ANNEX (F)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010127-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 127
• Content Type: OUTLINE

Approved For Qa 96 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010127-3j
a a ' ~ R
AIMI F
10 Cb motive
To assists in Korea and contiguous areas' UN military operationsa
2. Ps ychologi.ca]. Effects Desired s
nrrr~.gr.~+Frrr.~rrrr a.r~re.aa
ao Lowered morale of North Korean and Chinese troops and civilians
supporting Soviet-led Comrmmisma
Heightened morale of North Korean and Chinese peoples desiring
defeat of Soviet-led Conrunisma
co An attitude of violent antagonism to Soviet-led Ccvmuni_sm in
the minds of North Korean and Chinese peoples.
do Hopelessness in the minds of North Korean and Chinese Communist
leaders both military and civilians regarding the military
situationv
ea Explosive three way distrust between Pyongyang# Pekings and Moscow?
fo General confusion in the minds of North Korean and Chinese
Communist leaders*
Points for Prapa a ds I aasis
a. Eventual failure of ~ 'oviet-led Communism in Asia because of its
inherent unacceptability to Asian peopleso
b. Military successes of UN forces contrasted with military failure
on the part of North Korean and Chinese Communist armies o
Co Hopelessness of the North Korean and Communist Chinese moral-
political-economic-military situation as contrasted with the strong
moral political-economic m litary position of the free nations
acting confidently in mutual supports
do Physical and spirtual hardships imposed upon North Korean and
Chinese peoples by Soviet directed Canmunism and falsity of
promises of a better life under Soviet led Communism.
ea North Korean and Communist Chinese ineptness of military leadership,
inferiority of weapons' marked insufficiencies of military equipment
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Approved For Release 2002/01/0?IA-RDP80-01065A000400010127-3
 Approved For Rele se,2002/01/03: CIA-RDP80-01065A000400 010127-3
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and supplies, and costly tsar losses in men and equipment, contrasted
tirith UN military aptitude and plenty4
f4 Incipient dissension, contentious division, or actual political or
military cleavage between Pyongyang and Peking, Peking and r':oscozwo
or Moscow and Pyongyangs
g. Political, economics and military gullibility of North Korean and.
Chinese leaders; lack of veracity of Canni nist political' announce
manta, economic reports, and military cosrruniques; mismanagement of
North Korean and Communist China communications and failure of
the flog of supplies; general and specific economic confusion in
North Korea and Communist China; inefficiency of internal adminis-
tration of North Korea and Communist China; low intellect and waver-
ing purpose of North Korean and Communist China civil officialdom)
political intrigues for personal gain or advancement, of high North
Korean and Chinese Communist leaders; rising popular resistance in
North Korea and Communist China to Soviet-led Cemaminisrns appearing
in such acts as local eabotare, boycotts, increased guerrilla
activity, etc*
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Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010127-3