THIRD REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PSB D-14C PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMMUNIST POWER IN FRANCE .

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000200120004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 5, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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::ECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington, D. C.
THIRD REPCRT
TO TILE DIRECTOR OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION OF
P513 D- 24g
"PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS PLAN
FOR.. THE REDUCTION OF CQN:
NNNIST FO iER IN FRANCCE
Submitte by the LENAP Committee
Hom! Byington (Stn t2)
William Godel (Defense) -
Charles R Norberp, )
Chairma
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PSB D-14o/2
March 5, 1953
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N.arch' 5;1:953
I, B.C KGROT.IND OF LENAP PAPERS
A. elir inrry. Ex .. nat of Frpbl e}
1, On July 9, 1951, representatives of the Department of State, of
Defense, ECA, and-CAA met with Mr. Iverell Harriman, Director for Mutual
Security,, and with Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy
Board, in Mr. Harrint,,mis office. The purpose of the meeting was to con-
sider the implications for the defense of Western Europe, of the continu-
ing power of the Communist parties in France and Italy, as evidenced by
their popular vote in the 1951 Italian municipal elections and the French
elections for the Ch-tuber of Deputies.
2, At this meeting consideration was given to memoranda prepared in
the Department of State and by Mr. Samuel D. Berger of Mr. Harriman's
office, analyzing these recent elections. It was generally agreed that the
results of these elections had been disappointing. While the electoral
mechanisms had been manipulated so as greatly to reduce cormiunist repre-
sentation in the French Chamber and in Italian municipalities, nonetheless
the comrGunist parties in 1951 had shown a voting strength, roughly equal,
in the case of Italy, to that of the previous elections of 1948 and, in the
case of France, reduced only by about 9 percent over the elections of 1946.
It was conceded that despite the economic improvements which had been realized
in France and Italy as a result of American aid and the ECA program -- which
may well have saved these countries from communist control -- economic aid
alone and even improvement in the standard of living was by no means an
adequate answer to the internal threat. It was felt therefore that consider-
ation should be given to new techniques to deprive the French and Italian
Communists of their power, recognizing that these parties constituted a
continuing threat to democratic government and even to the security of the
NATO forces in Western Europe, ;
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3. The general conclusions reached at the above meeting resulted in
the following actions:
a.
Despatch by the Department of State of cables to the Embassies
in Paris and Rome on l2 July 1951, in which it was noted that
the U. S. Government should give consideration to taking steps
with the Italian and French Governments so that they would
attempt a more aggressive role in undertaking determined action
against the material sources of communist power.
Conferences with the Ambassadors in R~.ris and Rome and with
Ambassador Katz and other FCA representatives undertaken by
Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director of CIA, to consider:
(a) Specific actions which the French and Italian Governments
might take administratively or through legislation to deprive
the communist parties of their material resources and reduce
their power, particularly in the labor movements; (b) How the
United States can best proceed in bringing the respective
governments to initiate such action, and (c) How the various
United States agencies, once such steps are initiated by the
governments, could best lend support to such policies of the
governments and to their day by day action in carrying out
anti-communist measures.
4. Mr. Dulles' conclusions were developed in a memorandum entitled
"Analysis of the power of the Communist Parties in France and Italy and of
measures to counter theme', dated "eptember 15, 1951, for the Director of
CIA and the Chairman of the Psychological Strategy Board, in which he stated
that: "..it should be a major point of American and of NATO policy to cripple
these Communist Parties, to uncover their true intentions, to sow discord in
their ranks and promote defection, to deprive them of privilege and respec-
tability, and to drive them underground" and that "a stepped up program of
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action might well be considered by the Psychological Strategy Board in
consultation with State, Defense, ECA and CIA, and then coordinated with
our Embassies in Paris and Rome."
5. Mr. Dulles' memo was reviewed by the Director of the Psychological
Strategy Board and his staff; and a determination was made that the psycho-
logical actions proposed in subject report were immediately feasible, potenti-
ally profitable and susceptible of direction toward an area of relatively
high priority for the application of psychological strategy. Terms of
Reference were prepared to insure that the project was an action program,
that plans for subsidiary actions would develop in the implementing depart-
ments and agencies and referred to PSB for review and information, and that
action priorities were established in the basic plan to insure coordinated
planning. At the PSB meeting on September 27, 1951, the Terms of Reference
were approved and a planning panel was established. The task of the panel
was to analyze the Dulles Report, to proceed with consideration of the
feasibility of the several programs for France and Italy recommended therein,
and to develop additional programs for the same purposes.
