PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN PRESCRIBING SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET HARASSMENT OF WEST BERLIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000200060013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 30, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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July 30, 1954 Security Information Supplement No.1
pI3{'oris~tera tier OnI7)
THIS IS A WORKING DRAFT ONLY PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25,, D. C.
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN PRESCRIBING
SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET HARASSMENT OF
WEST BERLIN.
COPY NO. 6 ) f
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TO,P SEC
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WORKING DRAFT! Security . Ind ,tion PSB D-23.
July 30, 1952 Supplement 1
SECTION I
j L) AND ANALYSIS
ASSTJ1 JP TIONS f
That West Berlin's situation will continue substantially as set
forth below (with the possible variations indicated)f
1. Circumstances*
A. Vest Berlin'sRsittion, That West Berlin will continue to bet
(1) useful as a unique base behind the Iron Curtain for props"
gandaf intelligence and other activities&
(2) vulnerable to! and subjected toy Soviet and East-German
pressures of varying types and severity# particularly a drawm-out
campaign of encroachments and harassments, a ""creeping blockaders
or varying and alternating pressures, which would have dangerous
attritional effects on the city's economic viability and morale,
as well as discouraging and divisive effects on the three Allied
Powers in the city and the German Federal Republic;
(3) subject to internal political and other developments, in..
cluding inter- and intra..party discords some labor unrest$ occa-
sional impatience, and resentment toward the Federal Republic and
Western Allies in the city: all aggravated by uncertainty and irri-
tability;
(4) in need of continued subsidization of its economy and moral
support by the Western Allies? including the Federal Republic;
(5) required by circumstances to have a special status sep-
arate from the Federal Republic, and denied the degree of self-
government which the Federal Republic is to have under the Contrac-
tual Agreements, (Despite this? cue, facto ties between West Berlin
and the Federal Republic will be strengthened and West Berlin will
in practice be given considerable autonomy.)
Be Soviet Objectives and Methods. To the extent that they can be
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July 30., 1952 Security Information Supplement 1
ascertained or presumed, Soviet aims and courses of action vie-a-vie
West Berlin do not lend themselves to simple foi7nulations and it
is probable that they are subject to change at any time. It is
assumed thatt
(1) The Soviet optimum aim is to make Berlin the capital of
a reunited, Soviet-dominated Germany as a step forward in
strengthening the Soviet sphere and in the drive for control over
the rest of Western Europe and beyond.
(2) The Soviet minimum aim iss, in brief, to Sovietize Eastern
Germany and mobilize its potential to achieve Soviet ends.
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0, 1952 Security Information Supplement 1
SECTION II
OBJECTIVES OF UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
The principal objectives of United States psychological strategy in
relation to West Berlin are=
1. To maintain and strengthen free West Berlin.. the Western position,
and A lied resolve to support and protect it*
as To stimulate in the free world acceptance and support of
the burdens risks# and consequences involved in the main-
tenance of West Berlin, including reprisals, possible ulti-
matay and the possible use of force which a grave threat to
our West Berlin position might make necessary.
b. To deter Soviet and satellite actions against West Berlin.
c. To expose the aggressive nature of Soviet and satellite ac-
tion,, and make clear the defensive nature and peaceful pur-
poses of Allied measures*
d. To buttress West Berlin's morale.
2. To maintain and increase to the fullest the value of West Berlin as
a base of operations.. as a symbol of Western strength, and as a
symbol of future German reunification under freedomo
a. To turn Soviet actions against West Berlin, where possible.,
to advantage by using their Impact to develop Western strength
and unity to a degree not otherwise possible.
To continue to extract maximum value from West Berlin as a
rallying point for Allied determination a center of joint
efforts, a source of experience and moral strength# and a
clearing-house for Allied initiative, interests and poli-
cies at the tactical level.
