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December 9, 2016
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April 17, 2001
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July 24, 1953
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Approved ~vwRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-018000400100003-0 W .. 4 SECU SIT INFORMATION COP'S NO. 4 5 TO SECR 'T July 24, 1953 PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD WASHINGTON, D. C. MEMORANDUM FOR T PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD : SUBJECT: Status Report on the Na.t3,ona.1 Psychological Effort As of June 30, 1953, and Progress Report of the, Psychological Strategy Board The attached draft of the Status Report on the National Psychological Effort as of Juno 30, 1953, and Progress Report of the Psychological Strategy Board has been cleared by Agency Representatives and will be considered at the meeting of the Board to be held 'Wednesday., July 29, 1953. Acting Director Enclo sure : PSB D-47, Status Report on the National Psychological Effort As of June 30, 1953, and Progress Report of the Psychological Strategy Board, with Annex A. B, C and E, State, USAID, NSC, OSD, DIA declassification & release instructions on file SECURITY INFORMATION 1 OPSECCLET of 1 P Page Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01065A00040010000 Approved Pk% Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01t&?A000400100003-0 COPY NO. 45 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D1.47 TOP SECRET July 24, 1953 STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EF70RT AS OF JUNC, 30, 1953, and PROGRESS REPC.R,T OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD Submitted to the President and the National Security Council by the Psychological Strategy Board pursuant to the memorandum dated May 27, 1953 addressed to the Acting Director of the Psychological Strategy Board by M Jame S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, CONTENTS P, I, Status of the Program on June 30, 1953............... 2 II9 The Work of PSB.......... Annex C *Report of the Central Intelligence Agency..........,, Annex D Psychological Program - Expenditures ................. Annex E The Report of the Central Intelligence Agency I s specially classified, SECURITY INFORMATION TOP,P SECI ET I of 26 Pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 ; 3 i _ c Approved Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01A000400100003-0 M1 7T SECURITY INFORI?ATION PSB D-47 TOP SECEET July 24, 1953 I. STATUS OF TI-I PROGRAM ON JUNE 30, 1953 1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative siFmary of the status of our national psychological programs as of June 30, 1953, based on the appended Progress Reports by the departments and agencies responsi- ble for operations. GENERIC 2. While the President's Comrlittee on International Information Activities studied the whole problem of the world struggle with a view to basic improvements in the U.S. position, the struggle, on the psycho- logical as on other fronts, was conducted with increased vigor. The most far-reaching opportunity cane with Stalin's death. The President's speech of April 16 was signally successful in capitalizing on the situation by appealing to the new leaders for an era of worldwide peace and friendship. The world at large received the speech with great enthusiasm, and the follow-,up support through psychological exploitation added to the initial success. 3. Further exploitation of events behind the Iron Curtain has been guided by the requirement that psychological operations must be keyed in with political action. After Stalin's death, the next major occasion for such action followed the outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Plans and operations were stepped up accordingly, with prospect of conducting a major campaign in the long-range contest to take full advan- tage of the consequences of Stalin's death,, 4. Outside of the Soviet orbit the developments on the psychological front have been characterized by a disappointing deterioriation in the attitudes towards the U.S. Non-Comriunist press and public opinion in Western Europe has reflected mounting criticism of U. S. foreign policy SECUIMY INFOI'4MATIQN . 2 TTOOP EST of P Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01065A000402 0~006 Approved ft3Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 24, 1953 (the possible trend back to isolationism), and alleged anti-Communist "hysteria". These unfavorable attitudes in combination with a generally More receptive reaction among Western European peoples to the Soviet "peace offensive" now constitute an intensification of anti-.&iierican feeling among significant elements of European opinion. 5. World opinion has also been markedly unfavorable towards the development of U. S. foreign trade policies. At the same time that we are sharply reducing our programs for economic assistance, it has felt that we are providing little indication that our markets are to be opened up to foreign goods. Congressional criticism of our allies for their practices in the field of East-West trade, in combination with the; new Soviet line on expansion of trade with the free world, has begun to have an adverse psychological impact around the world, 6. Urgent planning for stronger psychological measures based on Thailand was set in motion as the result of the invasion of Laos and the aca;iying threat of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia,, A 7. While our overt psychological capabilities have been reduced by personnel difficulties, pressures in the Congress and appropriations cuts, covert capabilities continued to make sound progress, and faster and more energetic teamwork was secured through closer relations with the Mand the operating agencies. AREAS 8. Within the USSR itself, radio still constitutes the only important means used currently to roach the Russian people., Jamming by the Russian radio of our broadcasts continues to present a major problem. There was SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET of 26 Pages R377.9 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 DRAFT Approved F r 2elease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01061000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORIaTION PSB D-47 O SEC July 24, 1953 13. Among the principal problems that have confronted U. S. psy- chological efforts in v?estern Europe during the past six months are increased criticism of the U. S. and, especially since Stalin's death, the Soviet "Peace Offensive". It is evident that many, if not all, Western European governments have been influenced to some extent by the Kremlin's tension-reducing tactics. The effect has been to retard progress toward a number of our objectives, including the build-up of ,iestern defenses, the ratification of EDC, axd attainment of European integration, 14, The U. S. counter-offensive has included fullest exploitation by the Department of State's Information Program of the President's Inaugural address and of his April 16 speech challenging the new leaders of the USSR to prove their peaceful professions by deeds, not words,, Copies of the latter were presented to Foreign Offices all over the world in advance of delivery and kinescopes of the entire speech were sent to seventy-three posts within a day of its delivery. One of these was shown over BBC television on Ap4l 20 to an estimated audience of 6,000,000. Five million pamphlets, handbills, and leaflets on the speech were prepared and distributed, and a documentary film of it in thirty-five languages had been produced and shipped by May 2. 16, In France, the municipal elections in may showed that the Communists had suffered a slight set-back in rural areas, but had main- tained their position in the industrial areas in larger cities. Govern- mental instability was a troublesome factor during the period and a relaxation of earlier French official measures to reduce the power of the SECURITY INFORMATION TO SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0- of Pages Approved release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106,F1000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 SECRET TOP July 240 1953 C~;xnmunist Party in France resulted, The repercussions of some Congres. sional investigations, as well as of the Rosenberg executions, in con- junction with the Kremlints peace campaign, appear to have contributed to an increase in neutralism. 17. In the United Kingdom also, there appears to have been a marked increase in neutralism in its special British form of Bevanism, Although the belief is still widely held that Western unity must be preserved, three major elements contribute to the growth of anti- American feeling, (1) The belief that the U.S, is deeply divided on basic international policies, (2) The development of the Soviet "peace offensive", and (3) The desire to exercise a more positive and inde- pendent initiative in international affairs. 18. In West Germany and Berlin, the recent riots touched off greatly increased pressures for unification, complicating the problems of German ratification of the EDC. With this exception, however, U, S, psychological programs in Berlin and West Germany, as well as tha.r pro- jection into East Germany, appear to have been fairly effective in pro- moting progress toward our major goal of a Democratic Germany integrated into ;iestern defense efforts. Since late parch German press opinion has reflected a decline in confidence in U. S. leadership. This was tempo- rarily halted by the President's April 16 speech, but has since been re- sumed. The two major factors contributing to this area (1) the Soviet "peace offensive" and (2) lack of agreement within the U. S. on policy towards Germany. 19. In the Near and I1iddl e East and South Asia, neutralism, and the tendency to associate the U. S. with "colonialism", continued to present a major obstacle to the attainment of U. S. psychological ob- jectives. In the Arab States, the alleged pro-Israel bias on the part SECURITY INFORMATION TOPECNE-'L~ f ' - ------~- of 26 Pago s Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved F'&O'Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010SiA000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFCRMTION PSB D-47 TOP July 24, 1953 of the U. S. remained a major handicap, although the visits to Middle Eastern capitals by Secretary Dulles and Ni Stassen may have allevi- ated this problem, at least temporarily. IIA has continuously exploited the beneficial aspects of these visits in its output to the area. Turkey, Pakistan, and Greece appear to be the brightest spots in this area, psychologically speaking. 20. In the Far East, the resumption of Korean truce talks raised major psychological problems. The exchange of sick and wounded prisoners necessitated special measures to deal with "brain washing", Steps were taken to achieve more effectively coordinated guidance on information matters concerning Korea through the channels of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, The offer of a reward to i"iIG pilot defectors was followed by an immediate and significant shift in Communist air tactics over the Korean battle area. 21. In Japan, severe economic problems and growing neutralist resistance to the U. S. objective of Japanese rearmaments have been trouble spots in a picture otherwise fairly satisfactory, 22. In Latin America, our capabilities for effective psychological action increased in a number of countries, for the most part in the field of unattributable activity, There has been growing dissatisfaction in many Latin American countries directed mainly against American economic policies. To help offset this, a major psychological move was Dr. ii3lton Eisenhower's goodwill tour of South America initiated late in June, SPECIAL ITEhS 23. Emergency assistance provided by U. S. Armed Forces in cases of national catastrophe has made material contributions to U. S. psycho- logical efforts in The Netherlands, England, Turkey, Greece, Iran, SECURITY INF CRMA TI ON TOP ECRE ' of6 Pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 ;9t 7Q Approved Fe2elease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010000400100003-0 Ecliador, and Japan. SECURITY INFCRIVATI0N PSB D-I7 Top- RE July 2t , 1953 24. A grant of 1,000,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan has had a similarly favorable effect. 25. Carefully planned exploitation of U. S. leadership in the atomic field, pith a coordinated public information program on the Nevada weapons tests and other special weapons, as well as certain the US. psychological effort. SECURITY INFMJiATION TOP SECRET of 26 Pages n0 i Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Fc elease 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-0106 000400100003-0 M115? II. THE WORK OF PSB SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP; T July 24, 1953 During the first half of 1953, the work of PSB was marked by a vigorous shift in emphasis from long range planning to include more immediate implementation and operational activities. This change re- flected the advent of a new Administration, and especially the assumption of the Presidency by General Eisenhower, The F'resident's stature made his inauguration on January 20 a major factor in the world psychological struggle, doubly so because of the strong views which he was known to hold on the importance of seizing the initiative in the cold war. This found direct expression in the designation of Mr, C. D. Jackson as Special Assistant to the President, and his appointment, along with Harold E. Stassen, now Director of the Mutual Security Agency, to member- ship on the Psychological Strategy Board. Mr. Jackson was elected Chair- man of the Board. MOM ACTIVITIES The impact of these organizational changes on the work of PSB was further heightened by important psychological developments in the inter- national field during this period, including the death of Stalin, t ho intensified "peace offensive" of the successor regime in the Kremlin, the renewal of armistice negotiations in Korea, and the outbreak of large- scale anti-Communist and anti-Soviet rioting in East Germany. A number of special projects were undertaken by IDB as a result of those events and changes, some at the request of the National Security Council, others on the initiative of the new Chairman of the Board. These special projects included the following major activities of the staff undertaken in cooperation with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Mutual Approved For Release 2 Y0',f - P80-010 SECURITY INFORMATION 0~QRJ90003-0 89778 Approved Fo Celease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065O00400100003-0 RAT SECURITY INFORI ;TION PSB D-47 TOi' SECRET July 24, 1953 Security Agency : Program of UcYLolq osr1_ P ar'.tio for Stal n s P .s in ,,_frar~i Power PSB D-24 Plan for Psz holozica1-,l cloi station of Staln's eath` SB D During the early months of the reporting period, prepcxatory plan- ning in 'tnticip Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Fe&Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010MA000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORrIT ON PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 24, 1953 Plan D_18a/la provides for military use of escapees