STAFF STUDY ON INVENTORY OF INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR COUNTERING SOVIET ORBIT BLACKMAIL TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400070003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 19, 1952
• Content Type: STUDY

I . w Approved For Relea'2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000 U 070003-4
DRRAFFT
PSB D -19/1
(Revised)
Juno 19t 1952
Copy No. 19
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
STAFF STUDY
ON
1UTNTORY or, INSTRUMENTALITIES
FOR
COUNTERING SOVIET ORBT 11A M,'L sC(Z CS
Pale 1 of "Pages
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400070003C oZ C~
 Approved For ReIe Y2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065A0004W070003-4
DRAFT
TOP SECRET
SEC t IT jNFORW;TON
PSB D-19/1
6-19-52
INVENTORY OF INSTRUMENTALITIES
!LR
COMTERING SOVIET ORBIT BtJ CKI 'iIL TACTICS
I.
ROB N
To recommend psychological actions to frustrate Soviet
bia61 sail tactics as illustrated by the Oatis case and
the imprisonment of American fliers in Hungary.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Definition
Soviet blackmail tactics are defined as actions by Soviet or
satellite governments with the intent to injure the rights, position
or prestige of free world countries or their citizens. Such actions
are always framed in legality, making it difficult to retaliate
effectively without resort to violent or illegal measures. In
most cases, it is impossible to devise a countermeasure in the same
geographical area and related to the original action.
B. Criteria for Effectiveness of Countermeasures
Countermeasures taken by the free world must either exercise
deterrent influence, mitigate psychological consequence of Soviet
acts, or exploit the communist action to improve our position-in
some other way without appearing to create a grayer risk of war
than the action against which we retaliate. Even though a par-
ticular countermeasure would injure the USSR it should not be
employed if it would weaken the U S position with other countries
of the free world.
QC_MZ1.,INEORW.TIO.N
W13 SECI, Page 2 of 2 }sagas.
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400070003-4
 ? Approved For Releac* 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065AOOO4QP070003-4
U T 7"0P SECRET PSB D -19A
BURIU INFORW TION 6-19-52
Nature of Countermeasures
The best hope of deterrence of Soviet blackmail tactics must
be sought in a long-range policy aimed at placing as natty burdens
as possible upon the Soviet bloc not only in particular cases but
also in general. If the free world could thus create a sufficient
degree of anti-Soviet harassment, the ccmiminist governments might
eventually be impelled to abandon their blackmail tactics. Conse-
quently, in any new Soviet blaclmail actions against the free
world., Western policy should give special attention to exploiting
the incident in order to justify additional anti-Soviet harassments.
No legitimate pretext or occasion for adding to the backlog of
harassment should be neglected., particularly whon the cooperation Cr
a number of free nations can be obtained,
There is virtually no countermeasure which the United States
can take alone to meet the criteria discussed above, 'Concerted
action by the free world, requiring international agreement in
advance, would assure a greater degree of success,, Where feasible
and appropriate., Western countermeasures should be based upon, or
related to., UN action, thus acquiring the legal or psychological
force of international sanctions,
The position of the free world would be strengthened by the
accumulation of relatively minor harassing actions which produce
one or other of the following effects: (1) financial loss to the
Soviet government and the government of the satellite involved in
the outrage; (2) serious impediment to the work of foreign missions of
the two communist governments; and (3) weakening of the psychological
position of the Soviet bloc..
T0? S)aCRET
SECURITY. INFOI TION Page 3 of 2 Pages
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400070003-4
 Approved For Rele
2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80-01065A000070003-4
DDRRAA
TOP SECRET PSB D-191
SECURITY INFORMATION 6-19-52
Since the effectiveness of the types of action indicated above
depends on continuing them over long periods of time, perhaps years,
it is essential, if they are to have any deterrent value, to remove
any hope that they can be discontinued short of major concessions by
the Soviets, Operating agencies should retain the principle of
flexibility so that countermeasures can be taken selectively, called
off suddenly and re-applied with the same celerity. Elements of
surprise, uncertainty and shook can enhance the value of measures which
would normally have only modest effect. The search by the Department
of State for countermeasures in the economic, diplomatic and psyche
logical fields should be continued and the effectiveness of actions
already taken against Hungary and Czechoslovakia should be assessed
with reference to the particular cases involved..
D, formation Campaign
To have the proper effect in the free world as well as the com-
munist world.. any countermeasure must receive proper treatment by
media of information. Depending upon the circumstances in each cases
a countermeasure will be ignored, soft-pedaled, or advertised.
In each case of Soviet blackmail a prosecution brief should be
prepared for presentation through all channels to convince world
opinion of the injustice of the Soviet action. The information program
will strive at all times to discredit ccm1unism and enhance the
position of the free world even when countermeasures against Soviet
blackmail are not in question..
mok. SECRE
__CURITY T POI ATION Page 4 of .2 Pages
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400070003-4
 Approved For Rele 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065A0004 70003-4
DRAFT
TOP SECRET PSB D-19/1
SECURITY INFORMATION 6-19-52
SOVIET TACTICS AND APPROPRIATE COITNTERMEASURES
A. Catcgorie,s of Soviet Tactics
1, Invasions of property rights.
2. Deprivation of personal rights.
5. Harassment of U.S. and allied missions behind the Iron
Curtain. (It is recognized that the situation in Berlin
is unique. Special plans are required for a position of
such major strategic importance.)
B. Countermeasure
Before each measure is initiated by the U.S,, it s17ould be
weighed for its effect upon the Soviets, its reception by the
frog world, and the scope of probable Soviet retaliation. The
25X1X4 following are suggested as examples.
' P SF_>CRET
SECURITY INFORMATION Page 5 of 9 pages
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400070003-4
 Approved For Rdwdse 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80-01065AOQ000070003-4
DRAFT TOP SECRET PSB D-1