THE PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000200080038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: November 4, 1952
• Content Type: OUTLINE

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-0065A000200080038-7
acuran INFORMATION
SECRET
4 Nevem 19 2
To examine the concept for U.S. peychologil efforts via-a.-
vie Europe and the U.S. organisation and capabilities for implementing
psychological programs in Europe. (This paper deals primarily but not
exclusively uith covert aspects)
2. rinkagga24.2jaate
There is- general agreement among reaponaiblz officials in the
gomnt and in.the minds Of qualified observe:re of the European scene
the.t the psychological climate today in Europe is at a critically low
ebb. Same indices are;
a. The fact that Communist influence in Europe measured in
terms of party membership, bard core affiliatione and size of
Communist organization he not materially decreased in the seven
years of the cold var.
b. The growing neutralist sentiments, veering often to open
Amerioanism added to the considerable pro-Communiet sentiments,
has resulted in apathy and indifference to measurea designed to
sake Europe secure eoonomically prosperous and independent. For
more detailed analysis
see Tab A.
organization of Europe
uldespreadaamptance.
rTh.EOC Treaties might even 1il of ratification. The situation
had riached such a stage that the United States Government could not
overtly intervene in the matter, but that any covert support Watch
mull be given to the ratificaion uould be most beneficial to the
interests of the United States
the current European morale situation,
ctive proposals for a more iation
political and economic life to gain
3. It has become common. to say that Europe is not the object o a
f ether than a protagonist in the current cad war struggle.
SECUR/TX INORMATION
SECRET Pagel
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200080038-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-0 65A000200080038-7
sECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET
in nonetheless the result of en equation
'.(a) Soviet Poshologicel preeawe and action
(b) U.S. psydhological pressure and actions on Europe, and
(c) the subjective state of mind of the EUropeene themselves who are the
objects of these conflicting pressures. It follows that U.S. measures
in the are not alone responsible far the present situation there,
can they, even if made more effective, be certain of alteging the
te to one tore favorable to ourselves. Nonetheless, one cannot
regard U.S peychological efforts toward Europe with any degree of
complaeency. They have been faulty in these respects:
a, Oeneppt. The art of psychological operations in to
create a etate of mindand then act upon or take action which
that state of wind will support after it has been created. Our
overt polici,s toward Europe have fluctuated and have rarely been
pland or any reasonable period in advance, No paper or papers
east which comprehensively define U.S. psychological objectives
b. jaasemigligg. Even When there bee been given adequate
cy for psychological operations in advance of a major
on, the means available to implement policy have either been
inappropriate or too meager to achieve the results desired.
Approved For Release 2000/08/38MA-RDP80-01065AQQ1009080038-7
25X1C
25X1C
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200080038-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200080038-7
Approved For Release 2000910065A000200080038-7
SECRET
if it in a symbol or adnerenoe t
is included 4thin the NATO cone
the moral basis by tcb conflici
resolved,
or s
n sup ort
n idegl end ethic, it the
for common action
onal self-interest can be
TO either
by the various nationalist goverxmontn, inc
national position and must be re
operating within national frontiers.
positionthe Mnerica.n in ore of disputed leadership in official NATO
circles, the official erican position alrost invariably becomes the
official NATO on and is frequently presented as such by the Enropean
g*vsrzw*tn to their citizens. Refastened, and resentment of official NATO
policies thus can be rouged through European neutralism and anti.-Americanism
Even those Europeans most sympathetic to the NATO cause do not
enjoy the sensationf having the major NATO policies dictated to them
by the United States. On this point Raymond Aron remarked, To accept
passively the decisions of Anerican policy is as deplorable as to pretend
to isolate independence?whieit means, simply, impotence.'
5.
vipp. ptratvr. U.S. Peyehological strategy in Europe should
disabuse European fears of U.S. attempts to use Europe as a pawn for e =-
interests. The guiding principle of European strategy
should be to inspire European initiative to remove the prevailing belief
that the U.S. viii conduct its European policy uninfluenced by Euroepen
attitudes and o stimulate SUropean self-confidence.
b.
regard
European count
Eliminate Qnist influence
(2) Reduce neut'eliat sentiments.
