PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN RELATION TO THE BERLIN SITUATION IN 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 8, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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Prepared by
Prepared for
Case Number.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFA7iL IN ILLATION
TO THS.-BSRLIN SITUATION IN 1952
Operational Intelligence Support Division
Requirements Staff
: K-8374
Date Completed: 8 August 1952
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CONTENTS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN RZATION
TO THE BERLIN SITUATION IN 1952
I. The Problem
II. Scope and Limitation
III. Summary
No Discussion
In Reference to Pointe (a) and (b) of the Request
1. Basic Contradiction of Soviet Policy in Germany
Ao In General.
80 In Berlin
2. Psychological Vulnerabilities of Soviet Policy in, Germany
A, In General
B. In Berlin
30 Implications for PsychologiCal Warfare in the Bypassing
of West Berlin
Ao Railways
Bo Canals
C. Local Transit
D. Travel between Sectors
Ec. Telephone? Telegraph
F. Sewage.
In Reference to PointaaljgjaisUksold
4. The Morale of West Berlin
V. Notes
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I, The.Problem
Request was made by PY/Intelligence/ControlNo0- 280 June 16 1952
Concerning the following points:
(a) "The PT aims and implications which sterke from Ow:deal
acts of bypassing Berlinc; Such intelligence on physical factors',
is. therefore needed in order that we may respond to, counteract,
or forestall, the discernible alma of the other aided'
(b) "The PY vulnerabilities. exposed in the other aide in
their encirclement of Berlin, Which vulnerabilities May have
been produced among their own people" by certain acta,,,sudh as
digging of canals across private property, conscription Of laborn
use of child and woman labor, of East German military.formatiorN
depriyationeutilitiea.and of work travel permits, ete;.
(o) "How effective will the Berlin encircleMent be-in.
Ceasing West Berliners to mentally capitulate to the Soviet
ayste??"
?s2E2AaLlAmitation8
Material used: ONE/S&30? CIA Library material, CIA Cables and
OCI Reports, ORR information, current newspaper clipping service,
tiles Of Seat and West German newspapers and magazines., Unclasdified
literature on the Berlin airlift of 1944/49 and on Berlinvs economic
.conditions,
1110
gAgeEE
The chief vulnerability of Soviet policy in Germany follOWis from
the inherent contradiction of two objectives: (1) the subjugation
of Eastern Germany to the interests of the Kremlin by Making it a
fully integrated satellite; (2) the utilisation of Eastern Germany
as a base for attracting all Germany into the Soviet Orbit by appealing
to national and neutralist leanings. While Soviet sets reflect the
pursUit of the first aim, Soviet propaganda trios to conceal and
becloud the true intentions, The teak of our propaganda is, therefore,
to unmet* Soviet duplicity, particularly by alleging the parallel facts
in other subjugated areas. The measures taken by the Soviets in Berlin
lend themselves in many ways to such an exposure,.
The prognosis for the morale of West Berlin is favorable, since
the same reasons which operated during the 1948/49 blockade are still
valid as long as Berlin feels itself sustained by the West6
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IVO Discussion,
4. Basic Contradictions of Soviet Policejtatgertreatax
A. In General
The psychological implications of the Berlin situation
have to be visualized in relation to the general trend Of Soviet
licy in,Gorman7P ?
Soviet policy in Germany seems to pursue two aimss
(1) Complete satellization? sovietization, and economic
and military integration of the GDR along the line of the other
nFeopleos democracies."
(2) The more important aim of using the GDR as a base
for attracting all Germany into the Soviet Orbit. The achievement of
this goal would probably decide the struggle for Europe in favor of
the USSR0
th aims are contradictory at the present stage einde
they cannot pursued with full intensity at the same time,: at
43 long as the latter aim -- that of winning over allZermany -- has
to be pursued by psychological means.
