THE USE OF DOCTRINAL WARFARE IN A POLITICAL, NON-MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST THE USSR: A THEORY OUTLINED AND DEVELOPED BY DR. S. POSSONY BEFORE A CIA AUDIENCE ON 20 OCTOBER 1952.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000200080039-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: October 31, 1952
• Content Type: MFR

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131TOTIA ?DJJ FOR: T}TE ? 3ORD
VJBLTI CT: The Use of Doct;ri uu1. Warfare in a Po3_it:,cal9 1 on4Niii.tarj.
-ttack a gain n the U , R: A Theory OutBiied and Developed bar
I Ibefore a CIa Audience on 20 October 1952,
PRESENT: The list of the?se attendin? was comoi...led separately.
i1?Yr'Es The following .s not a liter-al trans aript, but a svxmnary prepared
25X1 A at, the ret xeest Of by a representativo of SE .rAvi.sion
who attended ti_e i
IQ The term "doctrinal wwrf&cell is used. in preference to "ideolorrica3. warfare".
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Essentially it is tie same, but the Reran doctrinal is probably more accurate and avoids
some undesirable connot'4tions of the older phrases We are interested in-the theory of
doctrinal warfare prinarl3.y as It bea'^s on ? e Communist problem facing us. Comnnani sts
cal], it "propaganda"-written int octri at iof -as compared with "agitation" or oral
proeeletysingo The well.-known meric an
tience with ideas per se, not to speak
of "systems" of ideas,, ::- and our cluct=xnce to read books are not shared by the elite
of other countries. On the contrary,, it is both unrealistic and perhaps even dangerous
to underestir.-zatee the force that ideas . quently possess elsewhere In the world and
which the Communists hav : learned o cell to exploit.
IL, Doctrinal warfare is E.ctual verr ,%r-old. By deaf inltie n, it is an attack
through the xr~edi~a z n~` bs on the motivation of a given Varlet, which seeks to
reorier the target's will in a ee:I.ecyed direction. In a sense, this is the ultimate
and decisive objective .,)f all cc iyert operations, We "have many historical precedents,,
se rree of which in their t ris proved to be decisive, At random., we night mention only
the Shoran., the doctrine;: built up parlor to md Bring the French rW olutionq Uncle
Toms s Cabin, Mein Kampf or a ho:E t, of other eramp",es d It is not now a c iesti.can tf
developing a c ? e ~ 'st m of attack but tc- examine some of the basic premises behind
the theory of doctrinal warfare and, tea find methods for its initial i aplementation,
We should be concerned at this roint tAth layi.ang; the foundation or cornerstone of l
p liti ca ox.-m attack or the :ov3,et Union and its minion;.,- abroad. The preeent
disc :,asion does not go ..nto the tatter of what our basic Ax rican message to the rest
of the world should, be, It like is-e -Ioas not, sock to interpret doctrinal warfare r .th
respect to 17)u.rope (NATO,, anon Cc:; r).Uni ,,t Asia, t ;e colonic . areas or the Arab wor d?
even thougti time w apon can and 1ioul., be used nitlua,tely in those 3x: asp
TLI~ r a nits we urn the us of .;octrtna.i ,?%rf a We knotwy, for exa r_ple that
Chang s ears be brought about in -,ho policies of a givens government through a r i er
Of ways, -- by war, by evoiutic-z f'raz below, by revo a.,.tion from above and bbr e~~ lion.
: nch as occurred in the United S6~a6:es under t- *.Lie ioosev It ad;aini. trat; onn Wer as an
:.nwtx?.z rent i 1AVp a 2 /'1 3 C 4 E= Xbl l 2( 08t e sc .~ e 4 .