6. The exploration of this problem constituted a relatively new field
for U. S. policy makers since it dealt with U. S. activities aimed at in-
fluencing the internal affairs of another sovereign state. Hence the
development of the plans constituted unique advances in U..5. psychological
effort, insofar as they authorized the U. S. agencies to foster and initiate
activities within the two countries to reduce communist political prestige
and to wean political support away from local communist parties. In providing
that the French and Italian workers should be separated from communist-
dominated unions, and that French and Italian business men be influenced to
deal with non-communist unions, the plans likewise ventured upon new terrain
insofar as government policy was concerned.
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entat,r,
7. Soon after the approval of PSB D-14o by the Psychological Strategy
Board on February 21, 1952, committees were established in both Washington
and Paris for the purpose of coordinating the implementation of the plan.
Since that times there has been interchange of views between members of
the committees, both by personal visits and by exchange of progress reports
and other pertinent papers.*
8. Functioning of the Paris committee is the direct responsibility of
our Ambassador and, in addition to interdepartmental representatives, dis-
cussions are now participated in by the Chief of the MSA Mission to France
and the Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris Embassy. Pursuant to a directive
from the Joint Chiefs of Staffs a representative of the United States
Commander in-Chief, Europe, has been authorized to soon participate in the
discussions as requested by the Ambassador.
9. The Paris committee had indicated that the present form of coordination
is adequate, namely periodic written reviews and reports on the part of
Paris and Washington and informal exchanges of views between both as oppor-
tunities srie-e. We are in agreement that it would be advisable to establish
informal coordination between the Rome and Paris committees in the form of
periodic exchanges of views whenever occasions permit.
* The Washington Commit'cee has submitted to the Directors PSB, two progress
reports with regard to the implementation of the plan; one report was submitted
on May 8, 1952 and the second report was submitted on 7 August 1952. Copies
of these progress reports were forwarded to the Paris coordinating committee
for their comment and information4
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SZCURITY INFORMATION P.M D--114c/2
Top SEOM
-----..~- March 1953
II. CURItaT A SESSMENT OF PSB D-14c
A4 Comments
10. The Paris Committee has studied and discussed PSB D-1!ic at con-
siderable length and the members are basically in accord with the aims of
the program. However, in the light of the current situation in France,
it is their view that the paper seems more appropriate as a check list
for actions which may or, may not be practical at the moment for the
French Government to undertake rather than as a blueprint for specific
actions to be carried out at any given time by another government. With
regard to this; the Washington committee feels it appropriate to refer
to the resolution adopted by the Psychological Strategy Board on
February 21, 1952 which was made an integral part of PSB D-14c, That
resolution recites the Board's position and reads in part as follows:
'First, that the continued strength of the Communist move-
ment in France is a source of continued concern to the
United States, which must be made clear to the French Govern-
ment at every appropriate opportunity; second, that the
United States will make a determined effort to reduce this
strength through the courses of action set forth in PSB D-14c;
and third, that it is extremely desirable that French intentions
in this connection be ascertained,"
11. We are in agreement that the delicacy of the plan cannot be over-
emphasized. It is noted that the Paris Committee feels that in the
process of reasserting herself, France has become acutely Jealous of her
sovereignty and desirous of limiting United States interference in her
affairs; that the present French Government is fully conscious of the
dangers to France represented in the Communist Party; that the French
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March 5, 1953
Government is currently proceeding to deal vigorously,u-ith the problem
and in consequence it behooves the United States to keep discreetly in
the background. Since the advent of the Mayer Government, it has appeared
that it probably will be as actively anti-oommuniat as its predecessor.
The former Ministers of Justice, Interior and Defense have been retained;
Mayer himself had a strong anti,-communist record; and the Gaullists are
now cooperating with the Government. The Pinay campaign may even be
intensified.,
12. With regard to the present strength of the Communist Party, the
estimate contained in PSB D-14c is amended to reflect the fact that the
Party membership is now estimated as somewhat below 500,000. The Party
has apparently lost 50,000 card bearing members since June 1952 and a
recent informed estimate places the loss as high as 100?000. It is also
noted that Party strength has been affected adversely by the government's
action against it, as well as by the internal dissensions that have arisen
over the Marty_Tillon and Guingouin incidents.
136 With regard to sources of strength of the Communist Party, the analysis
of the sources of communist strength made in Section B of Paris Embassy
Despatch No. %950 of May 8, 1952 is referred to and incorporated herein by
reference. We are in agreement that in drawing up any program of anti-
communist ci.ction, the sources of communist strength should constantly be
borne in mind and that such action to be effective must be aimed at each of
these sources individually.
14. Concerning the oapahilities of the Party, it is noted that the Party's
major effect in wartime is its potential for disrupting, and in some cases
paralyzing, communications and power facilities through the sabotage action
of its technical experts placed in strategic positions. The present
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SECURITY INFORMATION PS B D-1 c/2
? TO SECRET
flnrch 5, 1953
capabilities of the Para-military force of the Party for conducting
guerrilla activity are not considered particularly great. It is believed
that barring a situation of panic produced by an actual Soviet invasion,
the Government would succeed in smashing attempts at guerrilla activity
on the part of any communist para-military force. Assuming that the
Party is capable of carrying out some para-military harassment, it is
believed that so long as France is not invaded, the government would be
capable of preventing serious guerrilla activity in wartime.
