PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATIONS FOR STALIN'S PASSING FROM POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070031-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 11, 2002
Sequence Number:
31
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 22, 1952
Content Type:
PAPER
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80-01065A000300070031-4.pdf | 233.51 KB |
Body:
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I. THE PROBLEM
1. To review US policy and recommend all possible preparations
consistent with such policy for the initial psychological exploitation
of the situation created within the Soviet communist orbit by the
death of Stalin.
II. HISTORY
2. The problem above stated was first made subject of formal
State Department and CIA study and planning as the result of the Scott
3. Following the State Department study, "Death in the Family,"
it was informally agreed that the State Department would make no
comment on the death of Stalin and that CIA would exploit that situation
as effectively as possible by covert means.
4. In accordance with this understanding, plan CANCELLATION
was prepared and tentatively approved in draft by CIA and the Department
of State.
5. However, no implementing orders were issued and requests
for supporting intelligence were addressed to IAC and OIR.
6. In July, 1951, there having been no further action on
CANCELLATION, a crash plan (LEGACY) to exploit Stalin's death without
the build-up of capabilities as set forth in CANCELLATION, was prepared
by the Strategic Plant' Division.
7. During the ensuing months CANCELLATION and LEGACY were the
subject, study, comment, and controversy of amateur modification and
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much profitless talk by many activities within CIA, including some
in no way affected, PSB, and Department of State. An elaborate
study was prepared by the CENIS group.
8. The comment, aside from tedious re-statement of material
on which the plans were based, produced in general two conclusions:
(a) that capabilities would have to be increased if the plans were
to be executed, and (b) that requirements of the plans would have
to be reduced if they were to be implemented with existing capabilities.
Plans are thus no closer to implementation than they were when
originally submitted.
9. Policy
a. U.S. operational policy re death of Stalin is essential
to overt and covert psychological acts being considered. This
guidance is required in advance of the event if advance prepara-
tions are to be made. The intimate relation between overt and
covert operations in this instance requires that they be issued
to both overt and covert agencies. The nature of the event
permits development of policy prior to its occurrence.
10. Capabilities
a. Overt
(1) Diplomatic statements - US or Allied
(2) US inspired press
(3) VOA - USIS
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(3) vaA - usIs
(4) Radio RIAS
(5) Military Liaison - Berlin - Vienna
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IV. DISCUSSION
11. Po is
If advance preparations are to have any meaning, the policy
that is established in advance must be adhered to at the time of the,
event. The policy should be in sufficient detail to provide for the
development of appropriate overt and covert psychological warfare themes.
It should provide for the general US reaction to the death of Stalin
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and indicate in positive tones the type of individual and/or
organization we would like to see succeed him in Russia. State
has apparently decided, as one aspect of its overt policy.. to ignore
the event diplomatically. It might possibly issue expressions of
hope that the de facto regime in Russia will return to the democratic
ideals promulgated in the first steps of the Russian revolution, sub-
sequently betrayed by Stalin.
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13. Preparations
Once the overt and covert policies have been established
and promulgated to the appropriate agencies, the policy preparations
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can be undertaken to develop the content of actual broadcasts,
leaflets, fake editions of Pravda, etc. These preparations should
include: (a) Detailed material for overt broadcast announcements
such as VOA, BBC, USIS, statements by government officials, etc.
Insofar as possible, State Department should endeavor to have
allied governments follow a consistent line.
(c) Leaflets, fake
proclamations, etc., for dissemination by balloons. (d) Letter
campaigns aimed primarily at Soviet satellite installations abroad.
(e) Appropriate demonstrations at Soviet and satellite embassies
throughout the world. (f) Sound, specific policy guidance to
overseas installations with instructions for automatic implementation
as soon as fact of death is definitely established. (g) Specific
treatment of themes developed to implement approved policy. Many of
the themes developed in LEGACY and CANCELLATION can be used within
the framework of policy suggested here or whatever policy may be
subsequently agreed upon.
V. ACTION TO BE TAKEN
1. Develop plan in some detail including recommended policy.
Target date approximately 15 September.
2. Gain approval of PSB, State and Defense if necessary, in
plan including its policy elements. Upon approval of plan issue instruc-
tions to both headquarters and field elements to go ahead with
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preparations. From headquarter's point of view this may,include
purchase and shipment of balloons for large-scale delivery of
leaflets, etc. (A part of the policy element of the plan may be
approval for large-scale use of balloons at this time.)
3. Prepare operational plans for large-scale release of
balloons with Air Force in Washington and overseas. Write and
print all leaflets and other propaganda material to be used for the
event and hold in secure fashion for later operational use. On the
assumption that it will take three months for these initial prepara-
tions to be completed, review and keep preparations up-to-date on
a three months' basis.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
1. That any further delay in the development of a plan to
take advantage of the opportunities that may be presented',by Stalin's
death is inexcusable. The development of an approved plan leading
to orders to execute it should therefore be undertaken immediately.
2. A statement of policy should be promulgated to the field
to guide action on Stalin's death pending the assignment of specific
area, country, and local tasks under the opc plan.
3. The areas should be directed to plan, and prepared to execute
(within the next 90 days) such tasks in connection with the death of
Stalin as fall within their capabilities.
4. Areas should be directed forthwith to establish capabilities
required where they do not exist, to undertake the tasks which fall
in their areas.
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5. The State Department should be asked to re-affirm its
position with respect to making no official statement concerning
the death of Stalin in order that our covert FW activity may not
be interfered with.
VII. RECO124BIDATIONS
1. That the above conclusions be implemented.
Dictated but not read.
WRK/vt
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