Sovietization involves, in great measure, the isolation
and seclusion of the country and the removal of certain strata of
society from their economic and social position. However, every step
towards final separation of Eastern Germany from the Western Zone and
its full integration with the USSR is apt to antagonize many people
in Western Germany and to increase the tacit resistance within the GBH..
The striving for unity in Germany is se strong that it must be made the
basic theme of all propaganda.
Because of this contradiction, the process of sovietization
in the GDR lags far behind that in the other satellites and, is only
in the initial stage of the typical political, social, and military
development.
For the same reason, Soviet propaganda conceals the inten.
tion of sealing off and integrating East Germany, and depicts the steps
toward full severance as mere episodes in the fight for German unity,
a fight allegedly necessitated by Western aggression? It is, therefore,
Soviet policy to incite the West to reactions which can in turn be
denounced as provocations?
Moreover, Soviet propaganda holds out the promise of a
retreat from the present degree of sovietization if there should be a
neutralization of 4 united Germany.
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.20 In Berlin
As in the over-all German poeitWeecentradiction
Prevails in the Berlin Situation. The anomalous position or Berlina
having its origin in an arrangement based. on the. idea of temporary
condominium has been rendered permanent by Soviet pplicy. As an
Island within a closed Soviet state, Berlin is a source of incessant
annoyance, an unwanted leak in Soviet information eecurity, and a
point of oommunicati n and interchange with the West a Berlin is the
economic and administrative center of the GOR and its foreignecontaolled
Western sector a serious obstacle in the way of full sovietization of
Zastern Germany. In view of the iapending armament, the steady stream
of defectore to the West Zone, especially Of youth of military age,
will hardly be tolerable (Note 1 The over-all Soviet objective as
long as the West sector ? therefore, to isolate the West
Sector from its immediate "hinterland", to dry it up, to encyst :it
like a foreign body within a living organism, in order to reduce it
more and more to an artificial enclave Which will be abandonea as
meaningless in time.
111P canu0.122.1214.19.14LLMOIAAsils; 13e fore
the war, the population of beth sectors was.to'a large extent economi-
cally dependent upon the function of Berlin as a capital -- i capital
not only of all Germany: but of Central Europe as well, .For the
Berliner it was a "Weltstadt", an international-emporium, not merely
a center of administration of thoseprovinces which now fora the GDR.
ilorlin is a symbol of German unity and with the exception of
t e clique ruling the East Zones every one of ita citizens would
utterly resent final separation from Western Germany,
As a matter of fact, the initiative for separation lay
with the Sovietseho are responsible for the blockade, the severance
of the city administration and its utilities, as accomplished in 1949,
ipte-3)0 the division of the industry, and the restriction of inter-
zone communication to and from work. It require a great measure of
pereuasion to publicize these acts as episodes in the fight for unity
(Note 4) and to blame the other side for necessitating such acts, a
Vfll'UT-Pepaganda not very likely to impress Berliners who had been
exposed to similar reasoning at the time of Goebbels?
2, .
A. In General
(1) Our propaganda should denounce the insincerity
of Soviet unity propaganda, stressing the consistent trend of full
economic and military subjugation to the interests of the USSR as a new
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f? of colonialism practiced against Western populations. It
should point out the typical pattern of the sovietization procedure
followed in the other satellite etates.
(2) Propaganda should turn to the groups of popula-
tion, hitherto spared in the GDR, as farmers, middle class people,
and religions groups, showing what fate is in store for them in
case of full sovietization as practiced in the USSR and the satellitesc
(3) It should point to the past acts of rape and
plunder, the ever-lasting drain of reparations from current produc-
tion, the forced resettlment of specialists, the exploitation of
war prisoners, and the OrdereNdsse frontier, as proof that Soviet
policy is guided by exclusive Soviet Russian interests.