15. With reference to Paragraph 8 of PSB D-114c, referring to the wide-
spread disillusion of French workers with their government, their
employer-s attitudes, and even with their own trade unions, it is noted
that the price stabilization that the French Government has achieved
over the past 8 months and the accompanying restoration of confidence in
the French economy has considerably qualified, for the time being, the
arguments advanced for communist exploitation of economic and social
discontent. Such discontent is no longer widespread and the former
Pinay Government had enjoyed far more confidence than any other in recent
years.
16. Concerning the vulnerabilities of the Communist Party as referred
to in Paragraph 9 of D-14c, it is noted that at present no individual may
be legally removed from any post in the public service or national economy
by virtue of Communist Party membership. It has, however, been accepted
practice for sometime to transfer such persons to non-sensitive positions
by administrative action and the government is now considering a bill to
permit the direct removal of communist from government positions,
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TOP ----SBA March 5. 1953
17, The following addition to the terms of PSB D-14c is hereby &.ffected:
"Add to Group B, Paragraph B, 3(c): "Discretly encourage
and guide the explanation and rationalization of United
States East-West Trade policy to the French,"
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PSB D -Iltc/2
N'.dreh 5, 3.953
III. PROGRESS IN IMPLE ENTATION
A. Cur'ent 1\nti-Co nmunt st Act n in E__anrge
18. Over the past several months, great progress has been made along
the lines envisaged by P$B D-14o. Indications are that the Mayer Government
will be sympathetic to these objectives. The Pinay Government had succeeded
in effectively striking at some of the major sources of Communist Party
strength through two sets of legal proceedings against the communists and
through a concurrently and closely connected campaign to discredit the na-
tional loyalty of the Party. In addition, it had begun to dissipate fear
as a source of Communist Party strength and had laid. the basis for more
effective and extensive action against the Party and its network of organi.-
zations than has heretofore taken place?
19. The first set of legal proceedings is concerned with a plot against
the internal security of the State and is instituted against a hundred or so
of the communist "small-fry" who participated in the May 28 demonstrations.
The second set of legal proceedings is of exceptional importance and involves
charges of plotting against the s'21Ea: security of the State. Involved
are the Party's Acting Secretary General and four other politburo members,
as well as the Secretary General of the CGT and the leaders of the UJRF.
The Asserbly has been asked to waive the parliamentary immunity of the Party
leaders in question in order that they may be tried by military court for
directing an enterprise to demoralize the army and the nation.
20. To secure all possible evidence in recent months the government has
conducted three nation-wide raids on Party and front headquarters. As a
result of these and similar actions, the Party and its fronts now find them-
selves placed on the defensive to such an extent that they have had wholly
to renounce the violent tactics on which they had embarked late last spring,
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March 5, 1953
21. In addition to conducting a campaign to dissipate the national loyalty
of the Party, the government has partially dissipated the element of fear
as another source of Party strength internally by handling of the May riots
and externally by the build-up of Western defense capabilities through
NATO. Further, as part of a, program for more positive and extensive action
in the future, a bill is now under consideration by the Cabinet which would
eliminate communists from government posts. If the government wins its
case against the communist leaders, it will be possible for it to get
enacted a very effective bill and it will open the door to more fax--reaching
measures for reducing communist strength in France.
22. Certain, cautions, however, are to be noted particularly with the re-
signation of the Pinay Government and until we have a full realization of
future prospects of strong anti.-communist action by the Mayer Government.
Concurrently, there is always the danger that the economic situation may
not continue to improve, Further, the government's evidence against the
Communist Party may not be as solid as our Embassy has been assured in con-
fidence that it is. Also a refusal by the Assembly to lift the immunity
of the CP leaders may serve to discourage the government. Nevertheless,
the present anti-communist climate is the best since the war and the mea-
sures currently being taken againstthe communists will in all probability,
if pushed through to completion of even their present phases by the Meyer
Government, have lasting beneficial effect in weakening communist strength
in France?
B. -Note-s on Specific Actions Proposed by PSB D-14c
23. PSB D-14c proposed certain specific actions for general implementation
with the purpose of reducing communist strength and influence in France.
These actions have been reviewed by the Paris Embassy with notes of progress
which have been effected and the prospects for future accomplishment of our
objectives. Comments of the Paris Embassy are attached hereto as Annex A!
