ANNEX (B)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010020-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REQ

Stake Dept. declassificatio release instructions on f
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010020-1
ANNJ;X (B)
1O Vb' e
To fix moral and political responsibility for what has happened
in Korea -= and all bad that will result thbrefrom upon Moses, with
specific responsibility being placed upon Moscowis Chinese and North Korewi
Communist collaborators,
20 !My~ logical Effects Desired
a., Conviction of the wsrougriess of the pol *:iaa arid actions of
Soviet led Communism in Korea and strengthened psychological
rejection .of Soviet-led Communism,
ba .:trenythened desire and resolve to oppose the policies and
actions of Suviet-led C:ommnnismo
?a zc`? Banda Point o for F;mphasia
ao Insineerityq duplicity, intrensigoaneep and aggressy ve intent
of Soviet-led Communism =6-- hietoxivally, in Asia in generals
specifically in Korea 4- with pointing up of falsity of 'I desire
for peace' claims of Soviet-led Communism.
b, Political responsibility of Soviet-led Communism for what has
hspper d in Korea o- and the bad that will result theref om.,
cA Moral responsibility of Soviet-led Communism for what has
happened in Korea and the bad that will result therefrom.d
Damaging effect of the Korean actions of Soviet-led Communism
on the aspirations of the common man in the world at large and
specifically in Asia,
B l
Approved For Release 2002/01/03: CIA-RDP80-01065AO00400010020-1
62451
 'Approved For Release 2002/01/03: CIA-RDP80-01065A000 00010020-1
e, Undesirable effects of breakdown of Korean armistice, negotia-
tions ou the peace and at&ti ity of the world in general and
Lsia in particular,
Korean events and issues which can be used to oreate or
atreLgi.hen throughout the world;
of Soviet-led Communism in
.Korea in general and at Kaesong in particular
Distrust of the Far astern motives in general an+i
Korean motives in particular of Soviet led Co:3u^.'uni sm
Predispositionis to reject the policies end actions
of Soviet-led ommunism fnd Soviet-led Commnunism,
per ea (with particular emphasis directed at Asian
leaders and peoples).
Subservience to the Kremlin of North Korean and Chinese
Communist leaders,
h.. Korean events and issues which can be used to create, in
areas dominated by Soviet-led tloinumnismp overwhelming doubt
regarding the moral rightness of the actions and objectives of
Asia generally.
the Kremlin and Kremlin allies in Korea specifically arcs i n
Korean events and issues can be used ts --rIntey, yr
strengthens in the minds of the Kremlin, and in the minds of
r
its Qhinese and North lt,,reen eollaboraturrsg the conviction that
Approved For Release-2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010020-1
fear the time being not only have they pressed the.Or nsiar: z:taca
too far but also that tho free world is in nu mood tv tolerate
further aggressive action similar to that in Koreas
~,NFJDI L
62451