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Revolution from below must also be practically excluded;, particularly in the case of
a totalitarian Cox rnurii.st state with its ironclad system. of controls, unless these
controls are sensibly weakened in the courec of w war. Even in the case of a revolution
from below, however, the first step in its organization is still the inculcation of
a now motivation and the abandonment of forrsr motivations. This is even tracer in
the case of a revolution from above or in accelerating an evolutionary change, both
instrumentalities being closer, if not entirely tied in with the development of a
new motivation. Remexr,ber, we are not interested merely In an exchange of leaders who
are seeking to replace others :,n the seat of pcnier. What we must seek is a change
in POUCY as well as leadership, if this is so, then we mast devote special efforts
(a) to elaborate the form and conlrsnt of the message to be disseminated
by our propaganda... Propaganda after all meat have sore g
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(b) to ensure that our message reaches through to the elite we wish to
influence.
(c) to ensure`' continua, y and permanence-to the message we wish to communicate.
We will return later to the import aco of written propaganda,
Ill. 11ho is our target? Per our purposes, we should define our target as the
ene3W elite. While he word "elite" has an unpleasant sound in the ears of marT
Americans,, it has an accepted sense which w4n would do well to retain in dealing with
other countries. 114ore over, the elite of a country consists always Of kP3ose, whoa a y
wield the power as well as those existing ova its i:?z nges but whose collaboration with
the rulers is essential to the smooth-running of the social machine. Likewise,, the
elite might be broken down into the small group of "ins" " and the "outs"P that is,
those who potentially or covertly are in ac uu.al opposition to the ruling group. The
latter may be more difficult t:, locate and contact, but in the last analysis they may
be our ultimate target,
V. There are othe3 seasons why we have chosen the elite as our target.
For one thing, the cor2mnications problem is minimized. 13y a variety of methods ,we
can actually disseminate our m:ssagc over tkieir Darn c:omr, ati ca ch ? The
elite can also be reached more read--'Ay than others, with greater opportunities for
direct contact. Since the elV. e, by definition, has in margr ways identified itself
with the prevailing culture of the regime, its rationale is open to inspection and
dissection. Intelligent criti. ism of the it- sti cations and f olkta s with which the
elite identifies itself will a 1sso ix duce a w. iillingness to examine,, to couriterq and if
possible to refute the critioi; n lannohed at. aizxst them. The more difficult it is to
refute the charges, the greater is the streak on the elite's credibility in the regime
and its loyalty to its leaders p As we well. know motivation becomes es c:~ aa1~
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Important in the case of an elite.
91. The content of our motivating message might consist of such things as
",taalinism is old fashioned, a bt trays l of basic principles", or "emancipation of
the individual.". Here we must pay particular attention to the use of such terms as
"emancipation" which have potent historical overtones to a Russian ear. There are
many such, and one aim of our program would be to select and apply with maximum force
the words and phrases which have the host meaning for our target. This program should
be regarded as an "open-ended" p ,opos.`Aion, developing as we go along and as our
day-today experience clarifies -.}ie direction was should follow. Our use here of the
term "open-ended" is intentional.,. It would be a mistake to attempt to work out a
priori and in detail what the content of our ultimate message is to be. We should
not, therefor;, be overly concerned at-oat this at the moment. The~ta, which
I would like to emphasize most strongly, is to get things movie in some direction
co soon as possible. A problem reach like that encountered in the case of an automobile
caught in snow? We should, however, set ourselves the general task of modi.i a. the
inner co hesion of the Stalinist state in ways useful to our purpose, We must at-,
new cleavages started in the intellectual and political climate of the counts r or
at least develop existing cleavages and stresses,
VII. The extreme vulnerabil.i try o the Communisttem to this form of attack
is an important factor we should --awaya keep in mind. In a very real sense, the
Communist must rely on persuasion, conviction and dedication. Communism is a mass
phenomenon, as is the Democracy 'Uhat w ; understand, It has its secret channels, its
secret lines of command and control. But it also must rely on open media of com:;nanication
in order to reach all of its adherents and to keep thorn active. If we cannot penetrate
the hidden channels, lot us at least make every effort to penetrate their overt
communication channels* In this connection, share are, it seems to rya, three
important elements to consider. First, the Corrmaunistsffi own preoccan~ts with the
question of doctrine and its interpretation. ,Second, the Coamiunists are openly
comet: ; to the practical achievement of ideals which have not been,,and are not
likely to be, reached. bid third, the Soviet Union itself has been steadily undergoing
changes of a fundamental nature. Since these have now been codified at the recent
Cong ss, they afford us a concrete basis for effective doctrinal attack,
VIII. In ,o our concept of attack. we shcAi].d first select our targets
within the elite itself. These nt ght be defined roughly as upper and middle party
cadres, the non-party technical eJ'Ate, the middle strata., the NO etc. We should,,, as
a general concept, seek to activate the middle strata, both party and none-party, on
the fringes of power,, . "a. th--i I1GH,,, and neutralize other segments t e state
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hierarchy. (I would like to evphr:;size here that this is in no way meant as a definitive
appr,aach to the very intricate question we are discussing. I an trying only to sketch
in rougry what I believe to be the most profitable way of approaching our problem.)