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I ar`ch '5 1953
TV. F~ COURSES OF ACTON
A, Actions by the F ench Goyvernment
24. With regard to priorities for implementing the specific courses
of action suggested in 11SB D-14c, bearing in mind the observations of the
Paris panel, together with the realization that suggested courses of action
are not mutually exclusive and progress should be made on all fronts insofar
as possible, it is felt that a general priority should be established for
those courses of action in the trade union field as outlined in Section V,
Part II, A, 1., of the plan.
25. The importance of communist influence over labor is fully appre-
ciated both by the Paris and Washington committees. It is noted that action
by the French Government in this field has been impeded by (1) the small de-
gree of unionization of French labor, and (2) the strength of the force
dividing it. It is further appreciated that success of the government's preser}t
campaign against the communist leaders, and particularly against the CGTRa
Secretary General Leap may well permit stronger action to be taken to weaken
CGT influence, It is in the light of this critical situation that every
effort should be made which, in the Judgment of the Embassy, can be
effectively made at the present time to cause French Government action to be
successful in reducing the strength of the communists in the trade union
field.
26. Although the CGT has gradually declined in membership over a
considerable pont3d'of time, it nevertheless, remains by far the largest
organized labor force, and its overall control of the labor field is still the
dominating influence.in the French trade union field. It still has a consider-
able hold on both official and unofficial machinery in the labor field, a
hold which was grabbed during the immediate post-war period and has never
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March 5, 1953
been relinquished. On the other hand, it is sufficient to refer to the
recent FO congress to see the divisions existing in the non-communist labor
movement. Neither the FO, the CFTC, nor the independents are united, and
it is apparent that none of them at this time is making much progress in
cutting down the strength of the CGT, nor in attaining the degree of
cooperation required for any semblance of an united anti-communist labor
front. In this regard, it is important to emphasize the desirability of
a direct attack on the CGT; in particul,-ir to strengthen the anti-communist
forces already existent within it and which have in the past refused to
support CGT actions when they have been essentially for a political purpose.
Therefore, in complete awareness of the notes of the Embassy with regard
to the suggested actions, it is concluded that a general priority for those.
projects related to the trade union field is justified.
2'7. As a secondary priority, there is agreement that those actions out-
lined in Section V. Part II, A, 2., "In the field of Government, including
legislative and Administrative" offer a most fertile field among the pro-
posals for action by the French Government. Accordingly, this is a vital
sphere in which to encourage certain general and specific efforts and it
is understood that, in so doing, we should not spoil the present picture of
the campaign as the result of French initiative.
28. It is felt that particularly in view of the accession to power of a
new government, it is desirable to make clear to the French Government
our continuing concern with the strength of the communist movement in
France. It is suggested, therefore, that the Embassy continue to utilize
any appropricte opportunity of approaching the French Government with a
view to encouraging implementation of the plan,
29. In the field of national defense, it is understood that the para-
mount considerations for both the French Government and the United States
Government will always be military rather than anti-communist. In additions
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with regard to Part III, Group B, there is agreement that a great need
exists in France for social reforms, rationalization of the economy, etc.,
in order to strike out the social and economic basis for communist attack,
Every effort should continue to be made to encourage industrial productivityp
improvement in labor management relations and enactment of a more equitable
tax structure. It is understood, however, that French military preparedness
is still our primary goal today and that many social aims must perforce be
deferred.
B. Actiionsby the United States Government
It is concluded that as a matter of general priority, the United
States Government should take all feasible action to accomplish the objec-
tives outlined in Section V, Part II, B, 1., "In the trade union field".
Thus, a parallel effort along the same general priority lines will be con-
ducted by both the United States and the French Governments.,
31. As a matter of secondary priority, it is considered that it is de-
sirable to pursue the objectives outlined in Section V, Part II, B, 3.,
"In the Field of Public Opinion". It is clear that every effort should
be made to carry out our information program as subtly and discreetly as
possible. Every attempt should be made to eliminate or mitigate the im-
pression of the size of the American information program and organization
in France and to concentrate on cooperative efforts with the French, such
as the Paix et Liberte and non-attributable activities rather than
increase the dissemination of propaganda and informational materials under
official American auspices.
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32. As appropriate, active consideration should be given to the
accomplishment of all suggested activities outlined under Part III, Group B,
B, "Activities by the United States Government". While considerable United
States Government action has alre..dy been taken within the general frame of
reference outlined by these suggested actions,-there nevertheless remains a
great deal of work to be accomplished. It would seem most appropriate for the
Washington committee to have prepared detailed comtnents and proposals for the
purpose of implementing the objectives set forth in this section of the plan.
p__
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO?'U NDATIONS
__AQ_ _Conclusions`
33. The French Communist Party continued throughout 1952 to con-
tract in size and to display the same lack of dynamism that has charac-
terized it to an ever increasing extent during the past four yearse
Membership in the Party is now estimated at around 450,000, amounti; to a
50 percent decline in over-all membership since 1946, The electoral
strength of the communists, however) continues to run at about 5,;000,000
out of a total of 19,000,000 votes cast in all postwar national elections.
