STAFF STUDY - PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLANNING FOR WESTERN EUROPE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300050047-9
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• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: January 15, 1953
• Content Type: STUDY

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DOC. N DATE
Jan. 15,195:
COPY NO. 4l}
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington
STAFF STUDY - PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLANNING FOR WESTERN EUROPE
(THIS IS AN APPROVED PAPER)
NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION. 9/19/07
WARN ING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the'
United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,.Sec-
tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
January 1.5, 1953
STAI'F STUDY -- PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLANNING FOR WI STERN
EUROPE
The recommendations contained in this staff study were
approved by the Board at its Seventeenth Meeting, January 15,
1953.
Charles F. John
Secretary to the(B/ard
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IVIV ,'ar~uary 15, 1953
PSYCHOLOGICAL , S'TR,&TEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON,, D. Co
memorandum of January 12, 1953
F?.' ?I)RANDUM FC R: THE HONORABLE DAVID BRUCE
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: Staff Stud v, on Western
I. The attached staff study on an impor t aspect of psychological
strategy planning for Western Europe is submitted for informa-
tion and approval of the re comnendat ons paragraphs 5 and 6) ,,
2, The aim of the present study has been to analyze the approved
national policy objectives, to make a preliminary assessment of U.S..
psychological capabilities in the target area, together with the limiting
factors operative therein, and to formulate a meaningful psychological
objective. While some of the basic psychological problems which confront
the United States in Western Europe have been identified, the ways and
means by which such problems can be resolved have not been set forth.
This latter task will of course become the principal concern of the
planners once the recommendations have been approved by the Board.
3. In this context, the Board may wish to note that current intelli-
gence indicates that anti--American attitudes and sentiments in Western
Europe continue to develop at a rapid rate and are already hampering the
achievement of U.S, security objectives. Hence the preparation of a
psychological strategy plan designed to reduce Western &u-opeaaa antagonisms
to the United States and its purposes, should be considered a matter of
priority.
/s/ Alan G. Kirk
Director
Similar memos, sent tos
The Hon. William C. Foster
Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Walter B, Smith
Director of CIA
Brig. Gen. Millard C.: Young, USAF
Chief, JSPD, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Hon. 14. A. Harriman
Director for Mutual Security
85198::
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON!, D. C.
January 15, 1953
STAFF STUDY - PSYCHO OGICAL STRATEGY PLANNING FOR WESTERN EUROPE
PROBLEM
1. To determine the requirements of psychological strategy planning
with respect to the achievement of national objectives in Western Europe.
ANALYSIS
2. See Annex.
M14M USIONS
3. United States psychological operations in Western Europe have not
succeeded in reducing the growth of anti-American sentiments and attitudes
but in fact may have unwittingly been contributing to them by too strong
overt pressures.
4. Consideration of the sharp stresses and strains within the NATO
alliance, in the light of Soviet capabilities to capitalize on such strains
to the jeopardy of approved U.S. policy goals, indicates that in order to
attain progress towards the reduction of Soviet power and influence in Europe,
ways and means must be developed to increase the effectiveness of psycho-
logical operations aimed at the reduction of Western European antagonism to
the United States and its purposes.
RECOMMENDATIONS
5. That the analysis and conclusions be noted.
6. That the Director be authorized to undertake the preparation of a
psychological strategy plan for Western Europe with the objective of devising
effective ways and means of reducing Western European antagonisms to,and
achieving support for the United States and the U.S. national purposes,
Annex - Analysis of
Planning Tasks for
Wbst?'n Europe.
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P SEC I.E
ANNEX to
January ll..'1953
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1. A inroved National Policy
A survey of approved national policy objectives with respect to
Western Europe reveals the following explicit statement of urgent national
security goals. These guiding points have been selected with due regard
to the fact that in Europe the reduction of Soviet power and influence
continues to have over-riding priority in the employment of our psycho-
logical capabilities.