to derive psychological advantages. Incisive action in this regard resulted from appointment of a special committee by the NSC at the direction of the President. This task group, carrying forward the work of the Ihaso IS" panel.. made a comprehensive study and developed plans for the creation of a Volunteer Freedom Corps 25X1C (NEC 143). (o) Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8/b, NSC 127/1) National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War (PSB D-11//b) The substance of these plans has been integrated into the current war plans of both JCS and CIA. The Department of State chairs an inter- departmental subcommittee of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee consisting of representatives of State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the I-'Iutual Security Agency for the purpose of drafting an "X-Day" Han in implementation of NSC 127/3.. SECURITY INFORMATION 19 TOP SF PFT of 26 Pages 3772 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Foltkelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106 J000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 24, 1953 (f) A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under IBC 10/5 (PSB D-31) Work on this project was in effect taken over by the Presidentts Committee on International Information Activities. (h) Nationrr,l Psychological Strategy with Respect to Berlin (D..21/2) (Supplement to MB D-21 dated October 9, 1952) SECURI'T'Y' INFORMATION TOP SFC_ T T Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved FbwRelease 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-0108 (000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SEC: ET July 214, 1953 (j) Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East (PSB D-22) Implementation of this .an is proceeding under the active supervision of the Middle East Coordinating Panel in Washington. After the visit of the Secretary of State, accompanied by the Director of MSA, to the Middle E~-:st, the Panel held a special meeting toward the end of the reporting period to take into account the resultant new policy attitudes toward Middle Eastern problems. A roc+uost for comments on D-22 from the field resulted in replies from five of the ten Diplomatic Missions in the area. The comments received were uniformly favorable and several of them wore enthusiastic. The Washington Panel is considering the problem of establishing in the field the necessary coordinating mechanism to implement this regional program.. SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 21 of 26 Pages 7 ; Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Fd*Kelease 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-010 000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-I7 TOP SECREET July 2L., 1953 PLANNING ACTIVITIES Plans Authorized and in Process Development; Plans in various stages of preparation on June 30 included the followings (a) Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe (PSB D-38) A regional psychological strategy plan to increase the willingness of Europeans to support mutually agreed security goals in Western Europe by reducing anti-U.S. attitudes was completed and sent to the Board members on June 30 for approval by vote slip action. 25X1 C (c) Plan for Exploitation of Dissidence in the Soviet Bloc; USSR Armed Forces (PSB D-143) This plan to exploit the bases for schism between the regime and the military establishment of the Soviet union and to increase dissidence within the Soviet Armed. Forces where significant vulnerabilities arc indicated, awaits final clearance prior to early submission to the Board. (d) Iranian Contingency Plan A PSB chaired interdepartmental panel will coordinate psychological planning in relation to the possible partial or complete loss of Iran, a contingency which had not been assumed in the approved psychological strategy plan for the Middle East. SECURITY INFOW ATION 22 TOP SEC.~;ET of 26 Pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00040010~ib -0 Approved FoIdgelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106-SM00400100003-0 1)EcAFT SECURITY INFOi iATION PSB D-47 TOP SECh T July 24, 1953 (e) Indo-China A special program for the use of U. S. Influence in Support of U, Si Objectives in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was drafted and in the process of interdepartmental clearance at the end of June. (f) Psychological Strategies in North Africa This paper, including a study of the Psychological Data, a report on the Status of Power Relations, and an illustrative plan for U. S.. psycho- logical action in the area,, was in the process of clearance and completion on June 30. Review and Revision of Approved Plans A procedure was developed during the period, under which all completed plans are regularly reviewed by the staff with a view to determining whether revision is required, Early revision of the French and Italian plans is now contemplated.. EVALUATION AND INTELLIGENCE Evaluation l'1Sethods Work was continued with Government research offices engaged in de- veloping techniques for evaluating psychological operations. Progress in this field has been made through: a. examining current evaluation research projects in the Government to determine their relevance to PSB needs, bo alerting Government research units to the continuing need for research, particularly on evaluation criteria for psychological operations, and assisting them in fixing priorities for major research projects. c, holding conferences on evaluation techniques and criteria. SECURITY INFOR'iATION 23 TOP SECRET ET of 267ages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400 a~OEi Approved Fo)wR'elease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106 &600400100003-0 TOP SECRET July 2L , 1953 do suggesting specific evaluation projects for Government research units, such as a Handbook on Statistics for Psywar. Evaluations and Pre-plan ningSituation Estimates During the reporting period, the following projects in this category were carried out: a, An Evaluation of the Psychological Effect of the U0 Effort in Italy, (PSB D-29)s This paper, which was drafted during the final quarter of 1952, was noted by the Board on January 15, revised, and distributed for informations It concluded that U. S, policies and programs have contributed substantially to the attainment of our national objectives in Italy, but that the situation was still grave and that withdrawal of our support might well lead to the collapse of the Government then in power (February 1953). Accordingly, it concluded that there should be no slackening of our effort in the crucial period ahead, b, An Evaluation of the Psychological Impa. ;t of U. S. Foreign Economic Policies in the U. Kb (PSB D--36): This paper identi- fied some adverse psychological results of certain aspects of our economic policies towards the U. K., especially in the military aid and tariff areas, It was approved by the Board on January 15, armed, after further coordination, it was transmitted to the NSC, and, through the State Department, to other interested agencies. c. Evaluation of the Psychological Impact of U. S, Foreign Economic Policies in France (PSB D-r37); The completed paper was accepted as a reference document by the Board on January 15, It outlines the psychological causes of France's inability to SECUhITY INFOhIviATION TOP SL iT 24 of 2.6'Pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A0004Oi I1Ol0'08-0 Approved Foi%R61ease 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01065 00400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SEC1 ET July 2L1., 1953 pursue free world objectives, notes the psychological obstacles raised by our policy towards France, and proposes actions to 25X1 C obtain French cooperation. f. Soviet Sensitivities; An evaluative report on this subject, prepared in an interdepartmental committee, was completed and submitted to the Acting Director for approval and interdepartmental circulation for information as a staff study. A review of the psychological situation and related factors in Yugoslavia involved the assembly of basic intelligence and strategic considerations, for possible use in planning,, i. Latin America; A pre-planning estimate of the psychological situation in this region was nearing completion at the end of the reporting period. SECURITY INFORMATION 25 TO SERF of 26 Pages 13 77R Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Fo lease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106 'b0400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 21j ,, 1953 Intelligence Support Staff members continued to work in liaison with the intelligence- producing agencies of the Government to provide intelligence support and guidance to the Board and the Staff, This function includes selecting from, and, in some cases, synthesizing the output of the agencies, arranging for new research where necessary, and setting up staff briefings by experts from outside the staff. In this period, similar services were also developed to meet the needs of the Chairman of the Board for Government intelligence on such psychological subjects as foreign opinion trends, and international re- actions to particular programs, actions, and statements of the United States Government or its officials. This mission for the Chairman has required a greater emphasis upon the rapid procurement and processing of current intelligence from the agencies on a daily basis. Psychological Support for USUN As a result of discussions between Ambassador Lodge and Ar. C. D. Jackson, and subsequent PSB action at the informal meeting of June 3, a FSB-chaired committee of the member agencies was established to organize an anti-communist psychological campaign focussed upon the General Assembly scheduled to convene on.the 15th of Septembers At the close of the reporting period, the committee was in action and early documentation had been supplied to Ambassador Lodge. ATTACITh NTS Annex II. Report of tho Department of State Annex R Report of the Department of Defense Annex C Report of the Mutual Security Agency # Annex D Report of the Central Intelligence Agency Annex E Psychological Progrem - Expenditures *The report of the Central Intelligence Agency is specially classified SECURITY INFORT:TATION 26 TOP SECRET of 26 Pages Approved For Release 2001/06/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000,~Q91P4493-0 Approvedrio ..Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01Q, 000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX A SEC T PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 THE EORFIGN INFORMATIONPRQR/N (Prepared by the Department of State) 1. During the period between December 31, 192 and June 30, 1953, the Department of State undertook to carry out, through the foreign informa- tion and educational exchange programs conducted by the International Information Administration and in conjunction with programs carried out by other governmental agencies, the following major substantive tasks derived from relevant public laws, approved papers of the National Security Council, approved papers of the Psychological Strategy Board and programs agreed to by the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee: (1) Sustaining and increasing the confidence of other peoples and other governments in the high purpose and the trustworthy character of the United States as a leader of the free world. (2) Exploiting to the advantage of the free world the series of events in the Soviet Union and its satellites, including Communist China, ensuing upon the death of Stalin, (3) Promoting the achievement of an honorable armistice in Korea and greater stability in Asia generally,, (4) Promoting measures designed to bring about a greater degree of integration among the nations of Europe, with particular reference to the treaty establishing the European Defense Community. (5) Countering, particularly in Latin America, the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, attitudes hostile to the United States and disposed toward neutralism. SECURITY INFORMATION 1 SE CT of 12 Pages 8 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000 00100 3-0 Approved For-Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106DA000400100003-0 SECURITY INFOPMTION ANNEX A SECRET PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 (6) Demonstrating to the people of Italy in advance of the general election the advantages accuring to them because of their association with the free world. 2. The execution of the first task listed in 1 above involved primarily (1) exploiting the global prestige of the 'resident by (a) the wide dissemination in radio broadcasts, press releases., pamphlets and magazine articles of the Inaugural Address; (b) the preparation and distribution of a documentary film on the inauguration; (a) the preparation and the distribution of press and photographic materials concerning the career and the philo- sophy of the President; full coverage of the Message on the State of the the preparation and the distribution of press and photographic materials concerning the most important officers of the Administration; (2) exploiting the initiative taken by the President on behalf of peace and security in his address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, 1953, particularly by (a) assuring that copies of the speech were presented to foreign offices all over the world in advance of delivery; (b) delivery of kinescopes of entire speech to seventy- three posts within a day of its delivery., one of which was shown over BBC-TV on April 20 to an estimcted audience of six million; (c) the production and shipment on May 2 of a documentary SECURITY.INFORMATION 2 52311 }; T of 12 Pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01065A0004001601-18 Approved r Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-018 A000400100003-0 DRAT' SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX A SECRET PSB D-47 July 24~ 1953 film on the speech in thirty-five languages; (d) preparation and dissemination of five million pamphlets, handbills and leaflets on the speech; (e) distribution to all missions of a seventy-two page sum ry of world-wide editorial opinion; (f) preparation of photographic illustration of the speech in ten editions of the magazine "Free World" distri- buted throughout the Far East; (g) the preparation and distribution of pamphlets based on the speech, "What Disarmament Means" and "A Time to Turn the Tide of History;" (3) exploiting the visits of the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security to Europe and the Near and Middle East and South Asia and the visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower to Ictin America, (4) increased emphasis upon programs designed to reveal the moral, values and the spiritual attributes that animate the people of the United States in their personal attitudes and their public actions (5) citing the scheduled tripartite meeting at Bermuda as evidence of unity of free world and its ceaseless search for amicable adjustments of differences (6) supporting the committee in Japan in planning and carrying out the year-long celebration (1953-1954) of the hundredth anniversary of the visit to Japan of Admiral Perry 3. The execution of the second task listed in 1 above involved primarily (1) challenging the new leaders of the USSR to demonstrate their professions of peaceful intent by deeds, not words, particularly SECI.TRITY INFORMATION 3 SECof 12 Pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00040070d0'-0 Approved (. Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010WA000400100003-0 DR/:PT SECURITY. INFORMATION ANNEX A. SECS PSB D..47 July 24, 1953 in connection with the conclusion of a truce in Korea, the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Austria and the release of prisoners of war still held by the USSR (2) suggesting to the governments of Germany.. Italy and Japan that they demand the release of their nationals still held as prisoners of war in the USSR (3) exploiting the renewed effort of the United States, the United Id,.ngdom and F?a.nce to conclude a treaty concerning Austria and the refusal of the USSR to participate (4) exposing the withdrawal after the death of Stalin of the charges against the doctors as evidence of the dominance of expediency over principle in the conduct of affairs within the (5) demonstrating that conciliatory gestures of the new regime, while constituting recognition of need to placate opinion within and without the orbit, do not as yet demonstrate reduction of capabilities or change of intention on the part of USSR (6) emphasizing to the satellites of Europe the insecurity of the regimes under which they now live, and particularly as the result of demonstrations in East Germany and Czechoslovakia the potential for freedom that exists in the area and the betrayal by the US of the working populations (7) exploitation of the report of United Nations International Labor Organization Committee on forced labor as evidence of unchanged conditions within USSR (8) full but sober coverage of the Weis Escapee Center in Austria, Including address by Ambassador Thompson emphasizing purpose of escapee program S.EWRITY INFORMATION ... . SECS ,T of 12 Pa es ~ pp Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A0~~01 Ob03-0 Approved :Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-OlVaRA000400100003-0 UB'A FT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX A SEr CRET PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 The execution of the third task listed in 1 above involved primarily (1) demonstrating the unremitting patience and determination of the United Nations Command to achieve an armistice on reasonable term' (2) developing for global dissemination through personnel detailed to the Far East Command pictorial, written and transcribed material designed to demonstrate the humane treatment of prisoners of war by the United Nations Command and the justice of its position with regard to repatriation () countering; by reasoned argument and sober discussion the opposition of the Republic of Korea to an armistice (4) exploitation of the wide support, particularly by the government of India, to the proposals of the United Nations Command for a solution of the problem of repatriation (5) continued exposure of the charges that the United Nations Command employed biological warfare in Korea, including preparation of a fourth supplement to the kit on biological warfare, arrangement with the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom for a pamphlet to be written by a British journalist, exploitation of a denunciation of the charges by Pandit Nehru, and plans for dealing with the matter in the United Nations should it reappear there (6) encouraging, in conjunction with the governments of Vietnam, France and the United Kingdom.* greater psychological activity against the Viet-Minh; (7) promoting a special program in India designed to counter the appeal of Soviet Communism among students (3) increasing activity, in cooperation with the Government of Thailand, in the north and the northeast areas of the country SECURITY INFORMATION :.Z SE ORE, T of ' 12 Pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Is Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01O 000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY. INFORMATION ANNEX A SECRET P, '-,B D-.47 July 24, 1953 to counter increased Communist propaganda in connection with the invasion of Laos. The execution of the fourth task listed in 1 above primarily involved (1) continued promotion, increasingly by the provision of materials and data for the use of indigenous groups, of understanding of the objectives of the United States in Europe and so to promote the ratification of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community and of the contractual agreements with Germany (2) continued promotion, again largely through indigenous groups, of data and materials revealing the advantages to be gained by Europeans through closer integration militarily, economically and politically (3) providing grants to 1459 nationals of other NATO countries, including 34 journalists, to visit the United States and 1083 grants to nationals of the United States to visit other NATO countries (4) increased emphasis on the cultural attainments of the United States (5) the inauguration to Spain of a series of broadcasts designed to acquaint the people of the country with the objectives of the United States in Europe, to diminish their sense of isolation and so to provide a basis for the bettor understanding of the current negotiations. (6) the continued functioning of binational committees for promoting good relations between local communities and the United States forces stationed within them (7) the timely allocation of $50 million in counterpart funds for use in West Berlin at the time of the riots in F'storn Germany SECURITY INFORMATION -L- SECRET of 12 Pages J I Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 DRAFT Approved FQP Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-0104WA000400100003-0 S RITX INFORMATION ANNEX A SECIUST FSB D-47 July 24, 1953 (8) the exchange of notes constituting a cultural agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic (9) publicity for the visits to this country of Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Reuter, including appropriate public dissemination of the communique issued following the visit of Chancellor Adenauer. The execution of the fifth task listed in 1 above primarily involved (1) executing with the cooperation of the government of Austria plans to assure minimum publicity for the Congress in Defense of the Rights of Youth held in Vienna? (2) exploitation of the interest shown by the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security in their visit to the Neer and Middle East and by Dr. Milton Eisenhower in his visit to Ir.tin America of national culture and popular efforts to better the condition of the countries concerned (3) cooperation with the governments of Egypt, Turkey and Iraq in information programs directed at the armed forces of the countries concerned with the purpose of developing internal stability and individual responsibility and exposing Soviet Communism (4) provision to the Ministry of Education in Iraq of material exposing Soviet Comrluni stn for distribution among students (5) cooperation in Morocco and Libya with United States forces and local groups to facilitate acceptance of the presence of United States forces in the area (6) the provision to Radio Ankara of scripts exposing Soviet Communism for short-wave broadcasts to the satellites of Europe (7) cooperation between the USIS Near Fast Regional Service Center in Beirut and the Technical Cooperation tratien for the production of photographs and pamphlets SECURITY INFORMATION of o.f 12 Pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved fiat Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01OA000400100003-0 DFI SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET ANNEX A PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 (8) arranging for broadcasts to Argentina from Radio Carve in Montevideo (9) initiating an extensive program of personal contacts in Brazil to counteract doctrines hostile to the United States (10) initiating a program in Chile designed to hamper agitation for nationalization of the copper industry (11) increasing emphasis on cultural attainments of the United. States in conjunction with demonstrating United States interest in Latin American culture. (12) discrediting of Communist-dominated Continental Cultural Congress held at Santiago, Chile (13) continuing efforts to prevent dissemination to nearby countries of Communist-inspired doctrine emanating from Guatemala. 7. The execution of, the sixth task listed in 1 above involved primarily a carefully planned and executed program, largely in support of indigenous groups, including political parties and trade unions, to provide films, pamphlets, posters and exhibits emphasizing Italy's economic progress, agrarian reform and renewed international prestige and the threat of Communism to the retention of these gains. 8. Major obstacles or difficulties encountered in carrying out the tasks include (1) Differences between the United States and the peoples and the governments of other countries in a stim4 .ting the capabilities and the intentions of the USSR, particularly in view of the con- ciliatory gestures made by the leadership of the USSR following the death of Stalin. (2) The increasing preoccupation of the nations of Western Europe with internal, and particularly economic, problems, the SECURITY INFORMATION S SE FT^" of 12 Page s Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 'i j 778 Approved FdRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0104000400100003-0 AFT SECURITY Ih?FORMATI0N ANNEX A SF_;CR T FSB D-47 July 24, 1953 instability of the governments of several of these countries and their concern with past rivalries rather than present dangers and future opportunities. (3) The growth of strongly nationalist sentiment in many newly independent states and the tendency to identify the United States as a defender of practices associated with colonialism. (4) The preoccupation of the Arab States with Israel and their tendency to identify the United States as its champion. (5) Widespread ignorance and misunderstanding abroad of the evidence presented, the facts proven and the procedures 1.nvo]s*'d in trial, the sentencing and the execution of judgment in the case of the Rosenbergs. (6) The inability of the United Nations Command to ensure the cooperation of the Republic of Korea with regard to measures deemed necessary to achieve an acceptable armistice in Korea,, (7) The adverse reaction abroad to widespread publicity of charges made and measures taken during the course of congressional investigations into various aspects of the foreign information and educational exchange program. 9. Major changes that have occurred in the foreign information and educational exchange programs include (1) a reduction in force from 14,064 persons to 11,552. Those now employed include 1505 nationals of the United States employed in missions overseas and 2741 in the United States and 7633 local employees in missions overseas: (2) a net increase of six, from 195 to 201, ,r.nnmb. it of overseas outposts. However, current plans call for the closing SECURITY INFOF:MTT'O ..9... SECRET o# 12 Pages :778 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP8O-01065AO00400100003-0 Approved OswRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010000400100003-0 DRS SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX A SEC ELT PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 of 13 posts early in fiscal year 1954. (3) the closing of twelve libraries overseas, eleven of which were in Germany (4) a reduction in short..wavo broadcasts from 43 hours and 45 minutes to 33 hours, particularly in programs in Spanish and Portuguese to Latin America, in Portuguese to Portugal, Hotrow Malay, English, Korea, French and Italian (5) the elimination of twelve domestic tran.Hitter s and the suspension of contracts for the construction of major domestic transmitting facilities (6) the testing of two megawatt transmitters, one in Okinawa and one in the Phillipines, for early broadcasting on medium bands to the Far East (7) the relay by the improved facilities in,Col4mbo of daily programs in Hindi and Urdu, followed by broadcasting of transcriptions in Tamil and Bengali (8) the simultaneous relay by Munich of the program in Hindi to audiences in East and South Africa (9) the increase by 100% of religious broadcasts, planned in cooperation with many religious groups, to peoples behind the Iron Curtain (10) the transformation of the Wireless Bulletin to the Wireless File, designed for adaptation for publication in accordance with local needs (11) the initiation of the experimental use of folk-lore in motion pictures as a means of reaching sensitive areas with politically significant messages SECURITY INFORMATION 12 SECRET of 12 Pages U 118 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Felease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01061b00400100003-0 DPPET SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX A SECRET PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 (12) the distribution within India of 4500 sets of 101 paper- back books as expandible libraries (13) the appointment of Dr. Robert L. Johnson, former President of Temple University, to be Administrator of the International Information Administration (14) the establishment of a Plans Board in the office of the Administrator. (15) the appointment of rir. Cheever Cowdin, former chairman of the board of Universal Pictures, to be Assistant Administrator of the Informational Motion Picture Service and the appointment of Mr. Cecil B. deMille as principal consultant (16) the appointment of N. '. Leonard Erickson, formerly of McCann-Erickson, to be Deputy Administrator for the International Broadcasting, Service. SECS INFORMATION SECI?ET 1l of 12 Pages R J7 7 8 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved F.QpRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010SK000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX A E ,~'T PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 10, Actual or estimated expenditures and estimated carry-over are as IlA Fuibright NSA Sub- Total Radio Grand Construction Total Actual 1951 67.0 I'd 4.8 NA .,a 71.8 40" 23.01 95.2 Actual 1952 8900 7.0 10.6 106.6 19.2 126.0 tstirrated 1953 821.6 7,9 11.5 101 .0 - .9 103.1 The estimated carry-over of IIA funds available after June 30, 1953 is >17.5 million for radio acquisition and construction. This availability may be reduced by the Congress in order to provide obligation authority liquidation cost of the Department of State under the appropriation "Salaries and menses - Department of State." For 1954, IIA has requested of the Congress :;1;87.9 -pillion in the IIA appropriation, permission to obligate :x12.2 million of the radio acquisi- tion and construction carry-over funds, and ,,8.9 million in Fuibright local currencies of the Exchange of Persons program, or a total of ,109.0 million requested for 1954. IIA cannot furnish any estimates of periods of time beyond FY 1954 at this time. No estimates beyond those presently pending before the Congress will be made until appropriations have been made, the report of the President's Comxrlittee on International Information has been analyzed, the new Information Agency has been established, and the program .for 1954 has taken place. Thereinno