3L. At no time during 1952 did the Party reveal any capacity for
rallying non-communist. support to such an extent as to influence govern-
ment policy, Signs of a split in the Party hierarchy became evident with
the purge of Marty and Tillon and in September the Party line became a
"Uz5ited National Front" policy. The French Communists are apparently
striving to create a united front with all elements of the population
on the basis of a program of "peace, national independence,, and democratic
liberties",
35, In spite of its decline in 1952, the French Communist apparatus
will remain for the foreseeable future a powerful and dangerous factor
for French security and therefore for our own within the NATO framework.
The CPF is one of the World's largest Communist parties outside the Soviet
Bloc, In France, itself, it is still a major political party, an important
power in the trade union movement, and a huge propaganda machine.
36. After nearly a year of preliminary activity organizational
measures for the full implementation of PSB D-14o, "Psychological Opera-
tions Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France", are close to
crystallization. Committees are currently functioning in Paris and
Washington on a regular basis and it is anticipated that future considera-
tion by these committees of proposed specific activities to be carried out
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in Paris and Washington will be productive of further actions to reduce
communist strength and influence. It is noted that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have directed the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. European Command
(USCINCEUR) to provide, insofar as is consistent with his primary respons-
ibilities, full cooperation and all appropriate support to the U. S,
Ambassadors to Franc and Italy in implementation of these plans, to
include, if requested, appointment of a military officer to represent him
on each of the advisory panels expected to be established in Paris and
Rome, It is hoped that the Paris Committbb'.will avail itself of military
aid and assistance at its earliest opportunity, thus completing the
arrangements for coordinating the implementation of P5B D-14c.
37. It is believed that, upon such arrangements having been com-
pleted, the present form of coordination will be adequate, namely,, periodic
written reviews and reports on the part of Paris and Washington and
informal exchanges of views by both as opportunities arise. It is antic-
ipated that informal coordination will be established between the Rome
and Paris panels in the form of periodic exchanges of views whenever
occasions permit.
B. Recommendations
It is recommended that:
38, This report be forwarded by the Director to the members of the
Psychological Strategy Board to be noted;
39. That the committees in both Washington and Paris prepare or
cause to be prepared detailed operational plans and measures for the pur-
pose of accomplishing the objectives in the order of general priority
indicated in this report for the first six months of 1953.
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T9P,,SECRFT PSB D -14c/?
March 5, 1953
A. Actions bv the French Goverment
1. In the Trade Union Field
a So interpret or, if necessary, amend the law in order to limit
trade union representation to those unions which are genuinely
non-c onmiuni a t .
Comment: To amend the law in order to limit trade union
representation solely to non-communist unions does not seem
feasible as yet. Unless the x'4t3i?i5k> were able to show
very convincing reasons for such a measure, it would appear to
Labor and to a large strata of the public as an unnecessarily
discriminatory and drastio measure and could not count on the
support of the Socialists and MRP. If the Government.'s indictment
of CGT Secretary General Le Leap can succeed in producing enough
evidence of a sensational nature to brand the CGT as a tool
for Soviet designs, then such a step could be taken. The
Embassy will accordingly endeavor to encourage such action,
if and when appropriate.
ba Eliminate direct and indirect subsidy of the CGT as found in
such special privilege situations as free rent for headquarters,
reduced transportation charges, etc.
Stop the indirect subsidy of communist trade union officials who
are paid by both the national and local governments.,-:nd by public
and private industry,
d& Eliminate communist control over plant committees, hiring halls,
and curtail communists' rights to sit with various public and
semi-public agencies.
Comment on,b, cL,.andd: For some time now the P`rench Government
has been slowly and quietly eliminating various forms of sub-
sidies to the CGT and its officials. By using the "artichoke-
leaf" technique, various CGT offices have from time to time been
required to leave public buildings, and. payments to many communist
trade union officials have been gradually stopped, especially
in national industries. Steps are also being currently taken
to try to eliminate communist control over plant committees,
hiring halls, etc. The actions covered in b, c, and d are closely
connected with the problem of eliminating communist trade union
representation, and therefore if this is dealt with, progress
under b, c, and d would be accelerated.
e.. Support and assist the development and unification of the free
trade union movement.
Comment: There are ways whereby the French Government can be
of assistance to the free trade unions, and wherever possible
the Embassy will continue to encourage such actions. However,
it in difficult for the French Government--much less, a Right-
wing government-to take an active role in trying to bring about
the unification of free trade unions. Apart from the obstacle
of the Church's interest in the maintenance of a solely Catholic
union, the unions would resent any such interference by the
Government in their affairs--much as the AFL and the 010 would
oppose similar intereference by the United States Government.