3. To coordinate Allied plans and activities in the psychological field
in relation to Berlin to the maximum extent feasible and advisable,
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July 30, 1952 Security Information Supplement 1
SECTION III
SPECIFIC COURSES Q1' ACTION
NOTE ON TASKS$ The Th-W of t'.. is Plan are inherent in the Objectives
stated in the preceding SECTION,, and are implied in the Actions below,
1. Maintain and strengthen West Berlin, the Western position, and
Allied resolve to support and protect it,
A. Stimulate in the free world acceptance and support of the
burden, risks and consequences involved in the maintenance of
West Berlin, including reprisals, possible ultimata, and the
possible use of force which a grave threat to our West Berlin
position might make necessary.
03 Utilize all available media to auppvrb dij-A w e and other
political actions intended to foster oontinued interest in,
and a sense of responsibility for, West Berlin, in order to
promote governmental and other (including private commer-
cial) actions, and public support of such actions, in the
Allied countries (including the Federal Republic), result-
ing in continued and increased economic aid to West Berlin,
a further development of West Berlin's own economic strength,
and improvement off' West Berlin's stayinu power and defen--
s ive abi'
(2) Prepare the ground psychologically, through all available
media, for public acceptance and support, in I-Jest Berlin,
the Federal Republic, and the Allied nations, of the risks
involved in any actions (including reprisals, possible ul-
timata, and the use of force), which a serious aggravation
of the Berlin situation might make necessary. (This re-
quires the most subtle approach as well as mans and meth-
ods appropriate to the differing and changing psychological
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climates in each nation as a whole and in the regional,
class, political and other sub-groups of the several
countries. The risk of producing undesired results,
even diametrically opposed to those intenddd, may make
preferable no effort at all along these lines in some
areas.)
B. To deter Soviet and satellite actions against West Berlin,
:l) Persuade the Soviets that they will be held responsible
by the Western Allies for any action taken against West
Berlin.
(2) Demonstrate Soviet and (where applicable) East German
responsibility for action against West Berlin, through all
available media$
(a) the futility of their action in the light of Western
determination and demonstrated ability to hold out;
(b) the self-defeating effects of their action in strength-
ening Western unity and preparedness (which such ac-
tions as joint countermeasures, strong public reactions
and partial mobilization would emphasize effectively); and
(c) the cumulative and incalculable risks which the result-
ing situation of tension must produce, and which the
West is ready to see through to their ultimate logical
conclusion, i fnecessary.
(3) Promote, through all available means,, Past Berlin and Fast
German sympathy for West Berlin's plight, and foster the
translation of such a reaction into both positive and passive
actions, such as slowdowns, economic harassments, etc.
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(4) Stimulate popular action throughout the free world against
Soviet, satellite and local communist personalities, trade,
transport, communications and publications. (Free trade union
and social democrat protests and action would be particularly
valuable in discrediting the Soviet Union as a "paradise of
the workers", in counteracting communist inroads into local
labor ranks, in exposing "Fifth Columnists" and front organ-
izations, and in general humiliating and annoying the Soviet
(5) Use all available media to make Berliners aware of the dan-
gerous implications of provocative incidents.
Actions STATE/CIA
C. Through all available media expose Soviet encroachments against
West Berlin as aggressive, and reveal Allied actions as defensive
and Allied motives as peaceful.
Actions STATE
Supports CIA
D, Buttress West Berlin's morale.
(1) Assure West Berlin of the continuous support of the free world
through varied use of informational media;, important visitors,
international conventions in West Berlin, awards;, and other
distinctions to the city and its citizens.
Actions STATE
Supports CIA
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(2) Publicize Allied and Federal Republic aid and readiness to
act in defense of the city by informing the population of the
aid rendered,, and protective measures taken, in their behalfy
their own considerable achievements in restoring and maintain-
ing their city, and their role as "front line" citizens of the
free world.
(3) Utilize every opportunity to explain that the continuation of
West Berlin's special status is necessary in order to pre
serve the Allied right to remain in West Berlin and maintain
its freedom.
(4) Encourage the placing of orders by governments and large firms,
publicize Vest Berlin's ability to deliver, and stimulate a
"Buy Berlin" drive in business circles, informational media,,
and through civic groups.