basis for any valid projections beyond 19521 before these steps have been completed, rlhe above figures do not include the Public Affairs program in Germany or Austria or the NSA Information Program other than the certain 11SA themes which the Bureau of the Budget intended to be transferred to IIA on July 1, 1953. SLCURITY INFORMATION 12 SLCtfET of 12 pages 3(TB Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved F F- Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01 A000400100003-0 DRAFT P SEC RE T - PSB D-47 July 2L., 1953 SEMIANNUAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITY STATUS REPORT of the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE for the period from 1 January through 30 June 1953 Presented below is a summary of the status of the Department of Defense activities having psychological effects for the period from 1 January through 30 June 1953, 2. General Comments The Department of Defense released information designed to make clear the United States position with respect to truce negotiations and the prisoner of-war situation. Background press conferences were ar- ranged through which the Secretary of Defense and his key assistants briefed news media representatives on the American stand in Korea, 3, In conjunction with other agencies, the Department of Defense carried on a continuous program to inform the public of developments in biological and chemical warfare research. Documentary evidence was pro- vided to both the United States representative to the United Nations and to news media, to combat the Communist propaganda accusations'charCitg the United States waged germ warfare in Korea: . Vy ilitary Posture a, The most significant contribution of the Department of Defense with respect to the national psychological effort was the continued maintenance of U, S. military power in a strength to provide evidence of its readiness to resist aggression,; The SECURITY INFORMATION -1 TOP SECRET of ZE Pages 8 11 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved FbN'Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010 A000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX B TOP SECRET D-47 July 24, 1953 deployment of portions of U. S. military power in Europe contin- ued to be a significant unifying force against soviet aggression, although the psychological impact of such deployment among Euro- peans was probably lessened by the isolation of large-scale mili- tary power in Korea for the past two years, b. In connection with the Viet i.iinh invasion of Laos, French authorities requested and received military equipment and supplies on a priority basis, demonstrating U. .s. ability to sup- port friendly nations in meeting military emergencies'. 5. Also of note was the timely psychological exploitation of tech- nological leadership in military weapons through a coordinated public information program on the atomic bomb tests this Spring at the Nevada Proving Ground and similar programs on other weapons. 6. Goodwill Efforts Goodwill efforts of the military Service in overseas areas were promptly executed and effectively exploited. Emergency supplies and assistance have been provided in England, Holland, Turkey, Greece, Iran, and Ecuador, demonstrating U. S. preparedness and interest in the welfare of other nations. Military leaders have demonstrated an increased aware- ness and desire to gain from the psychological implications of mercy mis- sions, improved community relations and counter-propaganda. Many in- stances of the observance and participations of U. S. Military personnel in indigenous ceremonies and the consummation of well considered good will tours are in evidence. These are believed to be of great significance for the support they provide to fundamental and long-lasting attitudes of friendship, imbedded in the "grass roots" of foreign peoples. SECURITY INFC+ftiMATION T SECRET Approved For Release 2001109106':'"ClA:RDP80-01065A000$ 04U0 Approved Fb2elease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORnATION ANNEX B MP SECRET PSB D-1t? July 2L , 1953 7. Military Assistance Programs The Military Assistance Program has continued to be one of our greatest psychological assets. A new joint Service regulation aimed at maximizing psychological advantage in the release of information covering training, equipping and reimbursable aid to foreign nationals has been issued during the period, Offshore procurement has maintained U. S. in- fluence in the Far East and Europe and has made a major contribution in Italy. 8. Repatriated U. S. Prisoners of War By virtue of massive unfavorable press reaction, special at- tention in this report has been devoted to the so-called "special cases" of repatriated U. S. prisotrers, Considerable attention was accorded this matter as far back as April 1952 and in Hare concentrated fashion since January 1953 when it became necessary to cope with the actual situation. In view of the status of truce negotiations optimum handling of the situ- ation was not possible since routine medical and personnel policies as well as public demands had to be met. The Department of Defense will continue to devise correct policies for handling the situation in spite of press sensationalism, As evidence of its success, within a period of two months such sensationalism has run its course and a general acceptance of a realistic standard operating procedure has evolved. 9. Defection The public announcement of an approved plan and the establish- ment of facilities to receive and. reward i'viIG pilot defectors who would deliver their jet aircraft to the United Nations Command was followed by an immediate and significant shift in Communist air operations and tactics over the Korean battle area, -SECURITY INFORMATION 3 T 3P T of 28 Pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved F%r'Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106000400100003-0 MFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX B TOP-SET PSB D-47 July 2L , 1953 SECTION II Significant progress of the Department of Defense in the development of plans, capabilities, and organizational means for contributing further to the national psychological effort. 1. Intra-departmental activities, including plans., forces, training programs, and indoctrination courses. Office of the Secretary of Defense (1) Psychological Advantage of MDAP: Consistent with previous policy guidance, a joint Service regulation, published on 2t March 1953, sets policy and procedures relative to the re- lease of information concerning: (a) training of foreign nation- als, (b) off-shore procurement, (c) equipping of foreign military powers, (d) reimbursable aid, and (e) announcements of the assign- ments of personnel to ADAP duties, Its purpose is dual: (a) to ensure the proper control and coordinated release of such data, with due consideration for security; and (b) to effect the timely and psychologically advantageous release of such information within both the U. S. and the country of primary concern, (2 ) Psychological Advantage of U. S. Weapons Develop- ment: Continued progress was made under previously reported pro- grams by Department of Defense agencies in: (a) providing polity guidance on release of maximum data on atomic energy, guided missiles, and other new weapons consistent with military security; (b) establishing procedures for clearing release; and (c) prohibit- ing the release of uncleared information1 (See Section III) SECURITY INFORMATION T015-- SL T of((~)) 28 Pages I 7 1.. Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Fbw4Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010000400100003-0 DRAFT EC hITY INFORz AT ION ANNEX B TOP T :PSN D?41 July 2L , 1953 (3) Foreign Infoscult$eft Poliayz Direct and timely coordination between Department of Defense agencies continues the effective processing of "Foreign Infoa'iation Policy Guidance." (4) Organizations On 10 January 1953, the Secretary of Defense approved a directive activating the Department of Defense Committee on Psychological .Operations. This body was established to develop a policy governing and to provide for the utilization of resources of the Armed Forces in cold war, (5) Research and Development; The Advisory Group on psychological and unconventional warfare in the research and Development Board completed on 6 /+pril its six-month survey of repearch and development in this field, making a number of recan- iFtendations on each of the following: (1) the basis of a balanced and integrated program and (2) the organizational machinery and fiscal support necessary to implement such a program. The report was accepted and its implementation recommended by the RDB on 29 April? It was then forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for consideration, Present budgetary limitations have necessitated drastic readjustments of standing priorities in all Defense fields. Therefore, no approved estimate can be made until full considera- tion has been given to the new policy, br Gji g9f Staff (1) The receipt of a SHAPE paper setting forth the views of SACEUR with respect to his wartime unconventional war- fare responsibilities has generated further Joint Staff consider, ation of this in conjuhction with the previously submitted SACEUR paper outlining his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities. L of 28 Pares 3977,q Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100(00 - Approved Felease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNJX B TOP SECRET PSB D-147 July 24Y 1953 (2) Specific actions were taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to facilitate and strengthen world-wide unconventional warfare planning, including allied planning, by: (a) Strengthening CINCFE's unconventional war- fare staff. (b) Approval of steps to strengthen U, S. un- conventional warfare planning representation at the Stand- ing Group level. (c) Delineation of certain responsibilities among the Services and providing policy concerning points of contact for Allied planning in the field of Evasion and Escape; (3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved and CINCFE has implemented a psychological warfare defection program aimed against Corrimunist air crews in Korea. Early reports indicate a resultant shift in Red air tactics and impeded operational ef- fectiveness due to more stringent anti-defection measures. (4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Serviees provided comments and recommendations in response to a request for informa- tion by the President's Committee on International Information Activities. (5) Overseas Commandss CINCFE authorized U. S. participation in the United Nations Command (UNC), Joint Foycio, logical Committee (JPC) (activated 1 January 1953) which provides a central and top-level directorate for the review and defining of combat theater psychological warfare policy, A significant gap has thus been filled in the over-all coordination of a cohesive UNC effort. SECURITY INFOR1iATION TOP T of 28 Pages '3778 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved F Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010 5X000400100003-0 SEC UILITX INFORhATION ANNEX B TOP SECRET PSB D-47 July 2L , 1953 e. Significant Service Activities (1) Plan,: (2) Troop Information and Education: This program continues on a world-wide basis to orient Service personnel with respect to national and international affairs. As one significant facet of this activity, members of the U. S. Armed Forces are in- formed as to the language, habits, and customs of the various coun- tries in which they serve, Allied with this, committees composed of Service representatives and native civilians continue efforts to generate closer harmony between U. S. military and foreign popula- tions. The impact of this programming upon non-U. S. personnel cannot be denied, In the field of Armed Forces Radio Service alone, the estimated foreign audience in Europe is reported at the 80 mil- lion figure. (3) U14C Orientation Program for Communist POWs: The Civil Information and Education Division (CI&E), integrated into Psylar Section, FECOH during December of 1952, continues effectively to pursue its mission by providing a program of education and recre- ation for North Korean and Chinese PO?;s. In the performance of its functions, CI&E provides the opportunity for these POT,1s to gain SECURITY INFORW? TION T O P of 28 Pages 8J1iB Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved F%,Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010 5J000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORM ION ANNEX B TOP SECRET PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 general and vocational knowledge, as well as to acquire technical skills, which can develop attitudes favorable to the furtherance of U. S. and U. N. objectives. (4) Communist Indoctrination of U.S. Captured Person- nelI (a) Background; Evidence confirmed early De- partment of Defense estimates that the Communists were sub- jecting u. N,, personnel held as prisoners of war to inten- sive ideological indoctrination. This problem was recognized as early as April, 19520 The solution appeared to depend on striking a balance between two completely conflicting factors; (a) The necessity of informing the public in event POs had been successfully indoctrinated, if and when returned, and (b) Taking care not to create undue alarm which might jeopardize national policy with respect to the question of non-forcible repatriation, The Secretary of Defense requested the PSB to investigate the advisability of propaganda exploita.r tion by charging the Communists with a new type of war crime. (b) Repatriated U.S, Personnel: When it appeared that some prisoners might be released by the Communists in the exchange of sick and wounded, a press release was made and background material issued. Care was required in prepar- ation of this material, however, in order not to prejudice the negotiations then current. Many conflicting interests made handling of the repatriation exceedingly difficult, These included the natural "get the boys home" urge similar to the ones experienced in 1945 and 1946) requirements for a routine medical and perm nnel processing, a covert requirement SECURITY INFORMATION S TOP- SECRET of 28 Pares 18JTT8 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Fqg,,,Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0104 000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INF(R?IATION ANNEX B {. P R T_ PSB D-47 July 214, 1953 to enable the Federal Bureau of Investigation to e>p loit activities of some returnees, necessity for protecting the identities and reputations of innocent men, and the natural desire of the press for exclusive and sensational stories. Initially, a bad press was received on the operation, This has now run its course; some of the more responsible publications have implied that the Department of Defense position was correct. (c) hepatriated U. S. Personnel: On the basis of interim research results, highlighted by data secured on personnel returned to U. S. control during the period 20 through 26 April 1953, Service concern with respect to Communist treatment of American prisoners of war and the serious ramifications stemming therefrom has been justified. Reports indicate that some American prisoners of war have been subject to extreme inducements and coercion. hore- over, some