PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN RELATION TO THE BERLIN SITUATION IN 1952

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060008-2
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 19, 2000
Sequence Number: 
8
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 8, 1953
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REPORT
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74pprovedForReInte2000/08/30:CIA-RDP80-010*A000200060008-2 SSCRET SECURITY INFORMATION Prepared by Prepared for Case Number. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFA7iL IN ILLATION TO THS.-BSRLIN SITUATION IN 1952 Operational Intelligence Support Division Requirements Staff : K-8374 Date Completed: 8 August 1952 , SECRET Approved For Release 2080181801TIMA80-01065A000200060008-2 Xpproved For Reiteese 2000/08/36MA-RDP80-01 cedA000200060008-2 SECUITY INFORAATION CONTENTS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN RZATION TO THE BERLIN SITUATION IN 1952 I. The Problem II. Scope and Limitation III. Summary No Discussion In Reference to Pointe (a) and (b) of the Request 1. Basic Contradiction of Soviet Policy in Germany Ao In General. 80 In Berlin 2. Psychological Vulnerabilities of Soviet Policy in, Germany A, In General B. In Berlin 30 Implications for PsychologiCal Warfare in the Bypassing of West Berlin Ao Railways Bo Canals C. Local Transit D. Travel between Sectors Ec. Telephone? Telegraph F. Sewage. In Reference to PointaaljgjaisUksold 4. The Morale of West Berlin V. Notes AwroVeEsEcRelease 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060008-2 WRFT Approved For ReItese 2000/08/36W-RDP80-01d*A000200060008-2 SECURITY INFORMATION I, The.Problem Request was made by PY/Intelligence/ControlNo0- 280 June 16 1952 Concerning the following points: (a) "The PT aims and implications which sterke from Ow:deal acts of bypassing Berlinc; Such intelligence on physical factors', is. therefore needed in order that we may respond to, counteract, or forestall, the discernible alma of the other aided' (b) "The PY vulnerabilities. exposed in the other aide in their encirclement of Berlin, Which vulnerabilities May have been produced among their own people" by certain acta,,,sudh as digging of canals across private property, conscription Of laborn use of child and woman labor, of East German military.formatiorN depriyationeutilitiea.and of work travel permits, ete;. (o) "How effective will the Berlin encircleMent be-in. Ceasing West Berliners to mentally capitulate to the Soviet ayste??" ?s2E2AaLlAmitation8 Material used: ONE/S&30? CIA Library material, CIA Cables and OCI Reports, ORR information, current newspaper clipping service, tiles Of Seat and West German newspapers and magazines., Unclasdified literature on the Berlin airlift of 1944/49 and on Berlinvs economic .conditions, 1110 gAgeEE The chief vulnerability of Soviet policy in Germany follOWis from the inherent contradiction of two objectives: (1) the subjugation of Eastern Germany to the interests of the Kremlin by Making it a fully integrated satellite; (2) the utilisation of Eastern Germany as a base for attracting all Germany into the Soviet Orbit by appealing to national and neutralist leanings. While Soviet sets reflect the pursUit of the first aim, Soviet propaganda trios to conceal and becloud the true intentions, The teak of our propaganda is, therefore, to unmet* Soviet duplicity, particularly by alleging the parallel facts in other subjugated areas. The measures taken by the Soviets in Berlin lend themselves in many ways to such an exposure,. The prognosis for the morale of West Berlin is favorable, since the same reasons which operated during the 1948/49 blockade are still valid as long as Berlin feels itself sustained by the West6 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060008-2 _ 'Approved ForRe*Sse2000/08/nicc4-RDP80-01StA000200060008-2 SECURITY ,INFORMATION IVO Discussion, 4. Basic Contradictions of Soviet Policejtatgertreatax A. In General The psychological implications of the Berlin situation have to be visualized in relation to the general trend Of Soviet licy in,Gorman7P ? Soviet policy in Germany seems to pursue two aimss (1) Complete satellization? sovietization, and economic and military integration of the GDR along the line of the other nFeopleos democracies." (2) The more important aim of using the GDR as a base for attracting all Germany into the Soviet Orbit. The achievement of this goal would probably decide the struggle for Europe in favor of the USSR0 th aims are contradictory at the present stage einde they cannot pursued with full intensity at the same time,: at 43 long as the latter aim -- that of winning over allZermany -- has to be pursued by psychological means. Sovietization involves, in great measure, the isolation and seclusion of the country and the removal of certain strata