;
=MT! IliratMATION
Approved For Release 2000/08/30301A-RDP80-01065ANWI080038-7
Approved For Rt lease 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-6T065A000200080038-7
6ECURITT INFORMATION
nem
nationaliem from a single country
eation with membership of the large
an community.
WE with Atlantic world.
to to non-Europeans that Atlantic Community
is man's club but rather the democratic
(2)
(3)
Actively amapaign for supervised free
a prerequisite to unifiortion off:game-Iv.
Insure that significant American economic aid is
obanneled through lkulti-netional agencies rather
than directly with individual countries. Similar17
insure thai military aid assistance is channeled
through multi-national agencies xether than directly
Propagate forcefully and frequently our intentions
for the peaceful return of the satellite') to Europe.
U.S. and Britain asylum policy toward defectors should be as
geminated as possible throughout the Western European press.
done, the information say seep through the Iron Curtain some
e this dimeemination would be of extrema use in inducing
t mould also be of considerable aid in cambetting neutralism
ope, especially if more fresh propaganda material could be
dveloped from orbit sources for dissemination in astern Europe. De
fector storiSS could promote greater sympathy in the Weetern 'World for
those living behind the Iron Curtain. In order to achieve this twin aim,
there should be a greater exchange of propaganda analysis and gande
lines bePmen efforts in Germany and the rest of Western Europe
(5) Initiate program to make overseas economics resources
collectively available to Europe.
(6) Encourage trade of non-strategic materials between
Eastern and Western Enrope with a view to diverting
Satellite interest and trade from Russia to Western
UM*. (Contact is essential if any governmental
defection is ever to take pales.)
(7) Expedite official purchases under NSA program,
&moorage U.S. firms benefiting from Europeaa trade
to eamplign for reduction of U.S. tariffe.
a,
*A,
25X1C
Approved For Release 2001M1131:211A102M-01065A009080038-7
SECRET
25X1C
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200080038-7
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200080038-7
Approved For ;release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200080038-7
SECURITY STFCRMATION
SECRET
al Si
Western Europe today is the scene of a widespread and deep-rooted
apathy towards the communist threat. This has manifested itself in a
growing feeling of neutralism, i.e., an unwillingness to fight for those
principles which, up until the present, have been the heritage of Western
Europe. Two devastating were, a prolonged occupation, and a determined
large-stale communist propaganda campaign have taken their toll.
The trend toward neutralism in Europe poses a serious threat to
the adequate development of the community concept and to the success of
our policy vis-a-vis the USSR. The neutralist sentiment is being subtly
exploited by the communists. It is on this foundation that the ambitious
eommuniet front, Fighting Democracy, has been organized. This front
advocates controlled disarmament with international inspection, freedom
of information and communication between countries, a united Europe, and
a united world. This front appeals to the continental mood and ignores
the Soviet threat. The Europeans are anxious to avoid, if possible,
rearmament burdens and would like to give the Soviets opportunities to
demonstrate their peaceful intentions.
2. talguagtatauttlag.
a. The major atm of the Soviet peace offensive which has been in
progress some two years was to prevent the organization of the defense of
Western Europe. Their first tactic was to advance ?peace" per se by
exploiting deep-stated emotions of pacifism vs. militarism and, in
general, revolt against war. After intensive cultivation of the deep-seated
longing for peace, they then utilized "peace" to encourage nneutralismn by
developing the very simple proposition that neutrality leads to peace.
After establishing neutralit4r as the basic prerequisite for peace, their
next objective becameevident; namely, that a neutral Europe cannot be
Approved For Release 2068M1gi Agiatifka*0-01065A000200080038-7
SECRET Paige
Approved For Release 20000@itCH05,119ANTIO111765A000200080038-7
SECRET 2ALA
identified with either t
U.S. or the Soviet Union.
