PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD STAFF STUDY ON REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN KOREA
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CIA-RDP80-01065A000400160006-1
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T
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November 11, 2016
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March 19, 1999
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6
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Publication Date:
October 18, 1951
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STUDY
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18 October, 1951
3Copy of 2 Copies
STAFF STUDY ON REPATRIATION OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
INS
I. THE PROBLEM
From the standpoint of psychological strategy to recormtend U.S.
policies governing the repatriation and exchange of prisoners of ~rar in
Korea.
II. FAOTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. The U.S. is a signatory of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of. War of August 12, 1949? but has not yet
ratified the Convention.
2. Official views are set forth as follows:
View of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(1) By memorandum to the Secretary of Def ense, 8 August 1951,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that
from the military point of view, no objection wa;~ .raised
by the Joint Chiefs of staff to the adoption of a
policy authorizing the UN commander:
(a) Not to repatriate Chinese, or North Korean prisoners
of war to Communist-controlled territory without
their .full consent;
(b) To repatriate to Formosa all Chinese prisoners of
war who were found to be acceptable to the Chinese
Nationalist Government and who claim to be oo:x--
Nationalists or Nationalists at heart and Meet such
repatriation;
The adoption of such policies to be subject to the provi-
sion of adequate safeguards for United Nation prisoners
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in Corrulunist h,:3.nds.
b. View of the secretary of State,
(1) By letter, August 27, 1951 to the Secretary of Defense.
the Secretary of State reviewed the g August 1951
memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ho oxorossoci
serious concern over the feasibility of carrying out
the proposed policy without conflicting with the Geneva
Prisoner of War Convention of 1949. He surge sted that,
in order to achieve the desired psychological warfare
and humanitarian objectives, individuals who had
rendered outstanding ass:i_stanco to the United. Nations
command or whose return to the Communists would in all
probability result in -heir deaths should be paroled as
provided for in the Genes-,i Convention prior to the
reaching of an armistice; agreement.
(2) Additionally, the Secretary of State indicated that
under no circumstances should Republic of Korea person-
nel who were forcibly pressed into the North Korean
army (and subsociuently recovered by UN forces) be re-
turned to the Commnunists..
c. View of the Secretary of Defense:
By memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 Soptomber 1,951
the Secretary of Defense indicated that while
he recognized the military advantages inho'ont in
General Ridgway's present instructions, authorizing
hi,;~' to negotiate an exchange of prisoners of war on. a one--
foxy-ono basis, ho felt that, in order to avoid any
solution which night involve bargaining with the wel-
fare of our own prisoners, General Ridgway should bead
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viscid initially to seek exchange of prisoners of
war on a ono-for-eno basis but that he be authorized
to agree to an overall exchange, if such action wore
deemed nocossary in order to effect the release of our
own prisoners of war.
III, AI$(._,.. 9N
See TAB A.
CONCLUSIONS
1. There is no perfect safeguard to prevent Communist
reprisals against US/UN POWIs short of forcibit lib-
erating them. :However, expectations with respect to
reprisalo can be greatly Influonced by the specific
psychological actions we take to put the Hostilc-. Power
in a defensive position with respect to the treatment of
prisoners of war (See TAB B).
2. It appears from the Convention that parole of POW's
prior to the cessation of hostilities, as recommended
by the Secretary of State, can be accomplished in accor-
dance with the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1949.
Furthermore, by implication, prisoners of war can be
given the right of voluntary release without parole
prior to cessation of hostilities. The genuineness
of the voluntary character of the release can best be
shown by inspection and observance b;j ^ neutral body
such as the International Rod Cross.
An all-for-all principle of prisoner exchange offers a
better chance of the return of US/UN pri onors of war
than does any limited one-for-one method of exchange.
However, for administrative purposes CINCUNC might well.
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be advised to exchcnge-prisoners group-for-group,
composed of iai od. CCF and NKPA for mixed US/UN and
ROK groups.