appear to have succumbed, under duress, to re- lentless Communist pressures, Five (5) members of the group of twenty-three (23) Army personnel studied at the Valley Forge Army Hospital were held to have been so highly indoctrinated as to render reclamation virtually impossible and to constitute grave U. S. security risks, A recent surveillance report indicates that one (1) of the returned group not processed through Valley Force joined a Communist organization ("American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born") in the San Francisco Bay area on 13 May. (d) Current Procedures: Data secured within FECOM and at ValIy Forge Army Hospital from repatriated SECURITY INFORI'1IATION 9 OP....., S CREE_ of 2$ pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 01065 0004?S10ff 03-0 DRIFT Approved Fq&ReleaseA%JJ~ff R& P6B D-47 July 24, 1953 U. S. returnees are being collated and evaluated in conjunc- tion with other source reports on Communist indoctrination techniques. Continuing Department of Defense and Federal Bureau of Investigation surveillance and interrogation of all U, S. returnees is in process with the view of completely exploiting informational resources currently at hand, Plans have been developed to fulfill both security and rehabilita- tion requirements inherent to the projected mass return of U. S+ personnel upon completion of Armistice arrangements. There is continuous research to establish a basis for deter- mining a possible program to take psychological advantage of Communist indoctrination as a form of war crimes or atrocity. (e) Countermeasures: TI&E Activities, a Chaplain "Character Guidance" lecture series, and training materials on Communist interrogation-indoctrination methods are re- quired, and currently are under development and study. (5) Although no overt effort was made to promote defec- tions of Polish jet pilots, two Polish Lieutenants successfully escaped from the Iron Curtain and landed their IG 15 planes at Bornholm, Denmark. Pilots immediately requested political asylum and voluntarily surrendered their aircraft to Danish authorities, Through negotiations with Danish and British officials, the U. S. received custody of the two flyers,. (6) Interrogations of the defecting Polish pilots reveal the presence in Poland of additional aircrew members who favor defection, As a result, Department of Defense has generated staff action whereby appropriate agencies may encourage defection of Polish aircrew personnel and contribute to deterioration of the Polish Air Force command structure. SECURITY IUFORVIATION 10 TOPSECRJ T of 29-pages 7?n Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved FRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0104000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX B TOP -SMUT PSB D-47 July 2L , 1953 Inter-departmental activities, including plans, forces, training programs, and indoctrination courses. a. Psychological Strategy Board: Emphasis was placed on PSB papers for Southeast Asia, Germany and Berlin, Japan, and the fiddle East, b. Psychological Ope rations Coordinating Committee (?CC).- (1) Participation continues on the inter-departmental committee charged with preparation and transmission to FECOh of the "apecial Korean Information Guidance" (SKIG). Within FECO?l, the formal establishment of two reviewing committees has contributed significantly to the coordination of an over-all and cohesive psych- ological efforts The Korean Information Guidance Committee (KIGC) reviews, analyzes, and makes recommendations to CINCUNC based on data reported via the daily, inter-departmental POC cable. This body, further, is charged with the development of concepts within the psychological warfare field for submission to a central and top-level directorate within UNC in the Far East, the Joint Psych- ological Committee (JPC). (See ;.ection II, subparagraph 1 b. (5).) (2) X-Day Plan, "Relationship of U. S. Official Foreign Information Organization (Personnel, Facilities, Equipment) to U.S. Military Commanders," 30 September 1952, remains under consideration, awaiting outcome of the President's reorganization plan 1o, 7 and 8, c. Department of State: (1) 'Pending the determination of world-wide base require- ments, the Department of State has deferred action to secure and finalize an agreement providing for the wartime use of hadio Luxembourg, SECURITY IiNFORtN'IATION U TO? S ;CRI, ,T of 28 Pa{,es Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved FQ.Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01 W 000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INF>Ri'ik'TION ANNEX B TOP E T PSB D-147 July 24, 1953 (2) In coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Defense assisted in securing voluntary-statement documentation from ;orth Korean and Chinese POWs which invali- dates contentions alleging brutality and abuse in UNC POW camp treatment and screening. This project continues. (3) Through an inter-departmental committee to combat Communist propaganda;, the Der.)arti ent of Defense assisted in the conduct of a constant analysis of the various gambits of the Soviet propaganda ranging from the intense "Hate America Campaign" to the new "peace" line dating from March 1953. This group has sought immediate and long-range means of forestalling or counter- ing such propaganda and has reached agreement on certain conclu- sions and recommendations regarding measures the United States should adopt toward these various Soviet efforts. (Li) Germ T`arfare: A continuous counter-measures cam- paign was carried on by the Department of Defense in coordination with the Department of State, and other agencies, to combat Com- munist propaganda charges that the United States had waged biolog- ical and chemical warfare in Korea. (a) Through an inter-departmental committee, progress was made in developing plans and means for set- ting forth the U. S. position regarding such false charges, (b) Through the Department of State, assistance was provided to the U. S. Representative to the United Nations. As a positive program, every effort has been made to release as much information as possible consistent with military security. Some indications as to the success of these countermeasures may be reflected in the obvious de- crease of Communist germ warfare charges in the U. N. SECURITY II JFOhi,4IaTION 2 TOP SEC U T ...... Approved For Release 2001/007Ug--CM-RDP80-01065A00OI0Ar-- .3 377 8 Approved FrRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010W000400100003-0 DRAFT ANNEX B SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 21y, 1953 SECTION III Military activities having psychological implications conducted by the Department of Defense during the reporting period,' 1. Display of Strength aa. Significant news releases were made covering facets of U. S. military strength and technical ability. Effort was directed toward securing the maximum favorable psychological effects regarding release of such data. Major releases within this informational area included: (1) Continuing emphasis upon development and potential use of nuclear weapons in a tactical role. Supporting evidence was readily available from coverage of the series of closely- spaced atomic tests at Yucca Flats which included the deployment of ground troops and the successful firing of the 280.-mm artillery piece. (2) Steady development of the Array of the Republic. of Karen, (TlOKA) troop strength and ccnbat efficiency. ((See Soc,' IV, Subpara. 4 a (l)', b Certain news leaks tended, to some extent, to reinforce expository comment concerning U.S. strength status and technological capacity; significant among these for the period were: (1) Speculation that the U.S. had successfully test-detonated a thermo nuclear device at Eniwetok Atoll with results vastly more devastating than heretofore known to mankind. (2) Comment from Paris concerning the projected deployment of U,S. artillery battalions equipped with the new 280-rim gun to Europe for integration into the NATO Cormiand, SECURITY INFORMATION 13 TOP SECRET of 28 ae Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved F voRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010W000400100003-0 S ITY INFORMATION ANNEX B TOP SECRET PSB D..47 July 24, 1953 (3) Quotations of a member of the Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy to the effect that the U.S. now holds sufficient atomic weapons in stockpiles to permit forceful and imrmediate retaliation against aggressive attack and to backstop the conduct of a major war. c. A favorable report has been made by State Department on psychological value of the B-29 flights conducted over Malaya on 15 December 1952, 2. Combined Maneuvers and !~cercisest A total of six such operations were conducted within NATO. All wore com-and post shako-downs of portions of the NATO Staff aligrnent, except RENDEZVOUS, a naval maneuver in the Mediterranean, which was participated in by fleet elements of the U.S., France, Great Britain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Salient portions of this exercise involved the simulated atomic bombing of Toulon, and the landing of Turkish and Greek forces in Greece and Turkey res;pectively,r SECURITY INFORMATION 14 TOP SECRET of 28 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00040010000 8 Approved Fw'Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106AA000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX B TOP PSB D.-47 July 24, 1953 SECTION IV Implications of Department of Defense activities producing psycho- logical effects in foreign areas, including good-will efforts and related activities of the Services in such areas. 1. Psychological Results of I'r'esence ,_gf U. S. Personnel. Abroad: at Through the Committee on Acceptance of Americans Abroad, which is designed to improve relations between Americans and foreign nationals, the Department of Defense has continued to monitor and assist, as appropriate, the activities of coordinating subcommittees in each country in Europe in which American troops are located, and in Japans b although committee reports indicate that their work has been fairly effective, nevertheless some of the problems inherent in the stationing of U.S. military and civilian personnel abrordd remain. From time to time reports are received of friction between foreign nationals and U.S. nationals in various areas. Subsequent analysis, however, has shown that most of these frictions were in- consequential and to be expected. In addition to cementing closer troop-civilian relationships, effort to improve the area orient- ation training of all U.S. personnel selected for assignment overseas has continued, 2. MDAP Program: Of the total MDAP deliveries of $50 billion to date, the volume of military equipment shipped to our partners in the Mutual Security Program in the first four months of calendar year 1953 has totaled pl,,436 million; U. S. information offices have emphasized that positive accomplishments in the international re-armament effort are not the responsibility of the U.S. alone: That while the U.S# is doing its share, it is necessary that our partners shoulder their shares of the burden. Approved For Rele " 0 TOP SEC RE 0-01 065A00040 000 of 28 pages i :~ 7 P Approved R Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-019 A000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX B TOP SECS PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 3. Offoh re P,rocurepent (OSP) : a., Contracts placed by Department of Defense }~racurement agencies abroad from FY 1952 and FY 1953 MAP funds totaled X1,757,1277,310 as of 30 May 1953. Of this, $1,722,717,860 has been placed in Europe and $34,409,450 has been placed in the For East. Contracts were lot in all European Nt.TO countries as Well as in West Germany and Switzerland, while contracts in the Far East were let in Japan and Formosa. I Although OSP basically fulfills military requirements, supplementary economic and political aspects are involved. For example, the coordinated policy of the U. S. Government, agreed upon between Defense, State, and the Director for Mutual Security, provided that procurement agencies of the Department of Defense in Europe would try to place about $p150 million in OSP contracts in Italy prior to the holding of the Italian elections in an effort to support the DoGasperi government. This target was exceeded and although the DeGasperi government did not achieve the electoral vote hoped for, this project undoubtedly contributed to keeping D?Gaspori in office. c. As a result of OSP contracts, jobs have been created or employment sustained in a variety of European defense industries including weapons, ammunition, electronics, automotive vehicles and spare parts, construction equipment, small water craft, and aircraft equipment and spare parts. The aggregate impact of these contracts on the economies of the nations participating have had beneficial results. Increased employment has been achieved in Belgium, Denmark, Norway, (Lb'ooce, and The Netherlands, and continued ESS, CURITY INFORMATION 16 TOP,T of 28 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01065A00040010000i7 7 Approved FQRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010A000400100003-0 D "F SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX B TOP SEC _ T PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 industrial activity assured in varying degrees in all of the parti- cipating countries. Efforts continue to place as to benefit non Communist segments of the countries involved. 4. $up oort to .ieadlvNations: ax Republic of Koreas (1) The ROKA was expanded from twelve to sixteen divisions This action was publicized widely to show the steady development of a modern ROK fighting machine. The ROK Defense Ministry there- upon claimed, that it could man 85 per cent of the 155-mile line of contact. The 13 May authorization for activation of an additional four divisions will bring ROKA combat power up to twenty divisions. (2) On 25 February the U.S. agreed to pay $85 million to the ROK in settlement of Korean "Won" issued to U.S. troops in Korea. This served to bolster the South Korean public's confidence in the new "Whan" currency and raised to a reported $159,,990,440 the amount of ROK currency bought by the U, S, during the wer# (3) Continued civil relief and rehabilitation was made avail- able to the South Korean people through Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK), United Nations Korean Relief Agency (UNRRA), and voluntary private programs. b The Ryukyu Islands: The civil information and education proerem in the Ryukyus was continued to include the "Exchange of Persons Program", whereby Ryukyuan national lenders and students were brought to the U.S. for periods of study. ct_ Indochina: C-119 aircraft were lent to French forces in Indo- china for the purpose of transporting heavy equipment to repulse the aggressive Communist attack on Laos. Some twenty-onc additional SECURITY INFOI14ATION 17 T P SECFT of 2U pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00040010000 `O 7 Approved Ftw4Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01OW000400100003-0 DR " FT ANNEX B SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 24, 1953 C-47 aircraft on loap from FEAF to the French in Indochina remain in that area past the 1 April duo date for their return upon recom- mendation of GINCUNC, do Thailand: Upon request of the Thai government at the time of the invasion of Laos, a shipment of aircraft and a quantity of ar riuni- tion was provided. The Secretary of State commended prompt action in this matter. 