(4) It should denounce the GDR Five Year Plan as
devised to meet Soviet Russian interests, pointinz out the economic
wastefulneens, from the standpoint of German unity in building up
the East Zone industry. (Note 5)
(5) It should show the discrepancy between Soviet
words and deeds and the purpose behind apparent concessions and
the advocacy of neutralism in the struggle for domination of all
Gernany0
(6) It Should contrast the unity propaganda udth
the actual effort to transform the German interezonal border into
an international boundary with all theb aCcbssorieeer Soviet border
fortificationsosach as dead zones, watch towers, search lights,
blood hounds, etc.
80. In "Berlin
(1) Our propaganda should harp on the fact that
all actions of separation were Initiated by. the Soviets, and that
the policy of harrassment and chicaneries is designed to create
an atmosphere conducive to further separation,
(2) That the Soviet policy in fact aims at
reducing Berlin to the provincial capital of the Sast Zone.
(3) That the policy of bypassing West Berlin is
not only a nuisance but a costly waste from the point of view of
German unity.
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(4) That the establishment of two separate town
administrations is likewise economic waste.
(5) That the hurried construction of railways.
S-Bahn-lines, and canals results in low quality work.
(6) That Berlin at present still gets a prefer-
=tie' treat lent in comparison with other iron-curtain
areas because of its exposure to the West and that prefer
ential treatment of border diatricts is an old Communist
device (see Note 6).
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13.....P.ASL-313?U2PeLlaree.P157Ph?,XPARal Warfare 141Lthe rtrlitsgslAK
of West Berlin
A. Ltilroads
Building of peripheral rail lines around Berlin
was started chiefly for military reasons as early as 1900, The
German railroad net had to serve as 4 means of speedy transportation
of tro pa from Seat to West. This policy wee continued during World
War 11. The Soviets took over where the Nazis had left off. The
outer half circle around Rerlin was completed in July 1951 by fill-
ing in the missing section AlEataari_tatiam and rebuilding the
section Biessphorst-Karowe which the Russians had dismantled in
l945? both to the Northeast, (State HICOGe SE? Deep #2930 Oct. 17,
1951). Since the existing outer freighting cut through three miles
(5 km.) of the U. S. sector, a parallel line of 15 miles (24 kmo)
was built to the south of Berlin between Grossbeeren and Sch8nefeld0
The latter required the erection of 29 bridges and
the laying of 79 miles (126 km) of rails which were taken from
other lines. The work would have required two years under regular
procedure, but was completed in eight months. There were 4500 persons,
among them activist groups, put to work, 40% looms% working in three
shifts, day and night. After finishing on July 10. 19519 a breakdown
occurred which was repaired by September 15, 1951 MOOG, Deep.
#2930 Oct. 17, 1951).
As far as the passenger traffic is concerned, the
existing terminal stations of the several =verging lines will be
replaced by a central station - Friedrich-Strasee -.in the Bast
sector.
P cholo ical vulnerabilities: The construction
of new lines is not dictated by requirements of traffic, but by
strategic considerations. The wastefulness and senselessness of
allnthe efforts in hastening the construction of the Grossbeeren-
Schonefeld parallel stretch is obvious.
8. Can....Jae
Barge traffic has been one of the foundations of
the economic position at Berlin.. The construction of canals dates
back to the 161th century0 The main SIbe-Oder canal cuts through the,
West sector and is liable to interruption as a .Western countermeasure
against eloping the canals connecting West Berlin with West Germany.
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It. was decided on Apri1.19, 1951 by Bast German
Authorities (allegedly an Soviet Wider) to build a newedanal,
which would mainly :follow the route of the existing Paretz-
piederneuenderf Canal, measuring 22.5 mi (36 km) in 1OPEth0 and
bypaseing entirely the West Sector to the.Weat and North,;
The official motivations for its conatraction was
to epeed up traffic between the Elbe and the Oder..
Yet, according to West German experts, to time will
actually be saved. West German bservers maintain that one of the
purposes of the constrdation of the canal was the concealment from
the Berlin population of the true amount of bulk reparati n.goods
shipped to the USSR by canal transport.
Although theprE.A.I.Its