(a) to intensify and to accelerate the growth of confidence in
and among the peoples and the governments of the free world,
especially Western Europe .Ua in their capability to success-
fully deter aggression of Soviet communism., or to defeat it
should it nevertheless occur, and to inspire concrete inter-
national, national and individual action accordingly,, (Excerpt
from NSC 11.4/2, "Objectives and Programs for National Security",
October 18, 1951).
(b) The United States should ..* conduct, with groat vigor,
political warfare operations as an integral part of its over-
all strategy, in order to reduce communist and neutralist Ia.,-
fluence, combat anti-American propaganda, and create stronger
support for the purposes of United States foreign policy n..
(Excerpt from NSC 135/3, "Reappraisal of United States Objec-
tives and Strategy for National Security", September 25, 1952).
(c) The United States should undertake systematically and con-
sistently a program of clarifying to *.# peoples of the free
world, the complex problems of the free world In meeting the
Soviet threat, the nature of that threat, the strength and
resources the free world possesses to meet that threat, and to
the extent possible the reasoning behind the general lines of
policy and action described herein, in order to secure that public
understanding and support which is essential to the success of
our policies and actions. (Ibid,)
(d) Outside the Soviet orbit there exists a need for increased and
more selective political warfare operations by the United
States and its allies to combats
(1) The threat of local communist parties, which
remains serious although the United States and
its allies have demonstrated the ability to
weaken communist organizations and reduce the
communist potential for revolution and sabotage,
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(2) U.S.S.R. propaganda directed with particular force
against the United States.
(3) in many parts of the world, distrust of the United
States which weakens affirmative support for the
purposes of the United States, (Ibid.)
(e) .,, to further encourage the economic unification and the
political federation of Europe. (Excerpt from Section 101 (a),
The Mutual Security Act of 1951).
(f)
In the long run, satisfactory progress in.terms of an increased
measure of Continental European integration can only be secured
within the broader framework of the North Atlantic Community ...
(NSC 115, "Definition of United States Problems of the Defense
of Europe and the German Contribution .,.", August 1, 1951).
2. Assumptions.
U.S. psychological strategy for Western Europe should be based on
the premise that the following assumptions are valid during 1953 and 1954.
If events should invalidate them, a re-examination of U.S, policies and
programs in the area.may be expected.
(a) The U.S.S.R. will neither initiate overt military aggression in
Western Europe nor make any major move to decrease tensions by settlement
of the German or Austrian questions, or other pending issues. The U.S.S.R.
will continue its political warfare tactics designed to undermine European
strength and unity and split the Western allies. In particular there is
likely to be increased Soviet harassment of West Berlin, though probably
not to the extent of a renewed blockader
(b) The French and Italian communist parties, although slowly declining
in strength, will remain a major social and political force, with substan-.
tial propaganda, subversive, and sabotage capabilities,
(c) While pro-U,S. coalition governments will continue to hold
office in the major continental countries, their capabilities for firm and
vigorous action to deal with major political, economic, and rearmament
problems will remain limited. They will also be reluctant to take any
actions which appear to increase the risks of general war.
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(d) There will be no major economic depression in the Western world
during the time-span envisioned in this plant. On the other hand,, Western
Europe's economic recovery will remain precarious?
3. Estimate of U.S. Psychological Capabilities
In Western Europe, the following capabilities already exist, or
should be developedt
(a) United States Department of State representatives to the European
Governments., including those responsible for the Depertmentts Cultural
Affairs and Information programs, and the U.S. Special Representative to
Europe, will continue to be in a position to influence the nation-states by
direct representation and will also be able to have some indirect influence
on Western European Government officials and the public at large through
professional and social contacts.
(b) United States Department of State representatives to such multi-
national, and supranational organizations as the North Atlantic Council, the
Council of Europe, the emerging European Political Community (Coal and Steel
Community and the European Defense Community) will have a capability for
influencing European official and private attitudes.
