INTERIM U. S. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN FOR EXPLOITATION OF UNREST IN SATELLITE EUROPE (NSC ACTION 817-A)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300100030-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: June 29, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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June 29, 1953
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
I-QUOLOGICA
III" UN''R.EST I
1. Probot
To assess the significance of recent signs of unrest in the European
satellites of the USSR, particularly in the so-called German People's
Republic, to estimate U.S. psychological capabilities for influencing
the situation, and to develop a realistic program of coordinated U.S.
psychological operations to exploit rapidly existing opportunities for
furthering U.S. and Free World objectives in the satellite states of
Europe, while laying the foundations for more ambitious programs in the
future if events should warrant them.
2. i Site t on
A dramatic new element has been introduced into the European situa-
tion by the current wave of unrest in satellite Europe. Popular discontent
over Communist oppression has flared into open defiance of Communist
authority in Czechoslovakia, where workers' demonstrations of a violence
and temerity hitherto unknown in the satellite states broke out early
this month. Though these riots appear to have been triggered by resentment
over monetary reforms, in Pilsen, at least, they had broader implications.
There, by the admission of the governmental press, an angry mob trampled
on the Soviet flag and hoisted the American one. Minor acts of resistance
have been reported elsewhere in Czechoslovakia and in Rumania. For some
time, there has been unrest in Albania, and a sober U.S. press observer,
after a recent vitit to Budapest, compares Hungary to a volcano which
could erupt at any time.
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It is in the so-called German Democratic Republic, however, that the
most significant and spectacular developments have occurred. The anti-
regime demonstrations which began in East Berlin on June 16, and developed
the next day into bloody mass rioting, subsequently spread throughout a
large part of the Soviet Zone and were frankly characterized by the
governmental press and radio as a rebellion. Despite the proclamation of
martial law and the deployment of Soviet armed forces in East Berlin and
in several parts of the Soviet Zone, calm had not been fully restored
six days after the outbreak of the uprisings. Several hundred thousand
Germans appear to have participated in the movement. There were widespread
strikes. The rioters were mainly workmen, many of them from heavy industry
and public utilities. Several strategically important large plants were
either destroyed or badly damaged. The communist press has reported what
it termed "murderous assaults" on Party officials and police or other state
employees, and mob attacks on government offices, jails, Party headquarters
and other installations have been noted.
In East Berlin and elsewhere where mass riots occurred, the puppet
police appeared to be ineffectual. A number of defections from the
Communist police occurred. The pusillanimous behavior of Deputy Minister
Otto Nuschke and other puppet officials did not enhance the prestige of
the regime. The reenforcement or replacement of East German by Soviet
military forces, including tank units, naturally tended to suppress large-
scale mob demonstrations but did not immediately cow the rebellious workers.
A number of audacious attempts to spike the guns or sabotage the treads of
Soviet tanks were reported. Clearly there was no magic even in the most
impressive manifestations of Soviet military strength. The tearing-down
of the huge Soviet flag that has waved over the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin
since the Red Army first entered the city was a symbolic act of great portent.
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The drastic and sweeping Soviet repression, involving thousands of
arrests and a number of summary executions, bad not broken the spirit of
resistance in Eastern Germany a week after the beginning of the uprisings.
Official communist statements reported in the Western press on June 22,
declared that many of the "fascist provocateurs" alleged to be responsible
for the disorders were still at large and admitted that even in factories
where work had resumed a number of the workers still exhibited an embit-
tered spirit. Food shortages appear to be aggravating the unrest in Berlin.
Efforts of the East German puppet officials to win over the rebellious
population by announcements that workers who were merely misled will not
be dealt with harshly, by abject self-criticism which almost certainly
foreshadows a sweeping Party purge, and by promises of drastic reform and
economic relief, seemingly have been even less successful than the Soviet
repression of the rebellion. Though resentment over excessive production
quotas, food shortages and hard conditions of life generally triggered
off the revolts in Germany as in Czechoslovakia, these grievances were
overshadowed by the clearly expressed political objectives of the German
rebels. More than anything else the German uprisings appear to have been
a kind of spontaneous direct-action plebiscite in which the East German
masses voted with their fists for free elections, the reunification of
Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.
The repeated mob shouts of "Russki Go Home'" and similar slogans gave
the uprisings a clear anti-Soviet character from the start, but it would
be a mistake to view them as pro-Western. Their essential motivation was
nationalist. Unless the Soviets are prepared to come to terms with German
nationalism--which seems unlikely--or to adopt savage measures of mass
repression, there seems little likelihood that the spirit of resistance in
in Eastern Germany will abate. On the contrary, the partial victory over
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the puppet government indicated by the promises of reform which have already
been wrung from it, is likely to enhance the morale and step up the expecta-
tions of the resistance forces. Even if Soviet and satellite authority
should succeed in suppressing current unrest and in re-establishing control,
it can be assumed that the present demonstrations of overt and active
resistance have weakened their grip on the captive populations and that
attempts may be renewed, in different areas, to start local strikes,
demonstrations or other manifestations of continuing resistance.
At the same time the sweeping concessions which the Kremlin has forced
the puppet authorities in Germany to make, or promise, are almost certain
to stimulate demands for similar concessions in the other satellites where
the Kremlin can less easily afford to grant them. This communist dilemma,
plus the indications that popular resentment in all the European satellites
is near the boiling point, plus the discrediting of the German puppet
regime and the revelation that Soviet power in Eastern Germany has no
basis but naked force, plus the demonstration furnished by the German
rebels that defiance of Soviet authority is not always equivalent to
suicide, adds up to the greatest opportunity for initiating effective
policies to help roll back Soviet power that has yet come to light.
We must, of course, bear in mind that popular uprisings in the satel-
lites cannot cope with effective military force. The only counteraction
here is other military force which the West will not now use. However,
the use of military force by the Soviet to deal with revolt in a satellite
state is a confession of major defeat for their policy, and in areas where
there is no Soviet military force present, as in Czechoslovakia, popular
uprisings may reach a point where the local military force is unwilling
to intervene, thus creating a situation in which the Soviet would be
forced to cross an international boundary to make its force applicable.
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In certain situations it is conceivable that the Soviet might be reluctant
to take this step, especially if it considered there was any danger of the
revolutionary infection spreading to its own armed forces.
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