4. There Is adequate moral and legal justification for
releasing to the Korean govornmoni; ROK military per-
sonnel who were impressed by the North- Korean
regime and subsequently recovered.
RECOM1;ND11T IONS
1. That subject to security roquirements the United
States take action to roloaso unconditionally r. or
to the termiruitioh of hostilitios, selected enemy
prisoners of war in small nuinbors who exnross the
desire not to be repatriated at the close of hos-
tilities; that adequate provision be made for their
subsistence and welfare,
2, That in order to demonstrate i".ul1, compliance with
both the spirit and the letter of the Genova Con-
vention, the United States publicly notify the L-ostile
Powers of the unconditional release of such prisoners
of war, to include a .statement of the huruanitarian
reasons which governed such action.
That the United States policy with respect to exchange
of prisoners of war on cessation of hostilities
be on an all-for-all basis. Administratively, this
should be handled by exchanges in equal numbers (one-
for.-one), each group exchanged to be of mixed na=
tionality, with the expectation that some US/UN
prisoners will be returned In each group,.
That Republic of Korea personnel forcibly enrolled
in the North Korean people's army and subsequently
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recaptured by United Nations forces be released to
Republic-of Korea Jurisdiction.
5. That vigorous measures in support of the above-
recommended policies be undertaken by the Psy-
chological Operations Coordinating Cormittee of
the Department of State along tho general lines
indicated in TAB B,
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III. DISCUSSION
1. The basic problems involved in formulating U.S. po 1icX towards
lisoners of war are:
a, The complications of the legal requirements under the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War of August 12, 1949, including the psychological
consequences of any suggested modifications to or viola-
tions of that Convention,
b. The dilemma of liberalizing U.S. policy with respect to
repatriation of enemy prisoners of war while maintaining
adequate safeguards for the protection of UN prisoners in
the hands of the Communists (as well as public confidence
in the adequacy of those safeguards,)
2. Legal position and its psychological consequences.,
a. The United States has signed but has not ratified the Geneva
Convention of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War
Victims. Without prejudice to the question of ratification,
it is the announced policy of the United States to abide by
the provisions of this Convention,, with respect to the
Korean conflict. This policy of scrupulous adherence to
international agreements is accepted as a fundamental coin-
trolling consideration in the resolution of the problem.
b, International law recognizes the following ways of termina-
ting captivity: Parole, exchange, sir.plb release without
parole, successful flight, liberation by an invasion of the
Army to which the prisoners belong, transportation to
neutral territory by captors who take refuge in such
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territory, and teriiinetion of hostilities. (Oppenheirm,
3d edition, Vol. II, p. 195)
c Article 118 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention
requires the repatriation of all prisoners of war upon
the cessation of hostilities.
d. There is, however, no restriction upon release without
repatriation prior to the cessation of hostilities. This
can be accomplished with or without parole. Under the
Convention the permissibility of parole is governed jointly
by the policy of the Detaining Power and the policy of the
Power on which the prisoner depends. Assuming the
Detaining Power offers parole, the conditions under'which
the prisoner may accept parole are governed by the rules
stated by his government at the beginning of hostilities.
The two hostile regimes have failed to impose any such
rules with respect to the Korean conflict, and enemy
prisoners may therefore accept parole if they wish. If
parole is permissable, then, by inference release without
parole is also permissible if the Detaining Power so
elects.
3. Policy Prior to Cessr-_tion of Hostilities
a, It appears then that a policy of releasing prisoners of
war is feasible which does not require modification of the
Geneva Convention. This policy would entail the voluntary
release of prisoners of war prior to the cessation of
hostilities either with or without parole. To be
effective from the propaganda standpoint, such release
must include arrangements for the future welfare of these
persons,
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b. The wholesale release of enemy POWta does not appear
desirable for the following reasons:
(1) It would considerably increase the risk of reprisals.
(2) It would pose difficult administrative problems of
screening and resettlement.
c. Selective release with or without parole would serve the
purpose of permitting publicity on the granting of asylum,
without the disadvantages cited above.