Therefore
Europe is to be neutral it must break art entangling alliances with the
U.S. In effect, the goal of European neutrality requires positive
action to gain European independence from the U.S. Obviously, if the
communist campaign should succeed, Europe would be at the open mercy
of the Soviets.
b. At the present time the communists have thousands upon thousands
of PW operatives in Europe, not only because they use a large amount of
funds nor because they have recruited, trained, and employed such persons, but
primarily because they have organized all individuals participating in
Communist front organizations including youth labor, peace, and women's
groups into walking propaganda units dor oommunism.
c. Sheer volume of propaganda output has played a considerable
role in the success communists have achieved today in Western Europe,
Within the past six months the effectiveness of the overt communist
mechanisms in Europe has declined. Perhaps the communists anticipated
this decline for they have increasingly relied upon the use of their
undisclosed assets operating under the cloak of avowed European neutralists
and nationalists.
3.
Probably the dominant motivationamong Europeans today the
desire to avoid war. Over a year ago Lord Tway, now Chairman of the
NATO Council, stated, "Our obvious, our supreme and only aim should be
to avoid war." These strong words from Churchill's. Chief of Staff in
World War II reflect the deep and underlying anxiety of the Europeans,
The neutralist position inspired by the pressure of this motivation has
been described as "the rationalization of desertion." Neutralism is
strong today in Europe because anxiety, insecurity and passivity prevail.
Neutralism is potentially dangerous to our ;policies and advantageous to
the Soviets.
Approved For Release 20Glial1ft StiatERN0-01065A000200080038-7
SECRET Page 2
Approved For elease 2002111t1at :SiltRIRMO-01065A000200080038-7
SECRET
In analysis of existing U.S. organizations and NATIS as well
showy the official efforts in the European area are not geared to
meeting today's needs. All*overnmental propaganda in Europe today
is highly suspect. The few unofficial organizations that exist in
Europe for the avowed purpose of supporting the NATO aims have been
inadequate and thus far ineffectve. At the same time the official
U.S. policy in favor of greater rearmament efforts which has been
reluctantly supported by moat European governments, has tended to
have a megative morale effect on the continent. It has convincingly
demonstrated to them their ever increasing military dependence on the
U.S. and scarcely lessened economic dependence. Because of the European
"drag" on rearmament the U.S. has sometimes considered direct action
to take the place of actions which the European governments would not
themselves sponsor, this haa led to mutual resentment and mutual
recrimination on both sides and has spawned neutralism in Europe as
well as the "Europe be damned" attitude in the U.S. Georges Bidault
recently made this comment on this issue, "It would be an error to
minimize these misunderstandings. They exist, and we must deal with
them. It must be pointed out at the same time, that llost frictions:
are caused not by the policies of the V.S. government, but by ill-
conceived and loud opinions spread through the media o,f masg commu4-
Agii2LA."
5. SAuation Sumqarv.
The major threat posed by this situation to the success of NATO
is that the continental Europeans see the weaknesses and inadequacies
of their present situation, but lack the will to alter it for the
better. What is evidently lacking is the positive moral, economic
and political content which the concept of the Atlantic Community must
have if NATO is to survive.
25X1A
PSB;
se 200801130 11111:6151M0-01065A000200080038-7
SECRET Page 3
SECRET
Approxi0E-Olgoa.9121%0ARIS:Efiti514B8g11615A000200080038-7
INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet
and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient)
before further routing, This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.
FRO12:5X1A
NO.
Ple 3?le 3 Z
DATE
6 Nov 52
TO
2SX1A
ROOM
NO
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS
REM:,
FWD'D
. .,
The attached paper represents an
endeavor to establish a conceptual
pattern for psythological efforts
vis-a-vis Europe. It may serve
a useful purpose in delineating
our covert responsibilities with
regard to overall operations in this
important area. ,se,
? (for
PPC retention)
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM NO. 51-10Approved For Release 2000/ tT08L30 ? CIA- P8 -
FEB 1950 btum