(c) Members of official United States economic and military missions
to Western European Governments and to such multinational organizations,
as SHAPE. 4EECy. etc., will also possess a capability for influencing official
and public attitudes and actions.
(d) United States military forces and their dependents stationed in
Europe in fulfilment of United States security pledges to NATO constitute
an important medium for conveying an impression of the United States and
its purposes to the European peoples.,
(e) The policies and administration of United States military aid and
defense support programs in Western Europe, carried out by the Mutual
Security Ag?ncy$ can achieve a significant impact on United States
qr;r,
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January 15, 1953
psychological strategy for Western Europe and should be conceived and
directed with this in mind.
(f) Other United States capabilities vis,-a.-vis Western Europe
which have a direct bearing on reducing anti-American attitudes are:
(1) U.S. members of international opinion-forming groups.
(2) U.S* labor union representatives to foreign and inter-
national free-trade unions.
(3) U.S. business representatives with interests abroad.
(4) U.S. citizens engaged in commercial international mass-
4ommunications.
(5) U.S. tourists travelling in organized tours under travel
agency direction and counsel.
(6) Foreign nationals whose friendly orientation stems in
part from visits to the United States under government-
sponsored programs (e.g. productivity teams, exchange
students, MDAP training programs, etc*)
(g) Additionally, the United States has a capability for influencing
European opinion climate through (1) appropriate consultations and ex-
change of views, etc., with the appropriate representatives of the mass,.
media facilities in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, the
Vatican, and Spain, and (2) similar consultations and exchanges of views
and, to the extent practicable, participation in and support of the in.
formation program of NATIS, the Council of Earope, OEEC, and the emerging
European Political Community.
4. Adverse Factors
Despite the significant capabilities. indicated above, progress
towards achieving the United States security goals cited in paragraph 2
is being adversely affected by the following factors operating in the
target areat
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(a) Resentments occasioned by the massive intervention of the United
States in the domestic affairs of the several states, particularly
resentments aroused by too strong overt pressures. Some European observers
have c?n.1uded that "most frictions are not caused by policies of the U.S.
Government but by ill-conceived and loud opinions spread through the media
of mass communications."
(b) The reluctance of Continental countries to assume rearmament
burdens due to a lack of clear agreement with the United States as to the
nature of the Soviet threat.
(c) The continuing sense among certain economic interests that there
is little to gain and much to lose from unification of Europe.
(d) The fear of war which although lessening is still present in the
minds of many Western Europeans and is equated with defeat and occupation,
(e) The continuance of neutralist attitudes toward the United States,
including hostile attitudes toward any visible evidence of U.S. hegemony
in Europe,, stemming from a conclusion on the part of many Europeans who
tend to consider U.S. foreign policy as beneficial solely to the United
States and therefore Inimical to Europe.
(f) The Communist Party apparatus in France and Italy and neo-Nazi
and other Right radical movements in major Continental countries, which are
an endemic source of anti-American propaganda.
(g) Benefactor-beneficiary relationships between the United States
and its European allies together with the operations of U.S. East-WWJest
trade policies which provide neutralist and communist propaganda with oppor-
tunities to claim that the United States is "satellizing" the nations of
Europe.
(h) Colonial area problems in which anti-U.S, attitudes in Continental
Europe are intensified'by a misunderstanding of the role of the United
States in pressing for new political and economic measures in certain
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colonial areas,
(i) The manner in which our psychological operations have been em-
ployed to deal with these factors;, %O ich romats in. tho fc3 V-
(1) Europeans recognize that the strategic initiative in the
West lies inevitably with the United States. They feel
impotent to initiate basic strategy in the East-West conflict.