Psvc oloaical duplications of this policy.
a. General
(1) In order to maintain its position of caring for
prisoners of war according to the letter and spirit
of the Convention, the United States should notify
the Hostile Power of the unconditional release of such
prisoners of war.
b. Specific a vanta es
(1) It would re-enforce the principle of United Nations
asylum from tyranny.
(2) The effectiveness of future United States psychological
warfare programs would be enhanced by the adoption of
this policy.
(3) It would obviate the disadvantage cited in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff mem randtusn of 8 August of establishing
a precedent contrary to Article 118 of the Prisoner
of War Convention of 1949.
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c. Specific Disadvantages of Recommended Policy
(1) The Hostile Power might impose deprivations on
US/UN prisoners of war as a retaliatory measure,
although this is much loss likely in the cargo of
selective release than of wholesale release.
This might exert psychological pressure upon
Alt d publics and US/UN troops, although it is
not predictable whether these psychological
effects would result in strengthening or weak-
ening of Allied morale. This disadvantage can
be in part offset to the extent that specific
psychological actions by the U.S. (Soo TAB B)
effectively place thee Hostile Power on the
defensive with respect to treatment of prisoners
pf war.
(2) The disadvantage cited in sub-paragraph 3d of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper (that UN action
might be used by the Communists?as a reason for
breaking off peace negotiations) is not considered
fundamental, inasmuch as political issues more
important to the interests of the Hostile Power
than the prisoner of wax' issue exist as agenda items.
6. Policy Upon Cessation of Hostilities.
(a) Exchange of prisoners on a one-for-one basis is
subject to the disadvantage that the Communists
can impress Koreans and pass them off as genuine
POW's. This would enable them to retain a residue of
US/UN prisoners after all exchanges have been made.
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(b) Exchange of POWts on an all-for-all basis
offers' the best assurance of the protection and
return of US/UN prisoners of war. This should
be our announced policy.
Administratively, the return of US/UN
prisoners of war can be accelerated by
exchanges of groups mixed in rationality,
on an approximate basis of ono-to-one.
Lack of good faith on the part of the
Communists can thus be detected early,
and propaganda designed to influence.
their actions can be instituted.
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T 0 P S E C R E T
TAB B PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Wash_Lnn;toll, D. C.
CHECK LIST OF SUGGESTED PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS
WHICH MAY BE TAKEN AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN SUPPORT
OF GOOD TREATMENT AND RELEASE OF US/UN POW's
1. Immediate release of selected prisoners of war who do not desire to
return to Communist territory, especially prisoners of war held in
United Nations hospitals.
2. Removal of the above category of prisoners of war from the immediate
combat area under scrutiny of an International Board or Commission,
under. either UN or Red Cross auspices with an accompanying request
to the Hostile Power to allow a similar Board or Commission to
supervise removal of silk and wounded POW's. (Article 111 of the
Geneva Convention on Treatment of Sick and Wounded Prisoners of War).
Renewed publicity through efforts of the International Red Cross to
inspect prisoner of war camps in Communist area. Refusal of such
inspection will be the signal. for sustained psychological operations
designed to focus world opinion on Communist intransigeance.
4. Demonstrations, protests in the UN General Assembly, protests in
UN member nationst parliamentary bodies, newspaper campaigns citing
the number of days which have passed since request for permission has
been unanswered, publicity attendant upon flying inspection teams to
takeoff points, etc., invitations to neutral correspondents, various
international organizations to observe and report conditions in UN
prison camps.
5. Offering bounties for return of, or aiding escape of, US/UN
prisoners of war.
Organizations of guerrilla task forces to harass POW camps and
effect rescue of key personnel.
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7. Intensification of escape and evasion measures.
Leaflet drops to Prison Camps'Areas containing messages for prison
authorities and/or prisoners. These messages should include offer of
bounty for release, aid and escape.
9. Leaflet campaign to combat areas on the subject, with appropriate
themes.
10. Balloon campaign with leaflets, provided technological limitations
can be solved.
T O P S E C R E T
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