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TOP SECRET PSB D-?14c/2
March 5, 1953
f,,,, Persuade employers in those plants where vigorous non-
communist nuclei exist to stop dealing, negotiating and en-
tering into collective bargaining agreements with communist
unions, and to deal exclusively with non-communist unions.
Comnpxi : For the past two years it has been the policy of
organized industry to endeavor to deal, to the extent
legally possible, solely with non-communist unions,
g& Persuade employers to stop paying tribute to the Communist
Party
Con7,mrnt It is believed that in recent yeers there have
been px?ogr. essi ely fewer instances of employers paying
tribute to the Communist Panty, than during the years
imnedl atel.y following the war. However, whether or not
indusirialists feel the need to take out reinsurance depends
prxm.:irily on developments in the international scene and on
the state of internal security in France.
2. In the Field of Government including Legislation and Administrations
a Accelerate the elimination of communist influence in govern-
ment and autonomous agencies in the fields of defense,
internal security, informations motion pictures, national
education and national economy, and deprive communists of the
use of municipal facilities.
Comment Elimination of communist influence in the govern-
ment end autonomous agencies in all fields is of primary
importance. Much progress has been made, but there is still
room for improvement, The technique used by the government
until now has consisted of discreet and gradual removal of
suspect officials from sensitive posts, supplemented by
more drastic action when provocation aroso. Steps were
taken, for example, to cleanse the Atomic Energy Commissariat,
although more could be done on the lower staff levels; sus-
pect, officers have been retired from active military service;
the Paris and Toulon police forces were recently cleaned up;
and the Government has cracked down on local communist
mayor; where possible,,,
Stronger and more systematic action is in order and in fact
being taken. The governm nt's recent campaign against
communist leadership as tasonsble and Minister of Interior
Brunets attacks on the Communist Party as "foreign" have
lad a basis for more effective action along these lines
than heretofore feasible against the Party, in view of
the prevailing theory that it was jut another French politi-
cal party0 We are reliably informed furthermore that
extensive security checks are now being conducted throughout
the French civil service to identify the political undesirables,
Finally, on November 19, the Ministers of Justice and Interior
presented to the Cabinet a bill providing for the removal
from government posts of members of the Communist Party and
front organizations, There is every indication, therefore,
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FSB D-11tc/2
March 5, 1953
that the government is now Coing forward with extensive
measures aimed against communists in strategic posts, and
that no encouragement on this score is needed.
In public affairs and cultural matters, some progress has
been made, but this has bd.en handicapped by deeply-rooted
hostility to cay government interference in these realms.
E,adi.o programs have lately been far more pro-American and
anti-communist than heretofore--the recent Presidential
elections in the United States, for example, were very
thoroughly covered and favorably reported by French news
broadcasts. In motion pictures, especially news reels,
the situation has been lest favorable, but there is also
evidence of progress An, this field. In the realm of
national education, the some is true--two communist
teachers were suspended on August 17, 1952.. Nevertheless,
in tho race of widely-held suspicion towards government
interference in cultural affairs, it is difficult to
removes without very Food cause, pro-communist professors
and teachers, many of whom had obtained their university
and school posts immediately following the Liberation.
It is not known whether the new bill to bar communists
from holding government posts would apply to the radio,
universities, etc,, although there are indications that
it may.
b Fully implement decree of September 30, 1950 calling for
reorganization of the internal security system to cope with
communist action in the event of emergency.
Cosiannt With regard to implementation of the September
30, 1950 decree calling for reorganization of the internal
security system apparently no action hasbeen token as yet
on creating a territorial guard, although the gendarmerie
provisions including an increased number of units and
assignment of auxiliary personnel for imr ediate mobilization
have been largely completed. The :unbassy will, therefore,
encourage the full implementation of the decree as it seems
appropriate and practicable within French budgetary limits,
es, Amend the rules to reduce parliamentary immunity for extra-
parliamentary communist activity,
Comment: To amend the rules of parliamentary immunity would
require amendment of the Constitution, and it is doubtful
that the Socialists aind the MRP would support such a step
at this time. In any case, consideration of this is pre-
mature until the Parliamentary Immunities Committee of the
Assembly has rendered a decision on the government's request
now pending for waiver of Immunity on five communist deputies.
If the waiver is granted, a precedent will have been estab-
lished which should serve as an effective deterrent to the
activities of the other communist parliamentarians in the
future. Attention should also be drawn to the fact that the
recent law requiring appointment of legally responsible co-
directors to all newspapers whose directors are covered by
parliamentary immunity has served to offset some of the
advantages deriving to the communists from parliamentary
immunity?
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TCIP
March' 5, 1953
d. Take action to preclude communists from administering
social welfare benefits.
Comment: It is understood that a new Social Security bill
is now under consideration that would do much towards
preventing election of CGT officials to posts administering
social welfare benefits and would provide stronger State
control over expenditures by elected officials.
