdRitileast.22001008/40* : ClaigkiFiA5 P30.1$005A90010 801020-6
confident that it is no exaggeration to say that 90 percent of the
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les of 4ilitar7 OoVeflMDt in the
(table to &.htrttozt. In his respect
were different from caahat operations
the roles governing the historical treatment of
be different.
and unite vas
overneent *Pert
-
the same reason
activitie* most
The real 1eson of
rately stated in a few
1. sanisetion 4t14n the Ara, b at Military
Covernaent was late getting stsrt.d. Itenet an a yzr or
two late; I mean twenty years to late The U. 3. Are,
what it is, an institution to win b*tti.s with a flare* pride
in its **opiate detachment free the political life of the republic,
Ont be expected to occept with enthusiasm and effectiveneee in
Lhe middle of a war, or even at the beginning of tho war, a major
role in adhieving the political and economic obleativee of the
To the very end of the wer some of ,w,r bast and most
enlightened commanders carried out their military government M&4 U$
because they had been told to. To the very end they entertained
profound and sincere reservations as to wisdom of the using the
-?Army in this role.
4 nation vishes to use
Indispensable, that it be in
the intricacies and =mei
lieutenants, not when they a
2. After setive hostilities ended, the Army
oontrA. of military government much too long. All sorts of
reasons have been given for this delay, such 44 the intransi ce
of the ::tviets? the logistioal oemplexities of the problem,
the
reluctance of the soldiers to let get the difficailty in finding
a civilian -ith the peouliar qualities of Clay or MacArthur, the
feet that the Beitish would retain military control oven though
we switched to a civilian adainietration, and eo forth, You and
I. have seen other reasons advanced. But they ere not reagens
ot all; they are simplytomuses. T was in the middle of this
battle for 'Peers, and I can succeseAly refote the validity of
all the Ivo-called reason*, except one. The civilians weren't
ready. Thelly were late too - abrit twilit,' year*.
1. don't blame this far not taking over the government or relief
responsibilities of 300,000,000 people without the organisation
to do it. I simply say that they didn't do the lob they should have
done because they weren't ready for it, pitd ell the siry pereinsge
they have been dispensing in recent yeers to conceal their lack
of preparation won't, I feel sure, feel the historian.
3. Two losiono, it seems to me tend out clearly
A
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active hoatilit
ono, must be a mill
expert in an advise
*matador. (Siseehael
Gcv.rat.nt1 for
deaver with the
pacity to the
nd 'gurphy
(2) PrelePt4 after the lost shot is fired, within a
matter of months, primary responsibility for Nil tar7
Government should pass to civilian control with the
military commander in an advisory capacity to the
:ivial ,lemAssi%ner (moC107 ea lise47).
4. Ths Military lommander must *entre' 4UitsryGovernment
g active hostilities for the following reasonsa. :
Ailitary Cavernent is a powerful wmapon in the aom-
riishment of the military (tactical and strategic)
objectives.
h. In modern mechanised war tb battle area h
It doesn/t eneoapase a few counties as dtd
of Gettysburg, or even the *.cod Battle o
Tour countries were int1mat417 involved with he
of Basteigne. In A situation like this the inter.
f the United 5tates cennet be divided between a mill
rr emerander and a civilian cemmiesioner. Nor San
each member of an allianee be individuelly represented.
In a set-up lids 3mArr under a trommander like Tisenhower
we had an ideal arrangement for fighting and winning
wars. All the authority and all the resoxeles of the
ismse were in the hands of one man. -t ehould always
a* in modern warfare.
must be understood that when ite pe&k f XtUtr1
overnment we aro referring to every type of relation-
ship with eivilien activities in the battl area, the
least difficult of Whieh is bona-fidd Miter, Govern
ment. The eoet difficult type or arrangement ie the
civil Affairs problem in a frieedly country, such as
7isenhowerts partial control of French life through
Seen.. In so delicate a situation *a this it
MA to me that one paretin, representing all Allied
rests, oust deal with one person representin the
nal intereste of the liberated country.
said in 1941 ace.. 1942 when a* an Assistant Chief
at soldiers could not be tru ted with political miesions,
to the authorities of thet time there is something about
that repeals the t:housand nicities and instincts ihtch
go to make up a real underitanding or the demeeratie
Did not Military Goverment in '(-orld r Il prove that
era oan rise to great heights in political roles?
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in this cenry, 1ith Ui. pot ptions of seiel and
'ted a more diUicult politta1 & ignment than issnhawer in the yea
free DaDay to It'a . it ie cone ded ou all sides that he did his
politioal job admirably. And who in a blue suit could have done better
In extraordinarily diffieult litieal spots then Marehell McArthur
and Clay?
o. FinaU, I GOS to the pitt whth gives
at military ve the capabilities
d that It ry and proper the
d soldiers al gree that, axcept as
excluded fro* the fOrmnlation of political po
In this there is no disagreement. Yet when the record of
aiItt4Lrygovernaent is scrutinised it aiI1 be seen thet the '--Ar ')epertment
had uh to do ,lah creating the political and eaononta policy of the
United atates with respect to the countries my libernted and cowl:lend.
The culprits were largely Mr. MOCley and his staff and the Vireetor of
the aivil affairs Division and his staff.
fa,.1 sure that students of: bttor wtU be aerpl in
the attitUO of the Ar Departmen and of the &ray rcgarding
participation in political policy making with the record of the
lent in this field in :odd sr I. It is clear from reading
?.;r, rg's Kxplanation of Outline that he recognised that the Arey.
had crnsi4sr&bie influence and exercised mach Initiative in this field.
However, the explanatinn is veer simples perhaps too simple
t gain general acceptances
F.xsts there was no .dton in oepeble of
hammering out these pelicibe and &elisions except the
ar Departnenta There wasn't even a clear endi lasting
decieion as to What civilian department and agencies of
the government Should participate in the making of policy.
The Trescary Department and the Fnreign T:conomic adminietration
insisted that they must be Lacladed in the machinery of policy
making on equality with the Department of atate, and they never
failed to assert that they had presidential aupport for their
elate. The status that these two institutions elained for
theaaelves was never accepted by the Aato Departments which
maintained frotheginning to end that the tate Department
alone among the oivilian departments and agencies vas responsible
for polio,- without our herders, and that it was neeessary only
to conault other civilian agenclee of government when the Astir
partment felt the need for tedhnical &del.**. This very
tter and troublesome sontroversy W40 never resolved. In 1945,
at a time when the Army was involved in the monamental financial
problems of 400/000,00C people, the Tressary Department suddenly
withdrew film all the comnoils of Military Governeent and
refased an opinion en any /seas related to evil affairs.
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tion of a dtrective for %repo* Dozens
he X devoted to this project* I'very
irounotanees, osasonable objectiou vas
ordered the tvU Affairs Division
0r was issinent and only day*
'arts Japanese Directive* taro
a subject was the one prepared
with *, ilcOloy and his stet*
a only the Lord known how
would have waited for WI
'Went ot Japan*
a
Once the
to relative trir
For inotimee, atter
tie t;;A.
to a star pima, h
that problems of tz
did sicr
!flat14tary
ittott b
military operat1oz
Chiefs of Stott* T
Dill
do.
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