25X1 C
2.
A. Turn Soviet actions against West Berlin: where possible, to ssvvan-
tage by using their Impact to develop Western strength and unity to
a degree not otherwise possible.
(1) Use West Berlin's predicament as a means of persuading
prompt action on the Contractual and EDC Agreements, stress-
ng that communist pressures against West Berlin demonstrate
the insincerity of the Soviet unity campaign.
Acticnt STATE
Supports CIA
(2) Exploit each serious Berlin crisis to develop Western
strength and unity by taking or accelerating lr eparedness
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measures, including partial or full mobilization of
manpower, industry, and resources in the free nations,
developing and implementing Allied joint economic and
military plans, and stimulating through all possible
means popular support for such measures.
(3) If war does break out as a result of events in Berlin,
maximize in the public mind West Berlin's symbolic char--
acteri the offensive nature of communist actions and the
tragedy of Allied and German losses, in order to mobil-
ize world opinion for a fight to the finish,
Be Continue to extract maximtmi value from Berlin as a rallying
point for Allied determination, a center of joint efforts, a
source of experiences and a clearing-house for Allied initia.
tive, interests and policies at the tactical level.
(1) Exploit to the fullest, through all :N,.Ilable media? West
Berlin's situation as evidence of Western strength, unity,
determination and good faith? and as a demonstration of
the principle of collective security in action in an ex-
treme and dramatic situation; also exploit to the fullest,
through all possible media, West Berlin's role as a living
promise of future German reunification under freedoms by
such actions as beginning a program of city planning and
reconstruction publicized widely as the rebuilding of Berlin--
traditional and future capital of a free and reunified Ger-.
many, in order to reassure and, inspire the people of the
c of the Federal Republic
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(2) Communicate to other areas some of the usual resilience,
courage, optimism, and anti-totalitarianism of the people
of Berlin and their leaders by such actions ass (a) stim-
ulating visits by articulate Berliners to the'Federal Re-
public and other areas where they can inculcate some of
their own "front line" spirit; (b) stimulating visits by
influential West Germans and other persons cf th4 free
world visits by influential West Germans to Berlin; and
(c) distributing to other areas of information materialss,
particularly in the visual media (films and television
films) demonstrating West Berlin1s courage and defiance
of Soviet impingements. (NOTES The HICOG film "Friend
of the Worker" is a prime e:-.ample).
ACTION'S STATE
Coordinate Allied plans and activities in the psychological
field in relation to the maximum extent feasible and ad-
visable. Establish closest possible liaison and coordin-
ation of efforts in the field of psychological strategy in
relation to the Berlin situation, so that where advisable
and feasible,, Allied efforts can be directed toward common
objectives and avoid working at cross purposes; this should
include participation, to an increasing extent, of the com-
petent authorities of the West Berlin and Bonn Governments.
Actions STATE
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SECTION IV
SUGGESTED _ ACTIONS
The following list illustrates additional types of actions which should
be reviewed for possible use if and as the Berlin situation warrants,
1. Prepares, for publication when advisable.. a German White Paper
designed to show the essentially defensive nature of Allied
actions with respect to Berlins, and the essentially unwarran-
ted' hostiles, and aggressive nature of the actions of the
U.S.S.R.
Actiont STATE
Promote the organization of a West Berlin "Emergency Council"
consisting of politicalp, socials, and economic leaders (in-
cluding the SPD) from the Federal Republics, to sit with the
l'Jest Berlin Government for the conduct of siege operations.
Actions STATE/DEFENSE
3. With Government supports, take such actions as necessary to
guarantee adequate living and business conditions in West Ber-
lin under blockade such as stimulating) if necessary by sub.
sidy, low-cost travel to and from Berlins, etc,
Actions STATE/MSA
/.,, Stimulate the extension of credit from international and
other western European financial institutions to governments,
business: and individuals where warranted to support opera-
tions in Uest Berlin under blockade conditions..
Actions STATE/MSA
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