Make further revisions in the electoral laws to diminish
Communist Party representation in all levels of government.
Comment : The previous French Parliament made definite
pr. ogress in revising the electoral law in order to reduce
Communist Party representation in parliament. This was
clearly demonstrated in the 1951 elections when, owing pri-
manni.ly to the workings of the electoral law, the Communist
Party, despite receiving more votes (5 million total) than
any other party, gained only 101 seats in Parliament-,-that is,
less than the Socialist Party, for example, with 2.7 million
votes and 106 seats. To attempt to reduce artifice;lly
communist representation fur'h.er would risk meeting with con-
k
ely
siderable opposition at present. In any case, it is unli
that further national elections will be held much before 1956.
Strengthen and enforce legislation on defamation..
Comment: Existing legislation on defamation seems generally
aderuete and is now t6i:gig enforced. Several instances have
recently occurred where communist editors have been success-
fully prosecuted for libel.
Accelerate selective deportation of foreign communists
remaining in France.
Com7,~,ent' The expulsion of 28C foreign communists in
more da,nnyprous foreign communists ree:i.drng in France by
removing most of. such. elements with paramilitary training.,
h Develop harrassing action against French affiliates of
international cor iznist organizations and fronts.
Compjenty The government has done much since May, 1952 towards
harrassing the French affiliates of those international com-
munist organizations and fronts (World Federation of Trade
Unions, International Democratic Federation of Women,
Federation of Democratic Youth, and World Peace Movement)
whose headquarters in France it had dissolved in 1951. The
Panay Government had arrested top leaders of the communist
youth front, the UTJIRF, as well as the CGT Secretary General,
and it has conducted repeated searches of communist and
leading communist front headquarters.
Continue to control French communist and communist front
mass demonstrations.
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TOP ST{.CRFT P513 D -liic/2
March 5, 1953
Comment:: There is every indication that the government
intends to continue effective control of French communist and
front mass demonstrations. The government's handling of the
May riots and subsequent arrests gave striking emphasis to
its intentions and capabilities in this field:
Curtail availability to communists and communist-front press
of newsprint and press equipment, controlled or subsidized
by government agenci.e s.
Comment: The government has already taken steps to handicap
the-communist press. Direct action to curtail the avail-
ability of ne*h sp:t int to which the communist press has at
present a legal right, would not seem feasible yet. An amend-
ment of present legislation however inight be envisaged in the
event the current legal action against the Party leadership
proves successful and creates a climate of opinion favorable
to more di scriminf.tary steps.
Harass and restrict sale and distribution of Soviet and
Cominform publications
.
Comment s The government has prohibited the sale of leading
Soviet periodicals and Coni:nform publications are no longer
allowed to be distributed in France. However, action is still
required against Paix at Democra.tie, a French Communist
publication which reproduces most of the articles from the
Cominform Journal.
In the field of national defense,
Strengthen and improve enforcement of existing legislation
on military security and sabotage.
Comil7ent: Progress has been me.,-3.e with regard to strengthening
and enforcing legislation on military security and sabotage.
Mention should be made in this connection of the State
Security law of March, 1950 which resulted in the arrest and
Imprisonment of such communist anti-militarist agitators as
Henri Martin and Raymonde Dien among others, and the govern.
ment's decree of July 11, 1952 making military security laws
applicable to acts committed in France against NATO member
nations,,
Continue and develop the use of shipping and port facilities
for goods procured in dollar areas under MSA programs in a
manner militating against coiamuni st strength by excluding as
far as practicable:
i. Communist union participation as such.
ii. Employment of comziiuni sts a
iii. Accrual of other benefits to communists.
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Cow-,: Effective French Government control over the use
of shipping and port facilities for goods procured in dollar
areas is difficult in view of the fact that they are largely
private shipments whose handling is determined mostly by
economic considerations.
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Use, in a manner militating against comaunist strength, the
potential evailt::ble in:
3. The French military program (location of installations,
a'ocurement, construction, and contracting for services).
ii. The French undertakings for construction and for provision
for services under NATO infrastructure programs.
Comment: While military considerations are naturally-
paramount in governing French decisions with regard to their
military program, the Embassy will encourage whenever possible
the exploitation of this field to the corrmiunistst detriments
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SECURITY INFORMATION P$B3:D-1 c/2
T 0 P tLhC E' Mnroh 5y 1953
Actions by the United States Government
1. In the Trade Union Field
a.
Encourage and support programs to destroy communist control
in French trade unions; support and assist the development
and unification of the free trade-union movement through
all available means,
t.. Comment: The Embassy will continue to assist wherever
possible the free trade..uni.cns. Much of the activity
indicated properly comes within the bailiwick of the AFL
and the CIO, and the representatives in France of 'both are
energetics, however, French labor is presently so sharply
divided and so sensitive to American interference in its
affairs that action in this sphere comes very close to being
counter-productive.
b.
