SUGGESTED GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF SICK AND WOUNDED FROM VIEWPOINT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA PROBLEMS INVOLVED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400120001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 3, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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A Ft A F T -- - ^ T'^*t COPT N0. ~ 3
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PSB D-~lt2
April 3, 1953
PSYCHOLOGICAL, STRATEGY BOARD
L:~ashir~gtan 25 } D. C ~
SUGGESTED Gt3IDA:NCE FUR CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS b'OR
THE EXCHAIIGE OF SICK AND Z~,iOUNDLD
FkONi VI~,TrdPOTNT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA 1'FtOBLrI~~S IIWOLVED
(FOR BQA,N.D APPROVAL)
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I7 R A F T S~CUhITY INFORMATION COPY N0. ~ 3
,~
SECRET
PSB D~l~2
April 3, 1953
SUGGESTED GUIDANCE FoR CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR
TiiE EXCHANGE OF SICK A%QD WOUNDED
F~FO~! VIEWPOINT OF PSYGHO1~OtxICA_L A~fD PROPAGANDA PRt~LEM5 TNVOLVEb
It
QUESTIDI~?
~~~hat is major J. S. objective regarding; the return. of sick and.
wounded prisonE~rs of war?
A.I~1S~.~TER
The major consideration is our wish t a secure the earliest return
of the maximum number of UN prisonc~..rs, acid that the course of nebotiatians
establish prc~cccients which would facilitate rather than prejudice the
wider ax?mistice negotiations to fallow..
C~DESTISN
I~~1aat is the U . S. position regarding; the duration of negotia-
tion for the return of the sick and waunded prisoners of war?
Farmer experience in negotiations with the Conununists should
be borne in mind and be.~are renewing discussions a deadline should be
established to include tYse discussions far arrangements and the actual
deliverf of the prisoners at Panrnur~jorn. This will determine their
sincerity and limit their attemt~ts to use the discussions fox purely
propaganda purposes,
SECi1RITY INF0~tNiA'1~0N
SECIit~~T
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D RAF T SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET PSB U-1t2
1~p1c31 3, 1953
QUESTION
What is the U. S. position regarding the numbers of sick and
wounded returned?
If the Canmxunists proffer a list, particularly a small ones and
resist suggestions that there be any independent verification, the pre-
s~miption is that they are entering the negotiations as a bargaining deal,
a political or propaganda ga;nb9.t; that they are probably intent on giving
the appearance of peaceful intentions and normal international behaviour
while withholding as much of 'i,he su'astance as possibl,e* In this case it
is suggEStecl that CTNCUAIC not (repeat not) reveal, tl~e nu.~nber of sick and
wounded in our hands, and that p?iblia discussion and spe,;ulation on this
subject be discouragedo
?~;e shau:~d. awaa,t or maneuver the Canu~xuni.sts into making the first
move on numbers, If as above, we should counter with a similarly small
list and suggest that bath sides rewexamine the situation to see if some
hs.ve been overlooked? Before determining what "small number~- we are ready
to exchange, thau~ht should be given to the question pf whether the ratio
between the Communists' and our figures will later be used as a precedent
by the Communists on the question of total, nwrber of prisoners to be ex-
changed at the cessation of hostilitiesa Throughout, we should indicate
our willingness to have the actual numbers of sick and wounded on both
sa.des determined by an independent body If a stalemate on small numbers
arrives, we should x~ress far acceptance of an independent bodyts finding s
SECURITY INFORMA TION
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D .I~ A F T SECURI~'Y INFORMATION
SECRET PSB D-42
April 3, 1953
C~UESTION
-ihat would be the U. S. position if the Communists propose or
respond to our proposals fqr verification by I.C.R.C. or other
.neutral bodies?
We should accept this proposaa. ar agreement an its face and
proceed to agreement on what body wall survey camps on both sides, Our
attitude should be that we welcome this first demonwtration t~iat the
Communists have at last came to their senses and are beginning to act
like norms;l international entities in accordance with accepted inter-
national law.
~J~s~r IAN
_------~
.hat should be the attitude of the U. S. if the Communists
refer to the applicability of the Geneva Convention?
AP,T,S~ra ~~R
Chou and i4ialotav have both cited the Convention in their state->
raentso If we estimate that this is an indication of a Communist resolve
to follow throu;h and establish a reputation for accepted international
behaviour for the time beings it would probably be wise for us to make
frequent mention at the conference table of their belated but welcome
compliance witYi normal international standards and the Convention.
Pt~t~licly our attitude should be more reserveda "A good first step; will
thex~~ be another?<
If the indications are that this pointed reference to the Geneva
Contention has been made with a view to getting these negotiations into
the Convention frarnewark in order to be able to commit us to tr~eir inter-
pretation of the Convention regarding forcible repatriation i.n the later
SECURITY IPZFQRNATIO~t
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SECFcET PSB D-l~2
April 3, 1953
talks on the whole prisoner>of-war problem, our negotiators will, of
ccaursea endeavor to avaic~ the trap,. (A eluv may exist in the apparent
Communist effort to tie the two questions -sack and trounded with whale
ar~isoner?-of>war quest~.an -together.. Hut we must not depart from our
bas~.c o~sition that only after the entire process of exchanging sick
and woundedaners can we tai{e up b~ roader nebotiations.~ ~n these
cixcumstances~ it would probably be wisest to insist privately at the
Gc~nferenee tablet and publicly, that the twq questaans and sets of
negotiations are q~~ite unrelated. Z.his could be done by point:tng out
...._ .r._..,.....-.,..~. ....._.,.,..?..~-_.._.~
that the Coxivent:i,an assumes that, exchange of sick and wounded. wi11
normally automatically tape pace during hostilities; that no special
a regiment or ne~;otiat~.on such as the present one is contemplated nor
__,..~.........,......~....._.,....w..-....
norr
patriatian, our ne~;atiators can confer a~.zd ~~discover+~ that we, too, have
some, or a definite number, who also refuse. Since it is certainly true,
the proportion in our hands who refuse should be markedly greater than
SECU#~ITY In1FgR~'~iATION ~
SECN,ET of a . es
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D RAF T
SECURITY INFORN~ATION
SECRET
PSB D-~.2
April 3, 1953
the proportion in theirs,:
If there seems to be a disposition on their
part to make something of a success of the transaction, and the number
they 'hold out" not tpa large, we could, at this point, suggest that the
field be confined to sick and wounded who want to be exchanged, and that
tk~ose who refuse be, for purposes of the present negotiation, simply
considered as relegated to the status of prisoners of war slang with the
larger numbers who rriust be dealt w.tth latero
Alt~.rna.tively, ~.f thP~=, ?~hreat.en to announce they hold some who
refuse to be repatriated, we might cite Chains statement that they do
not .recognize our assertion an i-ahe su'aiect regarding those we hold, and
that they must gra~.xt us the sarr~e privilege of riot recognizing the
validity 4f their staterr~ent~ This tr~ight open the wary far another sugges-
tion for independent verification and agreed mutual compliance with the
Geneva Conve:~tion by both sides on this paint, both reserving their
positions regarding the validity o~ the others claims.. .If they attempt
to substantiate their assertion by statements or messages from our prison,
ers which they are a.~eady to make public, we could point out that this is
conclusive proof that all Communist "peace" moves are fakes, grid that
this matter leads directly to the heart of the fundarnenta~. conflict be-
t~JJeer~ Conti~~unism and mankind, since we have evidence that such documents
are the product of the state's tampering with and constraining the mind
and caul of man to its own purposes. This, no free Igan in the world will
regard with anything but horrar~ Hence, to introduce this at this point
is a clear decl