of society from their economic and social position. However, every step towards final separation of Eastern Germany from the Western Zone and its full integration with the USSR is apt to antagonize many people in Western Germany and to increase the tacit resistance within the GBH.. The striving for unity in Germany is se strong that it must be made the basic theme of all propaganda. Because of this contradiction, the process of sovietization in the GDR lags far behind that in the other satellites and, is only in the initial stage of the typical political, social, and military development. For the same reason, Soviet propaganda conceals the inten. tion of sealing off and integrating East Germany, and depicts the steps toward full severance as mere episodes in the fight for German unity, a fight allegedly necessitated by Western aggression? It is, therefore, Soviet policy to incite the West to reactions which can in turn be denounced as provocations? Moreover, Soviet propaganda holds out the promise of a retreat from the present degree of sovietization if there should be a neutralization of 4 united Germany. Approved For Release 2000/08/36W-RDP80-01065A000200060008-2 SRCHRYTY TUFORMATTM Approved For Relette 2000/08/30s:sE4RDP80-010014/A000200060008-2 SECURITY INFORMTION ' .20 In Berlin As in the over-all German poeitWeecentradiction Prevails in the Berlin Situation. The anomalous position or Berlina having its origin in an arrangement based. on the. idea of temporary condominium has been rendered permanent by Soviet pplicy. As an Island within a closed Soviet state, Berlin is a source of incessant annoyance, an unwanted leak in Soviet information eecurity, and a point of oommunicati n and interchange with the West a Berlin is the economic and administrative center of the GOR and its foreignecontaolled Western sector a serious obstacle in the way of full sovietization of Zastern Germany. In view of the iapending armament, the steady stream of defectore to the West Zone, especially Of youth of military age, will hardly be tolerable (Note 1 The over-all Soviet objective as long as the West sector ? therefore, to isolate the West Sector from its immediate "hinterland", to dry it up, to encyst :it like a foreign body within a living organism, in order to reduce it more and more to an artificial enclave Which will be abandonea as meaningless in time. 111P canu0.122.1214.19.14LLMOIAAsils; 13e fore the war, the population of beth sectors was.to'a large extent economi- cally dependent upon the function of Berlin as a capital -- i capital not only of all Germany: but of Central Europe as well, .For the Berliner it was a "Weltstadt", an international-emporium, not merely a center of administration of thoseprovinces which now fora the GDR. ilorlin is a symbol of German unity and with the exception of t e clique ruling the East Zones every one of ita citizens would utterly resent final separation from Western Germany, As a matter of fact, the initiative for separation lay with the Sovietseho are responsible for the blockade, the severance of the city administration and its utilities, as accomplished in 1949, ipte-3)0 the division of the industry, and the restriction of inter- zone communication to and from work. It require a great measure of pereuasion to publicize these acts as episodes in the fight for unity (Note 4) and to blame the other side for necessitating such acts, a Vfll'UT-Pepaganda not very likely to impress Berliners who had been exposed to similar reasoning at the time of Goebbels? 2, . A. In General (1) Our propaganda should denounce the insincerity of Soviet unity propaganda, stressing the consistent trend of full economic and military subjugation to the interests of the USSR as a new SECRa SSCURITY INFOHKATION Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060008-2 3 Approved For Reitberse 2000/08/320iSIA-RDP80-0100A000200060008-2 SECURITY INFORMATION f? of colonialism practiced against Western populations. It should point out the typical pattern of the sovietization procedure followed in the other satellite etates. (2) Propaganda should turn to the groups of popula- tion, hitherto spared in the GDR, as farmers, middle class people, and religions groups, showing what fate is in store for them in case of full sovietization as practiced in the USSR and the satellitesc (3) It should point to the past acts of rape and plunder, the ever-lasting drain of reparations from current produc- tion, the forced resettlment of specialists, the exploitation of war prisoners, and the OrdereNdsse frontier, as proof that Soviet policy is guided by exclusive Soviet Russian interests. (4) It should denounce the GDR Five Year Plan as devised to meet Soviet Russian interests, pointinz out the economic wastefulneens, from the standpoint of German unity in building up the East Zone industry. (Note 5) (5) It should show