(2) However, both because they are resigned to U.S. leadership
as a condition of their survival and because they fear
that U.S. strategy without their cooperation would be less
acceptable than it is now, they have applied themselves to
the military defense effort which the United States has
urged upon them,
(3) Nevertheless sharp differences in judgment concerning the
amount and kinds of strength necessary to act as an
effective deterrent to the Soviet Union continue to exist
between the Europeans and ourselves? Significant European
opinion groups hold that the Soviet Union has no intention
of risking a major war in the near future, that it will
risk war only as an act of final desperation, or that a
greater danger of Soviet aggression lies in political,
economic or ideological warfare. Essentially these
Europeans tend to believe that the United States has over-
estimated the military threat and under-estimated the non-
military threat. They are therefore reluctant to support,
rearmament of the magnitude that we recommend or with the
urgency that we recommend because of the presumed set-
back to the development of their economic and social
resources.
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(5)
January is, l953
This experience of being obliged to make a strenuous
efforts at the expense of private values they cherish,,
without conviction as to the likelihood of success, and
without the power to alter basic strategy, sets up serious
frustrations which are inevitably directed against the
initiating power.-the United States.
As a result, generalized European dissatisfaction with the
state of the world, and a growing tendency in some quarters
to regard the cause of anti-communism as purely American
rather than a matter of utmost concern to Europeans, are
markedly present, and U.S, psychological operations designed
to achieve the national security goals set forth in
paragraph 2 are being conducted in an unfavorable climate
of anti-American attitudes and sentiments,
5. Sov opt Cam, abiliteu and Possible Course
g,S o Action
In addition to the purely European factors examined in the fore-
going paragraphs, the problem is further complicated by the existence of
Soviet capabilities which are being, or can be utilized, to intensify anti-
American attitudes and reduce the effectiveness of U.S. operations, through
such progrcrs &a.
(a) The "Hate -Anericall campaign which impugns the moral purposes
of the United States and attempts to isolate the United States from the
rest of the world.
(b) The peace campaign which attempts to hamper rearmament, divide the
United States from Europe, impose moral sanctions against the use of ultra-
destructive weapons,and prepare a basis for future war-guilt accusations.
(c) The "Neutralist" campaign which, capitalizing on the desire of
European nations to gain their traditional initiative in world affairs
attempts to weaken adherence to NATO obligations.
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(d) Campaigns of opportunity based on current strains in Korea,
Indochina? and colonial areas, designed to split the United States from
its Western Allies.
(e) Fear campaigns based on predictions of a disastrous economic
slump in the free world, touched off by a recession in the United States3
and the raising of the spectre of war within the capitalist world.
6. Concluso?ps
(a) Pertinent evidence makes clear that U.S. psychological opera-
tions in Western Europe have not succeed pd in reducing the growth of anti-
American sentiments and attitudes but, in fact, may have unwittingly been
contributing to them by too strong overt pressures. As a result, communists
have often managed to identify measures designed to strengthen the Atlantic
Community with U.S* interests, thereby putting unstable & opern Govern-
ments on the defensive and forcing them to deny accusations of U.S. domi-
nation. In the present context. ULS. pressures upon the Europeans to
strive for goals which they feel, are not vitally their own results in a
negative morale effect, and all U.S. Government propaganda in ope suffers
a loss of effectiveness. In sum, a situation has been created in which our
overt psychological operations have evidenced a gradually diminishing
leverage on Uestern European minds, indicating that new ways and means must
be developed to make such operations more effective.
(b) Sharp stresses and str4,ins within the rXiO alliance, in the light
of Soviet capabilities to capitalize upon such strains to the jeopardy of
approved U.S. policy --,goals, indicate that in order to attain progress
towards the reduction of Soviet power and influence in Europe, the reduction
of Western European antagonisms to the United States and its purposes
should be considered a key objective of our psychological strategy.
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die pc?mmer~dation
It is recommended that the Psychologic l Strategy Board:
(a) Note the foregoing preliminary analysis and conclusionsa
(b) Authorize the Director to undertake the preparation of a psycho-
logical strategy plan for Western Europe with the objective of devising
effective ways and means of reducing Western European antagonisms to.. and
achieving support for$ the United States and the U.S. national purposes,
8588.;
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