5. NATO Ed tors! Tours: a. Four U.S. tours have been conducted: Three being for editors and correspondents and one for information officers from various NATO countries. All the European NATO countries have had representa- tives on one or more of these trips. A total of forty-four foreign nationals have participated. Reports from Public Affairs Officers in NATO countries indicate that the U.S. tours constitute one of the most effective single activities in the U,S. information program. 6. Resident Foreign Corres.Dondents: Numerous special interviews, feature story material releases and occasional special trips to U.S. military installations are arranged by DOD for foreign correspondents re- siding in the U.S. In addition tQ general stories, attempts were made to effect special guidance in line with the particular political and psycho- logical problems of a particular country or area of the world. 7. Good-Xi l Efforts Headquarters, USAF and Headquarter s, USAFE have approved a goodwill tour of NATO countries by Major Fred Blesse, USAF. jet air ace of Korean fighting, to be conducted in summer of 1953. SECURITY INFORMATION 18 TOPER ET of 2$'pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved ; Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01 QA000400100003-0 ANNEX B SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-47 TOP SECRET July 24, 1953 Ua. Top officers of Headquarter s, U,7-,FE participated in anni- versary ceremonies of the RICHTOFEN WING, composed of veteran German fliers and named in honor of the farmed German World Wer I ace, 15 April 19530 c? U, S. Ambassador to Ecuador reports that airlift conducted by 5 USAF C-47's during spring floods along the Quito-Guayaquil railway in April 1953 caused admiration in all cirelso. d,L In response to appeals of Turkish government officials for relief in earthquake-torn creas during March 1953, USAF "'Flying Boxcars" loaded with medicine, blankets and food were dispatched from Germany to Istanbul and the Dardanelles province of Canakkele. U.S, military units of Europe gave prompt and generous assis- tance to the Dutch and English during the February flood disaster along the North Sea coastline. At the initiative of responsible U.S. representr_.tives, Anorican helicopters, transport planes, naval errphiT bus and rescue craft and communication facilities were mobilized and committed to the saving of life arid property. Participating aircraft wore named "rescuing angels" by grateful Hollanders and an American airman was presented Britain t8 second highest award for rescuing stranded villagers during the height of the storm. Money and clothing were contributed to the Dutch victims of the flood by ships companies of the destroyers BR13TOL and JOHNSON and by the personnel of the aircraft carrier WRIGHT in memory of the welcome accorded that ship by the people of Rotterdam in September 1952. The American Ambassador to The Netherlands concluded "tbo Arlendly attitude of The Netherlands people toward the U.S. may well have reached a postwar high". f , An earthquake at Taroud, Iron, on 14. February caused serious damage and threatened starv,-.tion to the population, Highlighting SECURITY INFORMATION 19 TOP SECRET of 28 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003 :~ 7 1 11 Approved F elease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01OS&0000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX B P,'-,B D-47 TOP SECRET July 24, 1953 numerous and effective relief services performed by American military and Red Cross personnel in this disaster was the airdropping of 3000 Kgs of broad to the people of Taroud. R. On the occasion of extending a personal welcome to his home- coning Korean brigade, Emperor Haile Selassie was entertained February 7 by Corraander Middle East Forces on board the U.S.S. DUXBURY BAY cruising from Massawa to Djiboute. The trip was reported by American Embassy despatch as having been a gesture greatly appre- ciated by the Eiperor as well as the Ethiopian officials and public and as a most helpful contribution to U.S0-Ethiopian relations. h Arrangements are being made by the Navy for dedication of the nearly completed St. Lawrence, Newfoundland, Memorial Hospital erected as a gift of the American people in gratitude for the heroic efforts of the townspeople of St. Lawrence and Lawn in the rescue of survivors of the U.S.S. POLLUX and U.S.S. TRUXTUN when wrecked in a gale near St. Lawrence in February 19420 SECURITY INFORMTION 20 p e TOPSECRET of 28, Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved FdoRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010&000400100003-0 SECURITY INF CRM TI QN ANNEX B TOP SEChET PSB D-47 July 2I., 1953 Lessons learned through evaluation of Department of Defense psych- ological activities during this period. 1. Requirements which, if met, would assist in the development of a more effective contribution of the Department of Defense to the national psychological effort. a. A positive national psychological strategy, to include a determination of intermediate objectives and priorities for direct support tasks, without resort to "cold" or "hot" war qualifications. b. A review of Public Law 402 and NTSC 59/l with the object of including provision for the fuller utilization of existing military potentials in support of the current national psycholog- c. The enunciation of national policies for the conduct of unconventional warfare w,d thin multi-national structures. Pational clandestine Service agreements, with international implications likely to affect the conduct of U. 5. military operations in time of war,, are of concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 Psychological opportunities brought to light by analysis of past activities and their relationship to future courses of action. In view of the lessons learned in fostering cordial troop- civilian relations in Europe a program providing for the accept- ance of American personnel to be stationed in Spain has been inaugurated. For the first time, USAF installations and American personnel will be maintained on Spanish soil starting Fall of 1953, In order to build good will from the start, a USAF committee has SECURITY INFORMATION 21 T 0 P SLC LT of Ob pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A0004001000034 Approved F* 'Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106 000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INF0RP/IATION ANNEX B TOP SECRET PSB D-47 July 24, 1959 been established to conduct a study of likely community relations problems and recommend actions for proper orientation of American civilians and military personnel concerned with stationing troops in Spain. SECURITY INFORM TION 22 TOP SECRET of 2$ pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved F Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106W000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX B T 6P SECRET PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 SECTION VI New evidence of reactions to activities conducted during previous reporting periods. 1. The report situation, by country,, of the implementation of POO D-38/1 follows lished at Reykjavik University points up a desire on the part of our personnel to develop cultural understandingp b, United Kingdom: There were indications that accounts of British ill-feeling toward American Servicemen had been greatly exaggerated by that segment of the British press which was de- voted to communistic, chauvinistic., or sensationalized editorial policies. It is maintained that the public relations situation is basically healthy and is primarily the result of the conduct of U. S. troops themselves. The British Government has estab- lished a high-level committee, under the Air Minister, to hold civil-military relations under control. Some twenty-seven groups and associations are represented on this committee; its effort is aimed toward maintaining proper direction of local cormaittees in which commanding officers, Chaplains, and unit PIO=s take part, as Iceland: No major developments; the waiting list of S. personnel for matriculation in the Icelandic course estab- c. France; France appears to be leading the way in an effort to resolve difficulties in French-American relations, By continu- ing joint effort, at both central and local levels, significant steps have been taken in the direction of improved relations. The "Franco-American Committee" mechanism is developing to the point where the resolution of frictions rapidly can become reality. SECURITY INFORM,TION 23 TOP SECRET of 28 pages 39779 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Felease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010600400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFOR11iATION ANNEX B TOP PSB D-47 July 2L, 1953 d. Italy; Despite a Committee report from home dated 26 January which asserted that the presence of U. S. troops in Italy (in Leghorn, Florence, and Naples) does not constitute a serious public opinion problem at present, there were reported indications that the public reaction in Italy was characterized by increasing sensitivity to "U. S. intervention" in Italian affairs. Utilization of this "interventionist" line of attack by Communists and neo-Fascists to influence the numerous splinter parties arrayed against the DeGasperi government may intensify troop-civil relations problems. iioreover, it has been noted that - as yet - no representatives of the Italian government have joined the established committee in Rome, ep West Germate; Comparison surveys indicate that there has been a gradual improvement in the status of troop-civil rela- tions. 24 TOP SECRET of 28 pages /" >: Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved FsrwRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0101000400100003-0 DRAFT ANNEX B SECURITY INFORMATION R9B D-47 TOP SECRET July 24, 1953 SECTION VII The actual and estimated psychological and unconventional warfare expenditures of the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 1951 through 1958. 1. B&-,cliaound Re arding EbCpenditureg: The psychological and un- conventional warfare role of the units responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires that capabilities be developed in peacetime so that specialized equipment and trained personnel may be immediately available to the military commander in support of his psychological warfare and unconventional warfare missions. The major portion of expenditures presented provide for the specialized equipment, training, material and research necessary, to meet projected wartime requirements. 2, The expenditures listed below do not include such activities as goodwill visits, disaster aid, demonstrations, MDAP, and many other normal military activities having psychological implications, expenditures for which cannot be separately identified. 3, Special Assumptions; In the proprration of estimates for fiscal years 1954 through 1958, the following assumptions have boon made: That hostilities in Korea will terminate at the close of FY 1953. That domestic and foreign price levels and cost indices will remain relatively stable. cj. That no now areas of operational activity will be opened. 4. Militrry Force Expenditures: The figures reported in the following table cover Service expenditures for unconventional and psycho- logical warfare with the exception of research and development, which is presented separately. These expenditures are shown in millions of SECURITY INFORMATION TOP SECRET 25 of 28 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106000400100003-0 SECURITYTNFORMAfi ANNEX B N PSB D47 TOP SECUT July 24, 1953 dollars, to the nearest tenth. There are no unobligated or carry-over funds to report as of 30 June 1953, FISCAL PERIOD AIR TOTAL, 1951 5.0 21.0 26,0 1952 15.1 .6 21.0 36.7 1953 15,9 .7 21,6 41.2 1954 305 12.5 1955 8.6 .1 ### 5.7 1956 8.6 ?1 8,.7 1957 8.6 wl 5.7 195$ TOTALS 82.0** 1.8 67.4 151.2 *DA Figures from FY 54 on are based, additionally, on assumption that Army PsyWar troop strengths will remain constant with the exception that FECOM stiffs will be reduced to current EUCOM levels. **DA funding reports on psychological warfare operation; it does not include Special Forces activities or unconventional warfare operations, ***N.t ed ****USAF estimates beyond FY 54 are not available due to adjustments in. process necessitated by revised FY 54 budget. 5, Service Research and Develonrient .F >endit The figures reported in the table next following lists actual and estimated expenditures for fiscal years 1951 through 1958 and estimated carry-over funds on 30 June 1953. The expenditures are for non-mE torial or social science research conducted under technical objectives assigned by the Research and Development Board, lion becoming reimbursable SECURITY INFORK TION 26 TOP SECRET of 28a es Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01065A0004001 `9 i-pu Approved Felease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010600400100003-0 SECURITY INFORWITIO TOP SECRET ANNEX B PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 6. It will be noted that estirw,tes for FY 1954 are considerably below expenditures for the past two years due to existing budget policy. The present budget figures are consequently presented as interim estimates until such time as the future status of psychological and unconventional warfare research is clarified. SECURITY INFORMIiTION TOP SECRET 27 of 28 pages 8 '.A 7 -7 11 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved P' WRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010 4000400100003-0 DbAFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX B TOP SECRET PSB D-47 July 24, 1953 ADVISORY GROUP ON PSYCHOLOGICAL AND UNCOi1V ~iTIONAL WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMLNT BOARD Washington 25, D. C, ACTUAL AMD ESTIhhhAT TZ EXPENDITURES OF DE.PARTh NT OF DL:FE::H,9, N PSYCIIOLUGICAL AND UNCpi?VI;,ITIONA WARFARE NON -k.ATERIEL I SEARCH FT 1951 HI OUA FY 19 58., AS OF 2 JUNE 53 FY 154 plus Lstimated FY 1544 FY '53 Carry-over (Less Carry Ex enditures June 30, '53 Car- over Estimated Expenditures** FY151 2 FY 3 1953 r,. -over Funds FY1 FY' 5 F17 FY! Army .2 .9 1.2 0 .8 .8 101 1.2 1.3 1.4 Navy .2 .1 .05 0 o5 o5 .05 o5 :05 .05 USAF .7 .9 .7 .7 TOTAL 1.1 1.9 2.0 .7 .9 1.7 1.15 1.25 1.35 1.45 Interim estimates pending consideration by OSD of fiscal recommendations of Final Report of the Advisory Group on Psychological and Unconventional War- fare to the RDB (RDB-PC 202/34)j dated 6 April 1953. Project estimates based on current policies for reduced fiscal support. -, Air Force reports that estimated expenditures for FY 1955 and beyond are not available since projection of USAF program plans is uncertain at this time. SECURITY INFCF2,!ATION 28 TOP S ET of 2rpages 8 u (u, Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01WA000400100003-0 D RAF T SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX C PSB D-I7 July 24, 1953 Report of the Mutual Security Agency to the Psychological Strategy Board on the National Psychological Effort January 1 - June 3 0., 1953 (Part I: Europe) 1. Status of Programs A. Tasks Assigned The specific tasks of FFSA are set forth by Congress in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Sec. 2 (a): " strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world,..." and in Sec, 2 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952: ".....the Congress believes it essential that this Act should be so administered as to support concrete measures for political federation, military integration, and economic unification in Europe." The Information Division of MA has had the job of helping to bring about the results set forth above by the media techniques com- mon to information activity.. Funds for this purpose have been avail- able by authority of Sec. 115 (j) of the retained provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act, which orders the giving of "full and contin- uous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media, so as to inform the peoples of the participating countries regarding the assistance, including its purpose, source, and character, furnished by the American taxpayer." It is necessary to say at the outset that Information activity as such is simply an instrument that assists in attaining the objectives of policy. The very fact that there is a Mutual Security Program is the greatest affirmative factor in MSA+s psychological program. It is a SECURITY INFOWATION 1 - of 17 pages Obutml :1'Uj70 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Forelease 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-010600400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INF(RMATION ANNEX C SMET PSB D-!47 JuJW 24. 