the discrepancy between Soviet words and deeds and the purpose behind apparent concessions and the advocacy of neutralism in the struggle for domination of all Gernany0 (6) It Should contrast the unity propaganda udth the actual effort to transform the German interezonal border into an international boundary with all theb aCcbssorieeer Soviet border fortificationsosach as dead zones, watch towers, search lights, blood hounds, etc. 80. In "Berlin (1) Our propaganda should harp on the fact that all actions of separation were Initiated by. the Soviets, and that the policy of harrassment and chicaneries is designed to create an atmosphere conducive to further separation, (2) That the Soviet policy in fact aims at reducing Berlin to the provincial capital of the Sast Zone. (3) That the policy of bypassing West Berlin is not only a nuisance but a costly waste from the point of view of German unity. SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/08/304'. CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060008-2 Approved For ReNese 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-010011A000200060008-2 SZCRLT SSQURITY INFORXATION (4) That the establishment of two separate town administrations is likewise economic waste. (5) That the hurried construction of railways. S-Bahn-lines, and canals results in low quality work. (6) That Berlin at present still gets a prefer- =tie' treat lent in comparison with other iron-curtain areas because of its exposure to the West and that prefer ential treatment of border diatricts is an old Communist device (see Note 6). . =Ha sscuarn INFORMATION - 5.., Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060008-2 Approved For Rehm Ilse 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01610A000200060008-2 ? ZECReT S4Cp1ITY INFORMATION. 13.....P.ASL-313?U2PeLlaree.P157Ph?,XPARal Warfare 141Lthe rtrlitsgslAK of West Berlin A. Ltilroads Building of peripheral rail lines around Berlin was started chiefly for military reasons as early as 1900, The German railroad net had to serve as 4 means of speedy transportation of tro pa from Seat to West. This policy wee continued during World War 11. The Soviets took over where the Nazis had left off. The outer half circle around Rerlin was completed in July 1951 by fill- ing in the missing section AlEataari_tatiam and rebuilding the section Biessphorst-Karowe which the Russians had dismantled in l945? both to the Northeast, (State HICOGe SE? Deep #2930 Oct. 17, 1951). Since the existing outer freighting cut through three miles (5 km.) of the U. S. sector, a parallel line of 15 miles (24 kmo) was built to the south of Berlin between Grossbeeren and Sch8nefeld0 The latter required the erection of 29 bridges and the laying of 79 miles (126 km) of rails which were taken from other lines. The work would have required two years under regular procedure, but was completed in eight months. There were 4500 persons, among them activist groups, put to work, 40% looms% working in three shifts, day and night. After finishing on July 10. 19519 a breakdown occurred which was repaired by September 15, 1951 MOOG, Deep. #2930 Oct. 17, 1951). As far as the passenger traffic is concerned, the existing terminal stations of the several =verging lines will be replaced by a central station - Friedrich-Strasee -.in the Bast sector. P cholo ical vulnerabilities: The construction of new lines is not dictated by requirements of traffic, but by strategic considerations. The wastefulness and senselessness of allnthe efforts in hastening the construction of the Grossbeeren- Schonefeld parallel stretch is obvious. 8. Can....Jae Barge traffic has been one of the foundations of the economic position at Berlin.. The construction of canals dates back to the 161th century0 The main SIbe-Oder canal cuts through the, West sector and is liable to interruption as a .Western countermeasure against eloping the canals connecting West Berlin with West Germany. SSCReT ? SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2000/08/30 6CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060008-2 Approved For ReNdse 2000/08/MthaA-RDP80-01altA000200060008-2 SSCURITY INFORMAT-40N It. was decided on Apri1.19, 1951 by Bast German Authorities (allegedly an Soviet Wider) to build a newedanal, which would mainly :follow the route of the existing Paretz- piederneuenderf Canal, measuring 22.5 mi (36 km) in 1OPEth0 and bypaseing entirely the West Sector to the.Weat and North,; The official motivations for its conatraction was to epeed up traffic between the Elbe and the Oder.. Yet, according to West German experts, to time will actually be saved. West German bservers maintain that one of the purposes of the constrdation of the canal was the concealment from the Berlin population of the true amount of bulk reparati n.goods shipped to the USSR by canal transport. Although theprE.A.I.Its