As appropriate, create difficulties for French seamen who
are members of communist unions to take shore leave in
U.. S. ports.
Comment: Creation of difficulties in U. S, ports for French
seamen belonging to communist unions might only serve to
strengthen procommunist tendencies in many who at present
belong to the communist unions solely for economic reasons
and might also result in resentment in Franca, without
actually inducing the seamen to,abandon the communist unions
or restricting the activities of genuine communist couriers.
Influence the French Catholic Trade Unions to cease cooperat-
ing with the communist unions and unite with the other non-
communist unions in France.
Comment: Comments made under paragraph a., above would also
apply to the proposition of trying to influence the French
Catholic trade unions to cease cooperating with communist
unions and unite with the other non-communist unions. More-
over, the Catholic Church's natural diffidence to unification
with Socialist unions. is a factor not to be underestimated.
It should,.however, be stated in this connection that the
non-communist unions generally cooperate with each other on
most political issues; it is the necessity of having to be
competitive with the communist unions on economic demands that
often forces Catholic trade unions to cooperate with the
communist unions,
ds Discreetly promote and if necessary subsidize private cam-
paign of gift packages (CARE type) to poorest elements of
population.
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ANNEX A
PSB D -14c/2
March 5, 1953
Comment: 1,13A continues to subsidize the transport of gift
packages to France, but promotion of, gift campaigns no
longer seems feasible--barring occasions of national
disasters, such as floods, etc,,--owing to current budget-
ary limitations and growing American hostility to "hand-
outs" to Europe and especially to France. Howeveri
sponsoring of local charity organizations and similar local
activities on the part of American troops.. stationed in
French towns, as envisaged under paragraph 3 b.i. (page 22)
of i'SB D-114/c, would be effective and is now being encouraged..
2. In the Political Field
Encourage deviationism within the French Comr:iuni.st Party
and the COT.
Comment; The French Government has reportedly given some
dj street assist ante to the n .tional ~eviationjst Independent
Communist Movement, ti
'urtt r' innformation in
this connection may be furnished by the CIA in Washington,
3. In the Field of Public Opinion
Intensify discreet efforts to discredit communist-front and
communist-dominated propaganda and political organizations.
be Work with anti-communist pressure groups., particularly those
of youth, agriculture, labor, veterans, women and religion
to build public support for France's ailitary, economic and
political position as a member of NATO and a unified Europe.
Comment on a,, and be: Both discrediting communist propaganda,
cot,au_rist end t;.rontt+organizations and the positive side of
building up public support for Frances position in NATO
are absolutely essential and represent fertile fields which
the Embassy will continue actively to exploit,
!t, In the Field of Communist Income Sources
a. Discredit French business firms which maintain illegal trade
relations with the Soviet Bloc.
Comment: The Embassy will continue to report the names of
French business firms known to be trading illegally with the
Soviet Bloc, although it must be recognized that such trade
in itself carries little stigma here.
be Identify and discredit communist-owned concerns which cater
to American tourist trade,
Comment: The Embassy will endeavor to identify and discredit
any communist-owned concerns which cater to American tourist
t?T:;: ~.&r.y but no such concerns are known to the Embassy at present.
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a.
bn
In the field of National Defense
ANNEX A
PSB D-14p/2
March 5, 1953
Select where practicable sites for U. 5, military instal-
lations in a manner which will (1) deprive communists of
benefits thereof, provide these benefits to non-communist
communities or organizations, thus encouraging desertions
from the Communist Party, and (2) minimize the propaganda
potential of the installations to the communists,
As far as practicable regulate procurement of equipment,
materials, and service (either by the U. S. service commands
or in connection with NSA programs) and construction programs
by the service commands, so as to eliminate) or minimize.
i. Communist union participation,
ii. Employment of communists,
iii. Accrual of other benefits to communists,
c. As far as practicable influence selection of ports and port
facilities for military-aid cargoes in such a manner as to
discriminate against communist-dominated unions and areas
and to strengthen the nori-communists*
d.
As far as practicable program armed services activities such
as fleet visits, so that in addition to the psychological
purposes served, financial benefits to the local population
accrue to non-communists.
Comment on a, b d d.: In view of primary military
considerations involved, it is doubtful that the selection
of sites for installations, procurement and construction
programs, selection of ports for military.-aid cargoes, fleet
visits, etc., can be based to any large extent upon the
communist factor,. However, the possible usefulness of decisions
in this field in reducing communist influence shall be kept
in mind,
As necessary, continue U. S. demonstrations of Western strength
of purpose and military capabilities, by fleet visits, aerial
shows, etc,
Comment on e,: It is felt that U. S. demonstrations of
strength would at present be counter-productive, On the
other hand, the Embassy will continue to encourage demonstra-
tions of French military strength.
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