1953 mistake, in the opinion of MSA Information directors, for the United States in its public utterances to over-emphasize the military aspects of its overseas economic program; instead, it should show how the military aspects of the program complement the total economy, The MSA task in Europe during the first half of 1953 has been to create and to nurture in the minds of Europeans the faith that the United States would continue under the new Administration to support mutual security activities on an effective scale, Its job also has been to keEp its friends in power and to fight. Communism. Methods and Techniques Employed to Accomplish Tasks Substantively, the ivSA method of accomplishing its aims is to provide funds to help Americans European friends produce needed material and to provide the leadership capable of leading and persuading them to act in the mutual interest. The off-shore procurement program is one example of the method employed. Placing of important I'hardwareu' con- tracts at a strategic time during an election campaign is a refinement of such a technique. The VISA Information Division has sought to get maximum useful effect from such substantive acts by publicizing them through all media, explaining the beneficial effect. Thus, in conjunction with USIS, the Eisenhower April 16 speech was given maximum publicity - such as wide distribution of the full text - as evidence of U. S. devotion to peace and world economic progress. Thus also a6A built and financed large exhibits (which bore the names of local sponsors) for use in Italy during the election campaign, as an aid to the Embassy's public affairs program. Currently IiSA's regional office in Paris is concentrating on a program to arouse new interest in the SECURITY INFQRNATION 2 SECRET of 17 pages X3178 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Fgrr Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010 000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX C SECRET PSB D-47 J, ate, 1953 shift of the productivity program to OEEC as evidence of European ac- ceptance of the idea of productivity, European direction of the program, and continued U. Si support of European economic improvement. The re- cent East German riots against the Communist government are being pointed out - through indigenous outlets - as evidew a that life under the Reds is unbearable for the worker. This is important in combating neutralist sentiment as in France and in helping to win workers away from the Communist.rdominated labor unions. C, The media most in use are the conventional ones - the press, the radio) the cinema, exhibits at fairs and other gatherings, distribu- tion of pamphlets, mobile units capable of reaching remote places and fitted out to make use of the cinema, the loud speaker, the poster - all audio visual devices. This is done everywhere in cooperation with the International Information Administration, and the proportion of expenditure and effort by media is governed by the experience of the country missions Thus,, in Greece; the ASA has provided numerous com- munity radio sets for remote areas, adding an estimated 2,000,000 listen- ers to U.-S:-inspired programs over the Greek radio. A radio news service has been made available to broadcasters in several countries - the PBA messages being interspersed in the news. An example of fast, effective action was the making of a documentary film, "The Oldest Enemy," based on the Dutch floods of February and which showed how nations working together (actually, the NATO countries) could minimize the effects of catastrophe and by collective effort avoid catastrophe save in exceptional circumstance. This film, made within three weeks of the disaster; was shown in movie houses in many countries, The moral of the film was brought out by the deeds it pictured, The application SECURITY INFOP&-!ATION 3 SECR_T of 17 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100061-47 7 8 Approved Fowl elease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010600400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX C SECRET FSB D-147 July 240 1953 of the lesson to the more abstract danger of the Russian menace was easy for the simplest of spectators. D. What success was achieved in carrying out assigned tasks (in terms of B and The principal contribution that PISA has made to this type of activity is the development of a regional center capable of servicing and advising multi-national projects quickly. Although subject to policy guidance and some budgetary direc- tion from Washington, the regional Information center connected with the office of the Special Representative in Europe was and is in many ways self-contained, It has learned that effective use can be made of talent- ed non-Arnericans.$peaking the languages of the target groups, using skills and techniques familiar to those groups, such non-Americans have made much NSA/SRE-produced material more effective than had it been produced in America. European groups working toward the same goals of. economic, political, and military unity that we seek have turned to the SRE for technical help as well as for funds. The work "productivit&" and what it means have become well known in Europe, where five years ago neither the idea nor the name was known to many. Now the idea repre- sented by productivity has become a target of the Reds, a seeming indica- tion that the idea is hurting them. E. Tasks not carried out or not completed. The goals the U..5. has set as requested by MSA constitute a continuing campaign of persuasion, assistance, leadership. However, specific immediate gains contributing to the whole have been made. These include the re-election of the De Gasperi Government in Italy, the actual beginning of operations of the Coal and Steel pool, and the decision by OLEC to administer the productivity, campaign, SECURITY INFORiAI ION t- Approved For Release 2001/69/06': ' R 8 -01065A0004001000D3)47 pages Approved F%&Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010 000400100003-0 DRAFT In seeking to counteract Red propaganda., i'sSA has in France been able to learn ahead of time, occasionally, what turn the next Red propaganda line would take. G. Major obstacles or difficulties encountered. 1. Increased feeling in Europe that present U. S, adminis- tration is controlled by "reactionary"" or anti European elements in Congress. 2, The "stretch-out" of U. S. contribution to NATO was al lowed to become public under such circumstances that it was made to seem to Europeans that the U. s, was losing interest in NATO while ask- ing its allies to add to their loads. 3. Responsiveness to the Soviet Irpeace offensive" by all but the most responsible European leaders. 1. Political jockeying in France., and to some extent in Italy and Germany., which subordinated foreign policy to party interests, 5, Ability of anti-American groups and some neutralists like Le Monde, to make propaganda capital of newsworthy events, like the Rosenberg case and the Rhee recalcitrance. 6. Unfavorable reaction of many Europeans to the withdrawal of some books from American libraries abroad, The public conduct of the matter gave anti-Americans a good propaganda subject and gave pause to some of our friends. 7. Continued economic distress of lower income groups in Italy, France and Greece. 8. Growing conviction among many public opinion molders that EDC will not become a reality and that Russia does not contemplate armed aggression in the Pest in the discernible future. SECURITY INFORMATION SECRE ANNEX C PSB D-47 July 2tt, 1953 F. What ancilla results if an were obtained as a by-product .Zs J 17 R Approved For Release 20MMW?y: ? 4WJgW 065A000400100003-0 SECRET of 17 pages or Rrograms Approved F%, elease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01OW000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX C SECRET PSB D-7 July 2h, 1953 9. The French government's inability to keep a Cabinet in office long enough for it to have a policy for which it can be respon- sible. 10. Occasional utterances by U. S. leaders which are made to seem to show that this government is not sure of its policy. The recent speech by Senator Taft which was interpreted as threatening a "go it alone" policy is of this category. 11. Occasional failures of coordination sometimes have ad- verse effects, A case in point was public testimony before a Congres- sional committee by an evaluation team leader who was critical of con- tinued aid to Italy. This testimony would have been just as valuable for Congressional purposes after the June 7 Italian election as it was when given before the election - and it quite possibly figured in the way some votes went in a close election. 2. Summary of major developments in Psychological Programs (1) Principally, the letting of contracts under criteria that took into account economic and political conditions of that country and Europe as a whole, rather than the single criterion of cost. (2) Continuation of American forces in Lurope and the appoint- ment of a third American as commander of SHAPE. (3) Speedy assistance given the Dutch during the floods. (Li.) The granting of ;,,50,000,000 for stockpiling and other purposes in West Berlin, and its announcement during the East German riots, is another example of substantive action being taken at a propi- tious time and favorably exploited. (5) The upcoming NSA pact with Spain already presents an Information problem which will become more acute as the treaty is signed, SECURITY INFORMATION 6 SECRET of 17 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : L lA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 7 Approved FRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01OW000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFOhiiATION ANNEX C SECRET PSB P-47 July 2h, 1953 Nany European friends of the United States want to know how we justify helping Franco Spain. The Information Officer in Norway has cited the need for a statement on this subject. A Belgian exchange student stated the problem thus: "I have listened to VOA and have been impressed by American idealism. How can you help Spain and keep on talking the way you do on VOA?" (6) The signing of the Foreign Aid bill by the President will offer a new opportunity for a strong statement similar to the April 16 speech. The Mutual Security Act's statement of purpose emphasizes America's interest. A statement by the President re-emphasizing the broader philosophy of mutual aims of the common man would be of great psychological value. B. Public announcement of the letting of contracts was timed for the best effect psychologically. Thus, signing of huge aircraft con- tracts with England, Holland, Belgium, and Italy was timed to occur dur- ing the April NATO meeting. Wide coverage was given the Dutch flood co- ordinated relief via all media, including a quickly-made documentary film. C. Principal developments during the reporting period were (1) further integration of NSA and State Department informa- tion programs, (2) the reccz mendation of the President to form one United States Information Agency using the resources of the present IIA and NSA, and (3) the melding of the NSA and Point IV programs, which should make the same substantive resources go farther and which, by indicating prolongation of technical and economic aid, reassure our friends. 7 SECRET of 17 pages SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106;, 000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX C SECRET PSB D-.47 Julrr 24, 1953 D, ~iost significant is the close cooperation by SEE and the De- fense Department in carrying out a program to smooth U. S. troop rela- tions with local communities, The Armed Services have researched the problems involved, and ShE has with its resources in funds and techni- cians sought to provide the answers. Pamphlets, exhibits, and films are being produced for this pulp ose, and it appears as of this report that relations already are leas strained than they were six months ago. Explanation beforehand of why U. S. troops are there - that they are really NATO troops - is the key to the problem, E. NSA in Europe continues to work closely with other governments and with international groups, particularly NATO. A caravan explaining NATO, designed,, operated and financed by SRE/16A and sponsored by NATO, traveled in Greece and Turkey during much of the time covered by this report. It is now touring France again. The Train of Europe, under OEEC sponsorship, has been touring the continent. Coverage of NATO maneuvers for and in conjunction with otier agencies has been the rule. MSA has assisted groups like the European Movement and the Union of European Federalists to carry on their unifying work,, as well as the ICFTU in aiding the free trade union movements. Significant changes which have occurred since the previous report. (a) Change of U. S, administration with consequent European "wait and see" psychology; (b) Death of Stalin and accession of either new dictator or an oligarchy, with the same "wait and see" psychology natural to Western Europe; (c) Soviet "peace offensive" for chatever it may mean; (d) Korean situation (hoped for armistice and Rhee complication); SECURITY INFUkWATION 8 SECRET of 17 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved FQ,Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0101000400100003-0 SEC tRITY INFOWLAT ION ANNEX C SECOf PSB D-tt7 dui 24, 1953 (e) East Berlin riots and Czechoslovak riots, indicating possible other explosions for which plans should be made; (f) dragging of the EDO ratification schedule; (g) Change in SRE organization and in Paris regional U. S. Repre- sentative; (h) Yugoslav, Turkish, Greek pact. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 1. MSA in cooperation with State and Defense has worked out a plan for continued analysis and evaluation of Information programs in Europe and elsewhere. Implementation of the idea has been stymied. by a direc- tive from Washington suspending all public opinion surveys abroad. Such surveys are valuable and can be conducted via private agencies without necessarily embarrassing the U. S. 2. Notwithstanding evidence of a rise in neutralism, the outstand- ing psychological characteristic of Europe today appears to be the will- ingness of the majority of the people of every nationality to trust the good intentions, good faith, and ability to act effectively of the U. S. Many 1utcpeans, however, are skeptical of the abilities and ultimate in- tentions of other European countries, 3. The recognition of the U. S. desire to improve Europe's overall economic health (as exemplified by ECA) is consistent with the European's belief in U. S. good intentions and relative unselfishness. Emphasis on strictly military aspects is not good psychologically, because it gives the Reds an "I told you so" line, and because military emphasis is mis- leading. However, an armaments industry, like any other, creates the wages and the demand for other consumer goods, which aids the general economy. SECURITY INFtRNATION 9 SECRET : of 17 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0' 7 Approved FaRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0106W00400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INF(RMATION ANNEX C SECRET PSB D-47 A July 4, 1953 Ji.. It is noteworthy that while the "peace offensive" has cut down Russian "hate America" material, local Communist parties have not les- sened their harping on this theme, SECURITY INFtRMATION 10 .S CRET of 17 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP8O-01065AO00400100003-0 3 3 l 1' }j Approved FRelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMAT ION ANNEX C SECRET (Part II; Far East) PSB D-117 Jul 214, 1953 1. Summary of Program A. Tasks Assigned Mutual Security Agent No tasks per se have been assigned ~ISA for the Far Fast area in the overall psychological program. In the four Far East countries participating in the i?iutual Security Program - Formosa, The Associated States of Indochina, Philippines and Thailand - the NSA Missions provide extensive technical assistance designed to strengthen both governments and communities through the improvement of public health, food produc- tion, education and public administration and through the more effective utilization of their national resources. In Formosa, NSA is also providing economic aid to counter inflationary pressures, to bolster the government budget and to support the military build-up through the importation of supplies, such as petro- leum, food and cotton, required by the armed forces, and through the con- struction of joint-use facilities, such as roads, bridges, ports, ware- houses and barracks. In Indochina, NSA also provides direct military support by constructing joint-use facilities, assisting in the care and rehabilitation of war refugees and by financing relocation projects de- signed to aid in the pacification of North Viet Nam, In the Philippines, NSA has the corollary task of Inducing the Philippine Government to under- take the extensive administrative and legislative changes which the Bell hission deemed essential to the creation of political and economic sta- bility. The psychological effects grow out of such technical assistance and economic aid programs.. The data given in the following pages are presented against this background, SECURITY INFORiATION 11 SECRET of 17 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 J i ! 8 Approved Felease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0105000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORM ION ANNEX C PSB D-47 July 2. 1953 B. Methods and Techniques Employed Accomplishing These Tasks NJSA Missions have carried on three types of informational work, First, they have conducted general information activities designed to increase understanding and to secure public acceptance of the NSA pro-- gram, Second, they have disseminated specific information in order to secure the requisite wide-scale participating in programs to improve health practices and agricultural techniques. Third, they have strength- ened the information services of the participating governments. This work has been carried on through the usual channels of press and photo stories, newsreels, motion pictures and radio programs; wall newspapers, posters, picture leaflets, calendars, regular magazines and the like. In some instances this work has led to the establishment of photo laboratories, motion picture production units,-radio transmis- sion stations and printing plants. C. Concepts of Qperations in the Far East The high level of illiteracy has required emphasis upon the use of pictorial forms of communication; motion pictures, posters, picture leaflets, cartoon strips and exhibits. MSA believes that the tangible accomplishments of the aid programs constitute the most con- vincing proof of U. S. friendship and support. D. lidiat Success was Achieved in Carrying out the Assigned Tasks All the Far East Missions have publicized the contribution made by NSA toward improving health, food production and the general economic well-being of the people. In Formosa, NSA, the Joint Commission on hural Reconstruction (JCRR) and USIS jointly sponsor the magazine "Harvest,t which supplies the farming people with agricultural information as well as with SECURITY INFORMATION 712 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 -'RCtA-RDP80-01065A0004080OOes Approved Felease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-010000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFCRi ATION ANNEX C , . SECRET PSIS D-147 July 24, 1953 international and local news items, This magazine has reached a circula- tion of L2,000 and has been so successful that it may be possible to place it upon an entirely self-supporting basis within the coming year. ?tore than 300 farmers' associations, organized with the help of the JCRR, are well-provided with MSA and JCRR material such as posters and pamphlets explaining the projects undertaken by the JCRR. These projects and hSA activities in general are well publicized by the local press and radio and enjoy wide popular support, In Viet Nam, "Countryside," the farmers' journal published by the Vietnamese Government with 4SA financing and technical assistance, has reached a circulation of 50,OOO, MSA and USIS also sponsored a highly successful exhibit at the big "Kermesse," a fair attended by more than 1,200,000 people. This exhibit, based on the theme, "Toward Peace in Viet Jam," depicted the natural resources of Viet Nam, the nations friendly to Viet Nam, and the military, economic and productive power that supports the Free Jorld in its efforts to establish peace and security, The kIission has supported the government's information service by providing training in the use of informational media to specialists selected by the French and by Viet Nam, The radio programs prepared with VISA assistance and designed to explain the policies of the Associated States Governments to village audiences are increasing in popularity, In Thailand, the use of joint USIS and MSA exhibits has expanded with the Thai Government duplicating many of the exhibits and giving them further circulation. A substantial portion of both the town and rural population see these exhibits at numerous fairs where the response has been gratifying. In the Philippines, VISA has assisted the Government in develop- ing its information services, thereby enabling it to increase its support SECS L1FOFNATION 13 Approved For Release 2001/09/0 )a RDP80-01065A0004001660( 3- Paces Approved F elease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01OW000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX C SECRET PSI) D-47 Ju:-y 21i, 1953 among the people. Economic assistance, designed to improve the statue of the farmer-on-the-land and of the urban worker, provided in conjunc- tion with U. S. military aid under the ri.D.A.P., has substantially con- tributed to the Philippine Governmentts efforts to establish peace and order. E. Tasks not carried out or not completed gone to be reported. F. Ancillary Results G. Major obstacles In Formosa, a major objective of i?ISA assistance is to achieve economic stability which is essential to the maintenance of confidence in the competence and permanence of the National Government of the Re- public of China. A major obstacle to the achievement of this objective is the necessity for supporting a 550,000-man military establishment which makes no contribution to the economy of the island. In Indochina, the technical assistance program has been handi- capped to some extent by the terms of the basic agreements between France and the Associated States which provide that non-French technical experts shall be employed only when French experts are not available. This provision has been a serious obstacle only in the field of public administration. In the Philippines and Thailand the major obstacles to the achievement of ASA objectives are those inherent in all under-developed economies - widespread illiteracy, a shortage of skilled and professional workers, inadequate investment capital and relatively inefficient govern- mental administration,. SiiCURIT INFORI-ATION l1 Approved For Release 200 0 / G RDP80 01065A000400106&i-~ pages 33778 Approved F,elease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-0100000400100003-0 DRAFT SECURITY INTF CF i ATION ANNEX C SECRET PSB D-47 Ju.y .24, 1953 In the Philippines, in addition, there has been some friction between the U. S. representation and the quirino Government res lting from the disclosures of the Hardie report on land tenure conditions and from O" O's !'s that the A'morleans have been attempting to influence the coming elections; 2, Summary of major developments in the psychological -programs during the reporting period Since the operations of the Far East STENis are not a part of an over-all psychological program) there is nothing to report under this section. 3. Significant changes which have occurred since the period covered by the preceding report. (Far East-Philippines, Formosa, Associated States of Indo China, and Thailand) Gradually during the reporting period) the emphasis of the work of the MSA/STENs has moved from general information to more emphasis on program support and the build-up of the local government's information services. This change will continue in the coming period., as NSA withT draws entirely f7'om the area of general information. The suspension of U. S. technical assistance to Burma, at the re- quest of the Burmese Government) has shown other under-developed coun- tries that American assistance programs are truly cooperative in nature and will not be imposed on countries which prefer not to participate in them, Throughout the Far ;,ast countries receiving i3A assistance there has bean a general increase in the use of technical assistance publica- tions, with an accompanying increase in understanding of and respect for American technical achievements. SLCG'RITI INF CRMATION ik SECRET of 17 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 T'CTA'RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved f,W..,Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP80-01Q A000400100003-0 DFAFT SECURITY INFD tiATION ANNEX C SORE PSB D-47 Julys 24, 1953 B. Substantive Subjects or Activities Which Cut Across Area Lines (1) Role of Japanese Conditions remain substantially unchanged since the last report, although in its own self-interest, the Philippine Government is moderating its hostility toward Japan. This moderation of attitude has been shown by the Government's grant of amnesty to Japanese war criminals held in the Phil::.ppines, by its recently-expressed will.'.ngness to consider the question of Japanese membership in ICAO separately from its repara- tions claim, by its extension of the barter agreement with Japan and by the increasing val.ume of trade between the two countries, a trade which on balance is favorable to the Philippines. Some moderation of the popu. lar attitude is also reported as evidenced by a slackening in overt demonstrations of hostility toward individual Japanese on the streets of Manila. 5. Steps taken to Implement Approved PSB Plans This phase of the work has been handled by USIS, In most instances the Country Plan has been developed with close cooperation and assistance of ,SSA offic-.alsr SECURITY INFOW A.TION 16 SECRET of 17 pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved Felease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01x4000400100003-0 SECURITY INFORMATION ANNEX C SFCR,E MUTUAL SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAM PSB D-.47 July 24, 1953 Project Obligations and Estimated Personnel and Administrative Support Obligations (In i4illions of Dollars and Dollar Equivalents of Foreign Currencies) Carry-.over Funds Available for Obligation after FY 1951 Fy 1952 FY 1953 June 30, 1953 FY 1954 FY 1955 FY 1956 FY 1957 FY 158 18.8 20,3 20.5 None 7,6 Program transferred to U.S. Information Agency by Re- organization Plan, No, 8 1. The FY 1954 figure of . 7.6 million is scheduled for transfer to the new USIA under reorganization Plan No. 8, This figure excludes Sp7rO million of Mutual Security Information themes already transferred to International Information Administration by the Bureau of the Budget and merged with the IIA Program and FY 1954 appropriation request currently before Congress. Figures for FY 1951, 1952, and 1953 include small amounts for MSA audio- visual training and other informationsupport of Technical Assistance activities in the Far mast, but exclude amounts for similar support by Technical Cooperation Administration of its Point . activities, SECURITY INFORMATION 17 SECRET of 17-pages Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 25X1A Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400100003-0 SIGN C RD AND COMMENT SHEET NOTI& FOR THE INTRA-OFFICE USE OF 030 6 OPC ONLY Detaching Form No. 38-13 for the AS A COVER ATTACHMENT TO FORM NGt438--t ~' purpose of securing this form to Top Secret Documents is Prohibited. ATTENTION: ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES RELATE TO THE MATE- RIAL. EACH ALTERNATE OR ASSISTANT TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER WHO RECEIVES AND/OR RELEASES THE ATTACHED TOP SECRET MATERIAL WILL SIGN THIS FORM AND INDICATE PERIOD OF CUSTODY IN COLUMNS PROVIDED. EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO -SEES THIS TOP SECRET DOCUMENT WILL ENTER DATE OF HANDLING AND SIGN HIS FULL NAME IN THE PROPER COLUMNS. OFFICER DESIGNATIONS SHOULD " " BE USED IN THE TO COLUMN. UNDER EACH COMMENT A LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN ACROSS SHEET AND EACH COMMENT NUMBERED TO COR- RESPOND WITH THE NUMBER IN THE "TO" COLUMN. EACH OFFICER SHOULD SIGN FULL NAME BEFORE FURTHER ROUTING. FROM, k CONTROL NO. ~, ( ( S3 ^ ;. ROOM DATE OFFICER'S TO NO. REC'D. FWD'D-. Fgla NAME COMMENTS ~ 2. Zl 25X1A a 25X1A9a ~ L 4 ~/? 5 8. 9. 10. 11. l 12. 25X1A9a 13 14. : t 15. . `j, f em THIS FO T I(81i 1 4E~ NG FORM NO R OPC. . 38-13A JUN 1949 ~l J PLEASE RETURN THIS 11..F'-/RM TO REGISTRY