IX. Earlier we discussed the ratter of content. In other words, the question
of therms. As a general rule, In addressing ourselves to real or potential disaffected
and opposition groups we must seek out themes that are calculated to deepen their
disaffection and also to suggest way: whereby the sources of their discontent can be
eliminated. These suggestions should, of course, be the sort of thing that while
they appear reasonable and good, they are basically unacceptable to the rulers, such
as the idea of de-burezcratizing the state, as an exargnle. In attacking the cadres
of harrcore Communists, we shaald ty to reverse the process of sovietization at the
expense of party ideals. Stalin macs-4 be equated with Hitler or with the worst of
the Russian tsare., We should ridicule Stalinism as being strictly "old hat" and suggest
ways of brir,.ng "socialism" up to date. With respect to the present leadership of
the Soviet Union, we night seek to influence thera along the lines of intensifying
what they are already doing and which has already served to alienate their subjects..
Actually, in reaction to the pressures we may succeed in exerting on the middle strata,,
the rulers are likely to accentuate their present tendencies8 In approaching this
question of themes, there is no point in being too specific at this stage. All elements
of doctrinal criticism must be brought out, however, in ways that would be convincing
to ex-, present and future Co nmuni sts. Possibly the most fertile theme might be that
Stalinism. Is Leninism made quite unrecognizable and reactionaryj it is hopelessly out
of date, useful perhaps in 1927 but not in 1957. Our purpose is not to engage in dogmatic
arguments of a scholastic nature, but to sidestep and overcome the old arguments in
order to create a new intellectual climate that is more malleable to our intentions
and dangerous to the men in power. Somewhat as occurred in the fight between the
opponents and proponents of relativity or evolution, we should try to make them forget
the old cleavages and to create new ones. t4!e roast set then "straight" about today
and tomorrow.
X. At the beginning, I stated that we -wire faced by three problems the form and
WWWMWW
content of our message! the gettinn-through to our elite audience, and finally,ensuring
the errnanetace of our message. The written word is the chief and almost only weapon
Of doctrinal warfare as we conceive it to be. Certainly it is the first and foremost.
.From the earliest times,, beliefs have had to be transcribed into permanent materials
in order for `ahem to survive and develop along lines consistent with themselves, It
is the only method that forces thinking that has a lasting effect. Hence, our main
medium must be books.,
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a. Doctrinal warfare :rust be waged globally.
b. It must be directed against the Com. -unist elites and .mist therefore
waged within the context of Marnism.
c. Doctrinal warfare is the practical first sip in a oliti cal, non-
military assault on the Soviet complex.
d. It is an 'oopen,.erxed'l affair that will evolve according to our experience,
tools, and desires. It does not require, therefore, a definitive and specific
definition at this tiime, before w have even begun to fight, so long as we can
agree on certain basic pref aises.
e. Its purpose Is to inspire, accelerate and influenoe changes in the
thinking within the ene1i r cam.
25X1 C f. Its basic medium it., the written word.
It is relatively quite cheap, but requires competence, a sense of
organization and direction within the group charged with this mission, and
above a13, perhaps, imagination and a conceptual approach
.
i.. Since the development of a program of this nature cannot be carried out
overnight, nor would its results be parent for several years at least, the
important thing is to begin nocw4
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